On evaluating the successes achieved and lessons learned from EU enlargements since 2004 in the implementation of the EU budget

–having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0000/2026),

Facts and findings regarding the management structure, control and audit of EU cohesion policy

1.Stresses that the principal lesson learned from the post-2004 enlargements is that the protection of the EU budget depends less on the formal choice between centralised, decentralised or multilevel governance models than on the operational maturity, stability, digital capacity and audit culture of the administrations entrusted with EU funds;

2.Notes that governance structure alone does not determine the success of implementation and that instead, performance is primarily driven by other factors such as administrative capacity, digital transformation, institutional stability, quality of human resources, risk management systems, implementation maturity, absorption capacity, public procurement, control structures and audit culture, all of which are key to the successful programming of EU funds;

3.Highlights that although the ex ante conditionalities were found to be highly effective in improving governance quality and ensuring coherence in the implementation of funds, administrative capacity was the biggest bottleneck; regrets the fact that ‘limited capacity’ in some managing authorities directly hindered effectiveness, leading to delays, increased risk of error and reduced absorption capacity, which emphasises that money alone cannot drive development if it is not backed up by quality institutions and stable and qualified human resources;

4.Notes that controls are conducted at several levels to verify that beneficiaries’ expenditure is legal and regular; recalls that additional layers of assurance are provided by national audit and control bodies, which ensure that systems function effectively and that EU funds are managed in line with the applicable rules; underlines that the control and audit functions perform best when independence is preserved;

5.Notes the positive developments in the design of the relevant EU legislative frameworks and their implementation, over the last 20 years, by the Member States that have joined the EU since 2004, while highlighting the remaining weaknesses in the implementation of EU legislation and the need to invest further in administrative capacity;

Lessons learned regarding management structures, control and audit for Member States that have joined the EU since 2004 – design and implementation of EU funds

6.Acknowledges that the governance structure, whether in centralised or decentralised systems, does not systematically determine absorption outcomes, and that performance is instead shaped by a combination of factors including the governance model in place, the administrative capacity of national and regional authorities, institutional stability, public procurement, strategic risks linked to administrative and control culture, and programme complexity; regrets the fact that several Member States have faced significant difficulties in the timely absorption of funds at the end of programming periods, which can compromise project quality and value for money;

7.Highlights the fact that conditionalities have contributed to improving framework conditions and the necessary reforms to improve cohesion funds, investment strategies and governance, but that their added value in terms of improving investment conditions has been undermined by inconsistencies in the way in which they were applied and assessed across Member States;

8.Notes that evidence from the 2014-2020 programming period indicates that regions where priority was given to deploying highly qualified human resources were more likely to have programmes that performed well or even overperformed, reflecting the better programme design and the greater administrative capacity to handle EU complex procedures;

9.Regrets the fact that the administrative costs associated with managing European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) programmes have remained high; points out that ‘gold-plating’ (national-level additions to EU rules) has often increased the administrative and management burden on beneficiaries without necessarily reducing error rates; stresses that managing authorities run the risk of making errors despite their efforts to comply with EU regulations;

Lessons learned regarding management structures, control and audit for Member States that have joined the EU since 2004 – control and audit of EU funds

10.Underlines that implementation of EU funds relies on interconnected financial, control and monitoring flows, supported by national coordination structures and EU-level audit and anti-fraud bodies; notes that newly joined Member States initially faced challenges relating to administrative capacity, coordination and system maturity; notes that weaknesses in coordination, data quality and interoperability between systems were among the recurrent challenges identified in the Member States that have joined the EU since 2004, and that these diminished the effectiveness of monitoring and control mechanisms;

11.Regrets the fact that ‘gold-plating’ remains the most persistent operational challenge across the Member States that have joined the EU since 2004, as it has created an additional administrative burden in the management of EU funds, resulting in more complex procedures, with limited beneficiary expertise, and increasing the risk of error;

12.Regrets the fact that programme-level challenges within programme management, control and audit bodies remain among the most prominent identified weaknesses across the programming periods and may arise both during the design and initial implementation phase of programmes and projects and at the final stage, when expenditure is audited and reported;

13.Stresses that in order to verify and audit programmes financed under EU funds, it is essential to have competent human resources with appropriate experience and institutional memory at different levels; regrets the lack of sufficient financial resources, including for training and capacity-building dedicated to control functions, and notes that this is a factor affecting the capacity of managing authorities (in cohesion policy) to carry out effective and thorough checks and verifications of expenditure;

Conclusions and recommendations for EU candidate countries

14.Calls on the Commission to assess whether the cooperation channels, audit services and ECA-facing assurance systems of the Commission (DG REGIO and the Directorate-General for Enlargement and the Eastern Neighbourhood (DG ENEST)), OLAF and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) have sufficient capacity and the appropriate EU budgetary control architecture for a larger EU with more complex fund management environments; calls on the Commission to avoid unnecessary pre-accession restructuring unless this is evidence-based, phased and accompanied by transition plans, staff retention measures and continuity safeguards;

15.Stresses that administrative quality, digital readiness, human capital, innovation capacity and economic development have an influence on the outcome of the management structure, and that no factor works in isolation; recalls that underperformance is most frequent where limited administrative and human resource capacities coincide with structural discrepancies, such as weak audit and control structures;

16.Urges the Commission to support candidate countries with investing in modernising their governance structure and digitalising funds and internal IT tools, in order to ensure the adoption of interoperable digital tools, accelerate project selection, reduce delays, strengthen monitoring, enhance transparency, support auditability and real-time tracking of fund flows, and enhance risk control and fraud prevention, noting that this should be a blueprint for new candidate countries; highlights the fact that an effective human resources policy is key and should include an effective and efficient recruitment policy as well as investment in staff training and in the retention of high-quality personnel;

17.Calls on the Commission to support candidate countries in carrying out reforms aimed at establishing professionalised procurement authorities and beneficiaries before accession; insists that the Commission monitor gold-plating during negotiations and implementation, since extra national requirements can increase the administrative burden without reducing the risk of error; highlights the need to ensure that procurement control is digitalised through e-procurement, conflict-of-interest tools, beneficial ownership checks, red-flag systems and appeal-time monitoring;

18.Urges the Commission to support candidate countries in implementing reform plans aimed at strengthening their administrative capacity and administrative preparedness, which includes staffing and retention plans, functioning management and control systems, operational digital monitoring platforms, robust sampling methodology, an anti-fraud strategy, conflict-of-interest checks, and pilot implementation under the pre-accession process and funds, and at achieving higher absorption rates, lower error rates and better progress on outputs;

19.Requests that the Commission and the Member States move beyond technical assistance and invest in human capital within managing authorities and audit authorities to prevent the loss of institutional memory; calls on the Commission to develop strong audit systems to protect the EU’s financial interests from systemic corruption or conflicts of interest and to use digital tools and preventive guidance to reduce strategic risks, including by supporting the Member States with the adoption of national anti-fraud strategies;

20.Stresses that the experience of the Member States that have joined the EU since 2004 demonstrates that administrative capacity, institutional stability and mature management and control systems are more decisive for the successful implementation of EU funds than the formal governance model chosen; calls on the Commission to ensure that these lessons are reflected when preparing for future enlargements and drawing up the post-2027 EU budget framework;

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21.Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.