On the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) No 1095/2010, No 648/2012, No 600/2014, No 909/2014, 2015/2365, 2019/1156, 2021/23, 2022/858, 2023/1114, No 1060/2009, 2016/1011, 2017/2402, 2023/2631 and 2024/3005 as regards the further development of capital market integration and supervision within the Union

2.Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

3.Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

Amendment 1

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 5

Or. en

Justification

An explicit competitiveness mandate should be added for ESMA. A regulator that is not explicitly required to consider competitiveness will, over time, systematically underweight it.

Amendment 2

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 10

Or. en

Justification

The no-action letter as proposed can address regulatory gaps and disproportionate compliance costs but cannot respond to the competitive harm caused by misaligned international requirements. Where strict application of Union law creates a structural disadvantage for EU firms relative to third-country competitors, ESMA should be equipped to act.

Amendment 3

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 11

Or. en

Justification

The recital as amended establishes the data platform not as a passive data repository but as the architecture into which existing sectoral databases are integrated. Treating the EMIR, MiFIR and CSDR databases as modules of a single platform avoids parallel IT infrastructure, ensures consistent data standards and delivers the supervisory data integration the SIU requires.

Amendment 4

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 11 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

Embedding data-access rights on a regulation-by-regulation basis creates a maintenance problem that compounds with each new legislative act: every future supervisory mandate requires retrospective amendment of the platform architecture to connect it to existing information flows. A platform-level general access rule solves this at source, ensuring that additions to the supervisory perimeter integrate automatically without requiring co-legislative action each time the regulatory acquis expands.

Amendment 5

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 16 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

Effective joint supervision between ESMA and NCAs cannot be built through guidelines and peer reviews alone. Building a genuinely common supervisory culture requires people working together on live supervisory tasks. As ESMA assumes direct responsibility for significant FMIs and CASPs, the risk of divergent methodologies and institutional distance between ESMA and NCAs becomes a direct threat to supervisory quality. A structured secondment programme addresses that risk proportionately, without transferring competences or depleting NCA capacity.

Amendment 6

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 18 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

The new ESMA supervisory layer must not result in double-charging of regulated entities. On the contrary, a more harmonised supervisory approach should result in overall efficiency gains.

Amendment 7

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 19

Or. en

Amendment 8

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 19 a (new)

Or. en

Amendment 9

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 21 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

The supervisory architecture of this Regulation applies distinct allocation models across sectors without making the governing principle explicit. This recital supplies that principle, grounding full ESMA supervision of CCPs and CSDs in the combination of limited population, structural cross-border activity and systemic risk, while grounding the significance-threshold model for CASPs in the opposite characteristics. Making the principle visible insulates both choices from opportunistic challenge in trilogue.

Amendment 10

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 22

Or. en

Justification

The underlying logic of this proposal acknowledges that divergent national supervision creates an uneven playing field and supervisory arbitrage risk. That logic does not stop at the significance threshold. With a limited number of EU CCPs, full ESMA supervision is operationally realistic. Extending direct ESMA oversight to all CCPs eliminates the remaining structural incentive for regulatory competition between NCAs and completes the single supervisory framework the Commission itself began.

Amendment 11

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 23

Or. en

Justification

The underlying logic of this proposal acknowledges that divergent national supervision creates an uneven playing field and supervisory arbitrage risk. That logic does not stop at the significance threshold. With a limited number of EU CCPs, full ESMA supervision is operationally realistic. Extending direct ESMA oversight to all CCPs eliminates the remaining structural incentive for regulatory competition between NCAs and completes the single supervisory framework the Commission itself began.

Amendment 12

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 24

Or. en

Justification

The underlying logic of this proposal acknowledges that divergent national supervision creates an uneven playing field and supervisory arbitrage risk. That logic does not stop at the significance threshold. With a limited number of EU CCPs, full ESMA supervision is operationally realistic. Extending direct ESMA oversight to all CCPs eliminates the remaining structural incentive for regulatory competition between NCAs and completes the single supervisory framework the Commission itself began.

Amendment 13

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 25

Or. en

Justification

The underlying logic of this proposal acknowledges that divergent national supervision creates an uneven playing field and supervisory arbitrage risk. That logic does not stop at the significance threshold. With a limited number of EU CCPs, full ESMA supervision is operationally realistic. Extending direct ESMA oversight to all CCPs eliminates the remaining structural incentive for regulatory competition between NCAs and completes the single supervisory framework the Commission itself began.

Amendment 14

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 26 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

Dual-sided derivative reporting requires both counterparties to submit independently to trade repositories, generating reconciliation costs that ESMA's own analysis identifies as the primary compliance burden of the current framework. Extending the single-sided principle to all derivative contracts, with a regulated designation hierarchy, delivers equivalent supervisory data at materially lower cost.

Amendment 15

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 26 b (new)

Or. en

Justification

Intra-group derivative contracts net to zero at group level and generate no additional market or counterparty risk; the systemic risk objective is met by reporting of external contracts alone. The current exemption requires separate notification in each Member State where a group entity is established. Consolidating to a single parent-level notification preserves supervisory transparency at a fraction of the administrative cost.

Amendment 16

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 26 c (new)

Or. en

Justification

The technology-neutral definitions introduced by this Regulation are not extended to the collateral eligibility and custody provisions governing CCPs. Without confirmation that tokenised equivalents of eligible assets qualify on the same terms and that DLT Pilot Regime entities may act as eligible custodians, CCPs face legal uncertainty blocking end-to-end DLT integration in clearing.

Amendment 17

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 27

Or. en

Justification

The equity consolidated tape was selected in December 2025 and has not yet gone live. Amending its scope before any operational experience is premature and disproportionate. Article 52(14) already mandates an evidence-based ESMA review followed by a Commission legislative proposal. That process should be allowed to run before any changes to the content of the tape are considered.

Amendment 18

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 28

Or. en

Justification

The equity consolidated tape was selected in December 2025 and has not yet gone live. Amending its scope before any operational experience is premature and disproportionate. Article 52(14) already mandates an evidence-based ESMA review followed by a Commission legislative proposal. That process should be allowed to run before any changes to the content of the tape are considered.

Amendment 19

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 36

Or. en

Justification

A large share of SI executions offer no meaningful price improvement over lit market prices, undermining the rationale for bilateral execution. A minimum improvement of one tick over the primary market best bid and offer restores genuine client value, aligns the SI framework with its original purpose, and strengthens price formation across EU equity markets.

Amendment 20

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 36 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

Systematic internalisers' pre-trade transparency obligations apply only to shares classified as having a liquid market. Under the current methodology, the vast majority of EU-listed shares fall outside that classification, rendering the SI quoting regime largely inoperative. ESMA should revise the methodology to ensure a sufficiently high proportion of shares are classified as liquid, using dynamic calibration to prevent static threshold effects.

Amendment 21

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 36 b (new)

Or. en

Justification

Trading venues must publish comprehensive operational rulebooks; systematic internalisers face no equivalent obligation despite their growing share of Union equity trading. This amendment requires rulebook disclosure covering access criteria, execution process and bilateral execution arrangements, enabling market participants to assess execution conditions and competent authorities to enforce the bilateral-execution requirement.

Amendment 22

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 41

Or. en

Justification

The Commission's permanent derogation for national surveillance authorities risks entrenching supervisory fragmentation at the market integrity layer indefinitely. The NCA market surveillance role should only be transitional operational necessity, not a structural feature. An ESMA readiness assessment should precede any decision to progress towards full supervisory integration as the package's stated end-state.

Amendment 23

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 42

Or. en

Justification

The Commission's permanent derogation for national surveillance authorities risks entrenching supervisory fragmentation at the market integrity layer indefinitely. The NCA market surveillance role should only be transitional operational necessity, not a structural feature. An ESMA readiness assessment should precede any decision to progress towards full supervisory integration as the package's stated end-state.

Amendment 24

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 42 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

The Commission's permanent derogation for national surveillance authorities risks entrenching supervisory fragmentation at the market integrity layer indefinitely. The NCA market surveillance role should only be transitional operational necessity, not a structural feature. An ESMA readiness assessment should precede any decision to progress towards full supervisory integration as the package's stated end-state.

Amendment 25

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 49

Or. en

Justification

Settlement internaliser reporting obligations should reflect the nature of the activity generating internalised settlement. Requiring proportionate treatment avoids imposing reporting costs that exceed the supervisory benefit, consistent with the general proportionality principle this Regulation advances.

Amendment 26

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 50

Or. en

Justification

Uniform rules require uniform supervision. Limiting ESMA direct oversight to 15 of 32 EU CSDs preserves the supervisory fragmentation that CSDR was designed to eliminate. Diverging national practices raise costs, enable regulatory arbitrage, and deter cross-border activity. Extending ESMA's competence to all EU CSDs ensures consistent application of the single rulebook and delivers the level playing field the Savings and Investments Union requires.

Amendment 27

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 51

Or. en

Justification

Uniform rules require uniform supervision. Limiting ESMA direct oversight to 15 of 32 EU CSDs preserves the supervisory fragmentation that CSDR was designed to eliminate. Diverging national practices raise costs, enable regulatory arbitrage, and deter cross-border activity. Extending ESMA's competence to all EU CSDs ensures consistent application of the single rulebook and delivers the level playing field the Savings and Investments Union requires.

