amendment list, 7 July 2026
Amending Directives (EU) 2016/2341 and 2016/97 as regards the strengthening of the framework for occupational retirement provision
Document ECON-AM-789865 · (COM(2025)0842 – 2025/0362(COD))
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs
Full text
Jump to an amendment (233)
- Amendment 104
- Amendment 105
- Amendment 106
- Amendment 107
- Amendment 108
- Amendment 109
- Amendment 110
- Amendment 111
- Amendment 112
- Amendment 113
- Amendment 114
- Amendment 115
- Amendment 116
- Amendment 117
- Amendment 118
- Amendment 119
- Amendment 120
- Amendment 121
- Amendment 122
- Amendment 123
- Amendment 124
- Amendment 125
- Amendment 126
- Amendment 127
- Amendment 128
- Amendment 129
- Amendment 130
- Amendment 131
- Amendment 132
- Amendment 133
- Amendment 134
- Amendment 135
- Amendment 136
- Amendment 137
- Amendment 138
- Amendment 139
- Amendment 140
- Amendment 141
- Amendment 142
- Amendment 143
- Amendment 144
- Amendment 145
- Amendment 146
- Amendment 147
- Amendment 148
- Amendment 149
- Amendment 150
- Amendment 151
- Amendment 152
- Amendment 153
- Amendment 154
- Amendment 155
- Amendment 156
- Amendment 157
- Amendment 158
- Amendment 159
- Amendment 160
- Amendment 161
- Amendment 162
- Amendment 163
- Amendment 164
- Amendment 165
- Amendment 166
- Amendment 167
- Amendment 168
- Amendment 169
- Amendment 170
- Amendment 171
- Amendment 172
- Amendment 173
- Amendment 174
- Amendment 175
- Amendment 176
- Amendment 177
- Amendment 178
- Amendment 179
- Amendment 180
- Amendment 181
- Amendment 182
- Amendment 183
- Amendment 184
- Amendment 185
- Amendment 186
- Amendment 187
- Amendment 188
- Amendment 189
- Amendment 190
- Amendment 191
- Amendment 192
- Amendment 193
- Amendment 194
- Amendment 195
- Amendment 196
- Amendment 197
- Amendment 198
- Amendment 199
- Amendment 200
- Amendment 201
- Amendment 202
- Amendment 203
- Amendment 204
- Amendment 205
- Amendment 206
- Amendment 207
- Amendment 208
- Amendment 209
- Amendment 210
- Amendment 211
- Amendment 212
- Amendment 213
- Amendment 214
- Amendment 215
- Amendment 216
- Amendment 217
- Amendment 218
- Amendment 219
- Amendment 220
- Amendment 221
- Amendment 222
- Amendment 223
- Amendment 224
- Amendment 225
- Amendment 226
- Amendment 227
- Amendment 228
- Amendment 229
- Amendment 230
- Amendment 231
- Amendment 232
- Amendment 233
- Amendment 234
- Amendment 235
- Amendment 236
- Amendment 237
- Amendment 238
- Amendment 239
- Amendment 240
- Amendment 241
- Amendment 242
- Amendment 243
- Amendment 244
- Amendment 245
- Amendment 246
- Amendment 247
- Amendment 248
- Amendment 249
- Amendment 250
- Amendment 251
- Amendment 252
- Amendment 253
- Amendment 254
- Amendment 255
- Amendment 256
- Amendment 257
- Amendment 258
- Amendment 259
- Amendment 260
- Amendment 261
- Amendment 262
- Amendment 263
- Amendment 264
- Amendment 265
- Amendment 266
- Amendment 267
- Amendment 268
- Amendment 269
- Amendment 270
- Amendment 271
- Amendment 272
- Amendment 273
- Amendment 274
- Amendment 275
- Amendment 276
- Amendment 277
- Amendment 278
- Amendment 279
- Amendment 280
- Amendment 281
- Amendment 282
- Amendment 283
- Amendment 284
- Amendment 285
- Amendment 286
- Amendment 287
- Amendment 288
- Amendment 289
- Amendment 290
- Amendment 291
- Amendment 292
- Amendment 293
- Amendment 294
- Amendment 295
- Amendment 296
- Amendment 297
- Amendment 298
- Amendment 299
- Amendment 300
- Amendment 301
- Amendment 302
- Amendment 303
- Amendment 304
- Amendment 305
- Amendment 306
- Amendment 307
- Amendment 308
- Amendment 309
- Amendment 310
- Amendment 311
- Amendment 312
- Amendment 313
- Amendment 314
- Amendment 315
- Amendment 316
- Amendment 317
- Amendment 318
- Amendment 319
- Amendment 320
- Amendment 321
- Amendment 322
- Amendment 323
- Amendment 324
- Amendment 325
- Amendment 326
- Amendment 327
- Amendment 328
- Amendment 329
- Amendment 330
- Amendment 331
- Amendment 332
- Amendment 333
- Amendment 334
- Amendment 335
- Amendment 336
Text 1,848 paragraphs
Amendment 104
Martin Schirdewan
Proposal for a directive
Recital 1
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (1) In view of the ageing population of the European Union and the rising dependency ratio, strengthening complementary sources of retirement income has become indispensable to preserve intergenerational solidarity, social cohesion and the long-term stability of pension systems across the Union. | (1) In view of the ageing population of the European Union and the rising dependency ratio, it is essential to ensure that all people in the Union can rely on adequate, safe and sustainable pension systems that guarantee a decent standard of living and retirement income to preserve intergenerational solidarity, social cohesion and the long-term stability of pension systems across the Union. |
Or. en
Amendment 105
Isabel Benjumea Benjumea
Proposal for a directive
Recital 1
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (1) In view of the ageing population of the European Union and the rising dependency ratio, strengthening complementary sources of retirement income has become indispensable to preserve intergenerational solidarity, social cohesion and the long-term stability of pension systems across the Union. | (1) In view of the ageing population of the European Union, the growing pressure on the financial sustainability of public pension schemes in many Member States and the rising dependency ratio, strengthening complementary sources of retirement income has become indispensable to diversify sources of income for future pensioners, encourage long-term saving and contribute to the financial sustainability of pension systems, whilst preserving intergenerational solidarity, social cohesion and the long-term stability of pension systems across the Union. |
Or. es
Read the rest (1,836 paragraphs)
Amendment 106
Adnan Dibrani, Niels Fuglsang, Thomas Bajada, Lara Wolters, Jonás Fernández, César Luena
Proposal for a directive
Recital 1
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (1) In view of the ageing population of the European Union and the rising dependency ratio, strengthening complementary sources of retirement income has become indispensable to preserve intergenerational solidarity, social cohesion and the long-term stability of pension systems across the Union. | (1) In view of the ageing population of the European Union and the rising dependency ratio, it is crucial to ensure that everyone in the Union has access to adequate, secure and financially sustainable pension systems that provide a dignified standard of living in retirement. Strengthening complementary sources of retirement income has become indispensable to preserve intergenerational solidarity, social cohesion and the long-term stability of pension systems across the Union. Public statutory pension schemes should remain a key pillar in preventing old age poverty, in line with the principles of the European Pillar of Social Rights. |
Or. en
Amendment 107
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Recital 1
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (1) In view of the ageing population of the European Union and the rising dependency ratio, strengthening complementary sources of retirement income has become indispensable to preserve intergenerational solidarity, social cohesion and the long-term stability of pension systems across the Union. | (1) In view of the ageing population of the European Union, increasingly unsustainable national budgets and the rising dependency ratio, strengthening complementary sources of retirement income has become indispensable to preserve intergenerational solidarity, social cohesion and the long-term stability of pension systems across the Union. |
Or. en
Amendment 108
Martin Schirdewan
Proposal for a directive
Recital 1 a (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (1a) Public statutory pension schemes must remain and be enhanced as the cornerstone of pension systems in the Union, providing European workers with postretirement income and playing a fundamental role in preventing poverty in old age. However, the long-term sustainability of the redistributive system and the social effectiveness of first-pillar pensions are being systematically undermined by unemployment, flexible or atypical forms of work, demographic shifts, uninsured and undeclared work, and austerity policies. |
Or. en
Amendment 109
Adnan Dibrani, Niels Fuglsang, Thomas Bajada, Lara Wolters
Proposal for a directive
Recital 1 a (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (1a) In line with the principle of subsidiarity laid down in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the organisation of pension systems falls primarily within the competence of the Member States. This Directive therefore fully respects Member States’ responsibilities in this area, including labour law and collective bargaining. |
Or. en
Amendment 110
Martin Schirdewan
Proposal for a directive
Recital 1 b (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (1b) While complementary pension schemes can contribute to retirement income, their purpose should be to complement adequate first-pillar statutory pensions. The development of supplementary pensions across the EU should not lead to the weakening of public pensions, particularly with regard to pension adequacy. Ambitious policies on quality job creation, fair migration and gender equality should underpin more sustainable first-, second- and third-pillar pension schemes, providing the financial resources necessary to secure the pensions of current and future pensioners. |
Or. en
Amendment 111
Martin Schirdewan
Proposal for a directive
Recital 1 c (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (1c) Almost 20% of European citizens over the age of 60 are at risk of poverty. However, supplementary pension schemes tend to benefit higher-income households and workers with stable careers disproportionately. Meanwhile, women, lower-income groups, people in non-standard or precarious employment, and workers with interrupted careers often have limited access. As these schemes are linked to employment, they can exacerbate labour market fragmentation and inequalities between sectors and companies, thereby increasing the risk of poverty and social inequality. Private pension systems also decouple pension income from solidarity-based public provision and tie adequacy more closely to individuals’ capacity to save, creating serious risks of insufficient retirement income for those on low wages or with limited savings capacity. Therefore, any policy in this area should be subject to a thorough distributional impact assessment, comparing the effects of the first-, second- and third-pillar systems on pension income and social cohesion. However, the Commission has not provided such an assessment. |
Or. en
Amendment 112
Martin Schirdewan
Proposal for a directive
Recital 1 d (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (1d) In Europe, the gender gap in public pensions is, on average, between 30% and 32%, while in private and supplementary pensions, the gap is larger, reaching between 35% and 40%. This gap is caused by the fact that women tend to have interrupted professional trajectories, lower salaries, and less access to occupational pension plans, which exacerbates inequalities. |
Or. en
Amendment 113
Martin Schirdewan
Proposal for a directive
Recital 2
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (2) While the organisation of pension systems remains a national competence, the adequacy and financial sustainability of pensions are of common concern for the stability and cohesion of the Union. Ensuring that citizens have access to well-designed personal pension products contributes both to individual financial security and to the resilience of the Union’s economy. | (2) The organisation of pension systems remains a national competence. Article 153(4) TFEU prevents EU action from significantly affecting the financial equilibrium of Member States’ social security systems. |
Or. en
Amendment 114
Adnan Dibrani, Niels Fuglsang, Thomas Bajada, Lara Wolters, Jonás Fernández, César Luena
Proposal for a directive
Recital 2
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (2) While the organisation of pension systems remains a national competence, the adequacy and financial sustainability of pensions are of common concern for the stability and cohesion of the Union. Ensuring that citizens have access to well-designed personal pension products contributes both to individual financial security and to the resilience of the Union’s economy. | (2) While the organisation of pension systems remains a national competence, the adequacy and financial sustainability of pensions are of common concern for the stability and cohesion of the Union. Ensuring that citizens have access to well-designed personal pension products contributes both to individual financial security and to the resilience of the Union’s economy. In this regard, the role and independence of social partners should be fully respected, including their ability to develop effective occupational pension arrangements through collective bargaining. |
Or. en
Amendment 115
Sirpa Pietikäinen
Proposal for a directive
Recital 2
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (2) While the organisation of pension systems remains a national competence, the adequacy and financial sustainability of pensions are of common concern for the stability and cohesion of the Union. Ensuring that citizens have access to well-designed personal pension products contributes both to individual financial security and to the resilience of the Union’s economy. | (2) While the organisation of pension systems remains a national competence, the adequacy and financial sustainability of pensions are of common concern for the stability and cohesion of the Union. Ensuring that citizens have access to well-designed personal pension products contributes both to individual financial security and to the resilience of the Union’s economy. It is essential to preserve and support the role, autonomy and active involvement of social partners in designing well-functioning pension schemes through collective agreements. |
Or. en
Amendment 116
Markus Ferber, Andrea Wechsler
Proposal for a directive
Recital 2 a (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (2a) Directive (EU) 2016/2341 provides for minimum harmonisation and should continue to do so. This Directive should not call into question the prerogatives of Member States and of the social partners in the design, governance and organisation of occupational pension systems, which reflect national social, labour and tax law. Neither delegated acts adopted pursuant to this Directive nor guidelines issued by EIOPA should have the effect of establishing uniform requirements beyond what this Directive expressly provides. |
Or. en
Justification
The amending Directive must preserve the minimum harmonisation character of Directive (EU) 2016/2341. Occupational pensions are primarily a matter for Member States and social partners. Union rules should set a common prudential floor, not a uniform ceiling imposed through level-2 measures or supervisory guidance.
Amendment 117
Jonás Fernández, César Luena
Proposal for a directive
Recital 2 a (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (2a) Ensuring that people across the EU can retire with dignity, security and adequate income lies at the heart of the EU’s social and economic agendas. At the same time, a holistic approach is necessary at the appropriate level - national or European. This approach should combine measures that improve labour markets, strengthen the public pension systems and improve the supplementary pension systems. |
Or. en
Amendment 118
Auke Zijlstra, Mireia Borrás Pabón
Proposal for a directive
Recital 3
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (3) Despite being among the world’s highest savers, Union households still hold a large share of their financial wealth in short-term bank deposits with limited returns. Developing attractive occupational and personal pension products can help mobilise those savings for long-term investment, generating higher returns for savers and channelling capital towards productive uses that support growth, innovation and the green and digital transitions. | (3) Despite being among the world’s highest savers, Union households still hold a large share of their financial wealth in short-term bank deposits with limited returns. Developing attractive occupational and personal pension products can help mobilise those savings for long-term investment and generate higher net returns for savers, while supporting productive investments selected on their financial merits. |
Or. en
Justification
The purpose of pension investment is to provide retirement income, not to finance predetermined political agendas. Productive investment should result from financially sound decisions rather than political direction.
Amendment 119
Isabel Benjumea Benjumea
Proposal for a directive
Recital 3
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (3) Despite being among the world’s highest savers, Union households still hold a large share of their financial wealth in short-term bank deposits with limited returns. Developing attractive occupational and personal pension products can help mobilise those savings for long-term investment, generating higher returns for savers and channelling capital towards productive uses that support growth, innovation and the green and digital transitions. | (3) Despite being among the world’s highest savers, Union households still hold a large share of their financial wealth in short-term bank deposits with limited returns. Developing attractive occupational and personal pension products can help mobilise those savings for long-term investment, generating higher returns for savers and channelling capital towards productive uses that support growth, innovation and resilience. |
Or. es
Amendment 120
Adnan Dibrani, Niels Fuglsang, Thomas Bajada, Lara Wolters, Jonás Fernández, César Luena
Proposal for a directive
Recital 3
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (3) Despite being among the world’s highest savers, Union households still hold a large share of their financial wealth in short-term bank deposits with limited returns. Developing attractive occupational and personal pension products can help mobilise those savings for long-term investment, generating higher returns for savers and channelling capital towards productive uses that support growth, innovation and the green and digital transitions. | (3) Despite being among the world’s highest savers, Union households still hold a large share of their financial wealth in short-term bank deposits with limited returns. Developing attractive and well-managed occupational and personal pensions can help mobilise those savings for long-term investment, generating higher returns for savers and channelling capital towards productive uses that support growth, innovation and the green and digital transitions. However, the core purpose of pension systems must remain to provide members and beneficiaries with stable and adequate retirement income. Accordingly, any measures designed to encourage greater participation by pension funds in capital markets should fully respect the prudent person principle and place the protection of members and beneficiaries at the centre. In this context, Member States should also support adequate old-age income and seek to reduce gender pension gaps, including in public and occupational pension systems, while promoting pension arrangements that deliver strong outcomes for workers. |
Or. en
Justification
Gender gaps in supplementary pension systems can exceed 35 to 40%. Member States should explore appropriate measures to help reduce these gaps.
Amendment 121
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Recital 3
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (3) Despite being among the world’s highest savers, Union households still hold a large share of their financial wealth in short-term bank deposits with limited returns. Developing attractive occupational and personal pension products can help mobilise those savings for long-term investment, generating higher returns for savers and channelling capital towards productive uses that support growth, innovation and the green and digital transitions. | (3) Despite being among the world’s highest savers, Union households still hold a large share of their financial wealth in short-term bank deposits with limited returns. While always putting the interests of members and beneficiaries of pension funds first, developing attractive occupational and personal pension products can help mobilise those savings for long-term investment, generating higher returns for savers and channelling capital towards productive uses that support growth, innovation and the green and digital transitions. |
Or. en
Amendment 122
Jonás Fernández, César Luena
Proposal for a directive
Recital 3 a (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (3a) Supplementary pensions should not justify, directly or indirectly, weakening public pensions, especially as regards the adequacy of pensions. In addition, Member States should assess the possibility of taking concrete measures to reduce gender gaps in supplementary pensions, and such measures should be agreed with social partners. |
Or. en
Amendment 123
Jonás Fernández, César Luena
Proposal for a directive
Recital 3 b (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (3b) Occupational and individual pensions should complement efficiently. Member States should be vigilant that occupational and individual pension schemes do not compete but complement each other, and that practices of employers and financial institutions are not against the interest of its members and beneficiaries, especially with regards to possible incentives for competition between occupational and individual pension schemes, notably in the workplace. |
Or. en
Amendment 124
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Recital 4
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (4) Appropriate regulation and supervision at Union and national level remain important for the development of safe and secure occupational retirement provision across all Member States. Directive (EU) 2016/2341 of the European Parliament and of the Council3 has contributed to a more harmonised prudential framework for institutions for occupational retirement provision (IORPs). However, the supplementary pension sector remains underdeveloped in many Member States, which could jeopardise the financial security of citizens, in particular in light of ongoing demographic trends within the Union. As part of strong multi-pillar pension systems, developed in dialogue with social partners, it is essential to support the further uptake of supplementary pensions such as IORPs and to help deliver better outcomes for long-term savers. This requires policy action both at national and at Union level. | (4) Appropriate regulation and supervision at Union and national level remain important for the development of safe and secure occupational retirement provision across all Member States. Directive (EU) 2016/2341 of the European Parliament and of the Council3 has contributed to a more harmonised prudential framework for institutions for occupational retirement provision (IORPs). However, the supplementary pension sector remains underdeveloped in many Member States, which could jeopardise the financial security of citizens, in particular in light of ongoing demographic trends within the Union. As part of strong multi-pillar pension systems, developed in dialogue with social partners, it is essential to support the further uptake of supplementary pensions such as IORPs and to help deliver better outcomes for long-term savers. This requires policy action both at national and at Union level. At the same time, it is essential that national supplementary pension systems that already function well are not unnecessarily disturbed. |
| 3 Directive (EU) 2016/2341 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2016 on the activities and supervision of institutions for occupational retirement provision (IORPs) (recast) (OJ L 354, 23.12.2016, p. 37, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2016/2341/oj). | 3 Directive (EU) 2016/2341 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2016 on the activities and supervision of institutions for occupational retirement provision (IORPs) (recast) (OJ L 354, 23.12.2016, p. 37, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2016/2341/oj). |
Or. en
Amendment 125
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Recital 4 a (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (4a) To encourage and support Member States to further develop funded and supplementary pension systems and establish more IORPs, it should be possible for Member States to apply a lighter regime for new IORPs for the first years of operation. Since regulatory burden can be substantial for small and beginning IORPs, an initial phase with a lower burden could support the establishment of new IORPs and therefore increase the amount of funded pension capital in Europe. Member State should be able to not or partially apply burdensome provisions for new IORPs for a maximum of three years, while taking into account the aims of these provisions. In addition, as the social dialogue and collective bargaining to establish IORPs generally is a sensitive process requiring sufficient trust, national competent authorities should be able to request technical support and expertise from EIOPA, which could leverage expertise from Member States with more developed funded pension sectors via a standing advisory team. |
Or. en
Amendment 126
Jonás Fernández, César Luena
Proposal for a directive
Recital 4 a (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (4a) The importance of the pension system in citizens’ lives and in the public fiscal balance requires maintaining coordination and monitoring of the measures implemented at European level, as well as an evaluation of their impact. The creation of a specialized monitoring committee, led by the Commission but with the participation of Member States and other stakeholders, would help achieve this purpose. |
Or. en
Amendment 127
Martin Schirdewan
Proposal for a directive
Recital 5
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (5) The Savings and Investments Union (SIU) announced by the Commission in its Communication of 19 March 20154 aims to enable citizens to save and invest for their future, channel investments towards the priorities of the Union, deepen integration and scale in the Union’s capital markets, and ensure effective supervision across the single market. Among those four strands, helping citizens save and invest for their future is at the heart of the SIU’s ambition. Ensuring that Union citizens can build adequate retirement income is one of the most concrete ways in which the Union can make a difference in people’s lives. The work on supplementary pensions, and in particular on occupational pensions, embodies this citizen-centred approach. | deleted |
| 4 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Central Bank, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions of 19 March 2025, COM(2025) 124 final. |
Or. en
Amendment 128
Adnan Dibrani, Niels Fuglsang, Thomas Bajada, Lara Wolters, Jonás Fernández, César Luena
Proposal for a directive
Recital 5
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (5) The Savings and Investments Union (SIU) announced by the Commission in its Communication of 19 March 20154 aims to enable citizens to save and invest for their future, channel investments towards the priorities of the Union, deepen integration and scale in the Union’s capital markets, and ensure effective supervision across the single market. Among those four strands, helping citizens save and invest for their future is at the heart of the SIU’s ambition. Ensuring that Union citizens can build adequate retirement income is one of the most concrete ways in which the Union can make a difference in people’s lives. The work on supplementary pensions, and in particular on occupational pensions, embodies this citizen-centred approach. | (5) The Savings and Investments Union (SIU) announced by the Commission in its Communication of 19 March 20154 aims to enable citizens to save and invest for their future, channel investments towards the priorities of the Union, deepen integration and scale in the Union’s capital markets, and ensure effective supervision across the single market. Among those four strands, helping citizens save and invest for their future is at the heart of the SIU’s ambition. While also supporting the development of the Capital Markets Union, this Directive should not undermine the primary objective of ensuring adequate, safe and sustainable retirement income for people. The work on supplementary pensions, and in particular on occupational pensions, embodies this people-centred approach. |
| 4 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Central Bank, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions of 19 March 2025, COM(2025) 124 final. | 4 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Central Bank, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions of 19 March 2025, COM(2025) 124 final. |
Or. en
Amendment 129
Auke Zijlstra, Mireia Borrás Pabón
Proposal for a directive
Recital 5
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (5) The Savings and Investments Union (SIU) announced by the Commission in its Communication of 19 March 20154 aims to enable citizens to save and invest for their future, channel investments towards the priorities of the Union, deepen integration and scale in the Union’s capital markets, and ensure effective supervision across the single market. Among those four strands, helping citizens save and invest for their future is at the heart of the SIU’s ambition. Ensuring that Union citizens can build adequate retirement income is one of the most concrete ways in which the Union can make a difference in people’s lives. The work on supplementary pensions, and in particular on occupational pensions, embodies this citizen-centred approach. | (5) The Savings and Investments Union (SIU) announced by the Commission in its Communication of 19 March 20154 aims to enable citizens to save and invest for their future, facilitate investments selected on their financial merits and in the best interests of savers, deepen integration and scale in the Union’s capital markets, and ensure effective supervision across the single market. Among those four strands, helping citizens save and invest for their future is at the heart of the SIU’s ambition. Ensuring that Union citizens can build adequate retirement income is one of the most concrete ways in which the Union can make a difference in people’s lives. The work on supplementary pensions, including on occupational pensions, embodies this citizen-centred approach. |
| 4 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Central Bank, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions of 19 March 2025, COM(2025) 124 final. | 4 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Central Bank, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions of 19 March 2025, COM(2025) 124 final. |
Or. en
Justification
The Savings and Investments Union should serve savers and investors. Pension capital should not be directed towards changing Union political agendas.
