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report parliamentary committee draft, 12 May 2026

From prototypes to capabilities – enabling new defence actors to scale up

Document SEDE-PR-785352 · (2026/2025(INI))

Committee on Security and Defence · Rapporteur: Mārtiņš Staķis

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Motion for a european parliament resolution 56 paragraphs

(2026/2025(INI))

The European Parliament,

–having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–having regard to Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security, and amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC1,

–having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the European Defence Fund and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/10922,

–having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/2643 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2025 establishing the European Defence Industry Programme and a framework of measures to ensure the timely availability and supply of defence products (‘EDIP Regulation’)3,

–having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/2653 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 2025 amending Regulations (EU) 2021/694, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697, (EU) 2021/1153 and (EU) 2024/795, as regards incentivising defence-related investment in the EU budget to implement the ReArm Europe Plan4,

–having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1106 of 27 May 2025 establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the Reinforcement of the European Defence Industry Instrument5,

–having regard to the Commission proposal of 17 June 2025 for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the acceleration of permit-granting for defence readiness projects (COM(2025)0821),

–having regard to the Commission proposal of 17 June 2025 for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EC) No 1907/2006, (EC) No 1272/2008, (EU) No 528/2012, (EU) 2019/1021 and (EU) 2021/697 as regards defence readiness and facilitating defence investments and conditions for defence industry (COM(2025)0822),

–having regard to the Commission proposal of 17 June 2025 for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 2009/43/EC and 2009/81/EC, as regards the simplification of intra-EU transfers of defence-related products and the simplification of security and defence procurement (COM(2025)0823), as part of the Defence Readiness Omnibus package of 17 June 2025,

–having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 on the implementation of Directive 2009/81/EC, concerning procurement in the fields of defence and security, and of Directive 2009/43/EC, concerning the transfer of defence-related products6,

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–having regard to its resolution of 25 November 2025 on the institutional aspects of the Report on the future of European Competitiveness (Draghi Report)7,

–having regard to the report by Mario Draghi of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’ and, in particular, Chapter 4 thereof on increasing security and reducing dependencies,

–having regard to the report by Enrico Letta of 17 April 2024 entitled ‘Much more than a Market – Speed, Security, Solidarity: Empowering the Single Market to deliver a sustainable future and prosperity for all EU Citizens’,

–having regard to the Commission proposal of 25 March 2026 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the Programme for agile and rapid defence innovation (AGILE) of 25 March 2026 (COM(2026)0135),

–having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

–having regard to the report of the Committee on Security and Defence (A10-0000/2026),

A.whereas the EU’s defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB) is increasingly dependent on innovative start-ups, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and companies developing dual-use and defence technologies;

B.whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and conflicts in the Middle East have demonstrated the decisive role of disruptive technologies in modern combat;

C.whereas the fragmentation of national certification, testing and security accreditation regimes, combined with the absence of permanent mutual recognition, pose systemic difficulties for innovative companies;

D.whereas the lack of progress towards an EU single market for defence has resulted in a situation in which defence SMEs and start-ups struggle to find customers;

The scale-up gap

1.Underlines that EU-funded research, development and demonstration programmes can produce successful, innovative and disruptive defence products; recalls that such efforts must be followed by timely procurement by the Member States’ armed forces;

2.Notes that in the absence of follow-on contracts, innovative companies may fail or relocate to non-EU countries, reversing the progress made so far; calls on the Member States to develop national innovation procurement mechanisms that provide first contracts to domestic innovators and to set a target of at least 10 % of defence procurement expenditure for emerging and disruptive technologies;

3.Considers that Member States’ application of additional national requirements on top of existing EU regulations creates unnecessary bottlenecks in the procurement of innovative defence solutions;

4.Notes that defence start-ups and new market entrants frequently lack the manufacturing infrastructure needed to move from validated prototypes to serial production; welcomes, therefore, NATO’s initiative to connect defence innovators with civilian companies that have spare production facilities;