Amendment 28

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 52

Or. en

Justification

Uniform rules require uniform supervision. Limiting ESMA direct oversight to 15 of 32 EU CSDs preserves the supervisory fragmentation that CSDR was designed to eliminate. Diverging national practices raise costs, enable regulatory arbitrage, and deter cross-border activity. Extending ESMA's competence to all EU CSDs ensures consistent application of the single rulebook and delivers the level playing field the Savings and Investments Union requires.

Amendment 29

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 53

Or. en

Justification

Uniform rules require uniform supervision. Limiting ESMA direct oversight to 15 of 32 EU CSDs preserves the supervisory fragmentation that CSDR was designed to eliminate. Diverging national practices raise costs, enable regulatory arbitrage, and deter cross-border activity. Extending ESMA's competence to all EU CSDs ensures consistent application of the single rulebook and delivers the level playing field the Savings and Investments Union requires.

Amendment 30

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 54

Or. en

Justification

Uniform rules require uniform supervision. Limiting ESMA direct oversight to 15 of 32 EU CSDs preserves the supervisory fragmentation that CSDR was designed to eliminate. Diverging national practices raise costs, enable regulatory arbitrage, and deter cross-border activity. Extending ESMA's competence to all EU CSDs ensures consistent application of the single rulebook and delivers the level playing field the Savings and Investments Union requires.

Amendment 31

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 58 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

The T2S connection obligation applies only to currencies already supported by the Eurosystem infrastructure, leaving CSDs settling in other EU Member State currencies outside its harmonising scope. Co-legislators cannot mandate technical expansion unilaterally. A structured ESMA assessment in consultation with the ESCB creates a clear pathway to broaden the obligation where the evidence supports it.

Amendment 32

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 64

Or. en

Justification

The Commission's existing review mechanism documents fee levels without requiring action where they are excessive. This amendment introduces an enforcement backstop: where ESMA identifies unjustified or disproportionate host supervisory fees, the Commission must respond within twelve months and submit a legislative proposal where warranted. Without this, the review produces no change.

Amendment 33

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 67 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

The CBDF notification platform currently improves supervisory data exchange between NCAs but imposes no obligation to reduce reporting burdens on fund managers. This amendment requires the platform to generate real simplification: where data is already on the platform, managers may not be required to re-submit it. The report-once principle must apply to the fund sector as it does across the broader ESMA data hub.

Amendment 34

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 67 b (new)

Or. en

Justification

Divergent national interpretations of the phrase 'language customary in the sphere of international finance' create unnecessary friction in cross-border passporting procedures. This recital clarifies that English satisfies that standard for passporting documentation, ensuring consistent NCA practice across the Union. It does not affect language requirements for retail investor documents or marketing communications.

Amendment 35

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 74

Or. en

Justification

The amendments introduced by this Regulation (removing time limits on permissions, abolishing asset-specific caps and raising the aggregate threshold) fundamentally change the character of the framework. Retaining the notion of this regulation being a "pilot regime" is no longer accurate and sends the wrong signal to prospective participants who require long-term legal certainty to invest in DLT-based infrastructure at scale.

Amendment 36

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 76

Or. en

Justification

Recital 76 is updated to reflect the amended thresholds in Article 3(2) and Article 3(2b). The original figures were insufficient to support viable large-scale DLT business models and placed EU infrastructure at a competitive disadvantage relative to jurisdictions imposing no equivalent ceilings. The revised thresholds provide the scale necessary to attract institutional investment and develop tokenised capital markets in line with the SIU objectives.

Amendment 37

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 83

Or. en

Justification

The amendment removes specific figures, which are set in the operative text, and makes explicit that the caps are initial safeguards subject to review as the model matures, consistent with the graduation pathway logic applied to DLT market infrastructures under Article 3.

Amendment 38

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 88

Or. en

Justification

Interoperability between DLT market infrastructures is key to an integrated EU tokenised capital market. Effective standards require market expertise that regulators cannot anticipate in advance. This amendment reflects the primacy of industry-led standard-setting while preserving ESMA's advisory role. Premature regulatory prescription risks entrenching legacy designs and disadvantaging innovative architectures, undermining EU competitiveness.

Amendment 39

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 91 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

Blanket ESMA oversight of all CASPs, including SMEs operating in a single Member State, is disproportionate and adds bureaucratic cost without supervisory gain. ESMA direct supervision should be reserved for providers whose scale and cross-border reach genuinely justify centralised oversight. National competent authorities retain supervision of non-significant providers.

Amendment 40

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 92

Or. en

Justification

Blanket ESMA oversight of all CASPs, including SMEs operating in a single Member State, is disproportionate and adds bureaucratic cost without supervisory gain. ESMA direct supervision should be reserved for providers whose scale and cross-border reach genuinely justify centralised oversight. National competent authorities retain supervision of non-significant providers.

Amendment 41

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 93 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

The MISP transfers ESMA's market abuse competence through Title VII amendments without an explicit attribution in Title VI. This amendment supplies that explicit provision and confirms that ESMA's market surveillance and enforcement mandate extends to all market participants regardless of their CASP authorisation status or significance classification. Fragmented market abuse competence based on entity typology would undermine market integrity enforcement across the Union.

Amendment 42

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 94

Or. en

Justification

Blanket ESMA oversight of all CASPs, including SMEs operating in a single Member State, is disproportionate and adds bureaucratic cost without supervisory gain. ESMA direct supervision should be reserved for providers whose scale and cross-border reach genuinely justify centralised oversight. National competent authorities retain supervision of non-significant providers.

Amendment 43

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 97

Or. en

Justification

Blanket ESMA oversight of all CASPs, including SMEs operating in a single Member State, is disproportionate and adds bureaucratic cost without supervisory gain. ESMA direct supervision should be reserved for providers whose scale and cross-border reach genuinely justify centralised oversight. National competent authorities retain supervision of non-significant providers.

Amendment 44

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 98

Or. en

Justification

Blanket ESMA oversight of all CASPs, including SMEs operating in a single Member State, is disproportionate and adds bureaucratic cost without supervisory gain. ESMA direct supervision should be reserved for providers whose scale and cross-border reach genuinely justify centralised oversight. National competent authorities retain supervision of non-significant providers.

Amendment 45

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 99

Or. en

Justification

Blanket ESMA oversight of all CASPs, including SMEs operating in a single Member State, is disproportionate and adds bureaucratic cost without supervisory gain. ESMA direct supervision should be reserved for providers whose scale and cross-border reach genuinely justify centralised oversight. National competent authorities retain supervision of non-significant providers.

Amendment 46

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 99 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

The legal status of multi-issuance arrangements for e-money tokens under MiCA is currently unclear, creating regulatory uncertainty and potential financial stability risks. This recital establishes the policy rationale for Article 48a, grounding the multi-issuance framework in outcome-based prudential standards and legal certainty for existing operators.

Amendment 47

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 100

Or. en

Justification

Recital 100 as drafted would allow the Commission to go beyond just the methodology, but also to change the significance thresholds. The revised wording confines the delegated act reference strictly to the calculation methodology and procedural steps making clear that the thresholds themselves remain a co-legislative prerogative.

Amendment 48

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 108 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

Market infrastructure integration cannot be achieved through supervisory reform alone. Without a competition policy framework aligned with Single Market objectives, cross-border FMI consolidation will remain obstructed regardless of supervisory harmonisation. The Commission must therefore examine whether merger review thresholds, market definitions and national change-of-control regimes are fit for purpose.

Amendment 49

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point b – point 1

Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010

Article 1 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1 – point a

Or. en

Justification

Proportionality should be explicitly mentioned in order to guide and frame ESMA's work.

Amendment 50

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point b a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010

Article 1 – paragraph 5 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

An explicit competitiveness mandate, framed as a secondary objective ensures that competitiveness is structurally embedded in ESMA's decision-making

Amendment 51

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6 – point a – point 1

Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010

Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point aa

Or. en

Justification

The Union supervisory handbook shapes day-to-day supervisory expectations across all NCA interactions. As updated, it contains no requirement to consider the impact on competitiveness or innovation. Adding competitiveness and innovation capacity as explicit considerations ensures the handbook serves the SIU objectives.

Amendment 52

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7

Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010

Article 8a – paragraph 5 – point i a (new)

Or. en

Justification

The practical cooperation arrangements between ESMA and NCAs will govern the operational reality of ESMA's expanded direct supervision. As proposed, the guiding principles address efficiency and proportionality between ESMA and NCAs, but impose no obligation to minimise the burden on supervised entities or to consider competitive implications. Without this, arrangements could impose duplicative reporting, parallel supervisory contacts, or inconsistent expectations on market participants caught between two supervisory layers.

Amendment 53

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8 – point a – point 1

Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010

Article 9a – paragraph 1 – introductory part

Or. en

Justification

The 'urgent and unforeseen' threshold is excessively restrictive. Implementation difficulties are often not foreseeable yet acute. ESMA should be able to act whenever significant issues arise for market participants, not only in exceptional emergencies.

Amendment 54

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8 – point a – point 2

Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010

Article 9a – paragraph 1 – point e a (new)

Or. en

Justification

Level playing field considerations with third countries are a legitimate and distinct ground for ESMA to issue no-action relief. Where strict application of Union law places EU firms at a structural disadvantage relative to third-country competitors, ESMA should be able to act.