Amendment 130
Martin Schirdewan
Proposal for a directive
Recital 6
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (6) With approximately three trillion euros in assets under management, institutions for occupational retirement provision (‘IORPs’) play an essential role in the Union’s financial system but tend to be less active in listed equity, private equity, venture capital and infrastructure markets. Provided that investments in equity and alternative asset classes are prudently managed, such investments can be a valuable component of their portfolios, offering diversification, higher long-term returns for pension savers and protection against inflation, while also providing crucial funding for the real economy. It is therefore important to ensure that there are no undue regulatory barriers to such investments. | (6) With approximately three trillion euros in assets under management, institutions for occupational retirement provision (‘IORPs’) play an essential role in the Union’s financial system but tend to be less active in listed equity, private equity, venture capital and infrastructure markets. |
Or. en
Amendment 131
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Recital 6
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (6) With approximately three trillion euros in assets under management, institutions for occupational retirement provision (‘IORPs’) play an essential role in the Union’s financial system but tend to be less active in listed equity, private equity, venture capital and infrastructure markets. Provided that investments in equity and alternative asset classes are prudently managed, such investments can be a valuable component of their portfolios, offering diversification, higher long-term returns for pension savers and protection against inflation, while also providing crucial funding for the real economy. It is therefore important to ensure that there are no undue regulatory barriers to such investments. | (6) With approximately three trillion euros in assets under management, institutions for occupational retirement provision (‘IORPs’) play an essential role in the Union’s financial system. Provided that investments in equity and alternative asset classes are prudently managed, such investments can be a valuable component of their portfolios, potentially offering diversification, higher long-term returns for pension savers and protection against inflation, while also providing crucial funding for the real economy. It is therefore important to ensure that there are no undue regulatory barriers to such investments. In addition, developing more trusted and well-developed supplementary pension systems in Member States will by definition lead to more assets under management and therefore more capital invested on financial markets. |
Or. en
Amendment 132
Regina Doherty
Proposal for a directive
Recital 6
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (6) With approximately three trillion euros in assets under management, institutions for occupational retirement provision (‘IORPs’) play an essential role in the Union’s financial system but tend to be less active in listed equity, private equity, venture capital and infrastructure markets. Provided that investments in equity and alternative asset classes are prudently managed, such investments can be a valuable component of their portfolios, offering diversification, higher long-term returns for pension savers and protection against inflation, while also providing crucial funding for the real economy. It is therefore important to ensure that there are no undue regulatory barriers to such investments. | (6) With approximately three trillion euros in assets under management, institutions for occupational retirement provision (‘IORPs’) play an essential role in the Union’s financial system but tend to be less active in listed equity, private equity, venture capital and infrastructure markets. Provided that investments in equity and alternative asset classes are prudently managed, such investments can be a valuable component of their portfolios, offering diversification, higher long-term returns for pension savers, supporting retail investment, and protection against inflation, while also providing crucial funding for the real economy and advancing the Savings and Investments Union. It is therefore important to ensure that there are no undue regulatory barriers to such investments. |
Or. en
Amendment 133
Adnan Dibrani, Niels Fuglsang, Thomas Bajada, Lara Wolters, Jonás Fernández, César Luena
Proposal for a directive
Recital 6
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (6) With approximately three trillion euros in assets under management, institutions for occupational retirement provision (‘IORPs’) play an essential role in the Union’s financial system but tend to be less active in listed equity, private equity, venture capital and infrastructure markets. Provided that investments in equity and alternative asset classes are prudently managed, such investments can be a valuable component of their portfolios, offering diversification, higher long-term returns for pension savers and protection against inflation, while also providing crucial funding for the real economy. It is therefore important to ensure that there are no undue regulatory barriers to such investments. | (6) With approximately three trillion euros in assets under management, institutions for occupational retirement provision (‘IORPs’) play an essential role in the Union’s financial system but tend to be less active in listed equity, private equity, venture capital and infrastructure markets. Provided that investments in equity and alternative asset classes are prudently managed, such investments can be a valuable component of their portfolios, offering diversification, higher long-term returns for pension savers and protection against inflation, while also providing crucial funding for the real economy. It is therefore important to ensure that there are no undue regulatory barriers to such investments. While investments in different asset classes may contribute to diversification and long-term returns, they should remain consistent with the prudent-person rule and the long-term interests of members and beneficiaries. Pension funds should not be exposed to excessive market risks that could undermine retirement security. |
Or. en
Amendment 134
Sirpa Pietikäinen
Proposal for a directive
Recital 6 a (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (6a) Institutions for occupational retirement provision, in particular those governed on a paritarian basis, fulfil a social protection function distinct from retail financial products. Their governance structures, often based on equal representation of employers and employees and rooted in collective bargaining, provide institutional safeguards that should be duly recognised in the application of this Directive. |
Or. en
Amendment 135
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Recital 8
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (8) Achieving sufficient scale is often a prerequisite for the efficient and sustainable functioning of IORPs. Smaller IORPs may face higher administrative and investment costs, limited diversification, and difficulties in attracting or retaining the necessary professional expertise. Greater scale can help mitigate those constraints by improving risk pooling, governance capacity, and access to a broader range of investment opportunities, thereby contributing to more stable and cost-effective outcomes for members and beneficiaries. | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 136
Markus Ferber, Andrea Wechsler
Proposal for a directive
Recital 8
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (8) Achieving sufficient scale is often a prerequisite for the efficient and sustainable functioning of IORPs. Smaller IORPs may face higher administrative and investment costs, limited diversification, and difficulties in attracting or retaining the necessary professional expertise. Greater scale can help mitigate those constraints by improving risk pooling, governance capacity, and access to a broader range of investment opportunities, thereby contributing to more stable and cost-effective outcomes for members and beneficiaries. | (8) Achieving sufficient scale can contribute to the efficient functioning of IORPs. However, scale is not the only means by which IORPs can achieve diversification, sound governance, and competitive investment outcomes. Smaller IORPs may address those constraints through participation in pooled investment structures, outsourcing of investment management to professional asset managers, and shared administrative arrangements. Regulatory requirements should therefore be calibrated to the actual risk profile and operational structure of each IORP, and not to size alone |
Or. en
Justification
The Commission's scale-efficiency premise is empirically contested. Recital 8 as drafted risks embedding a policy bias towards consolidation that is not supported by evidence and disadvantages small sponsor-linked IORPs operating effectively through outsourcing and pooling structures.
Amendment 137
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Recital 9
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (9) Directive (EU) 2016/2341, however, has not been sufficiently effective in fostering economies of scale, resulting in pension providers that are often too small to benefit from diversification or efficiency gains, and therefore expose members and beneficiaries to higher costs and lower net returns. It is therefore necessary to facilitate such economies of scale. | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 138
Markus Ferber, Andrea Wechsler
Proposal for a directive
Recital 9 a (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (9a) The IORP sector across the Union is characterised by significant diversity in size, structure, governance model, and national legal framework. The majority of IORPs operating in the Union have fewer than 1 000 members and beneficiaries and manage assets below EUR 50 million. Many of these smaller IORPs are embedded in national social and labour law, operate on a non-commercial basis, and benefit from sponsor support arrangements that substantially reduce the risks borne by members and beneficiaries. Member States should therefore retain full discretion to exempt such IORPs from the requirements of this Directive, in whole or in part, where their size, risk profile, and governance structure render full application disproportionate. |
Or. en
Amendment 139
Damian Boeselager
Proposal for a directive
Recital 11 a (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (11a) In several Member States IORPs are constituted in a form under which they are operated by an authorised entity acting on their behalf, as referred to in Article 2(1). Such an entity may be an undertaking authorised under Directive 2009/138/EC, which already holds own funds under that Directive and should be permitted to operate such IORPs, another entity referred to in Article 2(2)(b) that the Union law applicable to it permits to do so, or an entity authorised under this Directive for that purpose. The assets of such an IORP are, in accordance with Article 2(3), kept legally separate from those of the entity that operates it, and its liabilities are covered, where relevant, by the technical provisions and regulatory own funds held under Articles 15 to 17. However, in operating the IORP, the entity gives rise to risks that those assets do not cover, such as administrative or accounting errors, failures of its systems or internal processes, its liability to the IORP or its members for breach of its duties, or where it ceases to operate the IORP, the cost of transferring the IORP to another entity or of winding it down. The entities referred to above, other than undertakings authorised under Directive 2009/138/EC, should therefore hold minimum own funds against those risks while they operate an IORP, so that the cost does not fall on the retirement savings of members and beneficiaries. The minimum amount should take into account the requirements already applicable to comparable entities under national law, should remain a floor that the home Member State may exceed, and should increase with the assets of the IORPs operated. Undertakings authorised under Directive 2009/138/EC and other entities referred to in Article 2(2)(b) already benefit from mutual recognition under the Union law applicable to them. Harmonising the authorisation and own funds of entities authorised under this Directive should ensure that those entities likewise benefit from mutual recognition, so that all entities operating IORP, may do so throughout the Union. Each entity should ensure that the requirements imposed by this Directive on the IORPs it operates are complied with. |
Or. en
Amendment 140
Marlena Maląg
on behalf of the ECR Group
Proposal for a directive
Recital 12
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (12) In certain Member States, responsibility for the operation of an IORP may be shared between the IORP itself and the authorised entity acting on its behalf, each performing distinct but complementary functions. The application of Directive (EU) 2016/2341 should be coherent with that allocation of responsibilities under national law and ensure that all those responsible are fully subject to its requirements, irrespective of the legal form of the IORP. This situation should however be distinguished from outsourcing as referred to in Article 31 of that Directive, since the shared exercise of responsibilities in these instances stems from the institutional structure of the IORP as defined under national law and not from a contractual outsourcing of functions. Member States should also ensure that the assets of IORPs are legally separate from those of the authorised entities operating them. | (12) In certain Member States, responsibility for the operation of an IORP may be shared between the IORP itself and the authorised entity acting on its behalf, each performing distinct but complementary functions. The application of Directive (EU) 2016/2341 should be coherent with that allocation of responsibilities under national law and ensure that all those responsible are fully subject to its requirements, irrespective of the legal form of the IORP. This situation should however be distinguished from outsourcing as referred to in Article 31 of that Directive, since the shared exercise of responsibilities in these instances stems from the institutional structure of the IORP as defined under national law and not from a contractual outsourcing of functions. Member States should also ensure that the assets of IORPs are legally separate from those of the authorised entities operating them, in a manner that precludes any transfer of assets between them, so as to ensure that those assets remain exclusively available to meet the obligations of the IORPs. |
Or. en
Amendment 141
Pasquale Tridico
Proposal for a directive
Recital 12 a (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (12a) Member States should actively promote the establishment of public-initiative IORPs as a strategic tool to expand pension coverage. These institutions should serve as a primary channel for mobilizing long-term savings toward the Union’s green and social transitions, notably through investments in dedicated sovereign social and green bonds. To ensure the highest level of protection, Member States shall guarantee a strict legal separation between the assets of these IORPs and the state budget, ensuring that investment strategies are driven exclusively by the best long-term interests of members and the prudent person principle |
Or. en
Amendment 142
Auke Zijlstra
Proposal for a directive
Recital 12 a (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (12a) Contributions paid by or on behalf of members into an institution for occupational retirement provision constitute remuneration earned through employment but deferred until retirement. Such contributions, and the assets acquired with them, should therefore be legally recognised as belonging individually to the members and beneficiaries of the relevant pension scheme. They should not constitute the property of the IORP, the sponsoring undertaking, an authorised entity operating the IORP, the members of its administrative, management or supervisory body, or any service provider or asset manager acting on its behalf. |
Or. en
Justification
Occupational pension contributions are deferred wages and should be legally recognised as such. The legislation should recognise that pension assets are held for the exclusive benefit of individual members and beneficiaries and cannot be treated as assets belonging to the collective, the institution, its managers or other intermediaries.
Amendment 143
Martin Schirdewan
Proposal for a directive
Recital 14
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (14) In some Member States, IORPs may also be allowed to provide personal pension products, including the pan-European Personal Pension Product, as reflected in Regulation (EU) 2019/1238 of the European Parliament and of the Council10 . To ensure a clear and sound organisation of such activities, and coherent and effective supervision across different forms of retirement provision, it is therefore appropriate to reflect this within Directive (EU) 2016/2341. | deleted |
| 10 Regulation (EU) 2019/1238 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on a pan-European Personal Pension Product (PEPP) (OJ L 198, 25.7.2019, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/1238/oj). |
Or. en
Amendment 144
Marlena Maląg
on behalf of the ECR Group
Proposal for a directive
Recital 14
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (14) In some Member States, IORPs may also be allowed to provide personal pension products, including the pan-European Personal Pension Product, as reflected in Regulation (EU) 2019/1238 of the European Parliament and of the Council10 . To ensure a clear and sound organisation of such activities, and coherent and effective supervision across different forms of retirement provision, it is therefore appropriate to reflect this within Directive (EU) 2016/2341. | (14) Some Member States allow IORPs to carry out personal retirement provision activities without being subject, in respect of those activities, to all the requirements laid down in Directive (EU) 2016/2341. In order to accommodate such national arrangements, Member States should retain the possibility not to apply all the provisions of that Directive to non-occupational personal retirement provision activities carried out by IORPs. However, in order to ensure an appropriate level of protection for members and beneficiaries in other Member States, where an IORP is not subject to all the provisions of Directive (EU) 2016/2341 in relation to such activities, Member States should ensure that the IORP does not carry out cross-border activities and that appropriate ring-fencing arrangements are in place. |
| 10 Regulation (EU) 2019/1238 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on a pan-European Personal Pension Product (PEPP) (OJ L 198, 25.7.2019, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/1238/oj). |
Or. en
Amendment 145
Danuše Nerudová
Proposal for a directive
Recital 14 a (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (14a) To improve access to occupational retirement provision, particularly for employees of small and medium-sized undertakings and self-employed persons, Member States should ensure that at least one IORP is available to accept sponsorship from any undertaking and participation by such employees and self-employed persons under objective, transparent and non-discriminatory conditions. This obligation concerns only the availability of such an IORP and is without prejudice to Member States' competence to organise their pension systems. Member States may fulfil this obligation jointly, including by relying on an IORP authorised in another Member State in accordance with this Directive and without prejudice to the applicable social and labour law of the host Member State. |
Or. en
Amendment 146
Marlena Maląg
on behalf of the ECR Group
Proposal for a directive
Recital 14 a (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (14a) Article 11 lays down harmonised procedures for cross-border activities in the field of occupational retirement provision. The distribution of personal pension products other than PEPPs by an IORP in a Member State other than the one in which the IORP has been authorised should be subject to the national laws of that other Member State in relation to distribution. |
Or. en
Amendment 147
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Recital 15
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (15) The organisation of occupational retirement provision may benefit from greater flexibility in how IORPs structure and manage pension schemes and sponsorship arrangements. Therefore, Member States should ensure that IORPs are allowed to operate different pension schemes, including those with distinct investment policies, and to accept sponsorship from multiple sponsoring undertakings, including within the same pension scheme. That flexibility can facilitate the achievement of greater scale, thereby enhancing cost efficiency, risk diversification and governance capacity, to the benefit of members and beneficiaries. | (15) The organisation of occupational retirement provision may benefit from greater flexibility in how IORPs structure and manage pension schemes and sponsorship arrangements. Therefore, Member States should ensure that specific categories of IORPs are allowed to operate different pension schemes, including those with distinct investment policies, and to accept sponsorship from multiple sponsoring undertakings, including within the same pension scheme. That flexibility can facilitate the achievement of greater scale, thereby enhancing cost efficiency, risk diversification and governance capacity, to the benefit of members and beneficiaries. |
Or. en
Amendment 148
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Recital 16
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (16) Directive (EU) 2016/2341 distinguishes between the authorisation and registration of IORPs but does not define either concept, while requiring Member States to maintain a national register of IORPs. This has resulted in divergent supervisory practices, including cases where competent authorities do not conduct an ex ante prudential assessment, or, in certain cases, where no prudential assessment is carried out at all. The absence of a prudential assessment as part of the registration or authorisation process may undermine the proper functioning of the internal market and the protection of the rights of members and beneficiaries. To avoid regulatory arbitrage and safeguard the interests of pension savers, all IORPs should be subject to an authorisation procedure that includes an appropriate prudential assessment by the competent authority. In line with EIOPA’s technical advice on the review of the IORP II Directive and with the Implementing Guidelines of the OECD Recommendation on Core Principles of Private Pension Regulation, the authorisation process should also require IORPs to establish and maintain a business plan for all planned activities. | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 149
Anouk Van Brug, Engin Eroglu
Proposal for a directive
Recital 17
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (17) To enhance effective and adaptable occupational retirement provision, as well as economies of scale, IORPs should be allowed to operate several pension schemes, including those with distinct investment approaches, and to accept sponsorship from several undertakings within the same scheme, while ensuring proper management and the protection of members and beneficiaries. | (17) To enhance effective and adaptable occupational retirement provision, as well as economies of scale, IORPs should be allowed to operate several pension schemes, including those with distinct investment approaches, and to accept sponsorship from several undertakings within the same scheme, while ensuring proper management and the protection of members and beneficiaries. The possibility to operate different pension schemes and to accept sponsorship from multiple undertakings within the same scheme should be without prejudice to compliance with the requirements laid down in the laws of the home Member State regarding the operation of different schemes or of schemes with multiple sponsoring undertakings. Any IORP which, due to the nature of its activities as laid down in its articles of association, operates a single scheme or can accept sponsorship from only a single sponsor should be able to convert into a type of IORP that can accept multiple sponsors or operate multiple schemes. Any national laws of a host Member State that require a particular legal form for the operation of such schemes should not apply to multi-sponsor or multi-scheme IORPs incorporated in another Member State in compliance with that other Member State’s rules. This should also be without prejudice to the option for the home Member State to require that schemes with multiple sponsoring undertakings be operated under Directive 2009/138/EC. |
Or. en
Justification
Not every single IORP is allowed to accept multiple sponsors under national legislation, this specificity should be taken into account.
Amendment 150
Marlena Maląg
on behalf of the ECR Group
Proposal for a directive
Recital 19
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (19) It is unnecessarily burdensome to impose on an IORP that is carrying out cross-border activities in a host Member State full initial cross-border procedures where such IORP wishes to extend those activities to additional sponsoring undertakings or schemes in the same host Member State. Such an approach could lead to duplication of procedures, increased administrative costs and delays, without improving the protection of members and beneficiaries. To facilitate proportionate and efficient supervision and ensure effective cooperation between the competent authorities of the home and host Member States, such extensions should be made subject to a simplified notification procedure to be completed within one month. That timeline ensures that competent authorities can carry out the necessary coordination and oversight without creating undue delays or burdens for IORPs. | (19) It is unnecessarily burdensome to impose on an IORP that is carrying out cross-border activities in a host Member State full initial cross-border notification procedures where such IORP wishes to extend those activities to additional sponsoring undertakings or schemes in the same host Member State. Such an approach could lead to duplication of procedures, increased administrative costs and delays, without improving the protection of members and beneficiaries. To facilitate proportionate and efficient supervision and ensure effective cooperation between the competent authorities of the home and host Member States, such extensions should be made subject to a simplified notification procedure to be completed within one month. That timeline ensures that competent authorities can carry out the necessary coordination and oversight without creating undue delays or burdens for IORPs. The simplified notification procedure should also apply with respect to non-material amendments. These are changes which do not affect the core characteristics of the notified pension scheme, including its benefit structure, members’ rights or risk profile, and which do not have a significant impact on members or beneficiaries. The competent authority of the Home Member State may require an IORP not to use the simplified notification procedure where it considers the intended amendments as being in fact material. |
Or. en
Amendment 151
Auke Zijlstra
Proposal for a directive
Recital 19
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (19) It is unnecessarily burdensome to impose on an IORP that is carrying out cross-border activities in a host Member State full initial cross-border procedures where such IORP wishes to extend those activities to additional sponsoring undertakings or schemes in the same host Member State. Such an approach could lead to duplication of procedures, increased administrative costs and delays, without improving the protection of members and beneficiaries. To facilitate proportionate and efficient supervision and ensure effective cooperation between the competent authorities of the home and host Member States, such extensions should be made subject to a simplified notification procedure to be completed within one month. That timeline ensures that competent authorities can carry out the necessary coordination and oversight without creating undue delays or burdens for IORPs. | (19) It is unnecessarily burdensome to impose on an IORP that is carrying out cross-border activities in a host Member State full initial cross-border procedures where such IORP wishes to extend those activities to additional sponsoring undertakings or schemes in the same host Member State. Such an approach could lead to duplication of procedures, increased administrative costs and delays, without improving the protection of members and beneficiaries. To facilitate proportionate and efficient supervision and ensure effective cooperation between the competent authorities of the home and host Member States, such extensions should be made subject to a simplified notification procedure to be completed within three months. That timeline ensures that competent authorities can carry out the necessary coordination and oversight without creating undue delays or burdens for IORPs. |
Or. en
Amendment 152
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Recital 20
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (20) The rules governing collective transfers of all or part of a pension scheme’s liabilities, technical provisions, and other obligations and rights play a key role in supporting consolidation and the achievement of scale in occupational retirement provision. Where such rules are overly strict, they create undue obstacles to achieving scale and facilitating consolidation, which can be detrimental to the long-term interests of savers. At the same time, it is important that members and beneficiaries, or their representatives, can effectively express their views on proposed cross-border transfers. To facilitate such transfers, it is therefore appropriate to clarify and simplify the applicable Union rules, ensuring that procedures remain transparent, proportionate and consistent with the protection of members and beneficiaries, while enabling greater efficiency and integration in the internal market. This should include provisions for timely notification, approval by the sponsoring undertaking where applicable, and the possibility for members and beneficiaries to formally express opposition. | (20) The rules governing collective transfers of all or part of a pension scheme’s liabilities, technical provisions, and other obligations and rights should be balanced. It is important that members and beneficiaries, or their representatives, can effectively express their views on proposed cross-border transfers. It is appropriate to clarify and simplify the applicable Union rules, ensuring that procedures remain transparent, proportionate and consistent with the protection of members and beneficiaries, while enabling efficiency. This should include provisions for timely notification, approval by the sponsoring undertaking where applicable, and the possibility for members and beneficiaries to formally express opposition. |
Or. en
Amendment 153
Markus Ferber, Andrea Wechsler
Proposal for a directive
Recital 21
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (21) For domestic collective transfers from one IORP to another, Member States should ensure that simple, transparent and operationally efficient procedures are in place to enable consolidation and restructuring of pension schemes within their territories. Such procedures should facilitate the attainment of scale and cost efficiency and should not be more restrictive than the procedures applicable to cross-border transfers. | deleted |
Or. en
Justification
To be read in conjunction with the proposed deletion of Article 12a.
