Changes between two versions
What changed between the plenary report and the adopted text
AI:What changed, in short
The only substantive change removes the mention of natural gas and biomass as transitional fuels for district heating.3 The other changes are formal: decimal commas are replaced with decimal points in several figures.1245
1 change of substance · 4 formal · 0 of wording only
Written by AI from the two texts only · read the changes before relying on it · 4 Sept 2026 · Report a problem
+4 added · −11 removed · 8 changed paragraphs, packaging included.
Part 1 of 4: MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION
Removed:MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION
Added:P10_TA(2025)0146
Changed:on the securitySecurity of energy supply in the EU
Removed:(2025/2055(INI))
Added:Committee on Industry, Research and Energy
Added:PE769.948
Added:European Parliament resolution of 8 July 2025 on the security of energy supply in the EU (2025/2055(INI))
10 unchanged paragraphs
The European Parliament,
– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 194 thereof,
– having regard to Council Directive 2009/119/EC of 14 September 2009 imposing an obligation on Member States to maintain minimum stocks of crude oil and/or petroleum products (Oil Stocks Directive),
– having regard to the Commission communication of 28 May 2014 entitled ‘European Energy Security Strategy’ (COM(2014)0330),
– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2017 concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply and repealing Regulation (EU) No 994/2010,
– having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on common rules for the internal market for electricity and amending Directive 2012/27/EU,
– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on the internal market for electricity,
– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/941 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on risk-preparedness in the electricity sector and repealing Directive 2005/89/EC,
– having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 entitled ‘The European Green Deal’ (COM(2019)0640),
– having regard to the Commission communication of 8 July 2020 entitled ‘Powering a climate-neutral economy: An EU Strategy for Energy System Integration’ (COM(2020)0299),
Changed:– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing the Connecting Europe Facility and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1316/2013 and (EU) No 283/2014,
10 unchanged paragraphs
– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 (‘European Climate Law’),
– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/869 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2022 on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure, amending Regulations (EC) No 715/2009, (EU) 2019/942 and (EU) 2019/943 and Directives 2009/73/EC and (EU) 2019/944, and repealing Regulation (EU) No 347/2013,
– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 18 May 2022 entitled ‘EU external energy engagement in a changing world’ (JOIN(2022)0023),
– having regard to the Commission communication of 18 May 2022 entitled ‘REPowerEU Plan’ (COM(2022)0230),
– having regard to the Commission communication of 18 October 2022 entitled ‘Digitalising the energy system – EU action plan’ (COM(2022)0552),
– having regard to the final assessment report on the EU-NATO Task Force on the resilience of critical infrastructure, published in June 2023,
– having regard to Directive (EU) 2023/1791 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2023 on energy efficiency and amending Regulation (EU) 2023/955 (recast) (Energy Efficiency Directive),
– having regard to the Euratom Supply Agency Annual Report 2023,
– having regard to Directive (EU) 2023/2413 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 October 2023 amending Directive (EU) 2018/2001, Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 and Directive 98/70/EC as regards the promotion of energy from renewable sources, and repealing Council Directive (EU) 2015/652 (the Renewable Energy Directive),
– having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1788 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on common rules for the internal markets for renewable gas, natural gas and hydrogen, amending Directive (EU) 2023/1791 and repealing Directive 2009/73/EC (recast),
Changed:– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1789 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on the internal markets for renewable gas, natural gas and hydrogen, amending Regulations (EU) No 1227/2011, (EU) 2017/1938, (EU) 2019/942 and (EU) 2022/869 and Decision (EU) 2017/684 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 (recast),
24 unchanged paragraphs
– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1787 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on the reduction of methane emissions in the energy sector and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/942,
– having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1711 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 amending Directives (EU) 2018/2001 and (EU) 2019/944 as regards improving the Union’s electricity market design,
– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1747 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 amending Regulations (EU) 2019/942 and (EU) 2019/943 as regards improving the Union’s electricity market design (Electricity Market Design (EMD) Regulation),
– having regard to its resolution of 14 November 2024 on EU actions against the Russian shadow fleets and ensuring a full enforcement of sanctions against Russia,
– having regard to the report by Sauli Niinistö entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’ (Niinistö report), published on 30 October 2024,
– having regard to European Court of Auditors Special Report 09/2024 entitled ‘Security of the supply of gas in the EU’,
– having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’ (COM(2025)0030),
– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 21 February 2025 entitled ‘EU Action Plan on Cable Security’ (JOIN(2025)0009),
– having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘Action Plan for Affordable Energy’ (COM(2025)0079),
– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 26 March 2025 on the European Preparedness Union Strategy (JOIN(2025)0130),
– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (A10-0121/2025),
A. whereas energy security is a key building block of a resilient, sustainable and competitive economy; whereas reliable and affordable energy supplies are essential for economic growth, industrial productivity and societal well-being;
B. whereas in the context of a general security crisis and the need for preparedness against defence challenges, securing energy supply constitutes a priority;