Amendment 55

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8 – point b

Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010

Article 9a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2

Or. en

Justification

To be read in conjunction with the previous amendment.

Amendment 56

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point -a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010

Article 10 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3

Or. en

(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:02010R1095-20251110)

Justification

The existing cost-benefit analysis requirement does not systematically require ESMA to consider whether draft technical standards place EU firms at a competitive disadvantage relative to counterparts in other jurisdictions. This amendment embeds a structured competitiveness assessment into ESMA's standard RTS process, ensuring compliance costs are weighed against the international regulatory environment. Results must be published, ensuring transparency and accountability.

Amendment 57

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point c

Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010

Article 10 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

Art 10(5) as proposed lacks any notification obligation to EP or Council. The proposed amendment corrects this shortcoming.

Amendment 58

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point c

Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010

Article 10 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 2

Or. en

Justification

Safeguards EP's information and procedural rights.

Amendment 59

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10 – point -a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010

Article 15 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

Or. en

(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02010R1095-20251110)

Justification

Implementing technical standards, while more operational in character than RTS, can impose significant compliance burdens and affect the competitive position of EU firms relative to counterparts in other jurisdictions. This amendment ensures that the competitiveness assessment required under Article 10 for regulatory technical standards applies equally to implementing technical standards, closing a potential gap and ensuring consistency across ESMA's Level 2 rule-making.

Amendment 60

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10 – point c

Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010

Article 15 – paragraph 5

Or. en

Justification

Safeguards the EP's information rights.

Amendment 61

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10 – point c

Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010

Article 15 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

Safeguards the EP's information rights.

Amendment 62

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10 – point c

Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010

Article 15 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 1 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

Art 15(6) as proposed contains no notification obligation to EP. The proposed amendment remedies this shortcoming.

Amendment 63

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 12 – point b

Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010

Article 17 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1

Or. en

Justification

The current ESMA Regulation already sets a two-month deadline for breach-of-Union-law recommendations. The proposal doubles this without justification. ESMA is simultaneously being granted expanded powers, greater resources, and a mandatory investigation trigger. The changes should accelerate, not slow, its enforcement capacity. Restoring the two-month deadline upholds the effectiveness principle the package claims to advance.

Amendment 64

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 13

Regulation (EU) 1095/2010

Article 17aa – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

Or. en

Justification

The Commission's proposed trigger for ESMA's convergence opinion power lacks the legal certainty necessary for proportionate application. This amendment conditions the power on a finding of a serious, demonstrable risk to market integrity, financial stability or investor protection. This ensures the power remains a targeted corrective tool rather than a standing supervisory override, preserving NCA accountability while maintaining effective EU-level escalation.

Amendment 65

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 14

Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010

Article 17aaa – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

A decision under Article 17aaa can suspend an entity's cross-border services. Unlike Chapter IIa enforcement decisions, it contains no obligation to inform the entity of its appeal rights before the Board of Appeal. This amendment closes that gap, aligning Article 17aaa with the procedural standard already established in Article 39h(4), without affecting ESMA's substantive powers.

Amendment 66

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 21 a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010

Article 29 b (new)

Or. en

Justification

ESMA's existing SNE framework is a generic HR tool with no supervisory culture mandate, no programme governance and no guaranteed annual participation. This Article establishes a structured, purpose-driven programme explicitly linked to supervisory convergence. Modelled on the ECB/SSM approach, it builds the common culture needed for effective ESMA direct supervision without disrupting the NCA role or creating additional compliance costs.

Amendment 67

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 25

Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010

Article 35c – paragraph 1

Or. en

Justification

ESMA should be gradually built in the EU's central data hub for supervisory data. To be read in conjunction with the changes to the respective changes to the database provisions in MiFIR, EMIR, CSDR.

Amendment 68

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 25

Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010

Article 35c – paragraph 3

Or. en

Justification

Formalises the "only report once" principle.

Amendment 69

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 25

Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010

Article 35c – paragraph 3 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

Formalises the "only report once" principle.

Amendment 70

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 25

Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010

Article 35c – paragraph 6 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

In order to be useful, the central data platform should be built on unified templates and universally used standards.

Amendment 71

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 27

Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010

Article 39f – paragraph 3

Or. en

Justification

Article 39g(2) does not contain any criteria, Article 39h(2) however does.

Amendment 72

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 27

Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010

Article 39n – paragraph 2 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

The unified fee framework for ESMA should be complemented by a binding obligation on NCAs to reduce their fees correspondingly when supervisory tasks are transferred. Without such a requirement, there is a good chance that an additional layer of supervision will result in additional costs.

Amendment 73

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 27

Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010

Article 39n – paragraph 7

Or. en

Justification

The fee transparency report as proposed documents ESMA's own fee methodology but provides no external reference point. Without benchmarking against comparable third-country supervisors, Parliament, Council and external stakeholders have no basis on which to assess whether ESMA's fees are internationally competitive. Annual publication of a comparative analysis creates a structural incentive for fee discipline and ensures that supervisory costs do not become a driver of regulatory arbitrage.

Amendment 74

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 27

Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010

Article 39n – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

Article 39n(8) empowers the Commission to set ESMA's supervisory fee methodology by delegated act, but provides no calibration criteria. Without guardrails, fees risk exceeding the cost of supervision, stacking across multiple regulatory regimes, or placing Union market participants at a systematic disadvantage relative to third-country competitors subject to lower supervisory charges. Embedding proportionality and competitive benchmarking criteria directly in the empowerment prevents this at source.

Amendment 75

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 27

Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010

Article 39n – paragraph 9 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

Requiring ESMA to report annually on NCA fee levels in transferred sectors allows to measure the efficiency gains from the Market Integration and Supervision Package.

Amendment 76

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 28 – point a

Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010

Article 40 – paragraph 1 – point ba

Or. en

Justification

The Executive Board exists to bring an independent, Union-oriented perspective to ESMA's decision-making. A double-weighted vote in the Board of Supervisors gives that perspective the structural influence it requires. This strengthens the European dimension in regulatory and convergence decisions without altering the BoS composition or displacing the role of national competent authorities, whose representation and objection rights are fully preserved.

Amendment 77

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 28 – point a a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010

Article 40 – paragraph 1 – point c

Or. en

(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02010R1095-20251110)

Justification

The Commission representative on the Board of Supervisors brings a pan-European institutional perspective that is structurally distinct from the national supervisory lens of NCA members. Granting voting rights reinforces the Union dimension in ESMA's decision-making and ensures that competitiveness and Single Market considerations not only micro-prudential risk sensitivity are reflected in outcomes. This is consistent with ESMA's evolving role as a genuinely EU-level authority.

Amendment 78

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 30 – point c

Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010

Article 43 – paragraph 5 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

This amendment requires ESMA to report annually on its contribution to Union capital market competitiveness using consistent, publicly available indicators benchmarked against third-country peers. Such an approach is in line with international best practices, as demonstrated by the UK FCA/PRA secondary competitiveness objective model. The requirement for the Chairperson to present the competitiveness chapter to Parliament's competent committee ensures the secondary objective is subject to democratic scrutiny and cannot be discharged as a box-ticking exercise.

Amendment 79

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 30 – point c

Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010

Article 43 – paragraph 5 b (new)

Or. en

Justification

Strengthens the secondary competitiveness objective by linking ESMA's annual reporting to a structured Commission response within 12 months, with a legislative proposal, in case serious and persistent shortcomings are identified.

Amendment 80

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 33

Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010

Article 44a – paragraph 4

Or. en

Justification

Effective supervision of capital markets requires understanding how those markets function in practice. Requiring the selection process to ensure collective experience in capital markets practice or financial services operations is strengthening the new Executive Board.

Amendment 81

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34

Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010

Article 44b – paragraph 2

Or. en

Justification

Streamlines ESMA's decision-making procedure by limiting timelines and veto powers of the Board of Supervisors.

Amendment 82

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 39

Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010

Article 46a – paragraph 4 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

For decisions materially affecting business models or cost structures, e.g. risk model approvals, capital add-ons, operational restrictions, the consequences for the entity's market position can be severe and lasting. A documented proportionality and competitiveness assessment ensures accountability and provides a basis for judicial review.

Amendment 83

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 – point a a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010

Article 48 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1

Or. en

(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02010R1095-20251110)

Justification

ESMA's expanded direct supervisory mandate under this Regulation warrants accountability standards consistent with those applicable to AMLA. Alignment with the AMLA model, under which the Commission nominates following Parliament hearings on a published shortlist, ensures democratic accountability commensurate with ESMA's significantly expanded powers.

Amendment 84

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 58

Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010

Article 75a – paragraph 6

Or. en

Justification

The standard objection period for financial services files is 3+3 months. There is no reason to deviate from this timeframe. The amendment aligns the provisions in Article 75a with the standard deadlines.

Amendment 85

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point a

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 1b a (new)

Or. en

Justification

Introduces a technology-neutral definition of central bank money in alignment with the new definition introduced in CSDR.

Amendment 86

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point a

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 1b b (new)

Or. en

Justification

References existing MiFID II definition of financial instruments for legal certainty. The MiFID II definition is technology agnostic, i.e. also allows for tokenised financial instruments.

