opinion parliamentary committee draft, 31 May 2023
On the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2019/943 and (EU) 2019/942 as well as Directives (EU) 2018/2001 and (EU) 2019/944 to improve the Union’s electricity market design
Document ECON-PA-749215 · (COM(2023)0148 – C90049/2023 – 2023/0077(COD))
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs · Rapporteur: Pedro Silva Pereira
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Short justification 137 paragraphs
On 14 March 2023, the Commission adopted a proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2019/943 and (EU) 2019/942 as well as Directives (EU) 2018/2001 and (EU) 2019/944 to improve the Union’s electricity market design (2023/0077(COD)).
The proposal is part of a package of proposals to reform the EU's electricity market design to accelerate a surge in renewables and the phase-out of gas, make consumer bills less dependent on volatile fossil fuel prices, better protect consumers from future price spikes and potential market manipulation, and make the EU's industry clean and more competitive.
As part of the same package, the Commission adopted the Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework (TCTF) establishing a temporary State aid regime to allow certain subsidies to soften the impact of high-energy prices on 23 March 2022.
Most critical to the competences of the ECON committee, the proposal introduces two new instruments, the Contracts for Differences (CFDs) and the Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs), although only the latter - establishing regional virtual hubs for the forward market - is a full novelty. It also empowers the Commission to declare a regional or Union-wide electricity price crisis.
As for the PPAs, the Rapporteur calls on the Commission to examine whether these instruments do not unduly distort or fragment the internal market and are in line with competition rules. He also urges the Commission to have due regard to vulnerable customers.
The CFDs add an upper and lower cap to the price. Thereby, the proposal indirectly amends current State aid rules (Communication from the Commission – Guidelines on State aid for climate, environmental protection and energy 2022 (CEEAG), TCTF) with reference to granting public support to certain forms of electricity generation through the specific instrument of CFDs. The Rapporteur therefore asks to assess whether the instrument is consistent with the goals of applicable State aid rules.
Furthermore, is also important to prioritise and protect the most vulnerable customers. This should include the consumers with low income, disabilities and those in energy poverty situation.
Finally, the Rapporteur highlights the need to ensure that the declaration of an electricity price crisis shall have regard to the need for a level playing field across all Member States affected by the decision so that the internal market is not distorted. It also asks the Commission to clarify how this instrument interacts with the temporary State aid regime currently in place.
AMENDMENT
The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs calls on the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, as the committee responsible, to take the following into account:
Amendment 1
Proposal for a regulation
Read the rest (125 paragraphs)
Recital 3
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (3) In response to this situation, the Communication on Energy Prices presented by the Commission in October 2021 contained a toolbox of measures that the EU and its Member States may use to address the immediate impact of high energy prices on households and businesses (including income support, tax breaks, gas savings and storage measures) and to strengthen resilience against future price shocks. In its Communication of 8 March 2022 entitled ‘REPowerEU: Joint European Action for more affordable, secure and sustainable energy’18 the Commission outlined a series of additional measures to strengthen the toolbox and to respond to rising energy prices. On 23 March 2022, the Commission also established a temporary State Aid regime to allow certain subsidies to soften the impact of high energy prices.19 | (3) In response to this situation, the Communication on Energy Prices presented by the Commission in October 2021 contained a toolbox of measures that the EU and its Member States may use to address the immediate impact of high energy prices on households and businesses (including income support, tax breaks, gas savings and storage measures) and to strengthen resilience against future price shocks. In its Communication of 8 March 2022 entitled ‘REPowerEU: Joint European Action for more affordable, secure and sustainable energy’18 the Commission outlined a series of additional measures to strengthen the toolbox and to respond to rising energy prices. On 23 March 2022, the Commission adopted the Temporary Crisis Framework establishing a temporary State Aid regime to allow certain subsidies to soften the impact of high energy prices.19 On 9 March 2023, the framework was replaced by the Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework which provides flexibility and simplicity in response to the crisis while ensuring targeted aid as well as cohesion objectives and contributes to achieving goals of the Green Deal Industrial Plan. |
| 18 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - REPowerEU: Joint European Action for more affordable, secure and sustainable energy, COM/2022/108 final | 18 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - REPowerEU: Joint European Action for more affordable, secure and sustainable energy, COM/2022/108 final |
