On the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2026

–having regard to the European Council conclusions, particularly those of 20 March 2026 and 19 June 2026,

–having regard to the Council conclusions of 16 March 2026 on advancing the European Union’s capacity to counter hybrid threats,

–having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 5 March 2024 entitled ‘A new European Defence Industrial Strategy: Achieving EU readiness through a responsive and resilient European Defence Industry’ (JOIN(2024)0010),

–having regard to the political guidelines for the next Commission 2024-2029 entitled ‘Europe’s choice’, presented on 18 July 2024 by the candidate for Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen,

–having regard to the report by Mario Draghi of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’, in particular Chapter 4 thereof on increasing security and reducing dependencies,

–having regard to the report by Sauli Niinistö of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

–having regard to the joint white paper from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 19 March 2025 entitled ‘Joint white paper for European Defence Readiness 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0120),

–having regard to the security and defence partnerships signed by the EU and India on 27 January 2026, by the EU and Iceland on 18 March 2026, by the EU and Australia on 18 March 2026, and by the EU and Ghana on 24 March 2026,

–having regard to the North Atlantic Treaty, which came into force in 1949,

–having regard to the Ankara Summit Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Ankara on 7 and 8 July 2026,

–having regard to the 11th progress report of 8 June 2026 on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017,

–having regard to the three joint declarations on EU-NATO cooperation signed by the Presidents of the European Council and the Commission and the NATO Secretary General on 10 January 2023, 10 July 2018 and 8 July 2016 respectively,

–having regard to the US National Security Strategy published in November 2025 and to the US National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026, adopted by the US Congress,

–having regard to Regulation (EU) 2026/467 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 February 2026 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the Ukraine Support Loan for 2026 and 20275,

–having regard to the report of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 30 June 2026 entitled ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy Report – Our Priorities in 2026’,

–having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2026 on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 20256,

–having regard to its resolution of 22 January 2026 on drones and new systems of warfare – the EU’s need to adapt to be fit for today’s security challenges7,

–having regard to its resolution of 11 March 2026 on flagship European defence projects of common interest8,

–having regard to its resolution of 11 March 2026 on tackling barriers to the single market for defence9,

–having regard to its resolution of 11 February 2026 on EU strategic defence and security partnerships10,

–having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

–having regard to the report of the Committee on Security and Defence (A10-0000/2026),

A.whereas the European continent is facing the most complex combination of both military and non-military threats as a result of Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, the spillover of the war in the Middle East, the deteriorating security situation from the Sahel to the Horn of Africa, and uncertainty as regards the US stance towards the EU;

B.whereas Ukraine needs to be provided with the necessary military capabilities in the quantities it requests and for as long as it takes to end Russia’s illegal war of aggression; whereas Ukraine is defending not only its sovereignty and territorial integrity, but also European security overall;

C.whereas since the adoption of the Versailles Declaration, the Strategic Compass and white paper and the Readiness Roadmap 2030, the EU’s institutions and its Member States have acquired new momentum to jointly strengthen European defence and thereby ensure the security of its citizens;

A rapidly deteriorating geopolitical context and the possible return of war to Europe

1.Warns that the world faces intense geopolitical confrontation, marked by high-intensity wars, sustained by technological innovation, a global surge in military spending, high levels of lethality and a disregard for international law, with the targeting of civilians and critical infrastructure;

2.Stresses that the main threat to European security is Russia, its allies and proxies; stresses that Russian attacks intensified in 2025, combining both a persistent aggressive posture and malign activities to weaken European resilience; affirms that the EU and its Member States must shift from crisis response to coordinated defence readiness as set out in the white paper and the Readiness Roadmap 2030;

3.Deplores the fact that Russia’s war of aggression continues with no ceasefire in sight, Moscow having rejected every proposal for an unconditional truce; calls on the EU Member States to hold firm and to treat such coercion as directed against the EU as a whole;

4.Highlights Russia’s constant pressure on and hybrid war against the Republic of Moldova, aimed at derailing its European aspirations through unprecedented levels of malign interference and the continued weaponisation of Transnistria; denounces Russia’s efforts to stifle the democratic and European aspirations of the people of Georgia and Armenia;

5.Underlines that the 2025 US National Security Strategy marks a sharp break with post-Cold War US policy; notes the announcement by President Trump of a reduction of the US military footprint in Europe, as well as persistent uncertainty over the United States’ willingness to honour its commitments under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty;

6.Firmly condemns President Trump’s repeated threats to seize Greenland, including by force; condemns any pressure to force the hand of any NATO ally; welcomes all initiatives to support Greenlandic and Danish resilience, security and territorial integrity;

7.Urges Iran, the United States and Israel to reinstate a ceasefire; welcomes the efforts led by European countries to establish a coalition force to secure freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz;

8.Regrets the withdrawal of US troops from Syria and Iraq; calls for the EU, its Member States and like-minded countries to step up their efforts to combat any resurgence of Daesh;