Amendment 87

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point b

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 13

Or. en

Justification

The underlying logic of this proposal acknowledges that divergent national supervision creates an uneven playing field and supervisory arbitrage risk. That logic does not stop at the significance threshold. With a limited number of EU CCPs, full ESMA supervision is operationally realistic. Extending direct ESMA oversight to all CCPs eliminates the remaining structural incentive for regulatory competition between NCAs and completes the single supervisory framework the Commission itself began.

Amendment 88

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point c

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

Article 2 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – points 13a, 13b and 13c

Or. en

Justification

The underlying logic of this proposal acknowledges that divergent national supervision creates an uneven playing field and supervisory arbitrage risk. That logic does not stop at the significance threshold. With a limited number of EU CCPs, full ESMA supervision is operationally realistic. Extending direct ESMA oversight to all CCPs eliminates the remaining structural incentive for regulatory competition between NCAs and completes the single supervisory framework the Commission itself began.

Amendment 89

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point e

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Or. en

Justification

To be read in conjunction with the amendments to Art. 17c EMIR, Art. 35c of the ESMA regulation and Art. 21a of CSDR: ESMA should build one central database for supervisory information. The EMIR database should be integrated into that database.

Amendment 90

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 5 a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

Article 9 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 6

Or. en

(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02012R0648-20250117)

Justification

Streamlines the exemption for intra-group transactions from the EMIR reporting obligation by applying it on group level: The existing exemption for intra-group derivative transactions requires separate notification to the competent authority of each Member State where a group entity is established, imposing compliance costs disproportionate to any supervisory benefit given that intra-group transactions net to zero at group level.

Amendment 91

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 5 b (new)

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

Article 9 – paragraph 1a – subparagraph 3

Or. en

(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02012R0648-20250117)

Justification

Current Article 9(1a) limits mandatory single-sided reporting to FC/NFC- pairs, leaving FC-FC trades subject to dual-sided reporting and TR-level reconciliation, which is the primary compliance cost driver identified in ESMA's Interim Report on the simplification of financial transaction reporting (ESMA12-1406959660-3175). This amendment extends the single-sided principle to all derivative contracts, with ESMA mandated to specify the designation hierarchy at Level 2.

Amendment 92

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 5 c (new)

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

Article 9 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1

Or. en

(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:02012R0648-20250117)

Justification

Article 9(5) is extended to mandate ESMA to specify the FC-FC reporting designation hierarchy at Level 2, giving precedence to the dealer or CCP as the party closest to the data. This ensures the single-sided principle introduced in paragraph 1a is operationally effective without prescribing technical sequencing at Level 1.

Amendment 93

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 6

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

Articles 12 – paragraph 1b

Or. en

Justification

The underlying logic of this proposal acknowledges that divergent national supervision creates an uneven playing field and supervisory arbitrage risk. That logic does not stop at the significance threshold. With a limited number of EU CCPs, full ESMA supervision is operationally realistic. Extending direct ESMA oversight to all CCPs eliminates the remaining structural incentive for regulatory competition between NCAs and completes the single supervisory framework the Commission itself began.

Amendment 94

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 10 – point a

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

Article 17c – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

Or. en

Justification

The EMIR platform should be part of the integrated data hub set up by ESMA as part of the changes introduced via this regulation to the ESMA regulation. For the performance of their macroprudential responsibilities, the European Systemic Risk Board and the members of the European System of Central Banks should have access to the information shared via the central database established under Article 17c of EMIR.

Amendment 95

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 14 – point a

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

Article 22 – title

Or. en

Justification

The underlying logic of this proposal acknowledges that divergent national supervision creates an uneven playing field and supervisory arbitrage risk. That logic does not stop at the significance threshold. With a limited number of EU CCPs, full ESMA supervision is operationally realistic. Extending direct ESMA oversight to all CCPs eliminates the remaining structural incentive for regulatory competition between NCAs and completes the single supervisory framework the Commission itself began.

Amendment 96

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 14 – point b

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

Article 22 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

Or. en

Justification

The underlying logic of this proposal acknowledges that divergent national supervision creates an uneven playing field and supervisory arbitrage risk. That logic does not stop at the significance threshold. With a limited number of EU CCPs, full ESMA supervision is operationally realistic. Extending direct ESMA oversight to all CCPs eliminates the remaining structural incentive for regulatory competition between NCAs and completes the single supervisory framework the Commission itself began.

Amendment 97

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 14 – point b

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

Article 22 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

Or. en

Justification

The underlying logic of this proposal acknowledges that divergent national supervision creates an uneven playing field and supervisory arbitrage risk. That logic does not stop at the significance threshold. With a limited number of EU CCPs, full ESMA supervision is operationally realistic. Extending direct ESMA oversight to all CCPs eliminates the remaining structural incentive for regulatory competition between NCAs and completes the single supervisory framework the Commission itself began.

Amendment 98

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 14 – point c

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

Article 22 – paragraph 1a

Or. en

Justification

The underlying logic of this proposal acknowledges that divergent national supervision creates an uneven playing field and supervisory arbitrage risk. That logic does not stop at the significance threshold. With a limited number of EU CCPs, full ESMA supervision is operationally realistic. Extending direct ESMA oversight to all CCPs eliminates the remaining structural incentive for regulatory competition between NCAs and completes the single supervisory framework the Commission itself began.

Amendment 99

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 14 – point d – introductory part

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

Article 22 – paragraph 2

Or. en

Justification

The underlying logic of this proposal acknowledges that divergent national supervision creates an uneven playing field and supervisory arbitrage risk. That logic does not stop at the significance threshold. With a limited number of EU CCPs, full ESMA supervision is operationally realistic. Extending direct ESMA oversight to all CCPs eliminates the remaining structural incentive for regulatory competition between NCAs and completes the single supervisory framework the Commission itself began.

Amendment 100

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 14 – point e

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

Article 22 – paragraph 4

Or. en

Justification

The underlying logic of this proposal acknowledges that divergent national supervision creates an uneven playing field and supervisory arbitrage risk. That logic does not stop at the significance threshold. With a limited number of EU CCPs, full ESMA supervision is operationally realistic. Extending direct ESMA oversight to all CCPs eliminates the remaining structural incentive for regulatory competition between NCAs and completes the single supervisory framework the Commission itself began.

Amendment 101

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 15

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

Articles 22a–22e

Or. en

Justification

The underlying logic of this proposal acknowledges that divergent national supervision creates an uneven playing field and supervisory arbitrage risk. That logic does not stop at the significance threshold. With a limited number of EU CCPs, full ESMA supervision is operationally realistic. Extending direct ESMA oversight to all CCPs eliminates the remaining structural incentive for regulatory competition between NCAs and completes the single supervisory framework the Commission itself began.

Amendment 102

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – introductory part

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

Article 23a

Or. en

Justification

The underlying logic of this proposal acknowledges that divergent national supervision creates an uneven playing field and supervisory arbitrage risk. That logic does not stop at the significance threshold. With a limited number of EU CCPs, full ESMA supervision is operationally realistic. Extending direct ESMA oversight to all CCPs eliminates the remaining structural incentive for regulatory competition between NCAs and completes the single supervisory framework the Commission itself began.

Amendment 103

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 25 a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

Article 46 – paragraph 1 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

The Master Regulation introduces technology-neutral definitions in EMIR but does not extend them to the collateral eligibility provisions in Article 46. Without express confirmation that tokenised equivalents of eligible assets qualify on the same terms, CCPs face legal uncertainty when accepting them as margin. The RTS mandate ensures supervisory convergence and proportionate risk treatment.

Amendment 104

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 25 b (new)

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

Article 47 – paragraph 3 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

Article 47 requires non-cash collateral to be held with operators of securities settlement systems and cash to be deposited with the ESCB or authorised credit institutions. DLT notaries and DLT account keepers authorised under Regulation (EU) 2022/858 are outside those categories, preventing CCPs from holding tokenised collateral in the form in which it is issued. Point (b) removes a corresponding ambiguity for central bank money in tokenised form, where the issuer is the same central bank but the technical settlement structure may not map to a conventional deposit.

Amendment 105

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 25 c (new)

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

Article 50 – paragraph 3 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

Modernises the settlement provisions in EMIR and makes them fit for DLT and tokenised money.

Amendment 106

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 2 – point a – point iv

Regulation (EU) No 600/2014

Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 10a a (new)

Or. en

Justification

Article 8a(3) requires pre-trade transparency requirements to be calibrated for different types of trading systems. A definition of hybrid trading systems is required to ensure that the calibration mandate operates effectively and that ESMA's RTS mandate under Article 9(5) covers the full range of systems operated by trading venues.

Amendment 107

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 2 – point a – point xiii

Regulation (EU) No 600/2014

Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 36b

Or. en

Justification

The equity consolidated tape was selected in December 2025 and has not yet gone live. Amending its scope before any operational experience is premature and disproportionate. Article 52(14) already mandates an evidence-based ESMA review followed by a Commission legislative proposal. That process should be allowed to run before any changes to the content of the tape are considered.

Amendment 108

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 3

Regulation No 600/2014/EU

Article 2a – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1

Or. en

Justification

This restriction should be removed as the concept of "ancillary activities that are linked to the operation of a regulated market" is ill-defined and the added benefit of the restriction remains unclear.

Amendment 109

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 3

Regulation (EU) No 600/2014

Article 2r – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 5

Or. en

Justification

The 60-working-day window for national competent authority opinions on extensions of authorisation is disproportionate for entities already subject to ongoing ESMA supervision.