| 19 Communication from the Commission Temporary Crisis Framework for State Aid measures to support the economy following the aggression against Ukraine by Russia C 131 I/01, C/2022/1890. | 19 Communication from the Commission Temporary Crisis Framework for State Aid measures to support the economy following the aggression against Ukraine by Russia C 131 I/01, C/2022/1890. |
Or. en
Amendment 2
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3 a (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (3 a) The Temporary State Aid Crisis and Transition Framework is part of the second pillar of the Green Deal Industry Plan. It should be noted that this is a temporary and targeted framework and that there are trade-offs between speeding up financing for clean tech production in Europe and the integrity of the internal market, as not all Member States have the same fiscal space to deliver the necessary investments. Therefore, the Commission intends to give a structural answer to the investment needs, by proposing a European Sovereignty Fund in the context of the review of the multiannual financial framework before summer 2023. |
Or. en
Amendment 3
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (11) The reform of the electricity market design should benefit not just household consumers but also the competitiveness of the Union’s industries by facilitating their possibilities to make the clean tech investments they require to meet their net zero transition paths. The energy transition in the Union needs to be supported by a strong clean technology manufacturing basis. These reforms will support the affordable electrification of industry and the Union’s position as a global leader in terms of research and innovation in clean energy technologies. | (11) The reform of the electricity market design should benefit household consumers and enable the Union’s industries to make the clean tech investments they require to meet their net zero transition paths. The energy transition in the Union needs to be supported by a strong clean technology manufacturing basis. These reforms will support the affordable electrification of industry and the Union’s position as a global leader in terms of research and innovation in clean energy technologies. |
Or. en
Amendment 4
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 19
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (19) Consumers and suppliers need effective and efficient forward markets to cover their long-term price exposure and decrease the dependence on short-term prices. To ensure that energy customers all over the EU can fully benefit from the advantages of integrated electricity markets and competition across the Union, the functioning of the Union’s electricity forward market should be improved via the establishment of regional virtual hubs with a view to overcome the existing market fragmentation and the low liquidity experienced in many bidding zones. Regional virtual hubs should cover multiple bidding zones while ensuring an adequate price correlation. Some bidding zones may not be covered by a virtual hub in terms of contributing to the hub reference price. However, market participants from these bidding zones should still be able to hedge through a hub. | (19) Consumers and suppliers need effective and efficient forward markets to cover their long-term price exposure and decrease the dependence on short-term prices. To ensure that energy customers all over the EU can fully benefit from the advantages of integrated electricity markets and competition across the Union, the functioning of the Union’s electricity forward market should be improved via the establishment of regional virtual hubs with a view to overcome the existing market fragmentation and the low liquidity experienced in many bidding zones. The added-value of Regional virtual hubs should be assessed by the Commission and this assessment should be presented to the co-legislators. |
Or. en
Amendment 5
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (21) To enhance the possibilities of market participants for hedging, the role of the single allocation platform established in accordance with Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/1719 should be expanded. The single allocation platform should offer trading of financial long-term transmission rights between the different bidding zones and the regional virtual hubs. The orders submitted by market participants for financial transmission rights shall be matched by a simultaneous allocation of long term cross zonal capacity. Such matching and allocation should be performed on a regular basis, to ensure enough liquidity and, hence, efficient hedging possibilities to market participants. The long-term transmission rights should be issued with frequent maturities (ranging from month ahead to at least three years ahead), in order to be aligned with the typical hedging time horizon of market participants. The single allocation platform should be subject to monitoring and enforcement to ensure that it performs its tasks properly. | (21) To enhance the possibilities of market participants for hedging, the role of the single allocation platform established in accordance with Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/1719 should be expanded. The single allocation platform should offer trading of financial long-term transmission rights between the different bidding zones and, where established, the regional virtual hubs. The orders submitted by market participants for financial transmission rights should be matched by a simultaneous allocation of long term cross zonal capacity. Such matching and allocation should be performed on a regular basis, to ensure enough liquidity and, hence, efficient hedging possibilities to market participants. The long-term transmission rights should be issued with frequent maturities (ranging from month ahead to at least three years ahead), in order to be aligned with the typical hedging time horizon of market participants. The single allocation platform should be subject to monitoring and enforcement to ensure that it performs its tasks properly. |