9.Reiterates its concerns about the worsening instability across West and Central Africa; is alarmed that Africa has become a hotspot of jihadist violence; reiterates its concern about the spread of jihadist violence from the Sahel to Mozambique and Somalia;

10.Is concerned by China’s accelerated militarisation and repeated episodes of tensions with some of its neighbours;

11.Stresses the need to further safeguard the US-brokered agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan through the swift signing of a comprehensive and lasting peace treaty in line with, and in full respect for, Armenia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty;

12.Stresses that a growing number of actors are denying the peaceful use of outer space, which is now a contested domain; considers space to be essential to the EU’s security, defence and strategic autonomy; calls on the Member States to accelerate the deployment of resilient, dual-use space capabilities and early-warning missile systems;

13.Stresses that Russia, first and foremost, but also other state and non-state actors hostile to the EU, are waging a hybrid war against the EU, its Member States and its citizens; underlines that these aggressions constitute a sustained, strategic and continuous attack on the EU’s sovereignty, security, democratic resilience and interests;

14.Is alarmed that drone incursions and airspace violations throughout Europe have intensified to an unprecedented scale, and that Baltic undersea cables have been sabotaged; calls on the Member States to urgently build multilayered counter-unmanned aerial system capabilities, drawing on Ukraine’s expertise;

Supporting Ukraine, and EU security guarantees

15.Stresses that Russia’s full-scale aggression of Ukraine has already lasted longer than World War I; praises the bravery of the Ukrainian army and population; supports a sustainable and just peace in Ukraine, where the aggressor is not rewarded and international law is upheld; reiterates its unwavering support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity;

16.Urges the EU and its Member States to enhance their military support for Ukraine; urges the adoption and implementation of the European Sky Shield Initiative; welcome the Freya air defence project; welcomes the adoption in April 2026 of the EUR 90 billion financial support loan for Ukraine; considers that the Commission proposal to use frozen Russian assets remains a legally sound and financially significant way to increase EU support for Ukraine’s military needs; calls for transferring Russian frozen assets held in the EU to a special-purpose vehicle as a first step, which would protect EU Member States’ interests;

17.Insists on the importance of the Coalition of the Willing for Ukraine in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; calls on the Member States to fully draw lessons from Ukraine’s combat experience and to apply them to their own armed forces; calls on the Member States and the European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB) to systematically draw lessons from Ukraine’s experience and to deepen joint development and co-production with Ukraine;

CSDP missions and operations: a profound change to match mandates, means and results

18.Calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Member States to comprehensively review CSDP missions and operations in order to reconsider their mandates, means and results; stresses that these missions and operations could offer a more tangible, external projection of the EU’s relevance and reliability to its security partners, if formal decisions are accompanied by credible mandates and resources;

19.Recalls the importance of CSDP missions in defending against cyberwarfare and countering foreign information manipulation and interference, in particular in Eastern Partnership countries;

20.Calls for a comprehensive review of the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine); welcomes the addition of two new objectives in the EUMAM Ukraine mandate;

21.Welcomes the renewal, until 2027, of the mandates of the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia and the European Union Mission in Armenia, which are key to building confidence;

22.Considers Operation Althea, formally the European Union Force Bosnia and Herzegovina, to be essential for stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina; recommends that the over-the-horizon reserve forces be fully manned and sustained at all times;

23.Calls on the European External Action Service to assess the effectiveness of the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo in promoting institutional accountability and good governance;

24.Stresses the importance of the European Union Mission for the Support of Palestinian Police and Rule of Law and the European Union Border Assistance Mission at the Rafah Crossing Point for the sustainability of the ceasefire; stresses that the renewal of their mandates for only three months, until September 2026, is insufficient and limits their ability to act in a predictable time frame; calls on the Member States to strengthen the CSDP mandate of and provide adequate resources to both missions; calls on Israel and the Palestinian Authority to maintain full cooperation with them;

25.Welcomes the Council decision of 4 June 2026 to grant 100 million EUR under the European Peace Facility to equip and train the Lebanese Armed Forces, and calls for its swift implementation;

26.Highlights the role played by European Union Naval Force Aspides in protecting merchant ships from Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and enhancing maritime security in the region; welcomes the extension of its mandate until February 2027;

27.Takes note of the extension of the mandate of European Union Naval Force Mediterranean Operation Irini until 31 March 2027;

28.Takes note of the extension, until February 2027, of the mandates of the European Union Capacity Building Mission in Somalia, the European Union Training Mission in Somalia and Operation Atalanta, formally European Union Naval Force Somalia, all taking part in reinforcing Somali security, maritime and rule-of-law capacities;

29.Notes the ineffectiveness of the Russian paramilitary forces in the face of the territorial gains made by jihadist groups in the Sahel region; deplores the endless violence endured by civilians; recalls that the EU can only assist African states that request assistance; regrets the lack of a coherent EU security strategy for Africa;