Amendment 110

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 3

Regulation (EU) No 600/2014

Article 2r – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 5 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

The 60-working-day window for national competent authority opinions on extensions of authorisation is disproportionate for entities already subject to ongoing ESMA supervision.

Amendment 111

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 3

Regulation (EU) No 600/2014

Article 2r – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 6

Or. en

Justification

Sets a clear deadline for ESMA to respond to the NCA opinion.

Amendment 112

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 6

Regulation (EU) No 600/2014

Article 8a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part

Or. en

Justification

Limiting pre-trade transparency to central limit order books and periodic auction systems creates an unintended coverage gap for exchange-operated block trading systems. This produces a structural incentive to route pre-arranged trades through the least transparent channel and renders LIS and illiquid-instrument waivers redundant for a significant portion of ETD activity.

Amendment 113

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 7 – point b a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 600/2014

Article 9 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1 – point (b)

Or. en

Justification

Provides an explicit mandate for ESMA to provide pre-trade transparency requirements to hybrid systems.

Amendment 114

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 10

Regulation (EU) No 600/2014

Article 14 – paragraph 7 – subparagraph 1 – point f a (new)

Or. en

Justification

Systematic internalisers' pre-trade transparency obligations apply only to shares classified as having a liquid market. Under the current methodology, the vast majority of EU-listed shares fall outside that classification, rendering the SI quoting regime largely inoperative. ESMA should revise the methodology to ensure a sufficiently high proportion of shares are classified as liquid, using dynamic calibration to prevent static threshold effects.

Amendment 115

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 10 a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 600/2014

Article 15 – paragraph 1 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

Trading venues must publish comprehensive operational rulebooks; systematic internalisers face no equivalent obligation despite their growing share of Union equity trading. This amendment requires rulebook disclosure covering access criteria, execution process and bilateral execution arrangements, enabling market participants to assess execution conditions and competent authorities to enforce the bilateral-execution requirement.

Amendment 116

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 11

Regulation (EU) No 600/2014

Article 15 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 – point a

Or. en

Justification

A large share of SI executions offer no meaningful price improvement over lit market prices, undermining the rationale for bilateral execution. A minimum improvement of one tick over the primary market best bid and offer restores genuine client value, aligns the SI framework with its original purpose, and strengthens price formation across EU equity markets.

Amendment 117

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 11

Regulation (EU) No 600/2014

Article 15 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 – point b

Or. en

Justification

A large share of SI executions offer no meaningful price improvement over lit market prices, undermining the rationale for bilateral execution. A minimum improvement of one tick over the primary market best bid and offer restores genuine client value, aligns the SI framework with its original purpose, and strengthens price formation across EU equity markets.

Amendment 118

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 11

Regulation (EU) No 600/2014

Article 15 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3

Or. en

Justification

The third subparagraph of the Commission text (defining "retail order" for purposes of the original Article 15(2)(b)) is deleted as a consequence of extending the quote-update obligation to all orders.

Amendment 119

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 30

Regulation (EU) No 600/2014

Article 38fa – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1

Or. en

Justification

The Commission's permanent derogation for national surveillance authorities risks entrenching supervisory fragmentation at the market-integrity layer indefinitely. A three-year transitional period, anchored in a binding ESMA readiness assessment, preserves operational continuity while creating a clear pathway to fully integrated supervision.

Amendment 120

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 30

Regulation (EU) No 600/2014

Article 38fa – paragraph 2 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

The Commission's permanent derogation for national surveillance authorities risks entrenching supervisory fragmentation at the market-integrity layer indefinitely. A three-year transitional period, anchored in a binding ESMA readiness assessment, preserves operational continuity while creating a clear pathway to fully integrated supervision.

Amendment 121

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 31

Regulation (EU) No 600/2014

Article 38fb – paragraph 7 – point c

Or. en

Justification

Supervisory transition plans will govern the transfer of competence over significant trading venues from NCAs to ESMA. As drafted, the delegated act mandate focuses solely on procedural orderliness, with no obligation to minimise disruption to supervised entities or their clients. Transitions that are poorly sequenced or insufficiently resourced impose real operational and reputational costs. Requiring transition plans to address competitive continuity and client impact ensures the architecture change does not itself become a source of market disruption.

Amendment 122

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 31

Regulation (EU) No 600/2014

Article 38fb – paragraph 8

Or. en

Justification

Determining which trading venues fall under ESMA direct supervision is a matter of fundamental institutional significance, not a technical adjustment. Delegating threshold-setting to the Commission bypasses the co-legislators and removes democratic scrutiny from a decision with direct consequences for the allocation of supervisory competence. This power must remain with Parliament and Council.

Amendment 123

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 31

Regulation (EU) No 600/2014

Article 38fb – paragraph 9 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

Systematic internalisers account for a material and growing share of EU equity trading. Where their activity meets significance thresholds comparable to those applied to trading venues, fragmented national supervision risks regulatory arbitrage. This clause requires ESMA to conduct and evidence-based assessment of the case for an extension of the scope of direct supervision to systematic internalisers.

Amendment 124

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Regulation (EU) No 600/2014

Article 38fd – paragraph 1 – introductory part

Or. en

Justification

The central platform should be an integrated part of the broader supervisory reporting platform set up by ESMA as part of the adjustments to the ESMA regulation. This amendment is to be read in conjunction with the corresponding changes to Art. 35c of the ESMA regulation and Art. 21a of CSDR.

Amendment 125

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Regulation (EU) No 600/2014

Article 38fd – paragraph 5 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

The central platform should be an integrated part of the broader supervisory reporting platform set up by ESMA as part of the adjustments to the ESMA regulation. This amendment is to be read in conjunction with the corresponding changes to Art. 35c of the ESMA regulation and Art. 21a of CSDR.

Amendment 126

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 39 – point a

Regulation (EU) No 600/2014

Article 52 – paragraph 14

Or. en

Justification

Amending the scope of the equity consolidated tape before it has gone live is premature. The existing review framework is the appropriate vehicle for evidence-based decisions on additional features such as increased depth of book or venue de-anonymisation. This amendment strengthens that framework by extending ESMA's assessment deadline to ensure it draws on sufficient operational experience, and by explicitly identifying the features to be evaluated.

Amendment 127

Proposal for a regulation

Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 2 – point j

Regulation (EU) No 909/2014

Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 17

Or. en

Justification

Uniform rules require uniform supervision. Limiting ESMA direct oversight to 15 of 32 EU CSDs preserves the supervisory fragmentation that CSDR was designed to eliminate. Diverging national practices raise costs, enable regulatory arbitrage, and deter cross-border activity. Extending ESMA's competence to all EU CSDs ensures consistent application of the single rulebook and delivers the level playing field the Savings and Investments Union requires.

Amendment 128

Proposal for a regulation

Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 2 – point k

Regulation (EU) No 909/2014

Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 17a

Or. en

Justification

Uniform rules require uniform supervision. Limiting ESMA direct oversight to 15 of 32 EU CSDs preserves the supervisory fragmentation that CSDR was designed to eliminate. Diverging national practices raise costs, enable regulatory arbitrage, and deter cross-border activity. Extending ESMA's competence to all EU CSDs ensures consistent application of the single rulebook and delivers the level playing field the Savings and Investments Union requires.

Amendment 129

Proposal for a regulation

Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 3 a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 909/2014

Article 3 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1

Or. en

(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02014R0909-20260117)

Justification

Article 3(2) CSDR requires recording exclusively in an authorised CSD, yet MISP introduces DLT notaries without updating this provision. DLT architectures functionally separate the recording layer from the settlement layer, which should be reflected in the CSDR. This amendment closes the resulting gap in the permanent framework, while preserving prudential safeguards.

Amendment 130

Proposal for a regulation

Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 8 – introductory part

Regulation (EU) No 909/2014

Article 10

Or. en

Justification

Uniform rules require uniform supervision. Limiting ESMA direct oversight to 15 of 32 EU CSDs preserves the supervisory fragmentation that CSDR was designed to eliminate. Diverging national practices raise costs, enable regulatory arbitrage, and deter cross-border activity. Extending ESMA's competence to all EU CSDs ensures consistent application of the single rulebook and delivers the level playing field the Savings and Investments Union requires.

Amendment 131

Proposal for a regulation

Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 9

Regulation (EU) No 909/2014

Article 11 – title

Or. en

Justification

Uniform rules require uniform supervision. Limiting ESMA direct oversight to 15 of 32 EU CSDs preserves the supervisory fragmentation that CSDR was designed to eliminate. Diverging national practices raise costs, enable regulatory arbitrage, and deter cross-border activity. Extending ESMA's competence to all EU CSDs ensures consistent application of the single rulebook and delivers the level playing field the Savings and Investments Union requires.

Amendment 132

Proposal for a regulation

Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 9

Regulation (EU) No 909/2014

Article 11 – paragraph 1

Or. en

Justification

Uniform rules require uniform supervision. Limiting ESMA direct oversight to 15 of 32 EU CSDs preserves the supervisory fragmentation that CSDR was designed to eliminate. Diverging national practices raise costs, enable regulatory arbitrage, and deter cross-border activity. Extending ESMA's competence to all EU CSDs ensures consistent application of the single rulebook and delivers the level playing field the Savings and Investments Union requires.