Or. en
Amendment 6
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 30
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (30) Where Member States decide to support publicly financed new investments (“direct price support schemes”) in low carbon, non-fossil fuel electricity generation to achieve the Union’s decarbonisation objectives, those schemes should be structured by way of two-way contracts for difference such as to include, in addition to a revenue guarantee, an upward limitation of the market revenues of the generation assets concerned. New investments for the generation of electricity should include investments in new power generating facilities, investments aimed at repowering existing power generating facilities, investments aimed at extending existing power generating facilities or at prolonging their lifetime. | (30) Where Member States decide to support publicly financed new investments (“direct price support schemes”) in low carbon, non-fossil fuel electricity generation to achieve the Union’s decarbonisation objectives, those schemes should be structured by way of two-way contracts for difference such as to include, in addition to a revenue guarantee, an upward limitation of the market revenues of the generation assets concerned. New investments for the generation of electricity should include investments in new power generating facilities, investments aimed at repowering existing power generating facilities, investments aimed at extending existing power generating facilities or at prolonging their lifetime. As these schemes are indirectly amending current State aid rules (Communication from the Commission – Guidelines on State aid for climate, environmental protection and energy 2022 19a, Communication from the Commission Temporary Crisis Framework for State Aid measures to support the economy following the aggression against Ukraine by Russia 2022/C 131 I/01 19b) as regards granting public support to certain forms of electricity generation, the Commission should regularly assess whether they remain adequate and do not disproportionately distort or fragment the internal market. Furthermore, it should always be ensured that they are in line with the Taxonomy Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2020/852). |
| 19a https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?toc=OJ%3AC%3A2022%3A080%3ATOC&uri=uriserv%3AOJ.C_.2022.080.01.0001.01.ENG | |
| 19b https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.CI.2022.131.01.0001.01.ENG |
Or. en
Amendment 7
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 34
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (34) Thanks to the upward limitation of the market revenues direct price support schemes in the form of two-way contracts for difference should provide an additional source of revenues for Member States in periods of high energy prices. To further mitigate the impact of high electricity prices on the energy bills of consumers, Member States should ensure that the revenues collected from producers subject to direct price support schemes in the form of two-way contracts for difference are passed on to all final electricity customers, including households, SMEs and industrial consumers, based on their consumption. The redistribution of revenues should be done in a way that ensures that consumers are still to some extent exposed to the price signal, so that they reduce their consumption when the prices are high, or shift it to periods of lower prices (which are typically periods with a higher share of RES production). Member States should ensure that the level playing-field and competition between the different suppliers is not affected by the redistribution of revenues to the final electricity consumers. | (34) Thanks to the upward limitation of the market revenues direct price support schemes in the form of two-way contracts for difference should provide an additional source of revenues for Member States in periods of high energy prices. To further mitigate the impact of high electricity prices on the energy bills of consumers, Member States should ensure that the revenues collected from producers subject to direct price support schemes in the form of two-way contracts for difference are passed on to the final electricity customers, including households, SMEs and industrial consumers, based on their consumption, while prioritising vulnerable customers and those affected by or at risk of energy poverty. The redistribution of revenues should be done in a way that ensures that consumers are still to some extent exposed to the price signal, so that they reduce their consumption when the prices are high, or shift it to periods of lower prices (which are typically periods with a higher share of RES production). Member States should ensure that the level playing-field and competition between the different suppliers is not affected by the redistribution of revenues to the final electricity consumers. |
Or. en
Amendment 8
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 43