Amendment 154
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Recital 21
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (21) For domestic collective transfers from one IORP to another, Member States should ensure that simple, transparent and operationally efficient procedures are in place to enable consolidation and restructuring of pension schemes within their territories. Such procedures should facilitate the attainment of scale and cost efficiency and should not be more restrictive than the procedures applicable to cross-border transfers. | (21) For domestic collective transfers from one IORP to another, Member States should ensure that simple, transparent and operationally efficient procedures are in place. Such procedures should facilitate cost efficiency and should not be more restrictive than the procedures applicable to cross-border transfers. |
Or. en
Amendment 155
Auke Zijlstra
Proposal for a directive
Recital 22
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (22) Member States have the option to allow temporary underfunding of occupational pension schemes. Different Member States have implemented that option in varying ways, while others have chosen not to use it, resulting in inconsistencies that may affect the protection of members and beneficiaries. While preventing underfunding is important, an absolute prohibition could, in some cases, force abrupt reductions in pension promises, which may be detrimental to members and beneficiaries. To ensure a balanced and proportionate approach and an adequate protection of members and beneficiaries, Member States should allow temporary underfunding for a limited period, determined by national law, which in any case should not exceed ten years. | (22) Member States have the option to allow temporary underfunding of occupational pension schemes. Different Member States have implemented that option in varying ways, while others have chosen not to use it, resulting in inconsistencies that may affect the protection of members and beneficiaries. While preventing underfunding is important, an absolute prohibition could, in some cases, force abrupt reductions in pension promises, which may be detrimental to members and beneficiaries. To ensure a balanced and proportionate approach and an adequate protection of members and beneficiaries, Member States should allow temporary underfunding for a limited period, determined by national law, which in any case should not exceed two years. |
Or. en
Amendment 156
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Recital 22
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (22) Member States have the option to allow temporary underfunding of occupational pension schemes. Different Member States have implemented that option in varying ways, while others have chosen not to use it, resulting in inconsistencies that may affect the protection of members and beneficiaries. While preventing underfunding is important, an absolute prohibition could, in some cases, force abrupt reductions in pension promises, which may be detrimental to members and beneficiaries. To ensure a balanced and proportionate approach and an adequate protection of members and beneficiaries, Member States should allow temporary underfunding for a limited period, determined by national law, which in any case should not exceed ten years. | (22) Member States have the option to allow temporary underfunding of occupational pension schemes. Different Member States have implemented that option in varying ways, while others have chosen not to use it, resulting in inconsistencies that may affect the protection of members and beneficiaries. While preventing underfunding is important, an absolute prohibition could, in some cases, force abrupt reductions in pension promises, which may be detrimental to members and beneficiaries. To ensure a balanced and proportionate approach and an adequate protection of members and beneficiaries, Member States should allow temporary underfunding for a limited period, determined by national law, which in any case should not exceed two years. |
Or. en
Amendment 157
Markus Ferber, Andrea Wechsler
Proposal for a directive
Recital 23
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (23) Certain technical parameters in Directive (EU) 2016/2341 stem from Council Directive 79/267/EEC11 , the first Life Insurance Directive, and have remained unchanged since their introduction. It is therefore appropriate to provide for the possibility of their adjustment through delegated acts, should this be considered necessary to ensure that they remain appropriate in light of market developments and supervisory practices. | deleted |
| 11 First Council Directive 79/267/EEC of 5 March 1979 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of direct life assurance (OJ L 63, 13.3.1979, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/1979/267/oj) |
Or. en
Amendment 158
Adnan Dibrani, Niels Fuglsang, Thomas Bajada
Proposal for a directive
Recital 23
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (23) Certain technical parameters in Directive (EU) 2016/2341 stem from Council Directive 79/267/EEC11 , the first Life Insurance Directive, and have remained unchanged since their introduction. It is therefore appropriate to provide for the possibility of their adjustment through delegated acts, should this be considered necessary to ensure that they remain appropriate in light of market developments and supervisory practices. | (23) Certain technical parameters in Directive (EU) 2016/2341 stem from Council Directive 79/267/EEC11 , the first Life Insurance Directive, and have remained unchanged since their introduction. It is nevertheless requiring policymakers and legislators to carefully assess its appropriateness of their adjustment through delegated acts, should this be considered necessary to ensure that they remain appropriate in light of market developments and supervisory practices. It is essential to recognise that such options may, on the one hand, provide greater flexibility to respond to market developments. On the other hand, they could weaken the principle of minimum harmonisation, strain the capacity of national competent authorities, reduce political scrutiny, increase technocratic governance, limit the involvement of social partners, and have inappropriate effects on social protection, labour relations, collective bargaining and national welfare models. |
| 11 First Council Directive 79/267/EEC of 5 March 1979 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of direct life assurance (OJ L 63, 13.3.1979, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/1979/267/oj) | 11 First Council Directive 79/267/EEC of 5 March 1979 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of direct life assurance (OJ L 63, 13.3.1979, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/1979/267/oj) |
Or. en
Amendment 159
Markus Ferber, Andrea Wechsler
Proposal for a directive
Recital 24
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (24) Directive (EU) 2016/2341 requires IORPs to hold an adequate available solvency margin. That solvency margin does not fully capture exposures to market and longevity risks, including where the IORP underwrites biometric risk or guarantees a given investment performance or level of benefits. Some Member States require IORPs to hold additional risk-based regulatory own funds above the required solvency margin. In Member States where such risk-based requirements do not exist, comparable protection for savers and beneficiaries should be ensured. In particular, IORPs covering biometric risk or offering guarantees and which are not subject to risk-based capital requirements, should carry out regular stress tests to assess their ability to remain funded over a long-term horizon, including under adverse market and demographic scenarios, and competent authorities should have the power to require remedial actions where an underfunding is identified. | deleted |
Or. en
Justification
To be read in conjunction with the proposed deletion of Article 18a.
Amendment 160
Anouk Van Brug, Engin Eroglu
Proposal for a directive
Recital 24
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (24) Directive (EU) 2016/2341 requires IORPs to hold an adequate available solvency margin. That solvency margin does not fully capture exposures to market and longevity risks, including where the IORP underwrites biometric risk or guarantees a given investment performance or level of benefits. Some Member States require IORPs to hold additional risk-based regulatory own funds above the required solvency margin. In Member States where such risk-based requirements do not exist, comparable protection for savers and beneficiaries should be ensured. In particular, IORPs covering biometric risk or offering guarantees and which are not subject to risk-based capital requirements, should carry out regular stress tests to assess their ability to remain funded over a long-term horizon, including under adverse market and demographic scenarios, and competent authorities should have the power to require remedial actions where an underfunding is identified. | (24) Directive (EU) 2016/2341 requires IORPs to hold an adequate available solvency margin. That solvency margin does not fully capture exposures to market and longevity risks, including where the IORP underwrites biometric risk or guarantees a given investment performance or level of benefits. Some Member States require IORPs to hold additional risk-based regulatory own funds above the required solvency margin. In Member States where such risk-based requirements do not exist, comparable protection for savers and beneficiaries should be ensured. In particular, IORPs covering biometric risk or offering guarantees and which are not subject to risk-based capital requirements, should carry out regular stress tests to assess their ability to remain funded over a long-term horizon, including under adverse market and demographic scenarios, and competent authorities should have the power to require remedial actions where an underfunding is identified. An IORP underwrites its liability to cover biometric risks insofar as that IORP has a contract with an external party, such as an insurance or reinsurance company, which guarantees those risks or insofar as the IORP concludes an insurance or reinsurance contract, whether partial or not, with an external party. In such cases, the IORP will only have a credit risk relating to that external party. In the event that a benefit is provided in the form of a variable annuity, meaning that the IORP does not or only partially bears biometric risks, the IORP should only apply the technical provisions laid down in Article 13 of Directive (EU) 2016/2341 to the extent that the IORP itself covers those biometric risks. |
Or. en
Amendment 161
Martin Schirdewan
Proposal for a directive
Recital 25
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (25) Private assets, including private equity, private debt and venture capital, can improve the risk-return characteristics of investment portfolios by enhancing diversification and potentially delivering higher long-term returns. However, such assets are often more complex to value and to assess in terms of risk, hence requiring substantial professional expertise. Pursuant to Article 19 of Directive (EU) 2016/2341, IORPs should invest in the best long-term interests of members and beneficiaries and in accordance with the prudent person rule. That rule, however, is not sufficiently specified, and several Member States have introduced, in line with that Article, detailed and sometimes restrictive investment limits. Such across-the-board constraints may prevent well-governed institutions with adequate risk-management capacity from investing efficiently in alternative assets. It should therefore be laid down that the key investment framework is a risk-based prudent person principle, allowing institutions to invest in any type of asset, provided that they can properly identify, measure, monitor, manage and report the associated risks. Accordingly, as a safeguard for members and beneficiaries, the possibility for Member States to apply investment restrictions should be limited to cases where the investment risk is borne by members and beneficiaries, and, those restrictions should not result in a blanket prohibition on investing in certain asset classes.The chapeau communication of 19 November 202512 provides further non-binding guidance on the application of the prudent person principle, including on how it should support the efficient allocation of long-term savings. | deleted |
| 12 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Central Bank, the European Economic and Social Commitee and the Committee of the Regions – Enhancing the capacity of the EU supplementary pension sector to improve retirement income and supply long-term capital to the EU economy. [PO = please include the number of the document and the internet link]. |
Or. en
Amendment 162
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Recital 25
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (25) Private assets, including private equity, private debt and venture capital, can improve the risk-return characteristics of investment portfolios by enhancing diversification and potentially delivering higher long-term returns. However, such assets are often more complex to value and to assess in terms of risk, hence requiring substantial professional expertise. Pursuant to Article 19 of Directive (EU) 2016/2341, IORPs should invest in the best long-term interests of members and beneficiaries and in accordance with the prudent person rule. That rule, however, is not sufficiently specified, and several Member States have introduced, in line with that Article, detailed and sometimes restrictive investment limits. Such across-the-board constraints may prevent well-governed institutions with adequate risk-management capacity from investing efficiently in alternative assets. It should therefore be laid down that the key investment framework is a risk-based prudent person principle, allowing institutions to invest in any type of asset, provided that they can properly identify, measure, monitor, manage and report the associated risks. Accordingly, as a safeguard for members and beneficiaries, the possibility for Member States to apply investment restrictions should be limited to cases where the investment risk is borne by members and beneficiaries, and, those restrictions should not result in a blanket prohibition on investing in certain asset classes.The chapeau communication of 19 November 202512 provides further non-binding guidance on the application of the prudent person principle, including on how it should support the efficient allocation of long-term savings. | (25) Private assets, including private equity, private debt and venture capital, can improve the risk-return characteristics of investment portfolios by enhancing diversification and potentially delivering higher long-term returns. However, such assets are often more complex to value and to assess in terms of risk, hence requiring substantial professional expertise. Pursuant to Article 19 of Directive (EU) 2016/2341, IORPs should invest in the best long-term interests of members and beneficiaries and in accordance with the prudent person rule. That rule, however, is not sufficiently specified, and several Member States have introduced, in line with that Article, detailed and sometimes restrictive investment limits. Such across-the-board constraints may prevent well-governed institutions with adequate risk-management capacity from investing efficiently in alternative assets. It should therefore be laid down that the key investment framework is a risk-based prudent person principle, allowing institutions to invest in any type of asset, provided that they can properly identify, measure, monitor, manage and report the associated risks. Accordingly, as a safeguard for members and beneficiaries, the possibility for Member States to apply investment restrictions should be limited to cases where the investment risk is borne by members and beneficiaries, and, those restrictions should not result in a blanket prohibition on investing in certain asset classes.The chapeau communication of 19 November 202512 provides further non-binding guidance on the application of the prudent person principle, including on how it should support the efficient allocation of long-term savings. At the same time, specific top-down imposed minimum amounts or restrictive mandates on investment policies can also jeopardize an IORPs ability to effectively stay solvent and to keep providing adequate retirement incomes. This includes geographical or asset-class investment mandates and should be prohibited. |
| 12 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Central Bank, the European Economic and Social Commitee and the Committee of the Regions – Enhancing the capacity of the EU supplementary pension sector to improve retirement income and supply long-term capital to the EU economy. [PO = please include the number of the document and the internet link]. | 12 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Central Bank, the European Economic and Social Commitee and the Committee of the Regions – Enhancing the capacity of the EU supplementary pension sector to improve retirement income and supply long-term capital to the EU economy. [PO = please include the number of the document and the internet link]. |
Or. en
Amendment 163
Markus Ferber, Andrea Wechsler
Proposal for a directive
Recital 25 a (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (25a) Institutions for occupational retirement provision operating defined benefit pension schemes, or schemes where the IORP itself underwrites biometric risk or guarantees a given investment performance or a given level of benefits, differ fundamentally from insurance undertakings in respect of their liability structure, the role of the sponsoring undertaking as a source of last-resort support, the long-term and illiquid nature of their obligations, and the social and contractual framework governing their activities. The risk-based capital requirements applicable to insurance undertakings pursuant to Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council are calibrated to the specific risk profile of insurance liabilities and are not appropriate to the structure of occupational retirement provision. The prudent person principle set out in Article 19 of Directive (EU) 2016/2341, as amended by this Directive, constitutes the appropriate and complete investment governance framework for IORPs. Nothing in this Directive, shall be construed as requiring Member States or competent authorities to impose on IORPs capital requirements calibrated by reference to the standard formula or internal model requirements of Directive 2009/138/EC. Applying Solvency II-equivalent capital requirements to defined benefit IORPs would impose disproportionate costs on sponsoring undertakings and members, penalise investment in equity and long-term productive assets, and thereby directly contradict the objectives of this Directive and of the Savings and Investments Union. |
Or. en
Justification
The Commission proposal creates an implicit supervisory pathway toward Solvency II-equivalent capitalisation. This recital forecloses that pathway explicitly.
Amendment 164
Anouk Van Brug, Engin Eroglu
Proposal for a directive
Recital 25 a (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (25a) Directive 2016/2341 determined that IORPs should consider sustainability risks in their investment policy, such as risks related to climate change, use of resources, the environment, social risks, and risks related to the depreciation of assets due to regulatory change. The consideration of those risks should be integrated into the broader prudent person principle and not supersede consideration of the security, quality, liquidity and profitability of the portfolio as a whole. IORPs should also consider the sustainability preferences of their members and beneficiaries, on whose behalf they invest. Due to the diversity in governance models and ways in which members are enrolled, IORPs should be able to determine how such sustainability preferences are to be gauged, including through the participation of members and beneficiaries, or their representatives, in governance structures of the IORPs, as well as surveys. |
Or. en
Amendment 165
Adnan Dibrani, Niels Fuglsang, Thomas Bajada, Jonás Fernández, César Luena
Proposal for a directive
Recital 25 a (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (25a) In order to further support the channelling of long-term savings towards productive investment, the Commission should continue to assess, in close cooperation with Member States and relevant stakeholders, whether voluntary Union-level tools could facilitate the development of simple, transparent and cost-efficient long-term savings or investment products suitable for retail investors. Such tools could include, where appropriate, a voluntary Union label based on common features such as product simplicity, low costs, diversified asset allocation, appropriate risk mitigation and clear information. Any such assessment should take due account of national pension and savings systems, Member States’ competences, including in the field of taxation, investor protection, and the need to avoid additional complexity or administrative burden. |
Or. en
Justification
A voluntary Union-level tool could help support the development of simple, transparent and cost-efficient long-term savings products, while fully respecting national competences and avoiding additional burden.
Amendment 166
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Recital 25 a (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (25a) If policies and decisions of an IORP structurally lead to lower purchasing power of members and beneficiaries, undermining the trust in occupational pension systems, then this warrants an open dialogue about IORPs’ risk-sensitivity. While it is essential that IORPs hold enough assets to always meet their obligations and stay solvent, being excessively risk-averse also has a cost and could affect the interest of members and beneficiaries. Specifically, the choices made by an IORP can impact the purchasing power of (future) beneficiaries. While certain decisions could be justified based on multiple factors, including demographic trends and market uncertainty, IORPs should also take into consideration the effects of overly cautious prudential behaviour at the expense of the interests of pension savers. |
Or. en
Amendment 167
Auke Zijlstra
Proposal for a directive
Recital 25 a (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (25a) The primary and overriding investment objective of an IORP should be to maximise net, risk-adjusted financial returns solely in the best long-term interest of members and beneficiaries, having regard to security, quality, liquidity, profitability, diversification and the nature and duration of liabilities. Pension assets should not be used as an instrument for financing sectors, undertakings, technologies or projects favoured by Union or national public policy. |
Or. en
Justification
Pension institutions have a fiduciary responsibility towards pension savers, not towards political programmes. Public authorities should not use workers’ deferred wages as an off-budget source of financing for politically preferred projects.
Amendment 168
Danuše Nerudová
Proposal for a directive
Recital 25 a (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (25a) To address the underinvestment in European venture capital identified in the Draghi and Letta reports, IORPs with assets under management exceeding EUR 1 billion should allocate at least 2 % of their assets to venture capital. |
Or. en
Amendment 169
Markus Ferber, Andrea Wechsler
Proposal for a directive
Recital 26 a (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (26a) The proportionality principle is fundamental to the effective operation of the diverse range of IORPs across Member States. The system of governance applicable to an IORP should be calibrated to its size and internal organisation, as well as to the nature, scale and complexity of its activities. The absolute size of an IORP is a distinct and material variable: mandatory governance requirements generate fixed costs that weigh disproportionately on small IORPs regardless of their risk profile. Removing size as an explicit proportionality criterion, and aligning the criterion with the approach used for insurance undertakings subject to Directive 2009/138/EC, is not appropriate for IORPs, given the structural differences between the two sectors, the social function of IORPs, and the triangular relationship between the employee, the employer and the IORP recognised in this Directive. The full proportionality criteria applicable under Directive (EU) 2016/2341 should therefore be retained. |
Or. en
Amendment 170
Markus Ferber, Andrea Wechsler
Proposal for a directive
Recital 28
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (28) Effective risk management is essential to ensure the sound and prudent operation of IORPs and to protect members and beneficiaries. Operational and structural choices of IORPs, including participation in pooled investment structures, shared services, or transfers, can affect their overall risk profile. To ensure sound and prudent management, IORPs should assess the risks they are or could be exposed to against the risk tolerance limits approved by their management or supervisory body, taking into account the capacity and appetite for risk of members and beneficiaries. Economies of scale and efficiency options can reduce operational and investment risks for members and beneficiaries and should therefore be considered in the own-risk assessment. | (28) Effective risk management is essential to ensure the sound and prudent operation of IORPs and to protect members and beneficiaries. Operational and structural choices of IORPs, including participation in pooled investment structures, shared services, or transfers, can affect their overall risk profile. To ensure sound and prudent management, IORPs should assess the risks they are or could be exposed to against the risk tolerance limits approved by their management or supervisory body, taking into account the capacity and appetite for risk of members and beneficiaries. Economies of scale and efficiency options can reduce operational and investment risks for members and beneficiaries and should therefore be considered in the own-risk assessment. Any risk assessment requirements, including in relation to climate-related financial risks, should remain proportionate to the nature, scale and complexity of the IORP concerned and should not take the form of mandatory, uniformly prescribed stress-test exercises imposed at Union level. |
Or. en
Justification
Climate-related risks are relevant to long-term investment management but their materiality varies significantly across IORPs by size, scheme type, and asset allocation. Mandatory Union-level stress-test exercises would be disproportionate for smaller IORPs and inconsistent with the minimum harmonisation character of the directive.