Amendment 133

Proposal for a regulation

Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 9

Regulation (EU) No 909/2014

Article 11 – paragraph 2

Or. en

Justification

Uniform rules require uniform supervision. Limiting ESMA direct oversight to 15 of 32 EU CSDs preserves the supervisory fragmentation that CSDR was designed to eliminate. Diverging national practices raise costs, enable regulatory arbitrage, and deter cross-border activity. Extending ESMA's competence to all EU CSDs ensures consistent application of the single rulebook and delivers the level playing field the Savings and Investments Union requires.

Amendment 134

Proposal for a regulation

Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 9

Regulation (EU) No 909/2014

Article 11 – paragraph 3

Or. en

Justification

Uniform rules require uniform supervision. Limiting ESMA direct oversight to 15 of 32 EU CSDs preserves the supervisory fragmentation that CSDR was designed to eliminate. Diverging national practices raise costs, enable regulatory arbitrage, and deter cross-border activity. Extending ESMA's competence to all EU CSDs ensures consistent application of the single rulebook and delivers the level playing field the Savings and Investments Union requires.

Amendment 135

Proposal for a regulation

Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 9

Regulation (EU) No 909/2014

Article 11 – paragraph 4

Or. en

Justification

As the rapporteur's approach extends ESMA's competence to all authorised CSDs, the significance determination procedure falls away in its entirety.

Amendment 136

Proposal for a regulation

Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 9

Regulation (EU) No 909/2014

Article 11 – paragraph 5

Or. en

Justification

Article 11(5) requires prospective CSDs to request a significance determination from ESMA before applying for authorisation. As the rapporteur's approach makes ESMA the competent authority for all authorised CSDs without distinction, no entity-level significance assessment is required at the authorisation stage. The provision is redundant and is deleted accordingly.

Amendment 137

Proposal for a regulation

Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 9

Regulation (EU) No 909/2014

Article 11 – paragraph 6

Or. en

Justification

Uniform rules require uniform supervision. Limiting ESMA direct oversight to 15 of 32 EU CSDs preserves the supervisory fragmentation that CSDR was designed to eliminate. Diverging national practices raise costs, enable regulatory arbitrage, and deter cross-border activity. Extending ESMA's competence to all EU CSDs ensures consistent application of the single rulebook and delivers the level playing field the Savings and Investments Union requires.

Amendment 138

Proposal for a regulation

Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 9

Regulation (EU) No 909/2014

Article 11 – paragraph 7

Or. en

Justification

Article 11(7) requires ESMA to maintain and publish a list of significant CSDs. As the rapporteur's approach removes the significant/less significant distinction and establishes ESMA as competent authority for all authorised CSDs, no such list is required. The general ESMA register of authorised entities serves the transparency purpose without duplication.

Amendment 139

Proposal for a regulation

Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 9

Regulation (EU) No 909/2014

Article 11 – paragraph 8

Or. en

Justification

Uniform rules require uniform supervision. Limiting ESMA direct oversight to 15 of 32 EU CSDs preserves the supervisory fragmentation that CSDR was designed to eliminate. Diverging national practices raise costs, enable regulatory arbitrage, and deter cross-border activity. Extending ESMA's competence to all EU CSDs ensures consistent application of the single rulebook and delivers the level playing field the Savings and Investments Union requires.

Amendment 140

Proposal for a regulation

Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 9

Regulation (EU) No 909/2014

Article 11 – paragraph 10 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

Article 11 grants the Commission an unconstrained power to set supervisory fees for CSDs by delegated act. Embedding proportionality, non-discrimination and third-country benchmarking directly in the empowerment prevents fee-setting from becoming a driver of regulatory arbitrage or market relocation.

Amendment 141

Proposal for a regulation

Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 10

Regulation (EU) No 909/2014

Article 11a

Or. en

Justification

Uniform rules require uniform supervision. Limiting ESMA direct oversight to 15 of 32 EU CSDs preserves the supervisory fragmentation that CSDR was designed to eliminate. Diverging national practices raise costs, enable regulatory arbitrage, and deter cross-border activity. Extending ESMA's competence to all EU CSDs ensures consistent application of the single rulebook and delivers the level playing field the Savings and Investments Union requires. No definition of significant CSDs is needed.

Amendment 142

Proposal for a regulation

Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 12

Regulation (EU) No 909/2014

Article 11c

Or. en

Justification

Uniform rules require uniform supervision. Limiting ESMA direct oversight to 15 of 32 EU CSDs preserves the supervisory fragmentation that CSDR was designed to eliminate. Diverging national practices raise costs, enable regulatory arbitrage, and deter cross-border activity. Extending ESMA's competence to all EU CSDs ensures consistent application of the single rulebook and delivers the level playing field the Savings and Investments Union requires.

Amendment 143

Proposal for a regulation

Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 22

Regulation (EU) No 909/2014

Article 21a – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

Or. en

Justification

The CSDR database should operate as an integral component of the general database introduced via the new Article 35c of the ESMA regulation. This setup ensures that there is one central database rather than several new databases that co-exist side-by-side. This amendment is to be read in conjunction with the changes made to Art. 35c of the ESMA regulation and Article 17c of EMIR and Art. 38fd of MIFR.

Amendment 144

Proposal for a regulation

Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 22

Regulation (EU) No 909/2014

Article 21a – paragraph 3 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

The CSDR database should operate as an integral component of the general database introduced via the new Article 35c of the ESMA regulation. This setup ensures that there is one central database rather than several new databases that co-exist side-by-side. This amendment is to be read in conjunction with the changes made to Art. 35c of the ESMA regulation, Article 17c of EMIR and Art. 38fd of MIFR.

Amendment 145

Proposal for a regulation

Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 22

Regulation (EU) No 909/2014

Article 21c – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3

Or. en

Justification

The CSDR database should operate as an integral component of the general database introduced via the new Article 35c of the ESMA regulation. This setup ensures that there is one central database rather than several new databases that co-exist side-by-side. This amendment is to be read in conjunction with the changes made to Art. 35c of the ESMA regulation, Article 17c of EMIR and Art. 38fd of MIFR.

Amendment 146

Proposal for a regulation

Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 26 – introductory part

Regulation (EU) No 909/2014

Article 24a

Or. en

Justification

Uniform rules require uniform supervision. Limiting ESMA direct oversight to 15 of 32 EU CSDs preserves the supervisory fragmentation that CSDR was designed to eliminate. Diverging national practices raise costs, enable regulatory arbitrage, and deter cross-border activity. Extending ESMA's competence to all EU CSDs ensures consistent application of the single rulebook and delivers the level playing field the Savings and Investments Union requires. The article establishing supervisory colleges is no longer needed if CSDs are directly supervised by ESMA.

Amendment 147

Proposal for a regulation

Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 35

Regulation (EU) No 909/2014

Article 34 – paragraph 10 – subparagraph 1

Or. en

Justification

The Commission's fee disclosure mandate is welcome but leaves ESMA with unconstrained discretion over template design, creating a risk that standardisation is achieved in form without generating meaningful comparability in practice. This amendment anchors the ITS template to a standardised fee grid structured around the core services in Section A of the CSDR Annex, ensuring that participants can make genuine like-for-like price comparisons across CSDs and competitive discipline can operate effectively in the post-trade space.

Amendment 148

Proposal for a regulation

Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 39

Regulation (EU) No 909/2014

Article 40 – paragraph 3 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

Review clause for T2S scope extension: The mandatory T2S connection obligation applies only to currencies already supported by the common settlement infrastructure, leaving CSDs settling in other EU Member State currencies outside its scope. Since extending the infrastructure to new currencies requires technical preparation that cannot be mandated unilaterally, this amendment introduces a mandatory ESMA review that should be conducted in close coordination with the relevant central banks, including the ECB.

Amendment 149

Proposal for a regulation

Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 50

Regulation (EU) No 909/2014

Article 54c – paragraph 2 – point a

Or. en

Justification

The significance criterion is too stringent and puts European providers and smaller players at a disadvantage.

Amendment 150

Proposal for a regulation

Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 58 – point a

Regulation (EU) No 909/2014

Article 67 – paragraph 2b

Or. en

Justification

Article 67(2b) erroneously cross-references Article 11a(6), which does not exist. The delegated act empowerment in Article 11a is contained in paragraph 5. Deletion of the reference to article 11a to be consistent with the amendment deleting this article.

Amendment 151

Proposal for a regulation

Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 58 – point b

Regulation (EU) No 909/2014

Article 67 – paragraph 3

Or. en

Justification

Article 67(3) erroneously cross-references Article 11a(6), which does not exist. The delegated act empowerment in Article 11a is contained in paragraph 5. Deletion of the reference to article 11a to be consistent with the amendment deleting this article.

Amendment 152

Proposal for a regulation

Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point e

Regulation (EU) 2019/1156

Article 4 – paragraph 6 – introductory part

Or. en

Justification

Requiring delegated acts to be principles-based and to reflect sector heterogeneity ensures harmonisation is achieved without disproportionate compliance costs for smaller and specialist managers.

Amendment 153

Proposal for a regulation

Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point 8

Regulation (EU) 2019/1156

Article 9 – paragraph 2

Or. en

Justification

A 36-month delay before the first fee review is unnecessary: competent authorities already hold the relevant information and can provide it to ESMA without delay. Shortening the initial review to 12 months ensures that disproportionate barriers to cross-border fund distribution are identified and addressed promptly, in line with the Savings and Investments Union objective of rapid Single Market fragmentation removal.

