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report parliamentary committee draft, 4 September 2026

Institutional aspects of the Common European Defence Union

Document CJ70-PR-790810 · (2025/2212(INI))

Committee on Security and Defence Committee on Constitutional Affairs · Rapporteur: Niclas Herbst, Salvatore De Meo

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Motion for a european parliament resolution 66 paragraphs

(2025/2212(INI))

The European Parliament,

–having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), and in particular Articles 21, 24, 31, 42 to 46 and 49 thereof,

–having regard to Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

–having regard to its resolution of 16 March 2017 on constitutional, legal and institutional implications of a common security and defence policy: possibilities offered by the Lisbon Treaty1,

–having regard to its resolution of 22 November 2023 on proposals of the European Parliament for the amendment of the Treaties2,

–having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2025 on the white paper on the future of European defence3,

–having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2026 on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 20254,

–having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

–having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on Security and Defence and the Committee on Constitutional Affairs under Rule 59 of the Rules of Procedure,

–having regard to the report of the Committee on Security and Defence and the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (A10-0000/2026),

A.whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its hostile actions against Member States show that peace, democracy and territorial integrity can no longer be taken for granted in Europe;

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B.whereas the EU faces conventional military and nuclear threats and hybrid attacks, including cyberattacks, sabotage and the spread of disinformation;

C.whereas the EU is a peace project committed to protecting its citizens and defending its values; whereas it is increasingly necessary for the EU to assume greater responsibility for European security, while preserving the transatlantic partnership and strengthening NATO’s European pillar;

D.whereas the EU is committed to progressively establishing a Common European Defence Union (CEDU) to strengthen deterrence and defence capabilities, prevent conflict and promote peace, in accordance with Articles 3(5) and 42(2) TEU;

E.whereas the founders of European integration envisaged that political and economic integration would ultimately be complemented by common defence;

F.whereas the Lisbon Treaty already provides the legal foundations for a CEDU, including Articles 42(7) and 44 TEU, the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Agency (EDA);

G.whereas these instruments remain fragmented and lack a coherent institutional framework for rapid decision-making, strategic direction and democratic accountability;

H.whereas Article 42(7) TEU should trigger a permanent EU mechanism rather than ad hoc intergovernmental arrangements, while complementing Article 222 TFEU through a coherent institutional architecture;

I.whereas the CEDU should reinforce NATO’s European pillar through closer strategic coordination, capability development, military mobility and crisis management, while respecting the autonomy of both organisations;

J.whereas its resolution of 22 November 2023 on its proposals for the amendment of the Treaties puts forward important proposals for developing a CEDU;

K.whereas a credible CEDU requires the full use of existing Treaties and, if required, targeted Treaty changes;

Establishing a Common European Defence Union

1.Believes that the time has come to establish a genuine CEDU to protect EU citizens and ensure peace and stability in Europe; calls on the European Council to urgently advance towards a CEDU under full democratic oversight, establishing a dedicated framework covering common defence, governance, financing and decision-making;

2.Underlines that the CEDU should complement NATO by strengthening its European pillar and the EU’s capacity to act; considers that, under the ‘separable but not separate’ principle, the EU should be able to act under Article 42(7) TEU, complementing NATO and being able to provide an EU response where NATO consensus cannot be reached, while respecting the autonomy and legal orders of both organisations;

3.Recalls that some Member States are not NATO members; stresses that, for these countries, Article 42(7) TEU constitutes the primary basis for collective defence;

4.Considers that the CEDU should provide a permanent framework for strategic planning, capability development, crisis management, mutual assistance and defence industrial cooperation based on solidarity, shared responsibility and democratic legitimacy; stresses that, in order to create a coherent constitutional framework, the CEDU should build on the existing Treaties, subject to targeted Treaty amendments, if necessary;

5.Calls on the Commissioner for Defence and Space and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) to fulfil the mandate assigned to them by the Commission President in their mission letters to complete their work in support of ‘a true European Defence Union’;

6.Calls on the Member States to fulfil the constitutional requirements under Article 42(2) TEU necessary for their participation in the CEDU;

Making full use of the existing Treaties

7.Recalls that the Lisbon Treaty provides significant but underused opportunities for defence integration;

8.Calls on the Member States to generate continued political will, making full use of Articles 42 to 46 TEU, in particular PESCO, the EDA, Article 42(7) TEU, Article 44 TEU and Article 222 TFEU;

9.Calls for greater use of Treaty flexibility to accelerate capability development, military readiness, interoperability and the deployment of EU missions;

10.Calls on the Council to make use of qualified majority voting in the area of defence, as provided for by the Treaties; encourages the wider use of constructive abstention under Article 31 TEU;

11.Regrets that PESCO has fallen short of its potential; calls for stricter commitments for willing and capable participants; calls for a genuine suspension mechanism under Article 46(4) TEU and an explicit command-and-control mandate;

Operationalising Article 42(7) TEU

12.Recalls that Article 42(7) TEU remains institutionally and operationally underdeveloped;

13.Stresses that credible mutual defence requires sustained political will, permanent institutions, common planning, interoperable capabilities and predictable decision-making; calls on the Council, with the Commission’s support, to establish permanent procedures for contingency planning, political consultation, operational planning, intelligence-sharing and logistical coordination;