Contracts, procurement and risk

5.Highlights the structural disconnect between EU-funded research and development (R&D) and national procurement decisions; calls on the Member States to serve as first customers for domestic defence SMEs and new defence actors and to foster the uptake of innovative solutions using contracts that allow for flexibility during prototyping and scale-up stages;

6.Calls on the Member States to establish innovation procurement budgets that are explicitly not tied to guaranteed outcomes, accepting that a proportion of spending on emerging technologies will not result in fielded products; calls, in this context, on the Member States to pool resources for the procurement of innovative defence solutions, especially for products that have successfully completed EU-funded programmes;

7.Calls on the Commission to undertake an early assessment of the proposed regulation for a programme for agile and rapid defence innovation (AGILE) and to scale up this contract-based model substantially under the European Competitiveness Fund (ECF);

8.Calls on the Member States to expand the use of dedicated innovation units within their armed forces and calls further on the European Defence Agency (EDA) to provide training and capacity-building for national ministry of defence staff;

9.Welcomes the forthcoming revision of the defence8 and general9 procurement directives; calls on the Commission to ensure that these revisions raise thresholds for innovation procurement and offer flexible procedures across all stages of defence and dual-use innovation cycles;

Access to finance

10.Notes that, while early-stage EU defence funding is improving, a critical gap remains at the growth stage; stresses that such investment is dependent on the expectation of contracts, and that without procurement reform this capital gap cannot be closed by financial instruments alone;

11.Welcomes the opening of direct EU equity investments to defence start-ups, as well as the Scaleup Europe Fund and the Defence Equity Facility 2.0; calls on the Commission to ensure that these instruments also cover defence-first companies;

12.Is concerned that European defence companies are forced to sell to non-EU investors or relocate; calls on the Member States to reframe defence investment as contributing to EU common priorities within institutional investment mandates;

13.Calls on the Commission to design the defence component of the ECF as a coherent pipeline linking defence research to industrial deployment, and to ensure that national initiatives, EU-funded programmes and NATO innovation programmes are complementary;

14.Welcomes the quadrupling of the European Investment Bank’s (EIB) defence financing; calls on the EIB Group to expand its intermediated lending partnerships and working capital instruments across all Member States, particularly those on the eastern flank;

Certification and testing

15.Deplores the absence of permanent mutual recognition of defence product certifications across the EU; calls on the Commission and the EDA to evaluate and develop legally binding measures for a test-once principle in order to avoid duplicative national testing procedures;

16.Welcomes NATO’s Rapid Adoption Action Plan and its proposed use of Innovation Badges to build trust in tested products; calls for the EU to recognise these badges within its own instruments and on willing Member States to conclude agreements on the mutual recognition of defence testing and certification results;

17.Calls on large defence companies receiving EU funding to open their testing facilities to SMEs and start-ups and on the Commission and the EDA to scale up operational experimentation campaigns;

18.Stresses that effective defence testing and evaluation require not only physical facilities but also a functioning ecosystem, and that priority should be given to the creation of instruments and infrastructure through which new defence actors can receive iterative feedback from national armed forces;

19.Notes the nine capability coalitions established under the Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030; calls on the Commission and the EDA to ensure that each coalition includes a dedicated testing and demonstration component open to start-ups and SMEs;

20.Calls on the Commission to allocate dedicated funding under the next multiannual financial framework for defence testing and evaluation infrastructure, including equipment, methodologies and the expansion of facilities;

Intellectual property

21.Underlines the importance of intellectual property protection for new defence actors; calls on the Commission to ensure that intellectual property rights regimes in EU defence programmes protect small innovators from appropriation by consortium partners;

22.Calls on the Commission to expand mechanisms to incentivise prime contractors to work with start-ups, including through mandatory subcontracting thresholds for innovative SMEs in EU-funded defence consortia;

Ukraine

23.Welcomes successful examples of structured defence innovation cooperation with Ukraine, the inclusion of Ukraine in the SAFE and EDIP instruments and the creation of the BraveTechEU partnership;