Amendment 154

Proposal for a regulation

Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point 8

Regulation (EU) 2019/1156

Article 9 – paragraph 2 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

The review mechanism introduced by the Commission lacks an enforcement backstop. The new paragraph 2a addresses this gap by requiring the Commission to report to the co-legislators on intended remedial action within 12 months of an adverse ESMA finding, accompanied by a legislative proposal where the evidence warrants one.

Amendment 155

Proposal for a regulation

Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point 11

Regulation (EU) 2019/1156

Article 12 – paragraph 5 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

Cross-border fund managers should not be required to submit the same information to multiple authorities for the same purpose. Where data has been transmitted to the ESMA platform, NCAs must be deemed to have received it. This "report only once" principle should apply equally across the fund sector.

Amendment 156

Proposal for a regulation

Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point 11

Regulation (EU) 2019/1156

Article 12 – paragraph 5 b (new)

Or. en

Justification

The platform will only delivers genuine simplification if duplicative national obligations are identified and eliminated. This amendment requires ESMA to map reporting overlaps and recommend formal disapplication, with the Commission obliged to follow up legislatively within a fixed deadline. This creates a clear pathway towards a more integrated reporting regime.

Amendment 157

Proposal for a regulation

Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point 15

Regulation (EU) 2019/1156

Article 14c – paragraph 4 – point a

Or. en

Justification

The suspension of cross-border marketing carries immediate reputational and commercial consequences. Under point (a) as proposed by the Commission, ESMA may impose such a suspension for procedural non-compliance alone, irrespective of any actual risk to investors or market integrity. The amendment introduces a proportionality threshold, requiring ESMA to demonstrate a significant risk before acting.

Amendment 158

Proposal for a regulation

Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point 16

Regulation (EU) 2019/1156

Article 17c – paragraph 9 – subparagraph 1 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

The notification obligation for material UCITS changes currently runs without procedural consequence: a competent authority that fails to respond within 15 working days leaves the UCITS in legal uncertainty. A silence-equals-consent rule resolves this by deeming the change acknowledged at expiry of the period where no objection is raised, preventing supervisory inaction from becoming a de facto barrier to legitimate operational change.

Amendment 159

Proposal for a regulation

Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point 16

Regulation (EU) 2019/1156

Article 17c – paragraph 9 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

The proposal introduces a harmonised notification procedure for material changes but leaves the concept undefined, allowing divergent national thresholds to persist. This amendment mandates ESMA to develop RTS anchored in essential investor rights, providing a clear and uniform materiality standard while explicitly excluding purely operational changes from the notification trigger.

Amendment 160

Proposal for a regulation

Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point 16

Regulation (EU) 2019/1156

Article 17f – paragraph 10 – subparagraph 1 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

Introduces a silence procedure.

Amendment 161

Proposal for a regulation

Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point 16

Regulation (EU) 2019/1156

Article 17g – paragraph 9 – subparagraph 1 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

The notification obligation for material AIF changes currently runs without procedural consequence: a competent authority that fails to respond within 15 working days leaves the AIFM in legal uncertainty. A silence-equals-consent rule resolves this by deeming the change acknowledged at expiry of the period where no objection is raised, preventing supervisory inaction from constituting a structural impediment to cross-border fund management.

Amendment 162

Proposal for a regulation

Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point 16

Regulation (EU) 2019/1156

Article 17g – paragraph 9 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

The proposal introduces a harmonised notification procedure for material changes but leaves the concept undefined, allowing divergent national thresholds to persist. This amendment mandates ESMA to develop RTS anchored in essential investor rights, providing a clear and uniform materiality standard while explicitly excluding purely operational changes from the notification trigger.

Amendment 163

Proposal for a regulation

Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point 16

Regulation (EU) 2019/1156

Article 17i – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

Or. en

Justification

Double-charging by both ESMA and NCAs for the same service should be avoided.

Amendment 164

Proposal for a regulation

Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point 3 – point b

Regulation (EU) 2022/858

Article 3 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1

Or. en

Justification

The €100 billion cap constrains the viability of large-scale DLT infrastructure: a single tokenised short-term financing market already exceeds €350 billion. US platforms face no equivalent ceiling. Raising the threshold to €1 000 billion enables meaningful business models, attracts institutional investment and keeps EU capital markets competitive globally.

Amendment 165

Proposal for a regulation

Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point 3 – point b

Regulation (EU) 2022/858

Article 3 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2

Or. en

Justification

The €100 billion cap constrains the viability of large-scale DLT infrastructure: a single tokenised short-term financing market already exceeds €350 billion. US platforms face no equivalent ceiling. Raising the threshold to €1 000 billion enables meaningful business models, attracts institutional investment and keeps EU capital markets competitive globally.

Amendment 166

Proposal for a regulation

Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point 3 – point c

Regulation (EU) 2022/858

Article 3 – paragraph 2a

Or. en

Justification

The transition threshold in Article 3(2a) is raised to €1 500 billion in proportion to the increase of the aggregate cap to €1 000 billion. Maintaining a meaningful buffer between the operational ceiling and the transition trigger ensures operators are not forced into premature restructuring, preserving regulatory predictability and investment continuity for large-scale DLT infrastructure.

Amendment 167

Proposal for a regulation

Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point 3 – point c

Regulation (EU) 2022/858

Article 3 – paragraph 2b – subparagraph 1

Or. en

Justification

The €10 billion ceiling for the simplified regime limits commercial viability: market makers and liquidity providers will not integrate with platforms capped at volumes insufficient to support meaningful activity. Raising the threshold to €25 billion gives smaller, innovative operators the scale needed to build sustainable business models while preserving the proportionate treatment that distinguishes the simplified regime.

Amendment 168

Proposal for a regulation

Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point 3 – point c

Regulation (EU) 2022/858

Article 3 – paragraph 2b – subparagraph 2

Or. en

Justification

The €10 billion ceiling for the simplified regime limits commercial viability: market makers and liquidity providers will not integrate with platforms capped at volumes insufficient to support meaningful activity. Raising the threshold to €25 billion gives smaller, innovative operators the scale needed to build sustainable business models while preserving the proportionate treatment that distinguishes the simplified regime.

Amendment 169

Proposal for a regulation

Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point 3 – point d

Regulation (EU) 2022/858

Article 3 – paragraph 3

Or. en

Justification

The transition trigger for the simplified regime is set at €37.5 billion, equivalent to 150% of the revised €25 billion threshold. This preserves the ratio established by the Commission between the operational ceiling and the transition trigger, ensuring operators receive adequate advance notice to prepare for graduation to the regular regime without disrupting ongoing activity.

Amendment 170

Proposal for a regulation

Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point 5

Regulation (EU) 2022/858

Article 4a – paragraph 1 – point a

Or. en

Justification

"Highly disproportionate" is a very high threshold, discouraging operators from seeking exemptions for provisions that are meaningfully disproportionate in a DLT context but fall short of an extreme standard. Together with the ESMA guidelines introduced via the following amendment, the proposed change establishes a more proportionate approach.

Amendment 171

Proposal for a regulation

Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point 6 – point a

Regulation (EU) 2022/858

Article 5 – paragraph 5 – point c

Or. en

Justification

The ambition of the changes to the DLT regime are to make the regime permanent and increase it in scale and scope. Therefore, it should not longer be referred to as a "pilot regime".

Amendment 172

Proposal for a regulation

Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point 11 – point i

Regulation (EU) 2022/858

Article 8 – paragraph 9

Or. en

Justification

The 90-working-day assessment period for DLT TSS specific permissions is disproportionate for a regime defined by capped exposure and built-in risk constraints. Halving the period to 45 working days aligns with the Union's ambition to lead in tokenised market infrastructure.

Amendment 173

Proposal for a regulation

Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point 14

Regulation (EU) 2022/858

Article 10a – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1

Or. en

Justification

Applicants for a specific permission to provide individual CSD services under Article 10a are already authorised entities subject to ongoing prudential supervision. The absence of any consequence for supervisory inaction within the 40-working-day period creates an open-ended bottleneck incompatible with the objective of building a competitive Union framework for DLT-based post-trade services.

Amendment 174

Proposal for a regulation

Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point 14

Regulation (EU) 2022/858

Article 10b – paragraph 10 – subparagraph 2 – point ba (new)

Or. en

Justification

Article 10b(10) already requires ESMA to ensure proportionality and consistency with CSDR objectives when developing RTS for DLT notaries and DLT central account maintenance services. However, it contains no obligation to foster innovation or consider international competitiveness. Given that the DLT Pilot exists precisely to enable new technology-driven business models, requiring ESMA to facilitate DLT adoption and assess the competitive position of Union operators relative to third-country counterparts is essential to the provision's purpose.

Amendment 175

Proposal for a regulation

Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point 14

Regulation (EU) 2022/858

Article 10b – paragraph 10 – subparagraph 3

Or. en

Justification

The eight-month deadline for ESMA's RTS under Article 10b(10) prolongs the period during which DLT notaries and account keepers face unresolved compliance obligations under Title III of CSDR. This legal uncertainty is a direct barrier to participation. Reducing the deadline to six months shortens the window of ambiguity, signals regulatory commitment to the regime's success, and is consistent with the proportionality instruction already embedded in Article 10b(10).