14.Calls for an EU operational readiness review based on existing mechanisms, identifying strengths, capability gaps, dependencies and strategic enablers, while respecting confidentiality;

15.Calls for an Article 42(7) TEU playbook that defines activation procedures, assistance modalities and coordination mechanisms for scenarios including hybrid, cyber, critical infrastructure, space and subsea attacks;

16.Calls for a more frequent execution of annual EU-wide security and defence exercises for multiple scenarios involving relevant actors and, where appropriate, NATO allies;

17.Calls on the Commission to propose a defence-readiness omnibus enabling the coordinated use of EU legislation upon activation of Article 42(7) TEU, including in the areas of communications, transport, energy, raw materials, defence production, budgets and currencies;

18.Calls on the EU institutions to provide clear guidance on the implementation of Article 42(7) TEU as a cornerstone of a genuine CEDU;

Institutional architecture of the CEDU

19.Considers that the credibility of the CEDU requires a permanent institutional architecture that ensures political direction, coordination, command and democratic accountability;

20.Calls for the establishment of a European Security Council, composed of Heads of State or Government and chaired by the President of the European Council, as the CEDU’s permanent strategic body, which would be responsible for coordinating Article 42(7) TEU responses and ensuring coherence between EU external, security and defence policies; considers that participation of other European countries, in particular the strategic security and defence partners of the EU, including Ukraine, should be envisaged;

21.Calls for the establishment of a permanent defence council, bringing together ministers of defence and chaired by the VP/HR, to coordinate capability planning, military readiness, common procurement, defence industrial initiatives and the implementation of CEDU decisions;

22.Calls for a stronger coordinating role for the VP/HR in EU foreign, security and defence policy; calls for clarification of the respective roles of the VP/HR and the Commissioner for Defence and Space in order to avoid institutional overlap;

23.Supports the gradual development of the Military Planning and Conduct Capability, including the capability for strategic planning, operational coordination, intelligence fusion, logistics and command support;

Treaty changes and decision-making under the CEDU

24.Considers that CEDU decision-making must balance national sovereignty with the EU’s need for timely action;

25.Recalls its resolution of 22 November 2023 on proposals of the European Parliament for the amendment of the Treaties, while recognising that Treaty revision faces exceptional political challenges under the current circumstances; calls, nevertheless, on the European Council to initiate a structured reflection on the establishment of a CEDU as an objective of the EU, with a view to defining at Treaty level its governance, financing arrangements, command structures and framework for democratic accountability;

26.Calls for greater use of qualified majority voting in capability development, defence industry, procurement and financing, while exploring decision-making mechanisms for military deployments that preserve national sovereignty without allowing blockage;

Enlargement and the future of the CEDU

27.Underlines that the CEDU should be designed for a Union of more than thirty Member States;

28.Considers that Ukraine’s future EU accession would strengthen the CEDU through its military capabilities, operational experience, defence industry and expertise in conventional, hybrid and cyber warfare;

29.Calls for accession negotiations to include structured dialogue on participation in the common security and defence policy, PESCO, the EDA, capability planning and future CEDU institutions;

30.Calls on the Commission and the VP/HR to assess the institutional, financial and operational implications of enlargement for the CEDU;

Democratic accountability and parliamentary oversight

31.Stresses that deeper defence integration must be matched by stronger democratic legitimacy, transparency, accountability and parliamentary scrutiny;

32.Considers that all CEDU actions should be subject to parliamentary scrutiny; calls for an annual debate within Parliament on the state of the CEDU, based on a report by the European Council and the Commission;

33.Considers that Article 36 TEU, in its current form, reflects a framework primarily conceived for the EU’s external crisis-management role and is no longer sufficient in the light of the EU’s evolving responsibilities in the field of security and defence; considers, therefore, that Parliament must be able to exercise full democratic scrutiny over EU defence commitments and decisions with significant security and defence implications, including in connection with the activation and implementation of the mutual assistance clause under Article 42(7) TEU;

34.Calls for Parliament to be informed whenever Article 42(7) TEU is invoked and to receive regular implementation reports, subject to confidentiality requirements;

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35.Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Council, the Commission, the parliaments of the Member States and candidate countries, and the Secretary General of NATO.

Explanatory statement 16 paragraphs

The security architecture that has ensured peace and stability in Europe since the end of the Second World War and during the Cold War has undergone a profound transformation. With Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine military conflict has returned to the European continent and the subsequent reaction of historic allies has demonstrated that the Union must no longer postpone difficult decisions to assume greater responsibility for protecting its citizens, territory and fundamental values. Strategic competition, hybrid threats, cyber-attacks and growing instability in the Union’s neighbourhood require a corresponding evolution of the Union’s institutional framework.

The purpose of this report is to address the constitutional, institutional and democratic implications of establishing a Common European Defence Union (CEDU). The central question is not whether the Union should become a stronger security actor, as this objective has already been recognised by all Union significant actors, including the European Parliament, but how the Union should organise itself to act effectively and democratically. The Union shall act in full respect of the Treaties, some mechanisms of which are yet to be fully explored but must also examine the need for Treaty change to develop the institutional architecture that enable her to respond to growing threats in a more efficient and coherent manner.