Amendment 171
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Recital 31
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (31) Depositaries provide a convenient remedy for safeguarding assets and overseeing the management of occupational pension schemes, particularly in defined contribution schemes where members and beneficiaries fully bear the investment risk. Under Directive (EU) 2016/2341, Member States have discretion to require, as a general rule, a depositary or to allow IORPs to perform these functions themselves. That discretion has led to inconsistencies and supervisory challenges in cross-border activities. Differences in national rules on the types of entities that may act as depositaries and the scope of their responsibilities may undermine effective prudential oversight, reduce transparency, and increase the risk of conflicts of interest or operational failures. In recent years, the rules on depositaries laid down in Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council13 have been updated and strengthened to ensure a high level of investor protection. Members and beneficiaries of IORPs, who similarly entrust their retirement savings to professional managers, should benefit from no less protection than investors covered by Directive 2009/65/EC. Therefore, to ensure consistent protection of members and beneficiaries, enhance trust in the pension system, and facilitate cross-border activities, Directive (EU) 2016/2341 should require the appointment of a professional depositary for occupational pension schemes where members and beneficiaries fully bear the investment risk. The amendments should set out clear rules for such depository on the safekeeping of assets and oversight duties for depositaries, while allowing greater flexibility for other schemes and ensuring that competent authorities may not unduly restrict the choice of depositaries established in another Member State. However, to avoid unnecessary burden for IORPs, Member States may maintain existing safe-keeping measures providing a level of protection comparable with depositaries. | (31) Depositaries provide a convenient remedy for safeguarding assets and overseeing the management of occupational pension schemes, particularly in defined contribution schemes where members and beneficiaries fully bear the investment risk. Under Directive (EU) 2016/2341, Member States have discretion to require, as a general rule, a depositary or to allow IORPs to perform these functions themselves. That discretion has led to inconsistencies and supervisory challenges in cross-border activities. Differences in national rules on the types of entities that may act as depositaries and the scope of their responsibilities may undermine effective prudential oversight, reduce transparency, and increase the risk of conflicts of interest or operational failures. In recent years, the rules on depositaries laid down in Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council13 have been updated and strengthened to ensure a high level of investor protection. Members and beneficiaries of IORPs, who similarly entrust their retirement savings to professional managers, should benefit from no less protection than investors covered by Directive 2009/65/EC. Therefore, to ensure consistent protection of members and beneficiaries, enhance trust in the pension system, and facilitate cross-border activities, Directive (EU) 2016/2341 should provide competent authorities with the power to require the appointment of professional depositaries for occupational pension schemes where members and beneficiaries fully bear the investment risk. The amendments should set out clear rules for such depository on the safekeeping of assets and oversight duties for depositaries, while allowing greater flexibility for other schemes and ensuring that competent authorities may not unduly restrict the choice of depositaries established in another Member State. However, to avoid unnecessary burden for IORPs, Member States may maintain existing safe-keeping measures providing a level of protection comparable with depositaries. |
| 13 Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) (OJ L 302, p. 32, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/65/oj) | 13 Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) (OJ L 302, p. 32, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/65/oj) |
Or. en
Amendment 172
Auke Zijlstra
Proposal for a directive
Recital 31
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (31) Depositaries provide a convenient remedy for safeguarding assets and overseeing the management of occupational pension schemes, particularly in defined contribution schemes where members and beneficiaries fully bear the investment risk. Under Directive (EU) 2016/2341, Member States have discretion to require, as a general rule, a depositary or to allow IORPs to perform these functions themselves. That discretion has led to inconsistencies and supervisory challenges in cross-border activities. Differences in national rules on the types of entities that may act as depositaries and the scope of their responsibilities may undermine effective prudential oversight, reduce transparency, and increase the risk of conflicts of interest or operational failures. In recent years, the rules on depositaries laid down in Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council13 have been updated and strengthened to ensure a high level of investor protection. Members and beneficiaries of IORPs, who similarly entrust their retirement savings to professional managers, should benefit from no less protection than investors covered by Directive 2009/65/EC. Therefore, to ensure consistent protection of members and beneficiaries, enhance trust in the pension system, and facilitate cross-border activities, Directive (EU) 2016/2341 should require the appointment of a professional depositary for occupational pension schemes where members and beneficiaries fully bear the investment risk. The amendments should set out clear rules for such depository on the safekeeping of assets and oversight duties for depositaries, while allowing greater flexibility for other schemes and ensuring that competent authorities may not unduly restrict the choice of depositaries established in another Member State. However, to avoid unnecessary burden for IORPs, Member States may maintain existing safe-keeping measures providing a level of protection comparable with depositaries. | (31) Depositaries provide a convenient remedy for safeguarding assets and overseeing the management of occupational pension schemes, particularly in defined contribution schemes where members and beneficiaries fully bear the investment risk. Under Directive (EU) 2016/2341, Member States have discretion to require, as a general rule, a depositary or to allow IORPs to perform these functions themselves. That discretion has led to inconsistencies and supervisory challenges in cross-border activities. Differences in national rules on the types of entities that may act as depositaries and the scope of their responsibilities may undermine effective prudential oversight, reduce transparency, and increase the risk of conflicts of interest or operational failures. In recent years, the rules on depositaries laid down in Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council13 have been updated and strengthened to ensure a high level of investor protection. Members and beneficiaries of IORPs, who similarly entrust their retirement savings to professional managers, should benefit from no less protection than investors covered by Directive 2009/65/EC. Therefore, to ensure consistent protection of members and beneficiaries, enhance trust in the pension system, and facilitate cross-border activities, Directive (EU) 2016/2341 should require the appointment of a professional depositary for occupational pension schemes where members and beneficiaries fully bear the investment risk. The amendments should set out clear rules for such depository on the safekeeping of assets and oversight duties for depositaries, while allowing greater flexibility for other schemes and ensuring that competent authorities may not unduly restrict the choice of depositaries established in another Member State. However, to avoid unnecessary burden for IORPs, Member States may maintain existing safe-keeping measures providing a level of protection comparable with depositaries13a. |
| 13 Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) (OJ L 302, p. 32, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/65/oj) | 13 Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) (OJ L 302, p. 32, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/65/oj) |
| 13a Such as Article 42 of the Dutch Decree on the Implementation of the Pension Act and the Mandatory Occupational Pension Scheme Act (Wvb) |
Or. en
Amendment 173
Marlena Maląg
on behalf of the ECR Group
Proposal for a directive
Recital 32
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (32) Fragmented and incomplete information on accrued and projected pension entitlements makes it difficult for members and beneficiaries to obtain a clear overview of their future retirement income, particularly when they participate in several supplementary pension schemes. That lack of transparency can undermine engagement with retirement planning and trust in the pension system. To ensure that savers receive comprehensive, reliable and up-to-date information, Member States should require IORPs to provide data to national pension tracking systems, where such systems exist, in a standardised and interoperable format. Such systems should allow members and beneficiaries to access, in a coherent and comparable manner, information on their accrued rights, accumulated capital and projected benefits, while ensuring that IORPs remain responsible for the accuracy and completeness of the data transmitted. To avoid duplication of reporting requirements for IORPs, the format and structure of information should be consistent with the information included in the pension benefit statements. | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 174
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Recital 32
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (32) Fragmented and incomplete information on accrued and projected pension entitlements makes it difficult for members and beneficiaries to obtain a clear overview of their future retirement income, particularly when they participate in several supplementary pension schemes. That lack of transparency can undermine engagement with retirement planning and trust in the pension system. To ensure that savers receive comprehensive, reliable and up-to-date information, Member States should require IORPs to provide data to national pension tracking systems, where such systems exist, in a standardised and interoperable format. Such systems should allow members and beneficiaries to access, in a coherent and comparable manner, information on their accrued rights, accumulated capital and projected benefits, while ensuring that IORPs remain responsible for the accuracy and completeness of the data transmitted. To avoid duplication of reporting requirements for IORPs, the format and structure of information should be consistent with the information included in the pension benefit statements. | (32) Fragmented and incomplete information on accrued and projected pension entitlements makes it difficult for members and beneficiaries to obtain a clear overview of their future retirement income, particularly when they participate in several supplementary pension schemes. That lack of transparency can undermine engagement with retirement planning and trust in the pension system. To ensure that savers receive comprehensive, reliable and up-to-date information, Member States should require IORPs to provide data to national pension tracking systems, where such systems exist. Such systems should allow members and beneficiaries to access, in a coherent, accurate, reliable and comparable manner, information on their accrued rights, accumulated capital and projected benefits, while ensuring that IORPs remain responsible for the accuracy and completeness of the data transmitted. To avoid duplication of reporting requirements for IORPs, the format and structure of information should be consistent with the information included in the pension benefit statements. |
Or. en
Amendment 175
Anouk Van Brug, Engin Eroglu
Proposal for a directive
Recital 32
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (32) Fragmented and incomplete information on accrued and projected pension entitlements makes it difficult for members and beneficiaries to obtain a clear overview of their future retirement income, particularly when they participate in several supplementary pension schemes. That lack of transparency can undermine engagement with retirement planning and trust in the pension system. To ensure that savers receive comprehensive, reliable and up-to-date information, Member States should require IORPs to provide data to national pension tracking systems, where such systems exist, in a standardised and interoperable format. Such systems should allow members and beneficiaries to access, in a coherent and comparable manner, information on their accrued rights, accumulated capital and projected benefits, while ensuring that IORPs remain responsible for the accuracy and completeness of the data transmitted. To avoid duplication of reporting requirements for IORPs, the format and structure of information should be consistent with the information included in the pension benefit statements. | (32) Fragmented and incomplete information on accrued and projected pension entitlements makes it difficult for members and beneficiaries to obtain a clear overview of their future retirement income, particularly when they participate in several supplementary pension schemes. That lack of transparency can undermine engagement with retirement planning and trust in the pension system. To ensure that savers receive comprehensive, reliable and up-to-date information, Member States should require IORPs to provide data to national pension tracking systems, where such systems exist, in a standardised and interoperable format. Such systems should allow members and beneficiaries to access, in a coherent and comparable manner, information on their accrued rights, accumulated capital and projected benefits, while ensuring that IORPs remain responsible for the accuracy and completeness of the data transmitted. In particular, life decisions, such as working part-time to take care of a child or another family member, and events such as divorce, can have a considerable effect on a person’s pension benefit. Therefore, members of pension schemes should be provided with adequate information regarding the consequences to their pension benefits of any interruptions to, or changes in the amount of, contributions paid into the pension scheme in those circumstances. The provision of such information would improve financial literacy and enable people to make better informed financial choices. Such information should also be included in the pension tracking systems. To avoid duplication of reporting requirements for IORPs, the format and structure of information should be consistent with the information included in the pension benefit statements. |
Or. en
Amendment 176
Adnan Dibrani, Niels Fuglsang, Thomas Bajada, Lara Wolters, Jonás Fernández, César Luena
Proposal for a directive
Recital 32
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (32) Fragmented and incomplete information on accrued and projected pension entitlements makes it difficult for members and beneficiaries to obtain a clear overview of their future retirement income, particularly when they participate in several supplementary pension schemes. That lack of transparency can undermine engagement with retirement planning and trust in the pension system. To ensure that savers receive comprehensive, reliable and up-to-date information, Member States should require IORPs to provide data to national pension tracking systems, where such systems exist, in a standardised and interoperable format. Such systems should allow members and beneficiaries to access, in a coherent and comparable manner, information on their accrued rights, accumulated capital and projected benefits, while ensuring that IORPs remain responsible for the accuracy and completeness of the data transmitted. To avoid duplication of reporting requirements for IORPs, the format and structure of information should be consistent with the information included in the pension benefit statements. | (32) Fragmented and incomplete information on accrued and projected pension entitlements makes it difficult for members and beneficiaries to obtain a clear overview of their future retirement income, particularly when they participate in several supplementary pension schemes. That lack of transparency can undermine engagement with retirement planning and trust in the pension system. To ensure that savers receive comprehensive, reliable and up-to-date information, Member States should require IORPs to provide data to national pension tracking systems, where such systems exist, in a standardised and interoperable format. Such systems should allow members and beneficiaries to access, in a coherent and comparable manner, information on their accrued rights, accumulated capital and projected benefits, while ensuring that IORPs remain responsible for the accuracy and completeness of the data transmitted. To avoid duplication of reporting requirements for IORPs, the format and structure of information should be consistent with the information included in the pension benefit statements. Transparency should go beyond merely making information available. It must also ensure that information is clear and understandable for members and beneficiaries. If disclosures are overly complex or technical, they may be difficult to use in practice. Requirements should therefore be proportionate and support financial literacy and informed decision-making. |
Or. en
Amendment 177
Arba Kokalari
Proposal for a directive
Recital 33
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (33) The Pension Benefit Statement (PBS) is an essential instrument enabling members and beneficiaries to understand their pension entitlements over time and across different schemes. It should provide clear, comprehensive, and relevant information that enables members and beneficiaries to assess their financial situation and take any necessary action to secure an adequate pension. Currently, the absence of a uniform approach at Member State level, together with the fact that most members accrue pensions with multiple IORPs during their careers, results in PBSs that vary in format and presentation, thereby limiting comparability and aggregation. Current rules also do not require the inclusion of information on the costs, the performance of investments or on any investment options available and their corresponding risks. To enhance transparency and support informed decision-making, it is necessary to introduce requirements for the design of the PBS and on the provision of information on costs, investment returns and investment options. For the same reason, it is necessary to ensure greater standardisation and, where possible, alignment with the PEPP Benefit Statement referred to in Article 36 of Regulation (EU) 2019/1238, while taking into account the defined benefit or defined contribution characteristics of the pension schemes, and the specificities of occupational pension provision. | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 178
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Recital 33
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (33) The Pension Benefit Statement (PBS) is an essential instrument enabling members and beneficiaries to understand their pension entitlements over time and across different schemes. It should provide clear, comprehensive, and relevant information that enables members and beneficiaries to assess their financial situation and take any necessary action to secure an adequate pension. Currently, the absence of a uniform approach at Member State level, together with the fact that most members accrue pensions with multiple IORPs during their careers, results in PBSs that vary in format and presentation, thereby limiting comparability and aggregation. Current rules also do not require the inclusion of information on the costs, the performance of investments or on any investment options available and their corresponding risks. To enhance transparency and support informed decision-making, it is necessary to introduce requirements for the design of the PBS and on the provision of information on costs, investment returns and investment options. For the same reason, it is necessary to ensure greater standardisation and, where possible, alignment with the PEPP Benefit Statement referred to in Article 36 of Regulation (EU) 2019/1238, while taking into account the defined benefit or defined contribution characteristics of the pension schemes, and the specificities of occupational pension provision. | (33) The Pension Benefit Statement (PBS) is an essential instrument enabling members and beneficiaries to understand their pension entitlements over time and across different schemes. It should provide clear, comprehensive, and relevant information that enables members and beneficiaries to assess their financial situation and take any necessary action to secure an adequate pension. Current rules do not require the inclusion of information on the costs, the performance of investments or on any investment options available and their corresponding risks. To enhance transparency and support informed decision-making, it is necessary to introduce requirements on the provision of information on costs, investment returns and investment options. |
Or. en
Amendment 179
Isabel Benjumea Benjumea
Proposal for a directive
Recital 34
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (34) Persistent underperformance of IORPs may reduce the value of members’ and beneficiaries’ accrued rights and undermine trust in supplementary pensions. In line with the Implementing Guidelines of the OECD Recommendation on Core Principles of Private Pension Regulation, performance should be comparably disclosed and assessed against clear and objective benchmarks reflecting the investment policy. There is currently no harmonised framework to inform members and beneficiaries of underperformance. To address that, IORPs should be required to promptly inform their competent authority and provide evidence that the scheme’s costs and charges are justified and proportionate, and that the scheme is in line with the risk tolerance of its members and beneficiaries. Where the competent authority is not satisfied with such justification or underperformance persists for at least three years, IORPs should communicate clearly to members and beneficiaries about such underperformance, explain its causes, and outline measures to remedy the situation. Member States should ensure the establishment of objective benchmarks for assessing underperformance. | deleted |
Or. es
Amendment 180
Markus Ferber, Andrea Wechsler
Proposal for a directive
Recital 34
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (34) Persistent underperformance of IORPs may reduce the value of members’ and beneficiaries’ accrued rights and undermine trust in supplementary pensions. In line with the Implementing Guidelines of the OECD Recommendation on Core Principles of Private Pension Regulation, performance should be comparably disclosed and assessed against clear and objective benchmarks reflecting the investment policy. There is currently no harmonised framework to inform members and beneficiaries of underperformance. To address that, IORPs should be required to promptly inform their competent authority and provide evidence that the scheme’s costs and charges are justified and proportionate, and that the scheme is in line with the risk tolerance of its members and beneficiaries. Where the competent authority is not satisfied with such justification or underperformance persists for at least three years, IORPs should communicate clearly to members and beneficiaries about such underperformance, explain its causes, and outline measures to remedy the situation. Member States should ensure the establishment of objective benchmarks for assessing underperformance. | deleted |
Or. en
Justification
Supervisor-set benchmarks cannot capture scheme-specific investment strategies, liability structures, or demographic profiles. Deviations from a uniform benchmark do not indicate poor governance; they reflect legitimate long-term choices. The provision creates index-hugging incentives that discourage exactly the illiquid and long-term investments the SIU seeks to promote. Existing supervisory powers under Articles 30, 30a and 49 already provide adequate tools to address genuine underperformance.
Amendment 181
Marlena Maląg
on behalf of the ECR Group
Proposal for a directive
Recital 34
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (34) Persistent underperformance of IORPs may reduce the value of members’ and beneficiaries’ accrued rights and undermine trust in supplementary pensions. In line with the Implementing Guidelines of the OECD Recommendation on Core Principles of Private Pension Regulation, performance should be comparably disclosed and assessed against clear and objective benchmarks reflecting the investment policy. There is currently no harmonised framework to inform members and beneficiaries of underperformance. To address that, IORPs should be required to promptly inform their competent authority and provide evidence that the scheme’s costs and charges are justified and proportionate, and that the scheme is in line with the risk tolerance of its members and beneficiaries. Where the competent authority is not satisfied with such justification or underperformance persists for at least three years, IORPs should communicate clearly to members and beneficiaries about such underperformance, explain its causes, and outline measures to remedy the situation. Member States should ensure the establishment of objective benchmarks for assessing underperformance. | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 182
Arba Kokalari
Proposal for a directive
Recital 34
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (34) Persistent underperformance of IORPs may reduce the value of members’ and beneficiaries’ accrued rights and undermine trust in supplementary pensions. In line with the Implementing Guidelines of the OECD Recommendation on Core Principles of Private Pension Regulation, performance should be comparably disclosed and assessed against clear and objective benchmarks reflecting the investment policy. There is currently no harmonised framework to inform members and beneficiaries of underperformance. To address that, IORPs should be required to promptly inform their competent authority and provide evidence that the scheme’s costs and charges are justified and proportionate, and that the scheme is in line with the risk tolerance of its members and beneficiaries. Where the competent authority is not satisfied with such justification or underperformance persists for at least three years, IORPs should communicate clearly to members and beneficiaries about such underperformance, explain its causes, and outline measures to remedy the situation. Member States should ensure the establishment of objective benchmarks for assessing underperformance. | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 183
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Recital 34
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (34) Persistent underperformance of IORPs may reduce the value of members’ and beneficiaries’ accrued rights and undermine trust in supplementary pensions. In line with the Implementing Guidelines of the OECD Recommendation on Core Principles of Private Pension Regulation, performance should be comparably disclosed and assessed against clear and objective benchmarks reflecting the investment policy. There is currently no harmonised framework to inform members and beneficiaries of underperformance. To address that, IORPs should be required to promptly inform their competent authority and provide evidence that the scheme’s costs and charges are justified and proportionate, and that the scheme is in line with the risk tolerance of its members and beneficiaries. Where the competent authority is not satisfied with such justification or underperformance persists for at least three years, IORPs should communicate clearly to members and beneficiaries about such underperformance, explain its causes, and outline measures to remedy the situation. Member States should ensure the establishment of objective benchmarks for assessing underperformance. | (34) Persistent underperformance of IORPs may reduce the value of members’ and beneficiaries’ accrued rights and undermine trust in supplementary pensions. In line with the Implementing Guidelines of the OECD Recommendation on Core Principles of Private Pension Regulation, performance should be comparably disclosed and assessed against clear and objective guidelines and investment goals reflecting the investment policy. There is currently no clear framework to inform members and beneficiaries of underperformance. To address that, IORPs should be required to promptly inform their competent authority and its members and beneficiaries in case of underperformance. |
Or. en
Amendment 184
Isabel Benjumea Benjumea
Proposal for a directive
Recital 35 a (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (35a) Without prejudice to the Member States’ prerogative to organise their national pension systems as they see fit, automatic enrolment schemes with an opt-out option, where established by national law and, where appropriate, set up by means of collective bargaining or with the involvement of the social partners, can be used to help extend the coverage of supplementary pensions, encourage long-term saving and top up retirement income with a view to better matching members’ needs. This Directive should not prevent Member States from promoting such mechanisms under the aegis of their national occupational pension schemes. |
Or. es
Amendment 185
Damian Boeselager
Proposal for a directive
Recital 37 a (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (37a) Women continue to receive substantially lower occupational pensions than men, owing in particular to lower earnings, career interruptions and reduced working time linked to caring responsibilities. When reviewing whether a scheme remains appropriate, IORPs should consider features that may give rise to unjustified disparities — including disparities related to gender — such as whether the scheme enables continued accrual during parental, paternity or carers' leave within the meaning of Directive (EU) 2019/1158. Whether any such contribution is borne, wholly or partly, by the employer remains a matter for the social partners and for national social and labour law, which should also clarify whether continued enrolment at full contribution is encouraged during care leave. |
Or. en
Amendment 186
Damian Boeselager
Proposal for a directive
Recital 37 b (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (37b) Occupational pensions in the Union are increasingly provided through schemes under which members bear the investment risk. Where benefits can be taken only as a lump sum, this may increase the risk that members’ savings are depleted before the end of retirement. Members should therefore have access to at least one option under which benefits are paid, in whole or in part, as a regular income, for example through an annuity, programmed withdrawals or collective decumulation. Where more than one form of payment is available, members should also be able to choose or change, free of charge, the form in which their benefits are taken as they approach retirement, so that they can adjust to their circumstances before that choice takes effect. |
Or. en
Amendment 187
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Recital 38 a (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (38a) Lacking trust of citizens in private entities managing their savings can be an important obstacle to the development of supplementary pension systems and IORPs. It is important to explicitly provide that the accrued pension entitlements are protected, in accordance with Union law. This should contribute to giving citizens trust that their entitlements are safe, also when their savings are invested on capital markets and when IORPs take decisions that could affect their rights and entitlements. |
Or. en
Amendment 188
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Recital 40
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (40) IORPs vary significantly in terms of scale, operational efficiency, and organisational structure. Smaller or fragmented IORPs may face difficulties in achieving economies of scale, engaging in effective asset pooling, or optimising operational and investment efficiency. Early identification of structural challenges and vulnerabilities is therefore essential to ensure that IORPs can deliver value for members and beneficiaries over the long term. Competent authorities play an important role in fostering strategic reflection by IORPs on their long-term sustainability, including on aspects such as scale, organisational configuration, and potential for consolidation or cooperation where those are ways to address identified shortcomings. Competent authorities should therefore conduct regular structured supervisory dialogues with IORPs, during which IORPs can identify potential weaknesses and consider strategic options, including measures to enhance efficiency, scale, and resource sharing, while retaining primary responsibility for ensuring that members and beneficiaries receive adequate retirement benefits. | (40) IORPs vary significantly in terms of scale, risk, operational efficiency, and organisational structure. Smaller or fragmented IORPs may face difficulties in achieving economies of scale, engaging in effective asset pooling, or optimising operational and investment efficiency. Early identification of structural challenges and vulnerabilities is therefore essential to ensure that IORPs can deliver value for members and beneficiaries over the long term. Competent authorities play an important role in fostering strategic reflection by IORPs on their long-term sustainability, including on aspects such as scale, organisational configuration, and potential for consolidation or cooperation where those are ways to address identified shortcomings. Competent authorities should therefore conduct regular structured supervisory dialogues with IORPs, during which IORPs can identify potential weaknesses and consider strategic options, while retaining primary responsibility for ensuring that members and beneficiaries receive adequate retirement benefits. |
Or. en
Amendment 189
Markus Ferber, Andrea Wechsler
Proposal for a directive
Recital 43
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (43) Transparent, comparable, and easily accessible information on the total annual costs, past performance, and risk profiles of pension schemes operated by IORPs is essential for members and beneficiaries to make informed decisions about their retirement savings. Such disclosure could foster efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and the potential to achieve economies of scale, ultimately benefiting members and beneficiaries. To ensure comparability and accessibility, competent authorities should publish that information on a single public website for all relevant pension schemes or investment options, covering at least the previous ten years. | (43) Transparent, comparable, and easily accessible information on the total annual costs, past performance, and risk profiles of pension schemes operated by IORPs is essential for members and beneficiaries to make informed decisions about their retirement savings. Such disclosure could foster efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and the potential to achieve economies of scale, ultimately benefiting members and beneficiaries. To ensure comparability and accessibility, competent authorities should publish that information on a single public website for pension schemes where members and beneficiaries bear investment risk, as well as investment options within such schemes, covering at least the previous ten years. The presentation of that information should take due account of any guarantees, biometric cover and sponsoring undertaking funding obligations, so that it does not generate misleading comparisons between schemes of a fundamentally different nature |
Or. en
Justification
Cost and performance disclosure serves members who bear investment risk and can act on the information. Applied indiscriminately to defined benefit and guaranteed schemes it produces misleading comparisons that disregard guarantees and sponsor funding obligations.
Amendment 190
Auke Zijlstra
Proposal for a directive
Recital 44
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (44) Where cross-border activities are significant with respect to the market of the host Member State and require close collaboration between the competent authorities of the home Member State and the host Member State, especially where an IORP might risk being in financial difficulties to the detriment of members and beneficiaries, EIOPA should be able to set up and coordinate collaboration platforms, in a similar manner as under Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council14 . | deleted |
| 14 Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency II) (OJ L 335, 17.12.2009, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/138/oj). |
Or. en
Justification
The existing EIOPA instruments suffice, and an additional layer of competence is undesirable.
Amendment 191
Markus Ferber, Andrea Wechsler
Proposal for a directive
Recital 44
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (44) Where cross-border activities are significant with respect to the market of the host Member State and require close collaboration between the competent authorities of the home Member State and the host Member State, especially where an IORP might risk being in financial difficulties to the detriment of members and beneficiaries, EIOPA should be able to set up and coordinate collaboration platforms, in a similar manner as under Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council14 . | (44) Where the cross-border activity of an IORP is of material significance to the market of the host Member State, the competent authorities of the home and host Member States should make full use of the existing cooperation, coordination and mediation powers available to them and to EIOPA. Those instruments provide a sufficient and proportionate framework for supervisory cooperation in respect of cross-border IORPs. No additional institutional infrastructure at Union level is necessary for this purpose. |
| 14 Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency II) (OJ L 335, 17.12.2009, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/138/oj). |
Or. en
Justification
The existing cooperation architecture under the EIOPA Regulation and IORP II is adequate; a new EIOPA-led platform mechanism that has no demonstrated operational need.
Amendment 192
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Recital 46
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (46) In order to attain the objectives set out in Directive (EU) 2016/2341 and this Directive, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union should be delegated to the Commission in respect of certain technical parameters in Directive (EU) 2016/2341 stemming from Council Directive 79/267/EEC, which have remained unchanged since their introduction, as well as on the Pension Benefit Statement. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level. The Commission, when preparing and drawing up delegated acts, should ensure a simultaneous, timely and appropriate transmission of relevant documents to the European Parliament and to the Council. | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 193
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Recital 47
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (47) In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of the provisions on reporting of investment returns, net of investment costs, and all costs and charges incurred in connection with the IORPs’ activities, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 180/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council15 . | deleted |
| 15 Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers (OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2011/182/oj). |
Or. en
Amendment 194
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Recital 49
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (49) Amendments to Directive (EU) 2016/2341 regarding the authorisation of IORPs should replace the current regime of registration or authorisation in order to ensure consistent supervisory standards across the Union. However, it would be too burdensome to require all IORPs to apply for a new authorisation. IORPs already registered or authorised under that Directive should be given Therefore, Member States should provide for automatic recognition of IORPs which were already registered or authorised under that Directive. | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 195
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
throughout the text
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (1) the words ‘registered or authorised’ are replaced by ‘authorised’ throughout the Directive; | deleted |
Or. en
Justification
At the moment Member States can choose whether they apply an authorisation or registration procedure. The Commission states that divergent practices lead to a fragmented internal market. However, limiting this to authorisation procedures only would create an additional barrier for Member States to further develop a supplementary pensions sector, and would require Member States with smaller sectors and that apply registration procedures to switch to authorisation. This would not be proportional, considering that a single market for supplementary pensions is still largely absent.
Amendment 196
Markus Ferber, Andrea Wechsler
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
throughout the text
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (2) the words ‘size, nature, scale and complexity’ are replaced by ‘nature, scale and complexity’ throughout the Directive; | deleted |
Or. en
Justification
The horizontal deletion of "size" as a proportionality criterion deprives small IORPs of the principal protection against disproportionate compliance burdens. "Size" is a distinct and necessary variable: the cost of a mandatory governance function or reporting obligation is insensitive to risk profile but acutely sensitive to the number of members over whom it is spread. Deletion of this point restores the full existing criterion throughout the directive.
Amendment 197
Sirpa Pietikäinen
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
throughout the text
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (2) the words ‘size, nature, scale and complexity’ are replaced by ‘nature, scale and complexity’ throughout the Directive; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 198
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
throughout the text
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (2) the words ‘size, nature, scale and complexity’ are replaced by ‘nature, scale and complexity’ throughout the Directive; | (2) the words ‘size, nature, scale and complexity’ are replaced by ‘nature, risk, scale and complexity’ throughout the Directive; |
Or. en
Justification
Size is not a good measure for riskiness and proportionality for IORPs. Instead, 'risk' should be added.
Amendment 199
Markus Ferber, Andrea Wechsler
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
throughout the text
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (3) the words ‘their size and internal organisation, as well as to the size, nature, scale and complexity of their activities’ are replaced by ‘the nature, scale and complexity of their activities’ throughout the Directive; | deleted |
Or. en
Justification
"Internal organisation" captures a characteristic specific to IORPs: many are operated by social partners or sponsoring undertakings, with governance structures, including co-determination and paritarian bodies, that bear little to no resemblance to those of insurance undertakings. Stripping this criterion removes the ability of national supervisors to calibrate requirements to the institutional reality of sponsor-linked or mutually-governed IORPs. The fuller existing formula must be preserved.
Amendment 200
Sirpa Pietikäinen
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (3) the words ‘their size and internal organisation, as well as to the size, nature, scale and complexity of their activities’ are replaced by ‘the nature, scale and complexity of their activities’ throughout the Directive; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 201
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (3) the words ‘their size and internal organisation, as well as to the size, nature, scale and complexity of their activities’ are replaced by ‘the nature, scale and complexity of their activities’ throughout the Directive; | (3) the words ‘their size and internal organisation, as well as to the size, nature, scale and complexity of their activities’ are replaced by ‘the nature, risk, scale and complexity of their activities’ throughout the Directive; |
Or. en
Justification
Size is not a good measure for riskiness and proportionality for IORPs. Instead, 'risk' should be added.