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (43) During the energy crisis, consumers have been exposed to extremely volatile wholesale energy prices and had limited opportunities to engage in the energy market. Consequently, many households, have been facing difficulties when paying their bills. Vulnerable consumers and the energy poor are the hardest hit28 , but middle-income households have also been exposed to such difficulties. It is therefore important to update consumer rights and protections, allowing consumers to benefit from the energy transition, decouple their electricity bills from short term price movements on energy markets and rebalance the risk between suppliers and consumers. | (43) During the energy crisis, consumers have been exposed to extremely volatile wholesale energy prices and had limited opportunities to engage in the energy market. At the same time, some undertakings’ freeriding in the context of rising energy prices have enabled them to increase profits, causing further inflation and inequalities. Consequently, many households, have been facing difficulties when paying their bills. Vulnerable consumers and the energy poor are the hardest hit28 , but middle-income households have also been exposed to such difficulties. It is therefore important to update competition policy, tax policy and consumer rights and protections, allowing consumers to benefit from the energy transition, decouple their electricity bills from short term price movements on energy markets and rebalance the risk between suppliers and consumers. |
| 28 Particular groups are more at risk of being affected by energy poverty or more susceptible to the adverse impacts of energy poverty, such as women, persons with disabilities, older persons, children, and persons with a minority racial or ethnic background. | 28 Particular groups are more at risk of being affected by energy poverty or more susceptible to the adverse impacts of energy poverty, such as women, persons with disabilities, older persons, children, and persons with a minority racial or ethnic background. |
Or. en
Amendment 9
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 45
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (45) When suppliers’ do not ensure that their electricity portfolio is sufficiently hedged changes in wholesale electricity prices can leave them financially at risk and, result in their failure, passing on costs to consumers and other network users. Hence, it should be ensured that suppliers are appropriately hedged when offering fixed price contracts. An appropriate hedging strategy should take into account the suppliers' access to its own generation and its capitalisation as well as its exposure to changes in wholesale market prices. | (45) When suppliers’ do not ensure that their electricity portfolio is sufficiently hedged changes in wholesale electricity prices can leave them financially at risk and, result in their failure, passing on costs to consumers and other network users. Hence, it should be ensured that suppliers are appropriately hedged when offering fixed price contracts. An appropriate hedging strategy should take into account the suppliers' access to its own generation and its capitalisation as well as its exposure to changes in wholesale market prices, the size of the supplier and the market structure. |
Or. en
Amendment 10
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 53
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (53) Public interventions in price setting for the supply of electricity constitute, in principle, a market-distortive measure. Such interventions may therefore only be carried out as public service obligations and are subject to specific conditions. Under this Directive regulated prices are possible for energy poor and vulnerable households, including below costs, and, as a transition measure, for households and micro-enterprises. In times of crisis, when wholesale and retail electricity prices increase significantly, and this is having a negative impact on the wider economy, Member States should be allowed to extend, temporarily, the application of regulated prices also to SMEs. For both households and SMEs, Member States should be temporarily allowed to set regulated prices below costs as long as this does not create distortion between suppliers and suppliers are compensated for the costs of supplying below cost. However, it needs to be ensured that such price regulation is targeted and does not create incentives to increase consumption. Hence, such price regulation should be limited to 80% of median household consumption for households, and 70% of the previous year’s consumption for SMEs. The Commission should determine when such an electricity price crisis exists and consequently when this possibility becomes applicable. The Commission should also specify the validity of that determination, during which the temporary extension of regulated prices applies, which may be for up to one year. To the extent that any of the measures envisaged by the present Regulation constitute State aid, the provisions concerning such measures are without prejudice to the application of Articles 107 and 108 TFEU. | (53) Public interventions in price setting for the supply of electricity constitute, in principle, a market-distortive measure. Such interventions may therefore only be carried out as public service obligations and are subject to specific conditions. Under this Directive regulated prices are possible for energy poor and vulnerable households, including below costs, and, as a transition measure, for households and micro-enterprises. In times of crisis, when wholesale and retail electricity prices increase significantly, and this is having