C. whereas despite the potential for developing domestic clean and renewable energy sources, the EU imports more than 60 % of its energy, including 90 % of its gas and 97 % of its oil, leaving it vulnerable to potential energy supply disruptions;
D. whereas the EU has the potential to develop renewable resources, and since the publication of the Commission’s last Energy Security Strategy in 2014, the production of home-grown renewable energy has grown substantially – wind power by 98 %, solar photovoltaic by 314 %, solar thermal by 22 % and ocean energy by 244 %; whereas, over the same period, the EU’s domestic fossil fuel production has declined, with coal production falling by 53 %, oil by 31 % and gas by 73 %;
E. whereas with a renewable energy-dominated grid, Europe will need to secure over 100 GW of new clean firm power capacity by 2035 to ensure reliability, energy security and lower costs;
F. whereas the gap between energy production and EU demand negatively affects the EU’s trade balance, with energy imports amounting to EUR 427 billion in 2024 – down from a peak of EUR 602 billion in 2022 – for coal, oil and gas;
G. whereas EU nuclear production has declined by 24 % since 2014; whereas a number of Member States are demonstrating their commitment to expanding nuclear energy as a pillar of their energy strategies and advancing their nuclear power projects;
H. whereas the diversification of energy sources contributes to the EU’s open strategic autonomy, energy security and resilience against external supply disruptions;
I. whereas applying renewable and clean domestic energy production, energy efficiency and energy saving measures across the entire value chain decreases reliance on external energy sources and enhances the security of energy supply; whereas EU energy efficiency policies have yielded structural results, with energy demand peaking in 2006 and declining by 20 % in 2023, highlighting energy efficiency as the most cost-effective way to reduce emissions, enhance competitiveness, make energy consumption more affordable and improve energy security;
J. whereas Member States differ in terms of natural and geographical characteristics, energy supply, security, sources and policies;
K. whereas the Russian Federation has for decades weaponised its supplies of oil, coal, nuclear power and gas to the EU in order to create division among Member States and, since the summer of 2021, to fuel inflation and weaken Europe’s resolve to support Ukraine in its just fight for freedom; whereas Russia’s war against Ukraine started in 2014; whereas Russia has been carrying out an illegal, unprovoked and unjustified full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine since 24 February 2022; whereas Member States agreed in the Versailles Declaration to reassess how to ensure the security of their energy supplies and to phase out their dependency on Russian gas, oil and coal imports ‘as soon as possible’ by, among other means, speeding up the development of renewables and the production of their key components and accelerating the reduction of overall EU reliance on fossil fuels, taking into account national circumstances and Member States’ energy mix choices; whereas the REPowerEU plan put forward a set of actions to stop importing Russian fossil fuels by 2027 at the latest;
L. whereas while most Russian oil and coal imports have been sanctioned, Russian gas and nuclear imports have regrettably remained outside of the EU’s sanctions regime amid concerns over security of supply;
Change 1
Changed:M. whereas the share of Russian pipeline gas, both liquefied natural gas (LNG) and pipeline, in the EU’s total energy imports significantly decreased from 45 % in 2021 to approximately 19 % in 2024; whereas EU imports of Russian fossil fuels in the third year of the invasion have surpassed the EU financial aid sent to Ukraine in the same period (EUR 18.718,7 billion in 2024); whereas since the beginning of the war, Russia has earned a total of EUR 206 billion in revenue from fossil fuel exports to the EU; whereas global fossil fuel exports constitute the single largest source of revenue for Russia, amounting to EUR 250 billion per year – equivalent to 160 % of the Russian military budget for this year;
N. whereas among the 100 reactors operating in the EU, 18 are located in five EU countries and are of Russian or Soviet-design, each with varying levels of built-in reliance on Rosatom, which poses a particular risk to European energy security; whereas in 2024, Russia met around 23 % of the EU’s total demand for uranium conversion services and 24 % for uranium enrichment services;
O. whereas Russia has been circumventing sanctions through its shadow fleet, which transports oil to willing buyers under false flags or without flags and which poses serious environmental risks; whereas Member States have yet to implement the effective measures adopted by the Council in the 15th sanctions package against sanctions evasion through the shadow fleet;
P. whereas in its November 2024 resolution, Parliament called for the EU and its Member States to ban all imports of Russian energy, including LNG and nuclear, to require that ships exporting LNG from Russia be banned from entering EU ports and to refrain from concluding any new agreements with Rosatom or its subsidiaries;
Change 2
Changed:Q. whereas the absence of an updated robust EU energy security strategy is adversely affecting businesses, industries and households; whereas, among other contributing factors, this has led to a sharp rise in energy poverty with nearly one in ten households (10.6(10,6 %) unable to adequately heat their homes in 2023, an increase from 6.96,9 % in 2021;
R. whereas attacks against critical energy infrastructure can lead to a loss of power affecting several Member States simultaneously and substantial economic damage, undermine public security and have implications for the EU’s defence capabilities; whereas Europe’s energy sector has been inundated with cyberattacks since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; whereas the Baltic Sea’s critical energy infrastructure is under regular attack from Russia; whereas the growing number of perimeter harassment incidents against offshore energy infrastructure poses a serious concern;
S. whereas NATO’s role in energy security was first defined at the 2008 Bucharest Summit and has since been strengthened; whereas NATO is strengthening the security of critical infrastructure to prevent sabotage, including through the recently launched Baltic Sentry initiative; whereas NATO is supporting national authorities in enhancing their resilience against energy supply disruptions that could affect national and collective defence;