30.Notes the contribution of the European Union Training Mission in Mozambique to the capacity-building of armed forces;

Building an ‘EU ready for war’ defence architecture

31.Notes that the European Security Strategy can only be credible if all the actions set out in the 2022 Strategic Compass are fully implemented and evaluated and lessons are drawn from them;

32.Considers that the EU’s efforts in defence can no longer consist only of an accumulation of instruments, funding mechanisms and frameworks, and that a qualitative step is needed, in full respect of Member States’ prerogatives;

33.Believes that the Russian threat, US ambivalence around the conventional defence of Europe, and Ukraine’s growing centrality in the continent’s security architecture, demand a qualitative step in European defence; calls on interested Member States to define a renewed, fast, agile and efficient European security and defence architecture;

34.Supports the creation of a European security council where interested Member States would address overall strategy and objectives, security cooperation and intelligence-sharing, among other things;

35.Is convinced that this renewed architecture must include relevant European countries that are not, or not yet, members of the EU, in particular the UK, Ukraine and Norway;

36.Stresses that NATO’s European pillar, while fully embedded in NATO, must be conceived as ‘separable but not separate’, yet structured so that Europeans can plan, command and sustain a major operation on the continent autonomously;

37.Welcomes the continued expansion of the EU’s network of tailored bilateral security and defence partnerships, which now cover 12 partners; notes that six such partnerships were concluded in 2025 and 2026 alone;

38.Remains concerned about Türkiye, a member of NATO, displaying ambiguous behaviour through its continued challenges to the sovereignty and sovereign rights of EU Member States, first and foremost the Republic of Cyprus and Greece;

39.Notes that corridors towards the eastern and northern flanks remain riddled with bottlenecks; welcomes the Commission’s draft military mobility regulation of November 2025;

40.Calls on the Member States to extend military mobility corridors to Ukraine and to move from a narrow focus on ‘mobility’ towards a comprehensive approach to ‘logistics’;

41.Welcomes the French nuclear doctrine of ‘forward deterrence’ set out in March 2026;

Financing defence: a European budget that turns words into means

42.Demands that the next multiannual financial framework (MFF) fully reflects and adapts to defence as a new and essential priority for the EU; insists that the principle and definition of a European preference, as enshrined in the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP), be extended to all headings and instruments of the future budget as a whole;

43.Notes that the ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030 was announced as being capable of mobilising up to EUR 800 billion, of which some EUR 650 billion was to be freed up through the coordinated activation of the national escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact; observes the stark gap between this announcement and implementation; warns against a ‘Potemkin’ Europe of defence that promises far more than it delivers;

44.Stresses that the choices made, at a time when European defence budgets are rising at an unprecedented pace, will shape the structure of the EDTIB for decades;

45.Insists on the need to replenish depleted stocks, accelerate production capacities and close critical capability gaps; calls for the EU and its Member States to step up joint efforts to address these gaps also through European defence projects of common interest;

46.Stresses that neither a ramped up EDTIB nor the readiness of Europe’s armed forces will materialise without the personnel to deliver them;

47.Believes that recently adopted EU programmes to support the coordinated development of the EDTIB are useful and well-designed instruments that can deliver, provided they are adequately financed; insists that all these instruments be integrated into the future European Competitiveness Fund together with their respective criteria, in particular the EDIP’s requirements on eligibility and on the location of production;

48.Welcomes the inclusion of defence among the sectors eligible for support under the national and regional partnership plans (NRPP) of the next MFF; insists that any defence spending under the NRPPs comply with the same eligibility criteria as those laid down in the EDIP;

49.Stresses that the first priority is rapid and coordinated rearmament, closing the most pressing gaps, especially regarding strategic enablers; underlines that this requires massive additional investment;

50.Calls for the EU and its Member States to guarantee the EDTIB’s access to bank and non-bank financing;

51.Welcomes the broadening of the lending criteria of the European Investment Bank (EIB) to the defence sector and the scaling-up of the Defence Equity Facility; calls on the EIB to substantially reinforce its lending and equity support for this sector;

52.Welcomes the adoption of the Defence Readiness Omnibus as a first step towards rationalisation; calls on the Member States to step up their ambition and build a more agile, efficient and faster legislative ecosystem for European defence; underlines that all rationalisation and harmonisation efforts must be conducted in full respect of the Treaties;

The EU institutions’ accountability in respect of the parliamentary control of the CSDP

53.Insists that Parliament’s oversight and scrutiny role be strengthened in line with the expansion of the EU’s role in defence and the unprecedented increase in spending on EU defence policies and programmes;

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54.Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Council, the VP/HR, the President of the Commission and competent Commissioners, the UN Secretary General, the NATO Secretary General, the President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the EU security and defence agencies and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.