The ambition to develop a common defence is not new. It was already present among the founding fathers of European integration and was reflected in the negotiations on the European Defence Community in the early 1950s. Although that initiative failed, the objective of progressively developing a common defence remained embedded in the Treaties and is today explicitly recognised in Article 42 TEU. The pressing current circumstances advice in favour of deepening into the possibilities offered by this provision.

The Lisbon Treaty represented an important constitutional step forward by introducing Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), strengthening the Common Security and Defence Policy, establishing the mutual assistance clause under Article 42(7) TEU and reinforcing the role of the High Representative. However, these provisions remain only partially implemented. The Union possesses important legal instruments, but lacks the permanent institutional architecture required to transform them into a coherent system of common defence.

The report therefore proceeds from a fundamental observation: the European Union does not primarily suffer from a lack of legal basis in the field of defence. Rather, it lacks the institutions capable of providing strategic direction, coordinating implementation and ensuring democratic accountability. The Union has many of the legal foundations of a Defence Union, but it still lacks the constitutional framework necessary to make them fully effective.

For this reason, the report pursues two complementary objectives: first, making full use of the possibilities already provided by the existing Treaties; and second, preparing targeted Treaty changes required to establish a genuine Common European Defence Union.

The existing Treaties already provide significant opportunities for deeper integration. PESCO should become the principal framework for European capability development, supported by stronger commitments, evaluation mechanisms and links with Union financing instruments. Article 44 TEU should be used more systematically to enable groups of willing and capable Member States to undertake missions on behalf of the Union. The Military Planning and Conduct Capability should continue to evolve into a stronger operational planning structure, while greater use should be made of constructive abstention under Article 31 TEU to facilitate more effective decision-making.

At the same time, the current framework remains incomplete. This is particularly evident in relation to Article 42(7) TEU, the mutual aid and assistance clause. Article 42(7) TEU represents indeed one of the most important constitutional innovations in European security policy. It establishes a legally binding obligation for Member States to provide aid and assistance to a Member State that becomes the victim of armed aggression. However, unlike Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which is supported by decades of political practice, military planning and institutional arrangements, Article 42(7) is not yet accompanied by a permanent operational framework capable of ensuring rapid and coordinated implementation. The objective should therefore not be to replicate NATO’s collective defence mechanism, but to make the Union’s mutual assistance commitment credible and operational. This requires common procedures for invoking the clause, contingency planning, coordinated military and civilian responses, intelligence-sharing, logistical arrangements, regular exercises and permanent operational planning structures.

The operational framework for Article 42(7) must also reflect the changing nature of security threats. Modern aggression increasingly combines conventional military action with cyber-attacks, hybrid operations, attacks against critical infrastructure, disinformation campaigns and other forms of hostile activity. The Union’s mutual assistance mechanisms must therefore be capable of addressing contemporary security challenges while remaining fully consistent with international law.

A second major objective of the report concerns the institutional architecture of the Common European Defence Union.

The current system has developed incrementally and remains fragmented. While several institutions and bodies exercise responsibilities in the field of security and defence, they do not yet form a coherent governance structure capable of ensuring strategic direction, political coordination, capability development and operational preparedness.

The report therefore proposes the gradual establishment of a permanent up-down institutional framework centred on a European Security Council, a Defence Council and a strengthened MPCC . These structures should not create unnecessary duplication but rather provide the continuity and coherence currently missing from European defence governance.

The report also emphasises that the development of a Common European Defence Union must strengthen, not weaken, the transatlantic relationship. NATO remains the cornerstone of collective defence for its European Allies. The objective of the CEDU is therefore not to replace NATO, but to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance. This is why the report proposes as the guiding principle of relationship between NATO-CEDU that of “separable but not separate” that would allow the Union to act where the Alliance consensus cannot be reached.

A future enlargement of the Union will also have significant implications for the governance of the CEDU. The eventual accession of Ukraine would represent not only a political achievement but also a strategic transformation, bringing substantial military experience, operational expertise, defence industrial capabilities and lessons learned from Russia’s war of aggression. At the same time, a larger Union will require more effective institutions and decision-making procedures.

Democratic legitimacy remains a central element of the report. Strengthening executive responsibilities in the field of defence must be accompanied by stronger parliamentary scrutiny and accountability. The European Parliament should play a greater role in overseeing the implementation of the CEDU, including its financial governance and the application of Article 42(7) TEU. Democratic oversight should also be strengthened through closer cooperation with national parliaments, notably through the Inter-parliamentary Conference for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy (IPC CFSP/CSDP).

A Common European Defence Union is no longer merely an aspiration. It has become a strategic necessity. The challenge facing the Union is therefore no longer whether it should organise its common defence, but how it should equip itself with the institutions necessary to make its commitments credible, effective and democratically legitimate.

Annex: declarations of input 1 paragraph

The rapporteurs declare under their exclusive responsibility that they did not include in their report input from interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register1, or from representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies, to be listed in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.