Amendment 202
Marlena Maląg
on behalf of the ECR Group
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point b
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| For the purposes of the first subparagraph, where the authorised entities referred to in paragraph 2, point (b), operate IORPs and act on their behalf, Member States shall not restrict such authorised entities established in another Member State from carrying out those activities.; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 203
Marlena Maląg
on behalf of the ECR Group
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point b a (new)
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 2 – paragraph 3a (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (ba) the following paragraph is added: | |
| “ | |
| 3a. In the case of entities which are authorised based on other sectoral Union prudential legislation, Member States shall ensure that these entities apply the relevant IORP provisions, to the extent that they do not duplicate respective requirements under their sectoral Union prudential legislation. By way of derogation from paragraph 2, where entities authorised under EU prudential legislation intend to operate such IORPs on a cross-border basis, Articles 11 and 11a of shall apply. | |
| “ |
Or. en
Amendment 204
Damian Boeselager
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 a (new)
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 2a (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (4a) the following Article is inserted: | |
| "Article 2a. | |
| Authorised entities | |
| 1. Where an IORP is established in a form under which it is operated by an authorised entity acting on its behalf, as referred to in Article 2(1), only the following may act as that entity: | |
| (a) an undertaking authorised under Directive 2009/138/EC; | |
| (b) another entity referred to in Article 2(2)(b) of this Directive; | |
| (c) an entity authorised under this Directive by the competent authority of its home Member State, before taking up the activity, for the purpose of operating IORPs. | |
| An entity referred to in points (a) or (b) may act only where the Union law applicable to it does not preclude it from operating IORPs and its authorisation covers that activity. | |
| 2. An entity referred to in point (b) or point (c) of paragraph 1 shall, while it operates an IORP, hold own funds of at least the higher of EUR 1 000 000 and the amount required under the law of its home Member State. | |
| Where the assets of the IORPs it operates exceed EUR 250 000 000, those own funds shall be increased by 0.02 % of the excess, up to a total of EUR 10 000 000.This paragraph shall not apply to an entity that is subject, under the Union law applicable to it, to at least equivalent own funds requirements. The own funds required under this paragraph are in addition to the technical provisions and regulatory own funds that an IORP is required to hold under Articles 15 to 17 where it underwrites liabilities or guarantees benefits or investment performance, and shall not be used to cover them. | |
| 3. An entity referred to in paragraph 1 shall, in respect of each IORP it operates, ensure that the requirements imposed by this Directive on that IORP are complied with." |
Or. en
Amendment 205
Markus Ferber, Andrea Wechsler
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Articles 3 and 4
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (5) Articles 3 and 4 are replaced by the following: | deleted |
| ‘Article 3 | |
| Application to IORPs operating social security schemes | |
| IORPs which also operate pension schemes that are considered to be social security schemes covered by Regulations (EC) No 883/2004 and (EC) No 987/2009 shall be covered by this Directive in respect of their retirement provision business not covered by those Regulations. In that case, the liabilities and corresponding assets shall be ring-fenced, and it shall not be possible to transfer those liabilities and corresponding assets to the pension schemes which are considered to be social security schemes, or vice versa. | |
| Article 4 | |
| Optional application | |
| Member States may apply some or all of the provisions of this Directive to institutions, irrespective of their legal form, operating on a funded basis for the purpose of providing retirement benefits: | |
| (a) that are excluded from the scope of this Directive pursuant to Article 2(2), points (a) and (d); or | |
| (b) that are not covered by this Directive or by Directives 2009/65/EC, 2009/138/EC, 2011/61/EU, 2013/36/EU and 2014/65/EU. | |
| In the case of institutions referred to in Article 2(2), point (a), Member States may decide on the application of provisions of this Directive only insofar as that application is compatible with Regulations (EC) No 883/2004 and (EC) No 987/2009. | |
| Where, in accordance with national law, the institutions referred to in the first paragraph are operated by authorised entities responsible for acting on their behalf, Member States may decide to apply this Directive either to those institutions or to the authorised entities responsible for operating them and acting on their behalf, or to both, as appropriate. | |
| Member States may decide to apply Articles 11 and 11a under this Article only if all the provisions of this Directive apply. | |
| Member States shall notify the Commission and EIOPA where they make use of the options referred to in in the first and second paragraphs, indicating the types of institutions or, where applicable, authorised entities covered by the use of those options and the provisions of this Directive that apply to them. | |
| The Commission shall make that information publicly available.;’ |
Or. en
Justification
The new Article 4 lets Member States extend Directive provisions, by opt-in, to institutions expressly excluded under Article 2(2), Such opt-ins blur the line between the pillars.
Amendment 206
Martin Schirdewan
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 3 a (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Article 3a | |
| Auto-enrolment schemes | |
| Member States shall ensure that national systems of auto-enrolment to supplementary pension coverage are governed within the framework of collective bargaining arrangements and that they are limited to collectively negotiated occupational pensions schemes jointly managed by social partners, based on equal contributions of employers and employees. Member States shall ensure that employees have an effective opportunity to opt out of such auto-enrolment to supplementary pension coverage and sufficient time is given to them to receive information and independent assistance and advice before making their decision. |
Or. en
Amendment 207
Marlena Maląg
on behalf of the ECR Group
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 4 – paragraph 1 to 6
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Member States may apply some or all of the provisions of this Directive to institutions, irrespective of their legal form, operating on a funded basis for the purpose of providing retirement benefits: | 1. Member States may apply some or all of the provisions of this Directive to institutions, irrespective of their legal form, operating on a funded basis for the purpose of providing retirement benefits: |
| (a) that are excluded from the scope of this Directive pursuant to Article 2(2), points (a) and (d); or | (a) that are excluded from the scope of this Directive pursuant to Article 2(2), points (a) and (d); or |
| (b) that are not covered by this Directive or by Directives 2009/65/EC, 2009/138/EC, 2011/61/EU, 2013/36/EU and 2014/65/EU. | (b) that are not covered by this Directive or by Directives 2009/65/EC, 2009/138/EC, 2011/61/EU, 2013/36/EU and 2014/65/EU. |
| In the case of institutions referred to in Article 2(2), point (a), Member States may decide on the application of provisions of this Directive only insofar as that application is compatible with Regulations (EC) No 883/2004 and (EC) No 987/2009. | In the case of institutions referred to in Article 2(2), point (a), Member States may decide on the application of provisions of this Directive only insofar as that application is compatible with Regulations (EC) No 883/2004 and (EC) No 987/2009. |
| Where, in accordance with national law, the institutions referred to in the first paragraph are operated by authorised entities responsible for acting on their behalf, Member States may decide to apply this Directive either to those institutions or to the authorised entities responsible for operating them and acting on their behalf, or to both, as appropriate. | Where, in accordance with national law, the institutions referred to in the first paragraph are operated by authorised entities responsible for acting on their behalf, Member States may decide to apply this Directive either to those institutions or to the authorised entities responsible for operating them and acting on their behalf, or to both, as appropriate. |
| Member States may decide to apply Articles 11 and 11a under this Article only if all the provisions of this Directive apply. | Member States may decide to apply Articles 11 and 11a under this Article only if all the provisions of this Directive apply |
| Member States shall notify the Commission and EIOPA where they make use of the options referred to in in the first and second paragraphs, indicating the types of institutions or, where applicable, authorised entities covered by the use of those options and the provisions of this Directive that apply to them. | Member States shall notify the Commission and EIOPA where they make use of the options referred to in in the first and second paragraphs, indicating the types of institutions or, where applicable, authorised entities covered by the use of those options and the provisions of this Directive that apply to them. |
| The Commission shall make that information publicly available. | The Commission shall make that information publicly available. |
Or. en
Amendment 208
Marlena Maląg
on behalf of the ECR Group
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 4 – paragraph 1a (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1a. Where an IORP is not subject to all of the provisions of this Directive in respect of its personal retirement provision business, Member States shall ensure that the IORP complies with the following conditions: | |
| (a) where the IORP offers guarantees or covers biometric risk in relation to its personal retirement provision business, the liabilities, corresponding assets and financial resources related to that business are fully ring-fenced from those related to its occupational retirement provision business, and no transfer of assets, liabilities or financial resources between the two businesses shall be permitted, and the assets or financial resources allocated to the occupational retirement provision business shall not be used to cover any losses arising from the personal retirement provision business; | |
| (b) the IORP only operates retirement provision business in the Member State in which it has been authorised. Notwithstanding the first subparagraph, the distribution of a Pan-European Personal Pension Products registered in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2019/1238 shall in all cases be subject to the application of all provisions of this Directive. |
Or. en
Amendment 209
Marlena Maląg
on behalf of the ECR Group
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 4 – paragraph 1b (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1b. The distribution of personal pension products other than PEPPs by an IORP in a Member State other than the one in which the IORP has been authorised shall be subject to the national laws of that other Member State in relation to distribution. |
Or. en
Amendment 210
Auke Zijlstra
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6 – point a
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 5 – Title
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (a) the title is replaced by the following: | deleted |
| ‘Small IORPs;’ |
Or. en
Justification
A threshold disproportionately subjects Member States with mature and well-functioning IORP markets to additional Union rules, simply because they have more established institutions and schemes above the threshold. Union rules should apply to all Member States and not disproportionally affect a limited number of Member States.
Amendment 211
Markus Ferber, Andrea Wechsler
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6 – point a a (new)
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 5 – paragraph 1
| Present text | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (a a) the first paragraph is amended as follows: | |
| With the exception of Articles 32 to 35, Member States may choose not to apply this Directive, in whole or in part, to any IORP registered or authorised in their territories which operates pension schemes which together have less than 100 members in total. Subject to Article 2(2), such IORPs shall nevertheless be given the right to apply this Directive on a voluntary basis. Article 11 may be applied only if all the other provisions of this Directive apply. Member States shall apply Article 19(1) and Article 21(1) and (2) to any IORP registered or authorised in their territories which operates pension schemes which together have more than 15 members in total. | "With the exception of Articles 32 to 35, Member States may choose not to apply this Directive, in whole or in part, to any IORP registered or authorised in their territories which operates pension schemes which together have less than 1000 members or beneficiaries and EUR 50 million assets in total. Subject to Article 2(2), such IORPs shall nevertheless be given the right to apply this Directive on a voluntary basis. Article 11 may be applied only if all the other provisions of this Directive apply. Member States shall apply Article 19(1) and Article 21(1) and (2) to any IORP registered or authorised in their territories which operates pension schemes which together have more than 15 members in total." |
Or. en
(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02016L2341-20250117)
Justification
The EUR 25 million asset threshold proposed in the draft report does not reflect the actual asset profile of small sponsor-linked IORPs in most Member States. Raising the threshold to EUR 50 million ensures meaningful proportionality relief for the funds this provision targets. A disjunctive criterion (i.e. members or assets) ensures that no small IORP is excluded from relief on a technicality of how it happens to fall across both dimensions.
Amendment 212
Auke Zijlstra
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6 – point b
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 5 – paragraph 2
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) the second paragraph is deleted; | deleted |
Or. en
Justification
A threshold disproportionately subjects Member States with mature and well-functioning IORP markets to additional Union rules, simply because they have more established institutions and schemes above the threshold. Union rules should apply to all Member States and not disproportionally affect a limited number of Member States.
Amendment 213
Fernando Navarrete Rojas
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6 – point ba (new)
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 5 – paragraph 2a to 2d
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (ba) The following paragraphs are added: | |
| 2a. Member States may choose not to apply this Directive, in whole or in part, to any IORP registered or authorised in their territories which operates pension schemes which together have less than 1 000 members and beneficiaries and less than EUR 50 million in assets in total. | |
| 2b. Where Member States choose not to apply this Directive to the IORPs referred to in paragraph 1, Articles 32 to 35 and article 37a shall nevertheless apply. Subject to Article 2(2), such IORPs shall be given the right to apply this Directive on a voluntary basis. Article 11 may be applied only if all the other provisions of this Directive apply. | |
| 2c. Where, on the entry into force of this amending Directive, Member States did not apply this Directive to IORPs which operate pension schemes which together have less than 100 members in total, those Member States may continue not to apply this Directive to those IORPs as long as they continue to operate pension schemes which together have less than 100 members in total, even if their total assets exceed EUR 50 million. | |
| 2d. Member States shall apply Article 19(1) and Article 21(1) and (2) to any IORP registered or authorised in their territories which operates pension schemes which together have more than 15 members in total. |
Or. en
Amendment 214
Adnan Dibrani, Niels Fuglsang, Thomas Bajada, Lara Wolters
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6 – point a a
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 5 – paragraph 1
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (a a) the first paragraph is replaced by the following: | |
| With the exception of Articles 32 to 35, Member States may choose not to apply this Directive, in whole or in part, to any IORP registered or authorised in their territories which operates pension schemes which together have less than 100 members in total. Subject to Article 2(2), such IORPs shall nevertheless be given the right to apply this Directive on a voluntary basis. Article 11 may be applied only if all the other provisions of this Directive apply. Member States shall apply Article 19(1) and Article 21(1) and (2) to any IORP registered or authorised in their territories which operates pension schemes which together have more than 15 members in total. | With the exception of Articles 32 to 35, Member States may choose not to apply this Directive, in whole or in part, to any IORP registered or authorised in their territories which operates pension schemes which together have less than 100 members in total, or pension schemes that are being phased out and which are permanently closed to new members, provided that the IORP ensures an adequate level of protection of members and beneficiaries. |
Or. en
Amendment 215
Adnan Dibrani, Niels Fuglsang, Thomas Bajada, Lara Wolters
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6 – point b
2016/2341
Article 5 – paragraph 2
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) the second paragraph is deleted; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 216
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6 a (new)
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 5a (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (6a) the following Article 5a is inserted: | |
| ' | |
| Article 5a | |
| Introduction and development of IORPs in Member States | |
| 1. Without prejudice to Article 5 of this Directive, Member States may provide that Articles 18a, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 33, 36, 37, 37a, 38, 39, 40, 41, 41a, 42, 43, 44, 44b and 44c of this Directive do not apply or partially apply to IORPs newly registered or authorised in their territory which have fewer than 2500 members and total assets less than EUR 100 million, for a period not exceeding 3 years from the date of their first authorisation or registration. | |
| 2. The competent authority of a Member State may request EIOPA to provide technical support for the application of this Directive, as implemented in national law, where the system of funded pensions in that Member State remains underdeveloped compared to other Member States. EIOPA shall establish a standing advisory team composed of national experts from public authorities, competent authorities and social partners to assist in providing such support. | |
| Technical support may include, among other things, the exchange of best practices, technical workshops, training of competent authorities and involved social partners, support for public information activities, and coordination assistance in the social dialogue and collective bargaining related to the establishment of IORPs and pension schemes. | |
| ' |
Or. en
Justification
One of the main aims of this review should be to encourage and support Member States to further develop funded and supplementary pension systems and establish more IORPs. Since regulatory burden is often mentioned as a major obstacle for small IORPs, an initial phase ('starter pack') with a lower burden could support the establishment of new IORPs and therefore increase the amount of funded pension capital in Europe. Member State should be able to not or partially apply some burdensome provisions for new IORPs for a maximum of three years, while taking into account the aims of these provisions. In addition, as the social dialogue and collective bargaining to establish IORPs generally is a sensitive process requiring sufficient trust, national competent authorities should be able to request technical support and expertise from EIOPA, which could leverage expertise from Member States with more developed funded pension sectors via a standing advisory team.
Amendment 217
Martin Schirdewan
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7 – point a
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 6 – point 1 – point b
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (a) in point (1), the wording ‘and which carries out activities directly arising therefrom;’ is replaced by ‘and which carries out activities directly arising therefrom, and, where permitted under national law, personal retirement provision;’; | (a) deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 218
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7 – point c b (new)
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 6 – point 19
| Present text | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (19) 'cross-border activity’ means operating a pension scheme where the relationship between the sponsoring undertaking, and the members and beneficiaries concerned, is governed by the social and labour law relevant to the field of occupational pension schemes of a Member State other than the home Member State | "(19) 'cross-border activity’ means operating a pension scheme where the relationship between the sponsoring undertaking, and the members and beneficiaries concerned, is governed by the social and labour law relevant to the field of occupational pension schemes of a Member State other than the home Member State, excluding sponsoring undertakings that are solely active in the home Member State." |
Or. en
(32016L2341)
Amendment 219
Martin Schirdewan
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7 – point d
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 6 – point 21
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (21) ‘personal pension product’ means a personal pension product as defined in Article 2, point (1), of Regulation (EU) 2019/1238 of the European Parliament and of the Council*. | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 220
Auke Zijlstra
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7 – point d
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 6 – point 22
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (22) ‘pension tracking system’ means a digital tool, typically a secure web portal or mobile application, that provides individuals with an overview of their individual accrued pension entitlements, and projections of future benefits, across the pension schemes of which the individual is a member or beneficiary. | (22) “pension tracking system” means a national, sectoral or private digital tool that provides individuals with an overview of their individual accrued pension entitlements and projected benefits, across the pension schemes of which the individual is a member or beneficiary. |
Or. en
Justification
Common technical formats can improve portability and allow data to be exchanged without creating a central EU system. Pension information remains closely connected to national social, labour and tax law and should continue to be administered through decentralised systems.
Amendment 221
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7 – point d
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 6 – point 22a (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (22a) 'social partner’ means an organisation representing employees or employers that takes part in the social dialogue or collective bargaining to establish a pension scheme and that can take part in governing and overseeing an IORP or pension scheme. |
Or. en
Amendment 222
Martin Schirdewan
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 7 – paragraph 2
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Where, pursuant to national law, IORPs are authorised to provide personal pension products, all assets and liabilities corresponding to the personal pension provision business shall be ring-fenced, without any possibility to transfer those assets and liabilities to the other retirement provision business of the institution.; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 223
Stéphanie Yon-Courtin
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 7 – paragraph 2
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Where, pursuant to national law, IORPs are authorised to provide personal pension products, all assets and liabilities corresponding to the personal pension provision business shall be ring-fenced, without any possibility to transfer those assets and liabilities to the other retirement provision business of the institution.; | Where, pursuant to national law, IORPs are authorised to provide personal pension products, Member States may decide to require all assets and liabilities corresponding to the personal pension provision business shall be ring-fenced, without any possibility to transfer those assets and liabilities to the other retirement provision business of the institution.; |
Or. en
Amendment 224
Auke Zijlstra
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 a (new)
Article 8b (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (9a) The following Article is inserted: | |
| "Article 8b | |
| Legal ownership and protection of pension contributions | |
| 1. Member States shall ensure that contributions paid by or on behalf of members, and the assets acquired through the investment of those contributions, are legally recognised as the individual property of the members and beneficiaries of the pension scheme concerned. Such contributions shall constitute deferred remuneration. | |
| 2. The assets referred to in paragraph 1 shall not form part of the assets of the IORP, the sponsoring undertaking, an authorised entity operating the IORP, a member of the administrative, management or supervisory body, an asset manager, a service provider or any other natural or legal person responsible for administering or managing those assets. | |
| 3. Member States shall ensure that those assets are legally and operationally segregated and protected against claims by creditors and against the insolvency, restructuring, winding-up or bankruptcy of any of the persons or entities referred to in paragraph 2. | |
| 4. An IORP and any person acting on its behalf shall exercise only the powers of administration, investment and disposal necessary to operate the pension scheme, pay retirement benefits and cover costs expressly permitted by the pension scheme and national law. Those powers shall be exercised exclusively on behalf of members and beneficiaries." |
Or. en
Justification
Legal segregation alone does not necessarily establish who ultimately owns pension assets. The amendment expressly recognises members and beneficiaries as the owners and protects the assets against misuse, creditor claims and the insolvency of institutions or managers.
Amendment 225
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10 – point a
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 9 – title
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (a) the title is replaced by the following: | deleted |
| ‘Authorisation;’ |
Or. en
Justification
At the moment Member States can choose whether they apply an authorisation or registration procedure. The Commission states that divergent practices lead to a fragmented internal market. However, limiting this to authorisation procedures only would create an additional barrier for Member States to further develop a supplementary pensions sector, and would require Member States with smaller sectors and that apply registration procedures to switch to authorisation. This would not be proportional, considering that a single market for supplementary pensions is still largely absent.
Amendment 226
Anouk Van Brug, Engin Eroglu
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10 – point a
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 9 – title
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Authorisation; | Authorisation and registration; |
Or. en
Amendment 227
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10 – point b
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Member States shall in respect of every IORP the main administration of which is located in their territory ensure that the IORP is authorised by the competent authority and included in a national register. | Member States shall in respect of every IORP the main administration of which is located in their territory ensure that the IORP is registered in a national register or is authorised by the competent authority. |
Or. en
Justification
At the moment Member States can choose whether they apply an authorisation or registration procedure. The Commission states that divergent practices lead to a fragmented internal market. However, limiting this to authorisation procedures only would create an additional barrier for Member States to further develop a supplementary pensions sector, and would require Member States with smaller sectors and that apply registration procedures to switch to authorisation. This would not be proportional, considering that a single market for supplementary pensions is still largely absent.
Amendment 228
Anouk Van Brug, Engin Eroglu
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10 – point b
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Member States shall in respect of every IORP the main administration of which is located in their territory ensure that the IORP is authorised by the competent authority and included in a national register. | Member States shall in respect of every IORP the main administration of which is located in their territory ensure that the IORP is registered in a national register, or authorised, by the competent authority; |
Or. en
Amendment 229
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10 – point b
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Member States shall require competent authorities to perform a prudential assessment as part of the authorisation of IORPs. The assessment shall take into account the nature, scale and complexity of the activities of the IORP concerned. | Member States may require competent authorities to perform a prudential assessment as part of the authorisation of IORPs. The assessment shall take into account the nature, risk scale and complexity of the activities of the IORP concerned. |
Or. en
Amendment 230
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10 – point b
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 4
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| IORPs seeking authorisation shall prepare and submit to the competent authority a business plan for all their planned activities, detailing the financial resources available to cover current and future operating costs. The business plan shall contain projections of at least three years of the IORP’s income and expenses and a breakdown of the IORP’s operational costs, including where relevant, the distribution and acquisition costs and any other elements to assist the competent authorities to assess compliance with the operating requirements. | The competent authority of a Member State may require IORPs seeking authorisation to prepare and submit to the competent authority a business plan for all their planned activities, detailing the financial resources available to cover current and future operating costs. The business plan shall contain projections of at least three years of the IORP’s income and expenses and a breakdown of the IORP’s operational costs, including where relevant, the distribution and acquisition costs and any other elements to assist the competent authorities to assess compliance with the operating requirements. |
Or. en
Amendment 231
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10 – point c
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 9 – paragraph 1a – subparagraph 2
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Without prejudice to Article 48(9), each Member State shall make provision for a right of appeal to the courts where its competent authorities have not dealt with an application for an authorisation within six months of the date of its receipt.; | Without prejudice to Article 48(9), each Member State operating an authorisation procedure may make provision for a right of appeal to the courts where its competent authorities have not dealt with an application for an authorisation within six months of the date of its receipt.; |
Or. en
Amendment 232
Anouk Van Brug, Engin Eroglu
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 9a – paragraph 1
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Member States shall ensure that IORPs are allowed to operate different pension schemes, including those with different investment policies, and to accept sponsorship from multiple sponsoring undertakings within the same pension scheme. | Without prejudice to national social and labour law on the organisation of pension systems including industry-wide pension funds, company pension funds and compulsory membership, Member States shall ensure that IORPs are allowed to operate different pension schemes, including those with different investment policies, and to accept sponsorship from multiple sponsoring undertakings within the same pension scheme. |
Or. en
Amendment 233
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 9a – paragraph 1
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Member States shall ensure that IORPs are allowed to operate different pension schemes, including those with different investment policies, and to accept sponsorship from multiple sponsoring undertakings within the same pension scheme. | Member States shall ensure that all or specific types of IORPs are allowed to operate different pension schemes, including those with different investment policies, and to accept sponsorship from multiple sponsoring undertakings within the same pension scheme. |
Or. en
Justification
In some Member States, specific company pension funds are not allowed to operate different pension schemes, since they are connected to one company. This national option should remain intact.