a negative impact on the wider economy, Member States should be allowed to extend, temporarily, the application of regulated prices also to SMEs. For both households and SMEs, Member States should be temporarily allowed to set regulated prices below costs as long as this does not create distortion in the internal market or between suppliers and suppliers are compensated for the costs of supplying below cost. However, it needs to be ensured that such price regulation is targeted and does not create incentives to increase consumption. Hence, such price regulation should be limited to 80% of median household consumption for households, 100% for vulnerable customers and 70% of the previous year’s consumption for SMEs. The Commission should determine when such an electricity price crisis exists and consequently when this possibility becomes applicable. The Commission should also specify the validity of that determination, during which the temporary extension of regulated prices applies, which may be for up to one year. To the extent that any of the measures envisaged by the present Regulation constitute State aid, the provisions concerning such measures are without prejudice to the application of Articles 107 and 108 TFEU. |
Or. en
Amendment 11
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point a
Regulation (EU) 2019/943
Article 1 – point b
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) set fundamental principles for well-functioning, integrated electricity markets, which allow all resource providers and electricity customers non-discriminatory market access, enable the development of forward electricity markets to allow suppliers and consumers to hedge or protect themselves against the risk of future volatility in electricity prices, empower consumers, ensure competitiveness on the global market, enhance flexibility through demand response, energy storage and other non-fossil flexibility solutions, ensure energy efficiency, facilitate aggregation of distributed demand and supply, and enable market and sectoral integration and market-based remuneration of electricity generated from renewable sources; | (b) set fundamental principles for well-functioning, integrated electricity markets, which allow all resource providers and electricity customers non-discriminatory market access, enable the development of forward electricity markets to allow suppliers and consumers to hedge or protect themselves against the risk of future volatility in electricity prices, empower consumers and address the position of vulnerable consumers, ensure competitiveness on the global market, enhance flexibility through demand response, energy storage and other non-fossil flexibility solutions, ensure energy efficiency, facilitate aggregation of distributed demand and supply, and enable market and sectoral integration and market-based remuneration of electricity generated from renewable sources; |
Or. en
Amendment 12
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6
Regulation (EU) 2019/943
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1. By 1 December 2024 the ENTSO for Electricity shall submit to ACER, after having consulted ESMA, a proposal for the establishment of regional virtual hubs for the forward market. The proposal shall: | 1. By 1 December 2024, the Commission, after having consulted ESMA, the ENTSO for Electricity and ACER, shall submit to the Parliament and the Council an assessment on the impact of the establishment of regional virtual hubs for the forward market. The assessment shall be accompanied by a legislative proposal where applicable and inter alia shall: |
Or. en
Amendment 13
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6
Regulation 2019/943
Article 9 – paragraph 5
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 5. Where a regulatory authority considers that there are insufficient hedging opportunities available for market participants, and after consultation of relevant financial market competent authorities in case the forward markets concern financial instruments as defined under Article 4(1)(15), it may require power exchanges or transmission system operators to implement additional measures, such as market-making activities, to improve the liquidity of the forward market. Subject to compliance with Union competition law and with Directive (EU) 2014/65 and Regulations (EU) 648/2012 and 600/2014, market operators shall be free to develop forward hedging products, including long-term forward hedging products, to provide market participants, including owners of power-generating facilities using renewable energy sources, with appropriate possibilities for hedging financial risks against price fluctuations. Member States shall not require that such hedging activity may be limited to trades within a Member State or bidding zone. | 5. Where a regulatory authority considers that there are insufficient hedging opportunities available for market participants, and after consultation of relevant financial market competent authorities in case the forward markets concern financial instruments as defined under Article 4(1)(15), it may require power exchanges or transmission system operators to implement additional measures, such as market-making activities, to improve the liquidity of the forward market. Where market operators develop forward hedging products, including long-term forward hedging products, they shall do so in full compliance with Union competition law and with Directive (EU) 2014/65 and Regulations (EU) 648/2012 and 600/2014, to provide market participants, including owners of power-generating facilities using renewable energy sources, with appropriate possibilities for hedging financial risks against price fluctuations. Member States shall not require that such hedging activity may be limited to trades within a Member State or bidding zone. |