24.Underlines that Ukraine’s defence innovation ecosystem operates at an unmatched speed, with iterative cycles of development, battlefield testing and adaptation often measured in weeks; stresses that facilitating European companies’ access to this operational learning, including through joint development and co-production, would serve the EU’s own defence readiness;

25.Calls on the Commission to ensure that all future EU defence instruments continue to expand access for Ukrainian companies and facilitate technology exchange with EU companies in order to build long-term partnerships;

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26.Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

Explanatory statement 6 paragraphs

Europe’s defence landscape is undergoing a fundamental transformation. Russia’s ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine, escalating conflict in the Middle East, and the emergence of low-cost attrition warfare using drones, autonomous systems, and other disruptive technologies have changed what modern defence capabilities require. The battlefield in Ukraine has demonstrated that innovation speed, not only industrial scale, determines military effectiveness. Technologies that are adapted weekly on the front line cannot wait years to move through European procurement cycles.

The EU has responded with ambition. New instruments such as EDIP have been adopted to strengthen the defence industrial base. The SAFE programme has mobilised up to EUR 150 billion in loans for defence procurement. The proposed multiannual financial framework budget (MFF) for 2028-2034 allocates EUR 131 billion for defence and space window under the ECF, a fivefold increase over the previous MFF. The European Innovation Council has opened to defence for the first time with a landmark equity call. The EIB has quadrupled its defence lending. Private venture capital in European defence tech has grown from virtually nothing to over 6 % of all European venture capital in just five years. These are significant shifts.

Yet this report aims to underline that the main barrier for new defence actors is not a lack of funding but the absence of real procurement contracts. European defence start-ups and innovative companies can secure grants, win accelerator places, and build working prototypes. But armed forces default to established suppliers, procurement specifications are written for mature products, and no structured mechanism connects EU-funded development to a purchase order from a Member State. The result is that promising EU defence start-ups and SMEs leave the Union, while up to half of private European defence venture capital comes from US investors. Promising European innovations either die in the gap between prototype and production, get acquired by non-EU players, or leave Europe entirely.

This valley of death exists across the European economy, but in defence it is uniquely severe. The defence market in the EU has 27 government buyers, each operating behind diverse procurement rules, certification requirements, and security accreditation regimes. Companies focused purely on defence or lethal capabilities face a fundamentally different and far more constrained funding reality than dual-use companies. Geographic concentration of EU programme participation means that companies in the Member States facing the most acute security threats, particularly on the eastern flank, often have the least access to the instruments designed to support them. And Ukraine, which has become Europe’s most important defence innovation partner and testbed, needs to be integrated permanently into the European defence innovation ecosystem rather than through crisis-driven arrangements.

As the EU moves towards a single market for defence, tackling this innovation gap is one of the key priorities. The emerging threats demand targeted approaches that connect publicly funded research to actual procurement, that create dedicated pathways for both dual-use and defence-first companies, and that ensure the entire European defence industrial base can contribute to European defence capabilities.

This report examines the specific gap of moving from prototype to scale up for new defence actors, looking at the full chain of barriers: access to first contracts and customers, fragmented procurement and certification, growth stage financing gaps, the role of civilian companies entering defence, geographic concentration of funding, the performance of existing EU and NATO instruments, and the design of future programmes under the ECF. It calls for contract-based instruments like AGILE to be scaled, for procurement directives to be revised with innovation in mind, for a coordinating function at EU level to support SMEs, for dedicated testing infrastructure funding, and for the ECF and other EU innovation instruments to be designed as a coherent pipeline from defence research to deployment.

Annex: declaration of input 4 paragraphs

Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that he included in his report input on matters pertaining to the subject of the file that he received, in the preparation of the draft report, from the following interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register1, or from the following representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies:

1. Interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register
NATO
DG DEFIS
European Commissioner for Defence and Space
European Commissioner for Startups, Research and Innovation
European Defence Agency
European Investment Bank
DigitalEurope
European Innovation Council
Military Technology, Drones and Robotics Association
2. Representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies

The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that he has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.