Amendment 234
Adnan Dibrani, Niels Fuglsang, Thomas Bajada, Lara Wolters, René Repasi
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 9a – paragraph 2
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| The first paragraph shall be without prejudice to a decision by a Member State to require that schemes with multiple sponsoring undertakings be operated under Directive 2009/138/EC.; | The first paragraph shall be without prejudice to a decision by a Member State to require that schemes with multiple sponsoring undertakings be operated under Directive 2009/138/EC, and without prejudice to Member State law on the organization of pension systems including industry-wide pension funds, company pension funds and compulsory membership. .; |
Or. en
Amendment 235
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 9a – paragraph 2
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| The first paragraph shall be without prejudice to a decision by a Member State to require that schemes with multiple sponsoring undertakings be operated under Directive 2009/138/EC.; | The first paragraph shall be without prejudice to a decision by a Member State to require that schemes with multiple sponsoring undertakings be operated under Directive 2009/138/EC. In addition, the first paragraph shall be without prejudice to the role of collective bargaining, social partners, and social and labour law in a Member State.; |
Or. en
Amendment 236
Sirpa Pietikäinen
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 9a – paragraph 2
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| The first paragraph shall be without prejudice to a decision by a Member State to require that schemes with multiple sponsoring undertakings be operated under Directive 2009/138/EC.; | The first paragraph shall be without prejudice to a decision by a Member State to require that schemes with multiple sponsoring undertakings be operated under Directive 2009/138/EC, and without prejudice to collective bargaining and social and labour laws; |
Or. en
Amendment 237
Damian Boeselager
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 9a – paragraph 2b (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| A deferred beneficiary within the meaning of Article 3(h) of Directive 2014/50/EU, whose dormant pension rights — or the value thereof — do not exceed EUR 600, or any higher threshold set by the Member State of accrual under Article 5(3) of that Directive, shall be entitled, on request and free of charge from the transferring scheme, to have the transfer value of those rights transferred to an IORP of their choice in the same or another Member State. The receiving IORP shall accept such a transfer where it is selected. The transfer shall not result in any loss of acquired rights |
Or. en
Justification
Small dormant pension entitlements are routinely eroded by administrative charges over a working life and clog Member-State registers. A right of free transfer aligned with the EUR 600 threshold lets workers consolidate small pots into the IORP of their choice. The receiving IORP's obligation to accept ensures that the right is effective. Aligns occupational pensions with the consumer-protection logic that already applies in single-market portability.
Amendment 238
Danuše Nerudová
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11 a (new)
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 9a – paragraph 2 a (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (11a) Member States shall ensure that at least one IORP operating in their territory accepts sponsorship from any undertaking and from self-employed persons not subject to mandatory participation in another occupational pension arrangement under national law. This obligation may be fulfilled jointly by two or more Member States, including through an IORP authorised in another Member State pursuant to this Directive. |
Or. en
Amendment 239
Adnan Dibrani, Niels Fuglsang, Thomas Bajada, Lara Wolters, René Repasi
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 12 – point b
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 10 – paragraph 3
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) the following paragraph 3 is added: | deleted |
| ‘3. EIOPA shall issue guidelines, in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010, on the prudential assessment to be carried out as part of the authorisation of IORPs, as well as on the requirements laid down in Titles II and III.;’ |
Or. en
Justification
The mandate given to EIOPA must be limited. Since this Directive is based on minimum harmonisation, any rules that could amount to capital, funding or own-funds requirements should be clearly decided at Level 1, with full democratic scrutiny by the Union legislator, and should not be introduced through Level 3 guidelines.
Amendment 240
Markus Ferber, Andrea Wechsler
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 12 – point b
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 10 – paragraph 3
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) the following paragraph 3 is added: | deleted |
| ‘3. EIOPA shall issue guidelines, in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010, on the prudential assessment to be carried out as part of the authorisation of IORPs, as well as on the requirements laid down in Titles II and III.;’ |
Or. en
Justification
The empowerment is far too broad. Conferring that power across the full prudential and governance framework of a minimum harmonisation directive is constitutionally incoherent: it would allow EIOPA to achieve through guidelines what the co-legislators have deliberately withheld from the directive text. The provision should therefore be deleted.
Amendment 241
Marlena Maląg
on behalf of the ECR Group
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 12 – point b
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 10 – paragraph 3
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) the following paragraph 3 is added: | deleted |
| ‘3. EIOPA shall issue guidelines, in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010, on the prudential assessment to be carried out as part of the authorisation of IORPs, as well as on the requirements laid down in Titles II and III.;’ |
Or. en
Amendment 242
Anouk Van Brug, Engin Eroglu, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 12 – point b
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 10 – paragraph 3
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. EIOPA shall issue guidelines, in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010, on the prudential assessment to be carried out as part of the authorisation of IORPs, as well as on the requirements laid down in Titles II and III.; | deleted |
Or. en
Justification
Several provisions introduce new tasks for EIOPA, such as the development of guidelines and/or technical standards. We do not support these proposals, as they are not consistent with the nature of a minimum harmonisation directive. Moreover, EIOPA is not always the most appropriate body to carry out these tasks.
Amendment 243
Auke Zijlstra, Mireia Borrás Pabón
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 12 – point b
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 10 – paragraph 3
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. EIOPA shall issue guidelines, in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010, on the prudential assessment to be carried out as part of the authorisation of IORPs, as well as on the requirements laid down in Titles II and III.; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 244
Martin Schirdewan
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 12 – point b
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 10 – paragraph 3
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. EIOPA shall issue guidelines, in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010, on the prudential assessment to be carried out as part of the authorisation of IORPs, as well as on the requirements laid down in Titles II and III.; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 245
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 12 – point b
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 10 – paragraph 3
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. EIOPA shall issue guidelines, in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010, on the prudential assessment to be carried out as part of the authorisation of IORPs, as well as on the requirements laid down in Titles II and III.; | deleted |
Or. en
Justification
Deleted in relation to the minimum-harmonisation nature of the IORP-directive.
Amendment 246
Marlena Maląg
on behalf of the ECR Group
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 13
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 11
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| [...] | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 247
Marlena Maląg
on behalf of the ECR Group
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 13 – introductory part
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 11
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (13) Article 11 is amended as follows: | (13) Article 11 is amended as follows: |
| […] | 1. Without prejudice to national social and labour law on the organisation of pension systems, including compulsory membership and the outcomes of collective bargaining agreements, Member States shall allow an IORP registered or authorised in their territories to carry out cross-border activities, including accepting sponsorship from undertakings in other Member States. Member States shall also allow undertakings located in their territories to sponsor IORPs which propose to or carry out cross-border activities. Member States shall ensure that IORPs may accept sponsorship from one or several undertakings located in a Member State other than the home Member State of the IORP as soon as the conditions laid down in this Article are met. |
| 2. An IORP intending to carry out cross-border activity, including by accepting sponsorship from one or several sponsoring undertakings located in another Member State, shall notify its intention to the competent authority of its home Member State. Where, in accordance with national law, IORPs are separate from the authorised entities responsible for operating them and acting on their behalf, the notification may be submitted by that authorised entity. | |
| 3. Member States shall require the notification referred to in paragraph 2 to include the following information: | |
| (a) the name of the host Member State(s), which shall, where applicable, be identified by the sponsoring undertaking or undertakings; | |
| (b) the name and the location of the main administration of the sponsoring undertaking(s); | |
| (c) the main characteristics of the pension scheme or schemes to be operated for the sponsoring undertaking(s). | |
| 4. The competent authority of the home Member State shall, no later than 2 months after the date of receipt of the complete notification file referred to in paragraph 3, transmit that file to the competent authority of the host Member State or Member States. The competent authority of the home Member State shall enclose a statement that the IORP, or where applicable, the authorised entity responsible for operating the IORP and acting on its behalf, is authorised in its home Member State and complies with, and will continue to comply with, this Directive. | |
| Where the competent authority of the home Member State does not communicate the information referred to in paragraph 3 to the competent authority of the host Member State on account of the inadequacy of the administrative structure or the financial situation of the IORP, it shall give the reasons for this to the IORP concerned within the same deadline of two months from receipt of all that information. That non-communication of information shall be subject to a right of appeal to the courts in the home Member State. | |
| 5. Where the competent authority of the home Member State transmits the notification file referred to in paragraph 3, it shall notify the IORP or, where applicable, the authorised entity responsible for operating the IORP and acting on its behalf, without delay. | |
| The IORP or, where applicable, the authorised entity responsible for operating the IORP and acting on behalf of the IORP may start carrying out the cross-border activity in the host Member State as of the date of that notification. | |
| Where the competent authority of the home Member State of the authorised entity responsible for operating the IORP and acting on its behalf is different from the competent authority of the home Member State of the IORP, the former shall also inform the latter that the authorised entity managing the IORP may start accepting sponsoring undertakings in the host Member State or Member States of the IORP. | |
| 6. IORPs carrying out cross-border activity shall be subject to the requirements of social and labour law of the host Member State relevant to the field of occupational pension schemes. | |
| They shall also be subject to the information requirements referred to in Title IV imposed by the host Member State in respect of the prospective members, members and beneficiaries which that cross-border activity concerns. | |
| The competent authority of the host Member State shall, within one month after having received the information referred to in paragraph 3, through the means referred to in Article 59(3) and (4), communicate to the competent authority of the home Member State the legal provisions referred to in Article 59(1) which are applicable in its territory. The competent authority of the home Member State shall immediately communicate that information to the IORP or, where applicable, to the authorised entity referred to in paragraph 2 and 4 weeks after receipt of this communication, the IORP can start the cross-border activity. | |
| 7. The competent authority of the host Member State shall supervise compliance with the requirements of social and labour law relevant to the field of occupational pension schemes and with the information requirements referred to in paragraph 6. Where, in accordance with national law, IORPs are constituted in a form under which authorised entities are responsible for operating them and acting on their behalf, the competent authority of the authorised entity shall be responsible for supervising the adequacy of the arrangements and organisation of that entity so that it is in a position to comply with the obligations and rules relating to the constitution and functioning of all the IORPs it manages. | |
| 8. The competent authority of the host Member State shall inform the competent authority of the home Member State of the IORP of any significant change in the host Member State’s requirements of social and labour law relevant to the field of occupational pension schemes which may affect the characteristics of the pension scheme insofar as it concerns the cross-border activity. | |
| It shall also inform the competent authority of the home Member State of any significant change in the host Member State’s information requirements referred to in paragraph 6. | |
| The competent authority of the home Member State shall communicate that information to the IORP or, where applicable, to the authorised entity referred to in paragraph 2. | |
| 9. Member States shall ensure that all procedures and formalities relating to cross-border activities, and related procedures can be easily completed through electronic means. | |
| Member States shall ensure that electronic transmission and filing of the documents referred to in this Article are accepted by their competent authorities. | |
| Member States shall ensure that the notification file referred to in paragraph 3 and the statement referred to in paragraph 4 are provided in a language customary in the sphere of international finance. | |
| 10. The competent authority of the host Member State that has reasons to consider that an IORP conducting activities in its territory is not complying with the host Member State’s requirements of social and labour law relevant to the field of occupational pension schemes, or with the host Member State’s applicable information requirements, shall inform the competent authority of the home Member State immediately. | |
| The competent authority of the home Member State shall, in coordination with the competent authority of the host Member State, take the necessary measures to ensure that the IORP ends the detected breach. | |
| 11. If, despite the measures taken by the competent authority of the home Member State or because appropriate measures are lacking in the home Member State, the IORP persists in breaching the applicable provisions of the host Member State’s requirements of social and labour law relevant to the field of occupational pension schemes or the host Member State’s applicable information requirements, the competent authority of the host Member State may, after informing the competent authority of the home Member State, take appropriate measures to prevent or penalise further irregularities, including, insofar as is strictly necessary, preventing the IORP from operating in the host Member State for the sponsoring undertaking. | |
| Member States shall ensure that in their territories it is possible to serve the legal documents necessary for such measures on IORPs. | |
| In addition, the competent authority of the home or the host Member State may refer the matter to EIOPA and request its assistance in accordance with Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010. In that case, EIOPA may act in accordance with the powers conferred on it by that Article. | |
| 12. Paragraphs 10 and 11 are without prejudice to the power of host Member States to take appropriate and non-discriminatory emergency measures to prevent or penalise irregularities within their territory, in situations where immediate action is strictly necessary in order to protect the rights of members and beneficiaries, and where equivalent measures of the home Member State are inadequate or lacking. | |
| That power shall include the possibility of preventing IORPs, insofar as is strictly necessary, from operating in the host Member State for the sponsoring undertaking. | |
| 13. Any measure adopted under paragraphs 11 to 13 involving restrictions on the activities of IORPs shall be properly reasoned and communicated to the IORP concerned without undue delay. | |
| 14. Where, in accordance with national law, IORPs are constituted in a form under which authorised entities are responsible for operating them and acting on their behalf, Member States shall not prevent such authorised entities authorised in another Member State from carrying out those activities for an IORP authorised in their territory. | |
| The first subparagraph applies only where the authorised entity is an institution referred to in point (b) of Article 2(2), or an entity, other than an IORP, authorised pursuant to this Directive for the purpose of operating IORPs and acting on their behalf. | |
| In such cases: | |
| (a) the competent authority of the Member State in which the IORP is authorised shall be responsible for the prudential supervision of the IORP and for supervising compliance with the rules of that Member State relating to the constitution, functioning and operation of the IORP, including rules on authorisation, operating requirements, quantitative requirements, the conditions governing its activities, and the information to be given to prospective members, members and beneficiaries. The authorised entity shall comply with, and be responsible for adopting and implementing, all arrangements and organisational decisions necessary to ensure that the operation of the IORP complies with those rules. | |
| (b) the competent authority of the Member State in which the authorised entity is authorised shall be responsible for supervising the authorised entity and the adequacy of its arrangements and organisation, so that it is in a position to comply with the obligations and rules relating to the operation of the IORPs it operates. That supervision shall include rules relating to the organisation of the authorised entity, including delegation arrangements, organisational requirements, operational arrangements, fit and proper requirements, risk-management systems and internal controls. Those rules shall be no stricter than those applicable to authorised entities operating IORPs only in their home Member State. | |
| The competent authority of the Member State in which the IORP is authorised may require directly from the authorised entity any information, records, documents or explanations necessary for the supervision of the IORP. Where the authorised entity fails to comply with the rules referred to in the previous subparagraphs, that competent authority shall require it to put an end to the breach and shall inform the competent authority of the authorised entity's home Member State. Where the authorised entity does not put an end to the breach, the competent authority of the authorised entity's home Member State shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that it does so, and shall communicate those measures to the competent authority of the Member State in which the IORP is authorised. Where, despite those measures, or because they prove inadequate, the breach persists, the competent authority of the Member State in which the IORP is authorised may, after informing the competent authority of the authorised entity's home Member State, take the necessary measures, including the imposition of sanctions and preventing the authorised entity from operating the IORP in its territory. | |
| The competent authorities referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b) shall cooperate closely, exchange all information necessary for the performance of their duties under this Directive, and provide each other with assistance in relation to inspections, investigations and enforcement. In the event of disagreement about the procedure, content or absence of any action by either competent authority under this paragraph, either authority may refer the matter to EIOPA, which may act in accordance with Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010. | |
| This paragraph shall be without prejudice to the right of an IORP authorised in one Member State, including where it is operated by an authorised entity established in that Member State, to carry out cross-border occupational retirement activities in another Member State in accordance with paragraphs 1 to 13. It shall not be construed as requiring an IORP to be authorised in the host Member State in order for those cross-border activities to be carried out there in accordance with paragraphs 1 to 13. |
Or. en
Justification
Rewording of Article 11 to address legal and operational uncertainties relating to multi-sponsor pension institutions and pension institutions managed by an authorised entity established in another Member State.
Amendment 248
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 13 – point b
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 11 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Member States shall ensure that the competent authority of the home Member State issues the reasoned decision referred to in the first subparagraph within one month of receiving all the information referred to in paragraph 3.; | Member States shall ensure that the competent authority of the home Member State issues the reasoned decision referred to in the first subparagraph within three months of receiving all the information referred to in paragraph 3.; |
Or. en
Amendment 249
Auke Zijlstra
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 13 – point b
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 11 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Member States shall ensure that the competent authority of the home Member State issues the reasoned decision referred to in the first subparagraph within one month of receiving all the information referred to in paragraph 3.; | Member States shall ensure that the competent authority of the home Member State issues the reasoned decision referred to in the first subparagraph within three months of receiving all the information referred to in paragraph 3.; |
Or. en
Justification
Three months are required for the national competent authority in the home country to conduct a thorough assessment and protect the interests of the various members and beneficiaries in the countries concerned.
Amendment 250
Anouk Van Brug, Engin Eroglu, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 13 – point b
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 11 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Member States shall ensure that the competent authority of the home Member State issues the reasoned decision referred to in the first subparagraph within one month of receiving all the information referred to in paragraph 3.; | Member States shall ensure that the competent authority of the home Member State issues the reasoned decision referred to in the first subparagraph within three months of receiving all the information referred to in paragraph 3.; |
Or. en
Justification
Three months are required for the national competent authority in the home country to conduct a thorough assessment and safeguard the interests of the various members and beneficiaries in the countries concerned.
Amendment 251
Damian Boeselager
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 13 – point b a (new)
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 11 – paragraph 5
| Present text | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (ba) Paragraph 5 is amended as follows: | |
| 5. Where the competent authority of the home Member State does not communicate the information referred to in paragraph 3 to the competent authority of the host Member State, it shall give the reasons for this to the IORP concerned within three months of receiving all that information. That non-communication of information shall be subject to a right of appeal to the courts in the home Member State | "5. Where the competent authority of the home Member State does not communicate the information referred to in paragraph 3 to the competent authority of the host Member State, it shall give the reasons for this to the IORP concerned within one month of receiving all that information. That non-communication of information shall be subject to a right of appeal to the courts in the home Member State" |
Or. en
(32016L2341)
Amendment 252
Anouk Van Brug, Engin Eroglu, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 13 – point c
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 11 – paragraph 6
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 6. IORPs carrying out cross-border activity shall be subject to the information requirements referred to in Title IV imposed by the host Member State in respect of the prospective members, members and beneficiaries which that cross-border activity concerns, with the exception of the Pension Benefit Statement referred to in Article 38, which shall be subject to harmonised Union rules in accordance with paragraph 6 of that Article. | 6. IORPs carrying out cross-border activity shall be subject to the information requirements referred to in Title IV imposed by the host Member State in respect of the prospective members, members and beneficiaries which that cross-border activity concerns. |
Or. en
Justification
For consistency with our amendment on article 38(6).
Amendment 253
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 13 – point c
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 11 – paragraph 6
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 6. IORPs carrying out cross-border activity shall be subject to the information requirements referred to in Title IV imposed by the host Member State in respect of the prospective members, members and beneficiaries which that cross-border activity concerns, with the exception of the Pension Benefit Statement referred to in Article 38, which shall be subject to harmonised Union rules in accordance with paragraph 6 of that Article. | 6. IORPs carrying out cross-border activity shall be subject to the information requirements referred to in Title IV imposed by the host Member State in respect of the prospective members, members and beneficiaries which that cross-border activity concerns. |
Or. en
Amendment 254
Anouk Van Brug, Engin Eroglu, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 13 – point c
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 11 – paragraph 7
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 7. Before the IORP starts to carry out a cross-border activity, the competent authority of the host Member State shall, within one month after having received the information referred to in paragraph 3, prepare for the supervision of the relevant cross-border activities. That preparation shall relate to the requirements of social and labour law that are relevant to the field of occupational pension schemes under which the pension scheme sponsored by an undertaking in the host Member State must be operated and of the information requirements of the host Member State referred to in Title IV which shall apply to the cross-border activity. In addition, the competent authority of the host Member State shall through the means referred to in Article 59(3) and (4), communicate to the competent authority of the home Member State the legal provisions referred to in Article 59(1) which are applicable in its territory. The competent authority of the home Member State shall immediately communicate that information to the IORP.; | 7. Before the IORP starts to carry out a cross-border activity, the competent authority of the host Member State shall, within six weeks after having received the information referred to in paragraph 3, prepare for the supervision of the relevant cross-border activities. That preparation shall relate to the requirements of social and labour law that are relevant to the field of occupational pension schemes under which the pension scheme sponsored by an undertaking in the host Member State must be operated and of the information requirements of the host Member State referred to in Title IV which shall apply to the cross-border activity. In addition, the competent authority of the host Member State shall through the means referred to in Article 59(3) and (4), communicate to the competent authority of the home Member State the legal provisions referred to in Article 59(1) which are applicable in its territory. The competent authority of the home Member State shall immediately communicate that information to the IORP.; |
Or. en
Justification
The six-week period granted to the national competent authority in the host country is necessary to enable a prior assessment of whether the pension scheme complies with applicable social and labour law requirements.
Amendment 255
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 13 – point c
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 11 – paragraph 7
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 7. Before the IORP starts to carry out a cross-border activity, the competent authority of the host Member State shall, within one month after having received the information referred to in paragraph 3, prepare for the supervision of the relevant cross-border activities. That preparation shall relate to the requirements of social and labour law that are relevant to the field of occupational pension schemes under which the pension scheme sponsored by an undertaking in the host Member State must be operated and of the information requirements of the host Member State referred to in Title IV which shall apply to the cross-border activity. In addition, the competent authority of the host Member State shall through the means referred to in Article 59(3) and (4), communicate to the competent authority of the home Member State the legal provisions referred to in Article 59(1) which are applicable in its territory. The competent authority of the home Member State shall immediately communicate that information to the IORP.; | 7. Before the IORP starts to carry out a cross-border activity, the competent authority of the host Member State shall, within six weeks after having received the information referred to in paragraph 3, prepare for the supervision of the relevant cross-border activities. That preparation shall relate to the requirements of social and labour law that are relevant to the field of occupational pension schemes under which the pension scheme sponsored by an undertaking in the host Member State must be operated and of the information requirements of the host Member State referred to in Title IV which shall apply to the cross-border activity. In addition, the competent authority of the host Member State shall through the means referred to in Article 59(3) and (4), communicate to the competent authority of the home Member State the legal provisions referred to in Article 59(1) which are applicable in its territory. The competent authority of the home Member State shall immediately communicate that information to the IORP.; |
Or. en
Amendment 256
Auke Zijlstra
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 13 – point c
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 11 – paragraph 7
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 7. Before the IORP starts to carry out a cross-border activity, the competent authority of the host Member State shall, within one month after having received the information referred to in paragraph 3, prepare for the supervision of the relevant cross-border activities. That preparation shall relate to the requirements of social and labour law that are relevant to the field of occupational pension schemes under which the pension scheme sponsored by an undertaking in the host Member State must be operated and of the information requirements of the host Member State referred to in Title IV which shall apply to the cross-border activity. In addition, the competent authority of the host Member State shall through the means referred to in Article 59(3) and (4), communicate to the competent authority of the home Member State the legal provisions referred to in Article 59(1) which are applicable in its territory. The competent authority of the home Member State shall immediately communicate that information to the IORP.; | 7. Before the IORP starts to carry out a cross-border activity, the competent authority of the host Member State shall, within six weeks after having received the information referred to in paragraph 3, prepare for the supervision of the relevant cross-border activities. That preparation shall relate to the requirements of social and labour law that are relevant to the field of occupational pension schemes under which the pension scheme sponsored by an undertaking in the host Member State must be operated and of the information requirements of the host Member State referred to in Title IV which shall apply to the cross-border activity. In addition, the competent authority of the host Member State shall through the means referred to in Article 59(3) and (4), communicate to the competent authority of the home Member State the legal provisions referred to in Article 59(1) which are applicable in its territory. The competent authority of the home Member State shall immediately communicate that information to the IORP.; |
Or. en
Justification
The six weeks required by the national competent authority in the host country are necessary to assess in advance whether the pension scheme complies with social and labour laws.
Amendment 257
Damian Boeselager
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 13 – point c c (new)
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 11 – paragraph 8
| Present text | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (cc) Paragraph 8 is replaced by the following: | |
| 8. On receiving the communication referred to in paragraph 7, or if no communication is received from the competent authority of the home Member State on expiry of the period provided for in paragraph 7, the IORP may start carry out a cross-border activity in accordance with the host Member State's requirements of social and labour law relevant to the field of occupational pension schemes and with teh host Member State's information requirements as referred to in paragraph 7. | "8. On receiving the communication referred to in paragraph 4, or if no communication is received from the competent authority of the home Member State on expiry of the period provided for in paragraph 4, the IORP may start carry out a cross-border activity in accordance with the host Member State's requirements of social and labour law relevant to the field of occupational pension schemes and with teh host Member State's information requirements as referred to in paragraph 6." |
Or. en
(32016L2341)
Amendment 258
Marlena Maląg
on behalf of the ECR Group
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 14
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 11a – paragraph 1
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1. Member States shall ensure that in the event of a change in any of the particulars communicated under Article 11(3), points (b) or (c), an IORP gives written notice of the change to the competent authorities of the home and the host Member States at least one month before making the change in order to enable the competent authorities of the home and the host Member States to fulfil their respective obligations under Article 11. | 1. Member States shall ensure that in the event of a change in any of the particulars communicated under Article 11(3), an IORP gives written notice of the change to the competent authority of the home Member State at least one month before making the change. The competent authority of the home Member State shall inform the competent authorities of the host Member States of the change without delay, in order to enable the competent authorities of the home and the host Member States to fulfil their respective obligations under Article 11. |
Or. en
Amendment 259
Marlena Maląg
on behalf of the ECR Group
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 14
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 11a – paragraph 2
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. Member States shall ensure that where members and beneficiaries fully bear the investment risk, the notification of one or more additional sponsoring undertakings to a previously notified pension scheme, or of non-material amendments to the characteristics of that scheme, is subject to a simplified notification procedure.; | 2. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, Member States shall ensure that, where members and beneficiaries fully bear the investment risk, the acceptance of one or more additional sponsoring undertakings in respect of a pension scheme already notified under Article 11(3), or non-material amendments to the characteristics of such a scheme, shall not be subject to prior notification. Any requirement to notify such acceptance or amendment after it has taken effect shall be limited to what is necessary to verify compliance with the provisions referred to in Article 11, and shall not constitute a prior condition for the IORP to extend its cross-border activities. |
Or. en
Justification
Simplification resulting from the rewording of Article 11: New paragraph 2 introduces simplification for multi-sponsor schemes.