Amendment 176

Proposal for a regulation

Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point 14

Regulation (EU) 2022/858

Article 10c – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 2

Or. en

Justification

The two-scheme membership cap has no prudential basis in the text and no elaboration in the recitals. It arbitrarily constrains the network effects that the Settlement Scheme model is expressly designed to generate. Broad institutional participation across multiple schemes is a feature, not a risk. The cap should be deleted. Oversight of systemic exposure is adequately addressed through ESMA's existing supervisory and reporting powers under Articles 10c and 10d.

Amendment 177

Proposal for a regulation

Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point 14

Regulation (EU) 2022/858

Article 10d – paragraph 2

Or. en

Justification

A mere completeness check should not take 30 working days.

Amendment 178

Proposal for a regulation

Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point 14

Regulation (EU) 2022/858

Article 10d – paragraph 4

Or. en

Justification

Regulatory certainty is a precondition for market entry decisions. Applicants committing capital and operational resources to DLT settlement infrastructure, need quick and predictable timelines. A fixed 90-working-day deadline reduces time-to-market, and ensures the EU DLT framework remains competitive with other jurisdictions offering faster, more predictable authorisation pathways.

Amendment 179

Proposal for a regulation

Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point 14

Regulation (EU) 2022/858

Article 10g – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

Or. en

Justification

Mandating industry group formation and standard implementation is premature where the underlying infrastructure is still nascent. Interoperability standards must emerge organically as the market matures; imposing them at this stage risks entrenching legacy models and marginalising innovative protocols. A facilitative framework better reflects the experimental nature of the regime and the proportionality principle.

Amendment 180

Proposal for a regulation

Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point 14

Regulation (EU) 2022/858

Article 10g – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 5

Or. en

Justification

Mandating industry group formation and standard implementation is premature where the underlying infrastructure is still nascent. Interoperability standards must emerge organically as the market matures; imposing them at this stage risks entrenching legacy models and marginalising innovative protocols. A facilitative framework better reflects the experimental nature of the regime and the proportionality principle.

Amendment 181

Proposal for a regulation

Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point 18 – point a – point 1

Regulation (EU) 2022/858

Article 14 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

Or. en

Justification

The proposed 2030 deadline risks being too inflexible given negotiation timelines and implementation periods. Anchoring the ESMA report to three years after entry into force ensures sufficient market experience before any assessment of permanence, while maintaining regulatory predictability for operators.

Amendment 182

Proposal for a regulation

Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point 18 – point b

Regulation (EU) 2022/858

Article 14 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

The DLT regime is designed as an incubator for innovation, with the mainstream acquis as its natural destination. As the regime matures and operators scale towards the threshold in Article 3(2), a clear and evidence-based graduation pathway strengthens legal certainty for market participants and supports a coherent single rulebook.

Amendment 183

Proposal for a regulation

Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Regulation (EU) 2022/858

Article 15– paragraph 1

Or. en

Justification

Decentralised finance models present both opportunities and regulatory challenges that the current framework does not address. Global markets are developing rapidly in this area. An evidence-based assessment by ESMA, drawing on the experience with the DLT regime as well as international developments could inform the discussion about how to further develop the framework.

Amendment 184

Proposal for a regulation

Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Regulation (EU) 2022/858

Article 15– paragraph 1 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

Decentralised finance models present both opportunities and regulatory challenges that the current framework does not address. Global markets are developing rapidly in this area. An evidence-based assessment by ESMA, drawing on the experience with the DLT regime as well as international developments could inform the discussion about how to further develop the framework.

Amendment 185

Proposal for a regulation

Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point b

Regulation (EU) 2023/1114

Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 35 – point c – point i

Or. en

Justification

ESMA's competence as the relevant competent authority for CASPs should be limited to significant CASPs. NCAs retain competence for non-significant CASPs.

Amendment 186

Proposal for a regulation

Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point 1 a (new)

Regulation (EU) 2023/1114

Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 35 – point c – point i

Or. en

Justification

The introduction of a significance threshold for CASP supervision requires a defined term. The definition mirrors the drafting convention applied to significant trading venues in this regulation.

Amendment 187

Proposal for a regulation

Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point 1 b (new)

Regulation (EU) 2023/1114

Article 48 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

Global stablecoin networks require multi-issuance arrangements that existing MiCA rules do not accommodate. This amendment establishes an outcome-based equivalence framework enabling responsible multi-issuance, supported by robust prudential safeguards and legal certainty for existing operators. This strengthens EU competitiveness in digital finance without compromising financial stability.

Amendment 188

Proposal for a regulation

Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point 2 a (new)

Regulation (EU) 2023/1114

Article 59 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

The Commission's proposal transfers supervision of all CASPs to ESMA without distinction. This is disproportionate. The vast majority of European CASPs are SMEs operating primarily within a single Member State, for whom ESMA supervision adds bureaucratic cost without supervisory benefit.

Amendment 189

Proposal for a regulation

Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a

Regulation (EU) 2023/1114

Article 62 – paragraph 1

Or. en

Justification

Routing all initial CASP applications to ESMA imposes unnecessary administrative burden on SMEs and start-ups applying to operate in one or a small number of Member States. NCAs are better placed to process applications from non-significant entities: they have operational proximity and can make initial supervisory assessments more efficiently.

Amendment 190

Proposal for a regulation

Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point 5 – point a

Regulation (EU) 2023/1114

Article 63 – title

Or. en

Justification

NCAs are better placed to process applications from non-significant entities: they have operational proximity and can make initial supervisory assessments more efficiently.

Amendment 191

Proposal for a regulation

Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point 5 – point b

Regulation (EU) 2023/1114

Article 63 – paragraph 1

Or. en

Justification

NCAs are better placed to process applications from non-significant entities: they have operational proximity and can make initial supervisory assessments more efficiently.

Amendment 192

Proposal for a regulation

Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point 5 – point b

Regulation (EU) 2023/1114

Article 63 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1

Or. en

Justification

A mere completeness check should not take 25 working days.

Amendment 193

Proposal for a regulation

Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point 5 – point b

Regulation (EU) 2023/1114

Article 63 – paragraph 9

Or. en

Justification

Non-significant CASPs are predominantly domestic SMEs for whom a 40-working-day substantive assessment is disproportionate. NCAs have operational proximity and the MiCA application requirements are standardised. A 25-working-day assessment for non-significant entities reduces barriers to market entry without affecting the more thorough assessment appropriate for significant CASPs under ESMA supervision.

Amendment 194

Proposal for a regulation

Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point 14 a (new)

Regulation (EU) 2023/1114

Article 91a (new)

Or. en

Justification

The MISP transfers ESMA's market abuse competence through Title VII amendments without an explicit attribution in Title VI. This amendment supplies that explicit provision and confirms that ESMA's market surveillance and enforcement mandate extends to all market participants regardless of their CASP authorisation status or significance classification. Fragmented market abuse competence based on entity typology would undermine market integrity enforcement across the Union.

Amendment 195

Proposal for a regulation

Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point 14 b (new)

Regulation (EU) 2023/1114

Article 91b (new)

Or. en

Justification

The MISP transfers ESMA's market abuse competence through Title VII amendments without an explicit attribution in Title VI. This amendment supplies that explicit provision and confirms that ESMA's market surveillance and enforcement mandate extends to all market participants regardless of their CASP authorisation status or significance classification. Fragmented market abuse competence based on entity typology would undermine market integrity enforcement across the Union.

Amendment 196

Proposal for a regulation

Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point 22

Regulation (EU) 2023/1114

Article 138j – paragraph 1

Or. en

Justification

Prevents double-charging by ESMA and national competent authorities.

Amendment 197

Proposal for a regulation

Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point 22

Regulation (EU) 2023/1114

Article 138j – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

Article 138j(3) grants the Commission an unconstrained power to set ESMA's supervisory fee methodology for crypto-asset service providers by delegated act. Given the geographic mobility of the crypto-asset industry and the availability of competing regulatory frameworks in third countries, fees set without competitive calibration risk accelerating regulatory arbitrage. Embedding proportionality, non-discrimination and third-country benchmarking directly in the empowerment prevents supervisory costs from becoming a driver of market relocation.

Amendment 198

Proposal for a regulation

Article 14 – paragraph 1 – point 6 – point b

Regulation (EU) 2024/3005

Article 42 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2

Or. en

Justification

The suggested deadline is in the past and should be updated.

Amendment 199

Proposal for a regulation

Article 14 a (new)

Or. en

Justification

The Regulation's integration objective requires that competition policy and merger review frameworks support, rather than obstruct, cross-border FMI consolidation. This report ensures the Commission examines whether existing thresholds and market definitions are fit for purpose in the FMI sector, and whether national change-of-control and public interest regimes create unjustified obstacles to cross-border ownership and restructuring within the Union.

Amendment 200

Proposal for a regulation

Article 15 – paragraph 8

Or. en

Justification

The DLT Pilot Regime's most urgent barriers, such as the restrictions on eligible asset classes, volume limits, and the six-year cap on specific permissions for DLT TVs, SSs and TSSs. can be lifted without any Level 2 implementation. Immediate application upon entry into force removes a further year of unnecessary standstill, establishes legal certainty for operators and sends an unambiguous signal that Europe is ready to scale tokenised market infrastructure.