Changes between two versions
What changed between the plenary report and the adopted text
From · plenary report· 15 Apr 2025
on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Türkiye
AI:What changed, in short
Adds strong condemnations of recent arrests, including of journalists and opposition figures, and demands releases.458 Adds new paragraphs on Cyprus, including condemnation of Erdoğan's visit and ECtHR decision on murders.713 Adds conditions for cooperation, linking progress to democratic standards and CFSP alignment.3151618 Adds concerns on women's rights, prisons, and Erasmus oversight, and updates refugee numbers.2917 Other changes are formal: decimal separators and spelling corrections.11011
16 changes of substance · 2 formal · 0 of wording only
Written by AI from the two texts only · read the changes before relying on it · 4 Sept 2026 · Report a problem
+12 added · −10 removed · 16 changed paragraphs, packaging included.
Part 1 of 4: MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION
Removed:MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION
Added:P10_TA(2025)0092
Changed:on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Türkiye
Removed:(2025/2023(INI))
Added:Committee on Foreign Affairs
Added:PE767.988
Added:European Parliament resolution of 7 May 2025 on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Türkiye (2025/2023(INI))
15 unchanged paragraphs
The European Parliament,
– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 17 and 18 April 2024, 30 June 2023, 23 June 2022, 24 June 2021 and 12 December 2019, and to all relevant previous Council and European Council conclusions,
– having regard to Türkiye’s membership of the Council of Europe and NATO,
– having regard to the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey on the readmission of persons residing without authorisation (EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement),
– having regard to the statement of the members of the European Council of 25 March 2021 on Türkiye,
– having regard to the ‘EU-Turkey statements’ of 18 March 2016 and 29 November 2015,
– having regard to the ‘Turkey Negotiating Framework’ of 3 October 2005,
– having regard to the declaration issued by the European Community and its Member States on 21 September 2005 following the declaration made by Turkey upon its signature of the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement on 29 July 2005,
– having regard to the Council conclusions of December 2006 and March 2020, and to the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council in Copenhagen of 21-22 June 1993, also known as the Copenhagen Criteria,
– having regard to the Council conclusions on Enlargement of 17 December 2024 and of 12 December 2023,
– having regard to the International Law of the Sea and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),
– having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 on EU enlargement policy (COM(2024)0690) and to the accompanying Türkiye 2024 Report (SWD(2024)0696),
– having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 on EU enlargement policy (COM(2023)0690) and to the accompanying Türkiye 2023 Report (SWD(2023)0696),
– having regard to Special report 06/2024 of the European Court of Auditors of 24 April 2024 entitled ‘The Facility for Refugees in Turkey – Beneficial for refugees and host communities, but impact and sustainability not yet ensured’,
– having regard to the joint communications from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Council of 29 November 2023 (JOIN(2023)0050) and of 22 March 2021 (JOIN(2021)0008) on the state of play of EU-Türkiye political, economic and trade relations,
Changed:– having regard to the Commission communication of 19 December 2024 entitled ‘Eighth Annual Report of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey’Türkiye’ (COM(2024)0593),
20 unchanged paragraphs
– having regard to the fundamental principles of international law and to the Charter of the United Nations, the 1977 and the 1979 High-Level Agreements between the leaders of the two communities, and the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council on Cyprus, including Resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, which reaffirms the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, Resolution 550 (1984) of 11 May 1984 on secessionist actions in Cyprus, Resolution 789 (1992) of 25 November 1992, and Resolution 2537 (2020) on the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP),
– having regard to Article 46 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which states that the contracting parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in any case to which they are parties, and to the ensuing obligation of Türkiye to implement all judgments of the ECtHR,
– having regard to the relevant resolutions of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe,
– having regard to the 2025 Freedom in the World report published by Freedom House,
– having regard to the 2024 World Press Freedom Index published by Reporters Without Borders,
– having regard to the January 2025 prison statistics report published by the Civil Society in the Penal System Association (CISST) and to the 2024 country profile for Türkiye published by Prison Insider,
– having regard to the Global Gender Gap Report 2024 published by the World Economic Forum,
– having regard to recent reports of the We Will Stop Femicide Platform (Kadın Cinayetlerini Durduracağız Platformu),