Amendment 260
Damian Boeselager
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 14 a (new)
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 11a – paragraph 1
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1. Member States shall ensure that in the event of a change in any of the particulars communicated under Article 11(3), points (b) or (c), an IORP gives written notice of the change to the competent authorities of the home and the host Member States at least one month before making the change in order to enable the competent authorities of the home and the host Member States to fulfil their respective obligations under Article 11. | 1. Member States shall ensure that in the event of a change in any of the particulars communicated under Article 11(3), points (b) or (c), an IORP gives written notice of the change to the competent authorities of the home and the host Member States at least one month before making the change in order to enable those authorities to fulfil their respective obligations under Article 11. The competent authority of the home Member State shall inform the competent authorities of the host Member States of the change without delay. |
Or. en
Amendment 261
Damian Boeselager
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 14 a (new)
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 11a – paragraph 2
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. Member States shall ensure that where members and beneficiaries fully bear the investment risk, the notification of one or more additional sponsoring undertakings to a previously notified pension scheme, or of non-material amendments to the characteristics of that scheme, is subject to a simplified notification procedure. | 2. Member States shall ensure that where members and beneficiaries fully bear the investment risk, the acceptance of one or more additional sponsoring undertakings in respect of a pension scheme already notified under Article 11 (3), or non-material amendments to the characteristics of such a scheme, shall not be subject to prior notification. Any requirement to notify such acceptance or amendment after it has taken effect to the competent authority of the home Member State shall be limited to what is necessary to verify compliance with the provisions referred to in Article 11, and shall not constitute a prior condition for the IORP to extend its cross-border activities. |
Or. en
Amendment 262
Damian Boeselager
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 14 a (new)
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 11a – paragraph 2a (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2a. Where an IORP that already carries out cross-border activity authorised under Article 11 proposes to carry out cross-border activity in an additional host Member State, the competent authority of the home Member State shall not repeat the assessment of the administrative structure, financial situation, good repute, professional qualifications or experience referred to in Article 11(4), unless those elements have materially changed since the most recent assessment. |
Or. en
Amendment 263
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15 – point b
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 12 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 – point a
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (a) a simple majority of the members and beneficiaries concerned, or where applicable, a simple majority of their representatives; and | (a) at least a two-third majority of the members and beneficiaries concerned, or where applicable, at least a two-third majority of their representatives; and |
Or. en
Amendment 264
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15 – point b
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 12 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| For the purposes of the first subparagraph, point (a), the simple majority shall be calculated based on the received responses. | For the purposes of the first subparagraph, point (a), the majority shall be calculated based on the received responses. |
Or. en
Amendment 265
Marlena Maląg
on behalf of the ECR Group
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15 – point b
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 12 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Member States may provide that, for a transfer to be approved, a participation threshold of up to 25 % of the members and beneficiaries concerned shall be reached. | Member States may provide that, for a transfer to be approved, a participation threshold of up to 25 % of the members and beneficiaries concerned shall be reached. Member States may allow that the requirement for approval by a simple majority of the members and beneficiaries concerned or, where applicable, their representatives, shall not apply where the decision approving the transfer is taken in accordance with procedures laid down in the rules of the pension scheme or in any applicable collective agreement requiring a higher level of approval than a simple majority, together with proportionate safeguards necessary to ensure adequate member engagement and protection. In such cases, the participation threshold referred to in the third subparagraph shall not apply’. |
Or. en
Amendment 266
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15 – point b
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 12 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Member States may provide that, for a transfer to be approved, a participation threshold of up to 25 % of the members and beneficiaries concerned shall be reached.; | Member States may provide that, for a transfer to be approved, a participation threshold of up to 40 % of the members and beneficiaries concerned shall be reached.; |
Or. en
Amendment 267
Martin Schirdewan
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15 – point b
Directive 2016/2341
Article 12 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Member States may provide that, for a transfer to be approved, a participation threshold of up to 25 % of the members and beneficiaries concerned shall be reached.; | Member States shall ensure that, for a transfer to be approved, a participation of at least 50 % of the members and beneficiaries concerned shall be reached; |
Or. en
Amendment 268
Marlena Maląg
on behalf of the ECR Group
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15 – point c
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 12 – paragraph 11 – subparagraph 2
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (c) in paragraph 11, the second subparagraph is replaced by the following: | deleted |
| ‘Where the transfer results in a cross-border activity, the competent authority of the home Member State of the transferring IORP shall also inform the competent authority of the home Member State of the receiving IORP of the requirements of social and labour law relevant to the field of occupational pension schemes under which the pension scheme must be operated and of the information requirements of the host Member State referred to in Title IV which shall apply to the cross-border activity. This shall be communicated within a further four weeks.;’ |
Or. en
Amendment 269
Fernando Navarrete Rojas
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15 – point c a (new)
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 12 – paragraph 13
| Present text | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (ca) Paragraph 13 is amended as follows: | |
| 13. In the case of a disagreement about the procedure or content of an action or inaction of the competent authority of the home Member State of the transferring or receiving IORP, including a decision to authorise or refuse a cross-border transfer, EIOPA may carry out non-binding mediation in accordance with point (c) of the second paragraph of Article 31 of Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 upon request of either of the competent authorities or on its own initiative. | "13. In the case of a disagreement about the procedure or an inaction of the competent authority of the home Member State of the transferring or receiving IORP, or regarding a decision to authorise or refuse a cross-border transfer based on prudential grounds, EIOPA may assist the competent authorities in reaching an agreement in accordance with Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010. This binding mediation shall be without prejudice to the application of national social and labour law." |
Or. en
(32016L2341)
Amendment 270
Isabel Benjumea Benjumea
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 12a
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (16) the following Article 12a is inserted: | deleted |
| ‘Article 12a | |
| Domestic transfers | |
| Member States shall ensure that transfers between IORPs authorised within the same Member State of all or a part of a pension scheme’s liabilities, technical provisions, and other obligations and rights, and corresponding assets or cash equivalent thereof, are governed by simple and transparent procedures that ensure the protection of members and beneficiaries and the continued sound management of the pension schemes concerned. | |
| Such transfers shall be subject to prior approval by the competent authority, which shall verify at least all of the following: | |
| (a) that the information submitted is complete and accurate; | |
| (b) that the administrative structure, financial situation, and the good repute or professional qualifications and experience of the persons who effectively run the IORPs concerned are compatible with the proposed transfer; | |
| (c) that the long-term interests of members and beneficiaries are adequately protected; | |
| (d) that the assets to be transferred are sufficient and appropriate to cover the related liabilities, technical provisions, and other obligations and rights. | |
| Where a Member State makes domestic transfers subject to the prior approval of the members and beneficiaries concerned, the approval procedure shall not be more stringent than the procedure set out in Article 12(3).’ |
Or. es
Amendment 271
Markus Ferber, Andrea Wechsler
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 12a
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (16) the following Article 12a is inserted: | deleted |
| ‘Article 12a | |
| Domestic transfers | |
| Member States shall ensure that transfers between IORPs authorised within the same Member State of all or a part of a pension scheme’s liabilities, technical provisions, and other obligations and rights, and corresponding assets or cash equivalent thereof, are governed by simple and transparent procedures that ensure the protection of members and beneficiaries and the continued sound management of the pension schemes concerned. | |
| Such transfers shall be subject to prior approval by the competent authority, which shall verify at least all of the following: | |
| (a) that the information submitted is complete and accurate; | |
| (b) that the administrative structure, financial situation, and the good repute or professional qualifications and experience of the persons who effectively run the IORPs concerned are compatible with the proposed transfer; | |
| (c) that the long-term interests of members and beneficiaries are adequately protected; | |
| (d) that the assets to be transferred are sufficient and appropriate to cover the related liabilities, technical provisions, and other obligations and rights. | |
| Where a Member State makes domestic transfers subject to the prior approval of the members and beneficiaries concerned, the approval procedure shall not be more stringent than the procedure set out in Article 12(3).;’ |
Or. en
Justification
Domestic transfers between IORPs within the same Member State operate entirely within a single national legal framework and raise no cross-border dimension requiring prescriptive Union rules.
Amendment 272
Adnan Dibrani, Niels Fuglsang, Thomas Bajada, Lara Wolters, Jonás Fernández, César Luena
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 12a – paragraph 1
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Member States shall ensure that transfers between IORPs authorised within the same Member State of all or a part of a pension scheme’s liabilities, technical provisions, and other obligations and rights, and corresponding assets or cash equivalent thereof, are governed by simple and transparent procedures that ensure the protection of members and beneficiaries and the continued sound management of the pension schemes concerned. | Member States shall ensure that collective transfers between IORPs authorised within the same Member State of all or a part of a pension scheme’s liabilities, technical provisions, and other obligations and rights, and corresponding assets or cash equivalent thereof, are governed by simple and transparent procedures that ensure the protection of members and beneficiaries and the continued sound management of the pension schemes concerned. |
Or. en
Justification
This amendment clarifies that Article 12a applies only to collective domestic transfers between IORPs. Individual transfers initiated by members or beneficiaries should remain governed by national law, as applying prior supervisory approval to such transfers would be disproportionate and administratively burdensome.
Amendment 273
Adnan Dibrani, Niels Fuglsang, Thomas Bajada, Lara Wolters, Jonás Fernández, César Luena
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 12a – paragraph 1a (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| For the avoidance of doubt, this Article shall not apply to individual transfers of accrued pension rights or pension capital carried out at the request of individual members or beneficiaries under national law |
Or. en
Justification
This amendment clarifies that Article 12a applies only to collective domestic transfers between IORPs. Individual transfers initiated by members or beneficiaries should remain governed by national law, as applying prior supervisory approval to such transfers would be disproportionate and administratively burdensome.
Amendment 274
Marlena Maląg
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 12a – paragraph 1a (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Member States shall ensure that comptetent authorities have appropriate supervisory powers with regard to such trasnfers. Member States shall ensure the transferring IORP makes available to the members and beneficiaries concerned and, where applicable, to their representatives, the information on the conditions of the transfer in a timely manner. |
Or. en
Amendment 275
Marlena Maląg
on behalf of the ECR Group
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 12a – paragraph 2
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Such transfers shall be subject to prior approval by the competent authority, which shall verify at least all of the following: | deleted |
| (a) that the information submitted is complete and accurate; | |
| (b) that the administrative structure, financial situation, and the good repute or professional qualifications and experience of the persons who effectively run the IORPs concerned are compatible with the proposed transfer; | |
| (c) that the long-term interests of members and beneficiaries are adequately protected; | |
| (d) that the assets to be transferred are sufficient and appropriate to cover the related liabilities, technical provisions, and other obligations and rights. |
Or. en
Amendment 276
Fernando Navarrete Rojas
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 13 – paragraph 2
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. The home Member State shall ensure that IORPs operating pension schemes, where they provide cover against biometric risks or guarantee either an investment performance or a given level of benefits, establish sufficient technical provisions in respect of the total range of such schemes.; | 2. The home Member State shall ensure that IORPs operating occupational pension schemes, where the IORP itself, and not the sponsoring undertaking or any other party, underwrites the liability to cover against biometric risks or guarantee either an investment performance or a given level of benefits, establish sufficient technical provisions in respect of the total range of such schemes.; |
Or. en
Amendment 277
Anouk Van Brug, Engin Eroglu
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 13 – paragraph 2
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. The home Member State shall ensure that IORPs operating pension schemes, where they provide cover against biometric risks or guarantee either an investment performance or a given level of benefits, establish sufficient technical provisions in respect of the total range of such schemes.; | 2. The home Member State shall ensure that IORPs operating pension schemes, where the IORP itself, and not the sponsoring undertaking or another institution, underwrites the liability to cover against biometric risk or guarantees either an investment performance or a given level of benefits, establish sufficient technical provisions in respect of the total range of such schemes.; |
Or. en
Amendment 278
Jonás Fernández, César Luena
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 18 – point a – point ii
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 14 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| The limited period of time referred to in the introductory wording of the first subparagraph shall be determined by national law and shall in any case not exceed ten years.; | Underfunding shall be corrected within a maximum of ten years. Providers shall be required to submit annual reports and correction plans supervised by the competent authority, with early warning mechanisms and automatic compensations for affected members. Competent authorities should assess the optimum number of years, making a distinction between temporary and structural factors, and assess on the correction plan accordingly.; |
Or. en
Amendment 279
Anouk Van Brug, Engin Eroglu
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 18 – point a – point ii
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 14 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| The limited period of time referred to in the introductory wording of the first subparagraph shall be determined by national law and shall in any case not exceed ten years.; | The limited period of time referred to in the introductory wording of the first subparagraph shall be determined by national law and shall in any case not exceed two years.; |
Or. en
Justification
We consider that a period of ten years during which technical provisions may remain insufficiently covered is excessively long and not in the interests of members and beneficiaries. In our view, a period of one to two years would be more appropriate.
Amendment 280
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 18 – point a – point ii
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 14 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| The limited period of time referred to in the introductory wording of the first subparagraph shall be determined by national law and shall in any case not exceed ten years.; | The limited period of time referred to in the introductory wording of the first subparagraph shall be determined by national law and shall in any case not exceed two years.; |
Or. en
Amendment 281
Auke Zijlstra
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 18 – point a – point ii
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 14 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| The limited period of time referred to in the introductory wording of the first subparagraph shall be determined by national law and shall in any case not exceed ten years.; | The limited period of time referred to in the introductory wording of the first subparagraph shall be determined by national law and shall in any case not exceed 1 year; |
Or. en
Justification
A period of 10 years with insufficient coverage for technical provisions is too long and not in the interest of participants and pensioners. Shorter is better.
Amendment 282
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 18 – point b
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 14 – paragraph 3
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) paragraph 3 is deleted; | deleted |
Or. en
Justification
Paragraph 3 provided extra protection for members and beneficiaries in the case of cross-border activity. This should be maintained.
Amendment 283
Anouk Van Brug, Engin Eroglu, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 18 – point b
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 14 – paragraph 3
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) paragraph 3 is deleted; | (b) paragraph 3 is replaced by the following: |
| 'In the event of cross-border activity, the technical provisions shall at all times be fully funded in respect of the total range of pension schemes operated. In the event that an IORP which carries out cross-border activity is in a position of having insufficient assets to cover the technical provisions, the competent authorities of the home Member State shall promptly intervene and require the IORP to immediately draw up appropriate measures and implement them without delay in a way that members and beneficiaries are adequately protected. In the event that an IORP makes a notification requesting permission to carry out a cross-border activity, the competent authorities of the home Member State shall not grant that permission if, at that point in time, the IORP has insufficient assets to cover the technical provisions.'; |
Or. en
Justification
We oppose the deletion of paragraph 3, as this could result in reduced protection for members and beneficiaries in the absence of additional safeguards.
Amendment 284
Auke Zijlstra
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 18 – point b
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 14 – paragraph 3
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) paragraph 3 is deleted; | (b) Paragraph 3 is replaced by the following: |
| "In the event of cross-border activity, the technical provisions shall at all times be fully funded in respect of the total range of pension schemes operated. If this condition is not met, the competent authority of the home Member State shall promptly intervene and require the IORP to immediately draw up appropriate measures and implement them without delay in a way that members and beneficiaries are adequately protected." |
Or. en
Justification
The Commission's proposal to delete this paragraph is undesirable, as this could lead to less protection for participants without additional safeguards.
Amendment 285
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 18 a (new)
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 15 – paragraph 2a (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (18a) In Article 15 the following paragraph 2a is inserted as follows: | |
| ' | |
| 2a. Member States shall ensure that IORPs that hold substantially more assets than the minimum amount of additional assets required by their Member State continue to meet their obligations towards members and beneficiaries, including with regard to the impact of risk-based policy choices on their retirement income objectives and on adequate retirement benefits. | |
| ' |
Or. en
Justification
While it is essential that IORPs hold enough assets to always meet their obligations and stay solvent, being overly risk-averse could also affect the interest of members and beneficiaries, for example through choices made by an IORP that impact the purchasing power of (future) beneficiaries. This can include choices related to non-indexation of pension benefits. Since providing adequate retirement income also is a key obligation of IORPs, the effects of being overly risk-averse are relevant and should be included in the Directive, without including strict requirements.
Amendment 286
Fernando Navarrete Rojas
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 18 b (new)
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 15 – paragraph 3
| Present text | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (18 b) Article 15 paragraph 3 is amended as follows: | |
| Paragraph 1 shall, however, not prevent Member States from requiring IORPs located in their territory to hold regulatory own funds or from laying down more detailed rules that are prudentially justified. | "Paragraph 1 shall, however, not prevent Member States from requiring IORPs located in their territory to hold regulatory own funds or from laying down more detailed rules only where they can demonstrate that such measures are strictly necessary, proportionate and prudentially justified. |
| EIOPA may, on its own initiative or at the request of a competent authority, issue non-binding opinions on whether the additional regulatory own funds implemented by Member States comply with the conditions set out in the first subparagraph." |
Or. en
(32016L2341)
Amendment 287
Adnan Dibrani, Niels Fuglsang, Thomas Bajada, Lara Wolters, René Repasi
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 17 – paragraph 7
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (20) in Article 17, the following paragraph 7 is added: | deleted |
| ‘7. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 64a to amend the numbers and percentage values referred to in this Article and in Article 18.;’ |
Or. en
Justification
The numerical parameters referred to in Articles 17 and 18 are core prudential requirements and should remain subject to the ordinary legislative procedure. Amendments to such values may have significant implications for IORPs, members and beneficiaries, and should therefore not be made through delegated acts.
Amendment 288
Arba Kokalari
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 17 – paragraph 7
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (20) in Article 17, the following paragraph 7 is added: | deleted |
| ‘7. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 64a to amend the numbers and percentage values referred to in this Article and in Article 18.;’ |
Or. en
Amendment 289
Markus Ferber, Andrea Wechsler
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 17 – paragraph 7
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (20) in Article 17, the following paragraph 7 is added: | deleted |
| ‘7. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 64a to amend the numbers and percentage values referred to in this Article and in Article 18.;’ |
Or. en
Justification
Solvency margin thresholds are primary legislative parameters that define the fundamental financial obligations of IORPs and the liability exposure of sponsoring undertakings. A change in those thresholds should be done with a level 1 amendment, not via a delegated act.
Amendment 290
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 17 – paragraph 7
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 7. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 64a to amend the numbers and percentage values referred to in this Article and in Article 18.; | deleted |
Or. en
Justification
Deleted in relation to the minimum-harmonisation nature of the IORP-directive.
Amendment 291
Anouk Van Brug, Engin Eroglu, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 17 – paragraph 7
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 7. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 64a to amend the numbers and percentage values referred to in this Article and in Article 18.; | 7. The numbers and percentages in this Article and in Article 18 shall be amended, after a relevant appropriate and comprehensive study based on public sources is carried out by the Commission and accompanied by a legislative proposal, within a period of 18 months from ...[the date of entry into force of this amending Directive]. |
Or. en
Justification
Alternatively, this paragraph could be deleted.
Amendment 292
Engin Eroglu
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 21
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 18a
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| [...] | deleted |
Or. en
Justification
Necessary in order to maintain the current situation as it stands.
Amendment 293
Jonás Fernández, César Luena
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
2016/2341
Article 17 – paragraph 7
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 7. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 64a to amend the numbers and percentage values referred to in this Article and in Article 18.; | 7. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 64a to amend the numbers and percentage values referred to in this Article and in Article 18. Solvency margins shall be set within the minimum and maximum ranges laid down in this Directive. Any amendment by means of delegated acts shall require prior consultation with EIOPA, accompanied by an impact analysis. The reviews shall take place at regular intervals of five years.; |
Or. en
Amendment 294
Markus Ferber, Andrea Wechsler
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 21
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 18a
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (21) [...] | deleted |
Or. en
Justification
Article 18a applies short-term solvency stress scenarios to institutions with long investment horizons and existing national safety nets that already address the risks the provision purports to cover. The prescribed scenarios actively discourage equity and illiquid investment, contrary to the SIU objective. The article is disproportionate and should be deleted.
Amendment 295
Isabel Benjumea Benjumea
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 21
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 18a
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| [...] | deleted |
Or. es
Amendment 296
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 21
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 18a – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| The competent authorities of the home Member States shall require that IORPs operating pension schemes, where the IORP itself, and not the sponsoring undertaking, underwrites the liability to cover against biometric risk, or guarantees a given investment performance or a given level of benefits, carry out a stress test at least every three years to assess their ability to meet their obligations towards members and beneficiaries, including under scenarios representing adverse market and demographic developments. | The competent authorities of the home Member States shall require that IORPs operating pension schemes, where the IORP itself, and not the sponsoring undertaking, underwrites the liability to cover against biometric risk, or guarantees a given investment performance or a given level of benefits, carry out a stress test regularly to assess their ability to meet their obligations towards members and beneficiaries, including under scenarios representing adverse market and demographic developments. Competent authorities shall take into account the nature, risk, scale and complexity of the activities of an IORP when determining extent, level of detail and frequency of the stress tests. |
Or. en
Amendment 297
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 21
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 18a – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Member States may also require the IORP to assess whether its projected available solvency margin exceeds its required solvency margin, or, where applicable, any higher level of regulatory own funds required under national law pursuant to Article 15. | Member States shall also require the IORP to assess whether its projected available solvency margin exceeds its required solvency margin, or, where applicable, any higher level of regulatory own funds required under national law pursuant to Article 15. |
Or. en
Amendment 298
Auke Zijlstra
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 21
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 18a – paragraph 2
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, IORPs shall make projections, over the next ten financial years from the date of the most recent financial statements, of assets and liabilities under each of the following scenarios: | deleted |
| (a) a baseline scenario extending the economic conditions prevailing at the date of the most recent financial statements; | |
| (b) an adverse scenario of permanent relative decrease in interest rates of 40 % or absolute decrease of 0,75 percentage points, whichever is more severe, without interest rates falling below 0 % or exceeding 3,5 %; | |
| (c) an adverse scenario of decline in investment returns on non-depreciable assets by 30 %; | |
| (d) a decrease in the mortality rates of members and beneficiaries at all ages by 10 %. | |
| By way of derogation from the first subparagraph, Member States may require IORPs to: | |
| (a) make projections over more than ten financial years; | |
| (b) carry out projections under adverse scenarios that are more severe than the scenarios set out in the first subparagraph, points (b), (c) or (d); | |
| (c) carry out projections under additional stressed scenarios. |
Or. en
Justification
A harmonised ten-year projection period already provides a demanding long-term assessment. Allowing national authorities to impose longer horizons, more severe scenarios or additional scenarios creates open-ended supervisory requirements, reduces legal certainty and undermines comparability.
Amendment 299
Fernando Navarrete Rojas
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 21
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 – introductory part
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| By way of derogation from the first subparagraph, Member States may require IORPs to: | By way of derogation from subparagraphs 1 and 2, Member States may require IORPs to: |
Or. en
Amendment 300
Fernando Navarrete Rojas
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 21
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 – point a
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (a) make projections over more than ten financial years; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 301
Fernando Navarrete Rojas
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 21
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 – point c
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (c) carry out projections under additional stressed scenarios. | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 302
Fernando Navarrete Rojas
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 21
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2a (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| In case of increased market volatility or other exceptional market developments, the Commission after consultation with EIOPA may adopt a delegated act to carry out the projection under severe scenarios that are more severe than the scenarios set out in the first subparagraph points (b), (c) or (d). |
Or. en
Amendment 303
Auke Zijlstra, Mireia Borrás Pabón
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 21
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 18a – paragraph 2a (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2a. Stress tests required under this Directive shall be limited to financially material market, interest-rate, investment, longevity, mortality and demographic risks. Member States and competent authorities shall not require IORPs to perform climate-change, environmental, transition-policy or other environmentally related stress-test scenarios. |
Or. en
Justification
IORP stress testing should focus on risks directly relevant to the institution’s ability to meet pension liabilities. Climate-policy scenarios are speculative, politically dependent and unsuitable as compulsory prudential parameters for long-term pension schemes.