Or. en
Amendment 14
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9
Regulation (EU) 2019/942
Article 19a – paragraph 2
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. Member States shall ensure that instruments such as guarantee schemes at market prices, to reduce the financial risks associated to off-taker payment default in the framework of PPAs are in place and accessible to customers that face entry barriers to the PPA market and are not in financial difficulty in line with Articles 107 and 108 TFEU. For this purpose, Member States shall take into account Union-level instruments. Member States shall determine what categories of customers are targeted by these instruments, applying non-discriminatory criteria. | 2. Member States shall ensure that instruments such as guarantee schemes at market prices, to reduce the financial risks associated to off-taker payment default in the framework of PPAs are in place and accessible to customers that face entry barriers to the PPA market and are not in financial difficulty. The Commission shall examine whether these instruments do not disproportionately distort or fragment the internal market and are in line with Articles 107 and 108 TFEU. For this purpose, Member States shall take into account Union-level instruments. Member States shall determine what categories of customers are targeted by these instruments, applying non-discriminatory criteria among each category of customers, having due regard to vulnerable customers. |
Or. en
Amendment 15
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9
Regulation (EU) 2019/943
Article 19b – paragraph 1
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1. Direct price support schemes for new investments for the generation of electricity from the sources listed in paragraph 2 shall take the form of a two-way contract for differences. New investments for the generation of electricity shall include investments in new power-generating facilities, investments aimed at repowering existing power-generating facilities, investments aimed at extending existing power-generating facilities or at prolonging their lifetime. | 1. Direct price support schemes for new investments for the generation of electricity from the sources listed in paragraph 2 shall take the form of a two-way contract for differences. Pursuant to the Regulation (EU) 2020/852, new investments for the generation of electricity shall include investments in new power-generating facilities, investments aimed at repowering existing power-generating facilities, investments aimed at extending existing power-generating facilities or at prolonging their lifetime. |
Or. en
Amendment 16
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9
Regulation (EU) 2019/943
Article 19b – paragraph 2 – point e
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (e) nuclear energy; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 17
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9
Regulation (EU) 2019/943
Article 19b – paragraph 3 – point a
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (a) be designed so that the revenues collected when the market price is above the strike price are distributed to all final electricity customers based on their share of consumption (same cost / refund per MWh consumed); | (a) be designed so that the revenues collected when the market price is above the strike price are distributed to all final electricity customers based on their share of consumption (same cost / refund per MWh consumed), giving priority to compensating vulnerable customers; |
Or. en
Amendment 18
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9
Regulation (EU) 2019/943
Article 19b – paragraph 3 a (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3 a. The Commission shall regularly assess whether the direct price support schemes in the form of two-way contracts for difference remain adequate, and do not unduly disproportionately or fragment the internal market, and are in line with the Taxonomy Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2020/852). |
Or. en
Amendment 19
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Directive (EU) 2019/944
Article 66a – paragraph 2 a (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2 a. The declaration of a regional or Union-wide electricity price crisis shall ensure a level playing field across all Member States affected by the decision so that the internal market is not disproportionately distorted. |
Or. en
Amendment 20
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Directive (EU) 2019/944
Article 66a – paragraph 3 a (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3 a. The Commission shall issue guidance on how these thresholds can be applied in conjunction with the Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework, especially sections 2.1-2.4, for the time in which both this Directive and the Framework will be in place. |
Or. en
Amendment 21
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Directive (EU) 2019/944
Article 66a – paragraph 4 – point a
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (a) the price set for households only applies to at most 80% of median household consumption and retains an incentive for demand reduction; | (a) the price set for households only applies to at most 80% of median household consumption and retains an incentive for demand reduction, and 100% for vulnerable customers; |
Or. en