– having regard to the UNESCO statement on Hagia Sophia of 10 July 2020, and to the relevant UNESCO World Heritage Committee decisions 44 COM 7B.58 (2021) and 45 COM 7B.58 (2023), adopted in its 44th and 45th sessions respectively,
– having regard to its previous resolutions on Türkiye, in particular those of 13 September 2023 on the 2022 Commission Report on Türkiye, of 7 June 2022 on the 2021 Commission Report on Turkey, and of 26 November 2020 on escalating tensions in Varosha following the illegal actions by Türkiye and the urgent need for the resumption of talks,
– having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement,
– having regard to its resolution of 15 April 2015 on the centenary of the Armenian Genocide,
– having regard to its resolutions of 5 May 2022 on the case of Osman Kavala in Turkey, of 10 October 2024 on the case of Bülent Mumay in Türkiye and of 13 February 2025 on recent dismissals and arrests of mayors in Türkiye,
– having regard to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s visit to Ankara in December 2024,
– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0067/2025),
A. whereas Türkiye remains a candidate for EU accession, and EU membership remains the repeatedly declared political goal of the Turkish Government, although the gap with the values and interests of the EU is growing; whereas EU accession negotiations have effectively been at a standstill since 2018, owing to the deterioration of the rule of law and democracy in Türkiye;
B. whereas any accession country is expected to respect democratic values, the rule of law and human rights, and to abide by EU law; whereas Türkiye needs to credibly demonstrate its commitment to closer relations and alignment with the European Union in order to reinvigorate its European perspective; whereas being a candidate country presumes a willingness to progressively approach and align with the EU in all aspects, including values, interests, standards and policies, inter alia with its common foreign and security policy, to respect and uphold the Copenhagen criteria, and to pursue and maintain good neighbourly relations with the EU and all of its Member States without discrimination; whereas the tensions between the EU and Türkiye in relation to the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean have de-escalated but not ceased; whereas Türkiye has repeatedly been asked to refrain from all actions which violate the sovereignty and sovereign rights of all EU Member States and are in breach of international and EU law;
C. whereas the 2023 Commission progress report on Türkiye painted a picture of continued backsliding, while its latest progress report of 2024 appears to present a slightly more positive overall picture of progress on enlargement-related reforms in Türkiye, such as in the area of economic and monetary policies; whereas this cannot, however, be applied to the core matters related to democracy and fundamental rights, which have deteriorated even further since the release of the Commission’s latest report; whereas the gap between Türkiye and the EU’s values and normative framework has therefore remained unaddressed during the recent period with the persistent use of laws and measures aimed at curtailing the rule of law and human rights, fundamental freedoms and civil liberties;
D. whereas the joint communication on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations of 29 November 2023 struck a more positive note, putting forward a set of recommendations on cooperating in areas of joint interest in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner and based on the established conditionalities; whereas only a few concrete steps in line with the commitments therein have been taken so far; whereas the April 2024 European Council mandated Coreper to advance in the implementation of this joint communication; whereas nevertheless this joint communication has not yet received a clear political endorsement by the Council;
Change 1
Changed:E. whereas Türkiye is a member of the Council of Europe and is therefore bound by the judgments of the ECtHR; whereas owing to its failure to apply landmark ECtHR rulings, Türkiye is currently facing historical infringement proceedings; whereas Türkiye consistently ranks among the countries most frequently found in violation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms protected by the European Convention on Human Rights; whereas as of late November 2024, Türkiye had the highest number of pending cases before the ECtHR, with 22 450 applications, representing 36.736,7 % of the Court’s total caseload of 61 250 applications;
12 unchanged paragraphs
F. whereas Türkiye is classified as ‘not free’ by Freedom House and has experienced one of the worst declines in the level of freedom in the world in the past 10 years; whereas Türkiye ranks 158th out of 180 countries in the 2024 World Press Freedom Index; whereas the Turkish Government has closed dozens of media outlets, routinely blocks online articles, is reported to control 85 % of national media and uses its state agency Anadolu as an organ of propaganda;
G. whereas the Turkish constitution provides for sufficient protection of fundamental rights, but the practice of the institutions and the critical state of the judiciary, including the lack of respect for Constitutional Court rulings, are the main reasons for the dire situation of the rule of law and human rights in the country, issues repeatedly described in the reports of the EU, the Council of Europe and international organisations;