Amendment 304
Adnan Dibrani, Niels Fuglsang, Thomas Bajada, Lara Wolters, René Repasi
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 21
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 18a – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Where the results of the stress test referred to in paragraph 1 indicate that, under any of the scenarios referred to in paragraph 2, an IORP would either have insufficient assets to cover the technical provisions or, where applicable, have an insufficient available solvency margin to meet the required solvency margin or any higher level of regulatory own funds required under national law pursuant to Article 15 for any projected year, Member States shall ensure that the competent authority requires the IORP to submit a convergence plan. | Where the results of the stress test referred to in paragraph 1 indicate that, under any of the scenarios referred to in paragraph 2, points (a), (b) or (c), there is material risk that an IORP would either have insufficient assets to cover the technical provisions or, where applicable, have an insufficient available solvency margin to meet the required solvency margin or any higher level of regulatory own funds required under national law pursuant to Article 15 for any projected year, Member States shall ensure that the competent authority may require the IORP to submit a proportionate convergence plan. Where the results of the scenario referred to in paragraph 2, point (d), indicate a material risk, the competent authority may require the IORP to assess and address that risk through its existing risk-management or recovery arrangements. Such results shall not, in themselves, require the submission of a convergence plan or an immediate increase in the available solvency margin. |
Or. en
Amendment 305
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 21
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 18a – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Member States shall ensure that the IORP submits the convergence plan to the competent authority within three months from the date of carrying out the stress test. | Member States shall ensure that the IORP submits the convergence plan to the competent authority within a specific time period from the date of carrying out the stress test. |
Or. en
Amendment 306
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 21
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 18a – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Where no convergence plan is submitted within three months, or where the convergence plan does not contain credible actions to address the underfunding identified or, where applicable, the insufficient level of available solvency margin in the stress test, Member States shall ensure that competent authorities have the power to require the IORP to hold a higher available solvency margin. | Where no convergence plan is submitted within a specific time period, or where the convergence plan does not contain credible actions to address the underfunding identified or, where applicable, the insufficient level of available solvency margin in the stress test, Member States shall ensure that competent authorities have the power to require the IORP to hold a higher available solvency margin. |
Or. en
Amendment 307
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 21
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 18a – paragraph 3a (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3a. Where the results of the stress test referred to in paragraph 1 indicate that, under the scenarios referred to in paragraph 2, an IORP would, for any projected year, either hold assets that are substantially more than sufficient to cover its technical provisions or, where applicable, have an available solvency margin that is substantially more than sufficient to meet its required solvency margin or any higher level of regulatory own funds required under national law pursuant to Article 15, Member States shall require that IORP to provide a detailed explanation of how it will continue to meet its obligations towards members and beneficiaries, and of the impact of policy choices on its retirement income objectives and the provision of an adequate retirement income. |
Or. en
Justification
While it is essential that IORPs hold enough assets to always meet their obligations and stay solvent, being overly risk-averse could also affect the interest of members and beneficiaries, for example through choices made by an IORP that impact the purchasing power of (future) beneficiaries. This can include choices related to non-indexation of pension benefits. Since providing adequate retirement income also is a key obligation of IORPs, the effects of being overly risk-averse are relevant and should be included in the Directive. The stress tests under this new Article could be a useful way to also measure whether an IORP is overly risk-averse.
Amendment 308
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 21
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 18a – paragraph 5
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 5. Member States may decide not to apply paragraphs 1 to 3 where they require IORPs located in their territory to hold regulatory own funds, in excess of the required solvency margin referred to in Article 17, provided that such regulatory own funds requirements are risk-based, at least in relation to market and longevity risks.; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 309
Adnan Dibrani, Niels Fuglsang, Thomas Bajada, Lara Wolters, René Repasi
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 21
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 18a – paragraph 5
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 5. Member States may decide not to apply paragraphs 1 to 3 where they require IORPs located in their territory to hold regulatory own funds, in excess of the required solvency margin referred to in Article 17, provided that such regulatory own funds requirements are risk-based, at least in relation to market and longevity risks.; | 5. Member States may decide not to apply paragraphs 1 to 3 where they require IORPs located in their territory to hold regulatory own funds, in excess of the required solvency margin referred to in Article 17, provided that such regulatory own funds requirements are risk-based, at least in relation to market and longevity risks, or where equivalent national rules already require IORPs to assess and manage the relevant risks through risk-based solvency, governance and own-risk assessment requirements, including an own risk and solvency assessment, in order to avoid duplicative and disproportionate requirements .; |
Or. en
Justification
Requirements in 18a should be applied in a proportionate manner and should not automatically trigger additional capital requirements or convergence plans where risks can be adequately addressed through existing risk-management, governance or recovery arrangements. This amendment avoids duplicative requirements while preserving the ability of competent authorities to act where material risks are identified.
Amendment 310
Martin Schirdewan
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 – points a to d
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 19 – paragraph 1, paragraph 1a to 1d, paragraph 6 to 8
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| [...] | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 311
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 – point a – point a
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1. Member States shall require IORPs authorised in their territory to invest in accordance with the prudent person principle and in particular in accordance with the following rules:; | 1. Member States shall require IORPs authorised or registered in their territory to invest in accordance with the prudent person principle and in particular in accordance with the following rules:; |
Or. en
Amendment 312
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 – point a – point a a (new)
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point a
| Present text | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (a a) point (a) is amended by the following: | |
| (a)the assets shall be invested in the best long-term interests of members and beneficiaries as a whole. In the case of a potential conflict of interest, an IORP, or the entity which manages its portfolio, shall ensure that the investment is made in the sole interest of members and beneficiaries; | "(a)the assets shall be invested in the best long-term interests of members and beneficiaries as a whole, including providing adequate and cost-efficient long-term returns and safeguarding the long-term obligations of an IORP. In the case of a potential conflict of interest, an IORP, or the entity which manages its portfolio, shall ensure that the investment is made in the sole interest of members and beneficiaries;" |
Or. en
(32016L2341)
Amendment 313
Martin Schirdewan
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point a – point aa (new)
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point a
| Present text | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (aa) point (a) is replaced by the following: | |
| (a) the assets shall be invested in the best long-term interests of members and beneficiaries as a whole. In the case of a potential conflict of interest, an IORP, or the entity which manages its portfolio, shall ensure that the investment is made in the sole interest of members and beneficiaries; | "(a) the assets shall be invested in the best long-term interests of members and beneficiaries as a whole. In the case of a potential conflict of interest, an IORP, or the entity which manages its portfolio, shall ensure that the investment is made in the sole interest of members and beneficiaries; at least every three years, IORPs shall carry out an assessment of the retirement needs of their members and beneficiaries, including, inter alia, target replacement rates, expected rates of return and liquidity needs. On the basis of that assessment, the IORPs shall confirm or, where appropriate, revise their asset allocation in order to ensure its ongoing consistency with the characteristics and needs of their members and beneficiaries;" |
Or. en
(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02016L2341-20250117&qid=1782305062370)
Amendment 314
Martin Schirdewan
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 – point a – point ab(new)
Directive 2016/2341
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – points a a to a d (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (ab) in Article 19(1), the following points are inserted: | |
| '(aa) changes to multi-annual investment strategies shall be approved by the board or other governing bodies in which members and beneficiaries of statutory occupational pension institutions, including IORPs for the self-employed, are represented, either directly or through representatives elected or appointed by the social partners; | |
| (ab) IORPs shall determine members’ and beneficiaries’ investment preferences, including sustainability preferences, and inform members and beneficiaries about major investment lines, including those involving ESG criteria; | |
| (ac) IORPs shall ensure that the selection of investment managers and investment mandates takes into account the 'prudent person' rule, the interests of members and beneficiaries, and potential sustainability risks; | |
| (ad) IORPs shall avoid risk exposure to alternative assets including, but not limited to, private equity, venture capital and infrastructure markets.'; |
Or. en
Amendment 315
Auke Zijlstra, Mireia Borrás Pabón
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 – point a – point b
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point (b)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) within the prudent person principle, IORPs shall take into account sustainability risks, as defined in Article 2, point (22), of Regulation (EU) 2019/2088 of the European Parliament and of the Council\* in their investment decisions and for that purpose, IORPs shall take into account the potential long-term impact of their investment strategy and decisions on sustainability factors, as defined in Article 2, point (24), of Regulation (EU) 2019/2088. That shall be done in a proportionate manner, taking into account the nature, scale and complexity of the activities of IORPs.; | (b) the assets shall be invested solely in the best long-term interests of members and beneficiaries, having regard to security, quality, liquidity, profitability, diversification and the nature and duration of liabilities. |
Or. en
Justification
The proposed mandatory consideration of sustainability factors should be replaced by an unambiguous fiduciary duty. The central test must be whether the investment serves the long-term financial interests of pension savers.
Amendment 316
Fernando Navarrete Rojas
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 – point a – point b
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) within the prudent person principle, IORPs shall take into account sustainability risks, as defined in Article 2, point (22), of Regulation (EU) 2019/2088 of the European Parliament and of the Council\* in their investment decisions and for that purpose, IORPs shall take into account the potential long-term impact of their investment strategy and decisions on sustainability factors, as defined in Article 2, point (24), of Regulation (EU) 2019/2088. That shall be done in a proportionate manner, taking into account the nature, scale and complexity of the activities of IORPs.; | (b) within the prudent person principle, IORPs shall base their investment decisions strictly on the assessment of financial risks and the objective of maximizing long-term risk-adjusted returns, taking into account the life-cycle and age-differentiated risk profile of the members and beneficiaries; |
Or. en
Amendment 317
Martin Schirdewan
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 – point a – point b
Directive 2016/2341
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) within the prudent person principle, IORPs shall take into account sustainability risks, as defined in Article 2, point (22), of Regulation (EU) 2019/2088 of the European Parliament and of the Council\* in their investment decisions and for that purpose, IORPs shall take into account the potential long-term impact of their investment strategy and decisions on sustainability factors, as defined in Article 2, point (24), of Regulation (EU) 2019/2088. That shall be done in a proportionate manner, taking into account the nature, scale and complexity of the activities of IORPs.; | (b) within the prudent person principle, IORPs shall take into account the potential long-term impact of investment decisions on environmental, social, and governance factors, in particular adverse sustainability impacts, and the sustainability risks in their investment decisions. That shall be done in a proportionate manner, taking into account the nature, scale and complexity of the activities of IORPs; |
Or. en
Amendment 318
Isabel Benjumea Benjumea
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 – point a – point b
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) within the prudent person principle, IORPs shall take into account sustainability risks, as defined in Article 2, point (22), of Regulation (EU) 2019/2088 of the European Parliament and of the Council\* in their investment decisions and for that purpose, IORPs shall take into account the potential long-term impact of their investment strategy and decisions on sustainability factors, as defined in Article 2, point (24), of Regulation (EU) 2019/2088. That shall be done in a proportionate manner, taking into account the nature, scale and complexity of the activities of IORPs.; | b) within the prudent person principle, IORPs shall take into account sustainability risks, as defined in Article 2, point (22), of Regulation (EU) 2019/2088 of the European Parliament and of the Council\* in their investment decisions in cases where such risks are financially relevant to the value of their assets, the nature and duration of their liabilities, and the long-term interests of members and beneficiaries of systems. Such risks may include, where applicable, the risk of asset-value depreciation arising from regulatory changes or other sustainability-linked developments in the market. That shall be done in a proportionate manner, taking into account the nature, scale and complexity of the activities of IORPs.; |
Or. es
Amendment 319
Sirpa Pietikäinen
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 – point a – point b
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) within the prudent person principle, IORPs shall take into account sustainability risks, as defined in Article 2, point (22), of Regulation (EU) 2019/2088 of the European Parliament and of the Council\* in their investment decisions and for that purpose, IORPs shall take into account the potential long-term impact of their investment strategy and decisions on sustainability factors, as defined in Article 2, point (24), of Regulation (EU) 2019/2088. That shall be done in a proportionate manner, taking into account the nature, scale and complexity of the activities of IORPs.; | (b) within the prudent person principle, IORPs shall take into account the systematic, complex and long-term sustainability risks as well as their compound effects in their investment decisions and for that purpose, IORPs shall take into account the potential long-term impact of their investment strategy and decisions on science-baed sustainability factors. That shall be done in a proportionate manner, taking into account the nature, scale and complexity of the activities of IORPs.’; |
Or. en
Amendment 320
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 – point a – point b
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) within the prudent person principle, IORPs shall take into account sustainability risks, as defined in Article 2, point (22), of Regulation (EU) 2019/2088 of the European Parliament and of the Council\* in their investment decisions and for that purpose, IORPs shall take into account the potential long-term impact of their investment strategy and decisions on sustainability factors, as defined in Article 2, point (24), of Regulation (EU) 2019/2088. That shall be done in a proportionate manner, taking into account the nature, scale and complexity of the activities of IORPs.; | (b) (a) within the prudent person principle, IORPs shall take into account the impact on sustainability in their investment decisions and for that purpose, IORPs shall take into account the potential long-term impact of their investment strategy and decisions on environmental, social and governance factors. That shall be done in a proportionate manner, taking into account the nature, risk, scale and complexity of the activities of IORPs. Sustainability risk and factors may be applied as defined in Regulation (EU) 2019/2088. |
Or. en
Justification
As the SFDR is currently being reviewed, it would be risky to completely link the concepts of sustainability risk and sustainability factors to this regulation without knowing the final outcome. In addition, IORPs are not ordinary financial market participants as intended under the SFDR, offering financial products to investors. The members of an IORP in many cases do not have a choice, for example in the case of auto-enrollment, and IORPs work on the basis of social dialogue and collective bargaining. Applying the SFDR definitions should therefore be a choice for IORPs and not an obligation.
Amendment 321
Markus Ferber, Andrea Wechsler
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 – point a – point b
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) within the prudent person principle, IORPs shall take into account sustainability risks, as defined in Article 2, point (22), of Regulation (EU) 2019/2088 of the European Parliament and of the Council\* in their investment decisions and for that purpose, IORPs shall take into account the potential long-term impact of their investment strategy and decisions on sustainability factors, as defined in Article 2, point (24), of Regulation (EU) 2019/2088. That shall be done in a proportionate manner, taking into account the nature, scale and complexity of the activities of IORPs.; | (b) within the prudent person principle, IORPs shall take into account sustainability risks, as defined in Article 2, point (22), of Regulation (EU) 2019/2088 of the European Parliament and of the Council in their investment decisions. That shall be done in a proportionate manner, taking into account the nature, scale and complexity of the activities of IORPs. Member States shall not impose on IORPs sustainability-related requirements in relation to investment decisions that go beyond those applicable under Union law to other financial market participants of comparable size and risk profile; |
Or. en
Justification
Prudential investment rules should address sustainability risks that are financially material to the scheme. A general obligation to assess the impact of investment decisions on sustainability factors is disproportionate for small IORPs. The level-playing-field clause prevents gold-plating that would distort the internal market.
Amendment 322
Danuše Nerudová
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 – point a – point b a (new)
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b a (new)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (ba) IORPs with assets under management exceeding EUR 1 billion shall allocate at least 2 % of their assets to venture capital, in accordance with the prudent person principle and in the interests of their members and beneficiaries. |
Or. en
Amendment 323
Arba Kokalari
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 – point a – point c
Directive 2016/2341
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point d
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (d) the assets shall be predominantly invested on regulated markets, MTFs or OTFs;; | (d) The assets shall be invested in a diversified manner, with the liquidity profile of the assets considered in relation to the overall portfolio of the IORP. |
Or. en
Amendment 324
Sirpa Pietikäinen
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 – point b
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 19 – paragraph 1b
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1b. Member States shall require that assets held to cover the technical provisions are also invested in a manner appropriate to the nature and duration of the liabilities entered into by the IORP. | 1b. Member States shall require that assets held to cover the technical provisions are also invested in a diversified manner appropriate to the nature and duration of the liabilities entered into by the IORP. |
Or. en
Amendment 325
Isabel Benjumea Benjumea
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 – point b
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 19 – 1c
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1c. Member States shall require that investment decisions of IORPs reflect the sustainability preferences of members and beneficiaries, where IORPs are able to gauge those membership preferences and to the extent those preferences are consistent with the investment principles set out in paragraph 1. | deleted |
Or. es
Amendment 326
Marlena Maląg
on behalf of the ECR Group
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 – point b
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 19 – paragraph 1c
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1c. Member States shall require that investment decisions of IORPs reflect the sustainability preferences of members and beneficiaries, where IORPs are able to gauge those membership preferences and to the extent those preferences are consistent with the investment principles set out in paragraph 1. | deleted |
Or. en
Justification
The requirement for Member States to ensure that investment decisions of IORPs reflect the sustainability preferences of members and beneficiaries is unrealistic.
Amendment 327
Markus Ferber, Andrea Wechsler
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 – point b
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 19 – paragraph 1c
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1c. Member States shall require that investment decisions of IORPs reflect the sustainability preferences of members and beneficiaries, where IORPs are able to gauge those membership preferences and to the extent those preferences are consistent with the investment principles set out in paragraph 1. | deleted |
Or. en
Justification
Paragraphs 1c and 1d transplant the MiFID II individual suitability framework into a collective occupational pension context where individual preference elicitation is operationally unworkable. Reflecting disaggregated member preferences within collective DB schemes conflicts with their fundamental structure. The definitions cross-reference SFDR provisions currently under revision, creating legal uncertainty.
Amendment 328
Fernando Navarrete Rojas
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 – point b
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 19 – paragraph 1c
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1c. Member States shall require that investment decisions of IORPs reflect the sustainability preferences of members and beneficiaries, where IORPs are able to gauge those membership preferences and to the extent those preferences are consistent with the investment principles set out in paragraph 1. | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 329
Auke Zijlstra, Mireia Borrás Pabón
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 – point b
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 19 – paragraph 1c
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1c. Member States shall require that investment decisions of IORPs reflect the sustainability preferences of members and beneficiaries, where IORPs are able to gauge those membership preferences and to the extent those preferences are consistent with the investment principles set out in paragraph 1. | 1c. Where an IORP invests, or proposes to invest, in assets marketed, labelled or classified as pursuing environmental objectives, Member States shall require the IORP to survey each of its individual members and beneficiaries at least every three years and before any material change to the relevant investment policy. The survey shall ask members and beneficiaries: |
| a) whether they prefer the IORP to make more, fewer or the same amount of such investments; and | |
| b) what minumum and maximum percentage of the relevant portfolio may be allocated to such investments. |
Or. en
Justification
Participants, rather than regulators or IORP managers, should determine whether their pension savings may be used for green investments and the maximum permissible allocation. The approach respects participant choice without creating a compulsory green investment quota.
Amendment 330
Jonás Fernández, César Luena
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 – point b
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 19 – paragraph 1c
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1c. Member States shall require that investment decisions of IORPs reflect the sustainability preferences of members and beneficiaries, where IORPs are able to gauge those membership preferences and to the extent those preferences are consistent with the investment principles set out in paragraph 1. | 1c. Providers should reflect the sustainability preferences of members and beneficiaries in their investment strategies, in accordance with standards established by the European Union and consistently with the investment principles set out in paragraph 1, in order to avoid greenwashing, practices and to guarantee transparency of the information provided to members and beneficiaries. |
Or. en
Amendment 331
Sirpa Pietikäinen
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 – point b
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Art 19 – paragraph 1c
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1c. Member States shall require that investment decisions of IORPs reflect the sustainability preferences of members and beneficiaries, where IORPs are able to gauge those membership preferences and to the extent those preferences are consistent with the investment principles set out in paragraph 1. | 1c. Member States shall require that investment decisions of IORPs reflect the Do no significant harm principle as well as multiple different kinds of risks, including the systematic, complex and long-term sustainability risks as well as their compound effect. |
Or. en
Amendment 332
Dirk Gotink
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 – point b
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 19 – paragraph 1c
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1c. Member States shall require that investment decisions of IORPs reflect the sustainability preferences of members and beneficiaries, where IORPs are able to gauge those membership preferences and to the extent those preferences are consistent with the investment principles set out in paragraph 1. | 1c. Member States shall require that investment decisions of IORPs reflect the sustainability preferences of members and beneficiaries, where IORPs are able to gauge those membership preferences and to the extent those preferences are consistent with the investment principles set out in paragraph 1. IORPs shall be free to determine how these preferences can be best gauged, including through surveys or the participation of members and beneficiaries in specific governance structures. |
Or. en
Justification
IORPs should remain free to decide how to gauge sustainability preferences, since this is not in all cases about individual investment choices (could also be collective).
Amendment 333
Isabel Benjumea Benjumea
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 – point b
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 19 – 1d
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1d. For the purposes of paragraph 1c, sustainability preferences shall mean a member’s, beneficiary’s, or prospective member’s choice as to whether and, if so, to what extent, one or more of the following financial instruments are to be integrated into his or her investment: | deleted |
| (a) a financial instrument for which the customer or potential customer determines that a minimum proportion is to be invested in environmentally sustainable investments as defined in Article 2, point (1), of Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of the European Parliament and of the Council**; | |
| (b) a financial instrument for which the customer or potential customer determines that a minimum proportion shall be invested in sustainable investments as defined in Article 2, point (17), of Regulation (EU) 2019/2088; | |
| (c) a financial instrument that considers principal adverse impacts on sustainability factors, as defined in Article 2, point (24), of Regulation (EU) 2019/2088, where qualitative or quantitative elements demonstrating that consideration are determined by the customer or potential customer.; |
Or. es
Amendment 334
Sirpa Pietikäinen
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 – point b
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Art 19 – paragraph 1d
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1d. For the purposes of paragraph 1c, sustainability preferences shall mean a member’s, beneficiary’s, or prospective member’s choice as to whether and, if so, to what extent, one or more of the following financial instruments are to be integrated into his or her investment: | deleted |
| (a) a financial instrument for which the customer or potential customer determines that a minimum proportion is to be invested in environmentally sustainable investments as defined in Article 2, point (1), of Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of the European Parliament and of the Council\*\*; | |
| (b) a financial instrument for which the customer or potential customer determines that a minimum proportion shall be invested in sustainable investments as defined in Article 2, point (17), of Regulation (EU) 2019/2088; | |
| (c) a financial instrument that considers principal adverse impacts on sustainability factors, as defined in Article 2, point (24), of Regulation (EU) 2019/2088, where qualitative or quantitative elements demonstrating that consideration are determined by the customer or potential customer.; |
Or. en
Amendment 335
Fernando Navarrete Rojas
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 – point b
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 19 – paragraph 1d
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1d. For the purposes of paragraph 1c, sustainability preferences shall mean a member’s, beneficiary’s, or prospective member’s choice as to whether and, if so, to what extent, one or more of the following financial instruments are to be integrated into his or her investment: | deleted |
| (a) a financial instrument for which the customer or potential customer determines that a minimum proportion is to be invested in environmentally sustainable investments as defined in Article 2, point (1), of Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of the European Parliament and of the Council\*\*; | |
| (b) a financial instrument for which the customer or potential customer determines that a minimum proportion shall be invested in sustainable investments as defined in Article 2, point (17), of Regulation (EU) 2019/2088; | |
| (c) a financial instrument that considers principal adverse impacts on sustainability factors, as defined in Article 2, point (24), of Regulation (EU) 2019/2088, where qualitative or quantitative elements demonstrating that consideration are determined by the customer or potential customer.; |
Or. en
Amendment 336
Marlena Maląg
on behalf of the ECR Group
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 – point b
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 19 – paragraph 1d
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1d. For the purposes of paragraph 1c, sustainability preferences shall mean a member’s, beneficiary’s, or prospective member’s choice as to whether and, if so, to what extent, one or more of the following financial instruments are to be integrated into his or her investment: | deleted |
| (a) a financial instrument for which the customer or potential customer determines that a minimum proportion is to be invested in environmentally sustainable investments as defined in Article 2, point (1), of Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of the European Parliament and of the Council\*\*; | |
| (b) a financial instrument for which the customer or potential customer determines that a minimum proportion shall be invested in sustainable investments as defined in Article 2, point (17), of Regulation (EU) 2019/2088; | |
| (c) a financial instrument that considers principal adverse impacts on sustainability factors, as defined in Article 2, point (24), of Regulation (EU) 2019/2088, where qualitative or quantitative elements demonstrating that consideration are determined by the customer or potential customer.; |
Or. en
Justification
It is unrealistic to require IORPs' investment decisions to reflect and assess the sustainability preferences of their members.