H. whereas Türkiye has the highest incarceration rate and the largest prison population of all Council of Europe Member States, with an overcrowded prison population that has grown by 439 % between 2005 and 2023 and currently represents more than a third of all inmates of Council of Europe countries;
I. whereas Türkiye is ranked 127th out of 146 countries in the 2024 Global Gender Gap Index, underscoring severe gender inequality and systemic failures in protecting women’s rights; whereas according to the 2024 report of the We Will Stop Femicide Platform (Kadın Cinayetlerini Durduracağız Platformu), 394 women were murdered by men and 259 women were found dead in suspicious circumstances in Türkiye in 2024, the highest number recorded since the civil society group started collecting data in 2010; whereas in its 2023 report, the platform noted that 315 women were killed by men, and 248 women were found dead in suspicious circumstances;
J. whereas in recent months, Türkiye has taken steps towards the resumption of a process for a peaceful resolution of the Kurdish question; whereas on 27 February 2025 jailed militant leader Abdullah Öcalan called on his Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to disarm and disband, providing a historic opportunity to end the Turkish-Kurdish conflict; whereas these efforts have been accompanied by increasing repression and the curtailment of the powers of democratic local governments, including the dismissal of elected Kurdish and other opposition mayors;
K. whereas, alongside being a candidate for EU accession, Türkiye is a NATO ally and a key partner in the areas of trade, economic relations, security, the fight against terrorism, and migration; whereas Türkiye continues to play a key role in the region, acts as a bridge between Europe and Asia, and remains a key partner for the stability of the wider East Mediterranean region; whereas Türkiye continues to play a significant role in the Syrian conflict and maintains a military presence in northern Syria;
L. whereas Türkiye has not aligned with EU sanctions against Russia; whereas trade between Türkiye and Russia has nearly doubled since the EU’s imposition of sanctions against Russia; whereas despite some steps taken, Türkiye has not prevented its territory from being used to circumvent EU sanctions against Russia;
M. whereas the 2024 Commission progress report on Türkiye states that, as at 30 September 2024, the country maintained a very low alignment rate of 5 % with relevant statements of the High Representative on behalf of the EU and with relevant Council decisions, compared to 9 % in 2023;
N. whereas Türkiye is the EU’s fifth largest trade partner, and the EU is Türkiye’s largest trading partner by far, as well as its primary source of foreign direct investment;
O. whereas in the past year, the level of engagement between the EU and Türkiye has increased in terms of both technical and high-level meetings in sectoral areas;
P. whereas Türkiye has applied for membership of BRICS+ and shown interest in joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO);
Q. whereas following a period of unorthodox economic policy, Türkiye has implemented a tighter monetary policy over the past year leading to a reduction in external imbalances and a moderation of inflationary pressures;
Change 2
Removed:R. whereas Türkiye hosts the largest refugee population in the world, with around 3.1 million registered refugees, mainly from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan; whereas since 2011 the EU has directed more than EUR 10 billion to assisting refugees and host communities in Türkiye; whereas according to a credible investigative report by Lighthouse Reports and eight media partners, the EU is funding removal centres in Türkiye implicated in the detention, abuse and forced deportations of refugees under the guise of voluntary return;
Added:R. whereas in March 2025 the Turkish Government spent at least USD 10 billion of its currency reserves to counteract the collapse of its financial markets and the devaluation of the lira caused by its decision to arrest and detain Mayor of Istanbul and prominent opposition politician Ekrem İmamoğlu; whereas the Turkish Government’s undermining of Turkish democracy and the rule of law creates an unfavourable environment for foreign direct investment and hence weakens the Turkish economy, with grave consequences for the socio-economic situation of Turkish citizens;
Removed:S. whereas in addition to the emergency assistance coordinated via the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, with an estimated financial value of EUR 38 million, the EU provided EUR 78.2 million in humanitarian aid for the earthquake response in 2023, and EUR 26 million in humanitarian aid in 2024; whereas the EU signed an additional EUR 400 million in assistance under the EU Solidarity Fund to finance recovery operations following the devastating earthquake;
Added:S. whereas Türkiye hosts the largest refugee population in the world, with around 3,1 million registered refugees, mainly from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan; whereas since 2011 the EU has directed more than EUR 10 billion to assisting refugees and host communities in Türkiye; whereas according to a credible investigative report by Lighthouse Reports and eight media partners, the EU is funding removal centres in Türkiye implicated in the detention, abuse and forced deportations of refugees under the guise of voluntary return;