On the recent hybrid attacks and instrumentalisation of migrants in Ceuta and the need for a coordinated response to protect the EU’s external borders

–having regard to the joint letter of 1 August 2026 initiated by the Prime Ministers of Italy and Denmark concerning the recent events in Ceuta,

–having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.whereas approximately 80 000 people entered Ceuta from Morocco on 30 and 31 July 2026 in an unprecedented episode of mass illegal entry, placing exceptional pressure on the city’s public services, security forces and reception capacities, resulting in a tragic loss of life;

B.whereas Ceuta and Melilla are integral parts of the Kingdom of Spain and, as such, form part of the EU and its external borders; whereas their effective protection is essential for safeguarding the security of the EU and is therefore a matter of common European interest;

C.whereas the events of 30 and 31 July constitute an instrumentalisation of illegal migrants as a means of exerting political and social pressure on a Member State and, by extension, the EU;

D.whereas any attempt to undermine or put pressure on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of a Member State, including through the weaponisation of migration by non-EU countries or other hostile international actors, constitutes a hybrid threat to the security and stability of the EU and its Member States and requires a response that goes beyond the instruments designed for addressing ordinary migratory flows;

E.whereas the Spanish Government launched an extraordinary mass regularisation scheme, which had received 1 174 978 applications by 30 June 2026, of which 609 737 had been processed by 2 July, contributing to the perception that illegal entry may ultimately result in legal stay and, therefore, acting as an additional pull factor for illegal migration to the EU;

F.whereas the joint letter initiated by the Prime Ministers of Italy and Denmark and supported by 22 European leaders rightly underlined the need to address all policies that can serve as pull factors, such as the regularisation of very large numbers of irregular migrants, and stressed that the EU cannot allow uncontrolled mass crossings, the instrumentalisation of migration or other hybrid threats to create the perception that illegal entry into the EU can result in legal stay;

G.whereas Spanish and international intelligence reportedly raised concerns about the possible presence, among those who entered Ceuta, of individuals with potential links to jihadist groups, highlighting the serious security risks arising from the lack of effective identification and screening following such a large-scale mass entry;

H.whereas the Schengen area can only function efficiently if the EU and its Member States ensure the effective protection of the EU’s external borders and cooperate closely in combating migrant smuggling and other forms of organised crime;

I.whereas information that was subsequently made public by the Spanish authorities shows that, in the days preceding the events, the competent Spanish authorities received multiple reports, alerts and intelligence assessments concerning increasing irregular movements of people towards Ceuta and, on 29 July 2026, the National Intelligence Centre of Spain issued multiple warnings of calls on social media for a mass crossing by sea and over the border fence the following day;

J.whereas the mobilisation of tens of thousands of people through social media and messaging applications highlights the capacity of organised actors and networks to rapidly exploit information gaps, judicial developments and perceived weaknesses in border controls;

K.whereas the assessment of the competent Spanish police authorities concludes that the events of 30 and 31 July were neither spontaneous nor incidental, but part of a planned process involving different phases, coordinated actors, a high level of technical organisation and a shared objective;

L.whereas, despite the exceptional scale of the crisis and repeated requests from the authorities of Ceuta for a stronger response and support from the Spanish Government, it took 26 days to declare the crisis a situation of interest for national security and establish a coordinated command structure;

M.whereas relations between Spain and Morocco have repeatedly experienced episodes of territorial tension, including in May 2021 when thousands of people crossed illegally into Ceuta after Moroccan border controls were relaxed;

N.whereas the competent Spanish authorities have identified relevant common patterns with previous episodes in 2021 and 2024 and assessed the 2026 operation as significantly more complex, coordinated and sophisticated;

O.whereas Morocco is a key partner of the EU in the management of migration in the Western Mediterranean and, as a country of origin and transit, has a particular responsibility to prevent irregular departures from its territory, combat migrant smuggling and trafficking networks, and ensure effective and timely cooperation on identification, returns and readmission;

P.whereas the EU has a strategic interest in maintaining constructive and reliable relations with neighbouring non-EU countries, including Morocco, based on reciprocity, mutual respect, respect for territorial integrity and effective cooperation on border management, migration and readmission;

Q.whereas combating the instrumentalisation of migration is inseparable from dismantling the criminal infrastructure that facilitates illegal crossings, including networks that use social media and digital communication channels to organise and encourage mass movements;

R.whereas, in 2025, the Commission withdrew its proposal for a regulation addressing situations of instrumentalisation in the field of migration and asylum (COM(2021)0890) following the adoption of the Crisis and Force Majeure Regulation and amendments to the Schengen Borders Code, while failing to adequately address the threat posed by the instrumentalisation of migration in subsequent legislative proposals;

S.whereas the events in Ceuta demonstrate the need to ensure that the EU’s legal and operational framework is fully equipped to respond effectively to future cases of large-scale instrumentalisation;

T.whereas the EU asylum system has been suffering from structural weaknesses, including lengthy procedures, secondary movements, a social benefits system prone to abuse, insufficient cooperation with non-EU countries, a solidarity mechanism based on mandatory relocations within the EU, and low return rates for rejected applicants;

U.whereas Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) held an extraordinary meeting on 6 August 2026 to discuss the situation in Ceuta, with the participation of the Commissioner for Internal Affairs and Migration, Magnus Brunner, and the President of Ceuta, Juan Jesús Vivas; whereas the Spanish Minister for Home Affairs and Minister for Inclusion, Social Security and Migration, both of whom had been invited to participate, did not attend the meeting;

1.Reaffirms unequivocally that Ceuta and Melilla are integral parts of the Kingdom of Spain and form part of the EU’s external border; stresses that their sovereignty and territorial integrity are non-negotiable and that protecting Spain’s territorial integrity and the EU’s external borders is a matter of common European security;

2.Expresses its full solidarity with the people of Ceuta and recognises the exceptional pressure placed on the local population by the unprecedented mass illegal entry of migrants; is gravely concerned about all the documented cases of physical and sexual assault, theft and degrading treatment suffered by the local population as a result of this situation;

3.Strongly condemns the instrumentalisation of illegal migration and the use of migrants, including unaccompanied minors, as a means of exerting political pressure on a Member State and the EU;

4.Expresses its full support for law enforcement officers and for border and coast guards tasked with protecting the EU’s external borders;

5.Deplores the failure of the Spanish authorities to adequately anticipate and prepare for the scale of the mass entry into Ceuta, despite the relevant information, alerts and communications shared with them in the days preceding and during the event;

6.Raises serious concerns about the delayed response of the Spanish Government to the crisis in Ceuta; regrets that, despite repeated requests from the authorities of Ceuta for additional resources and support, including help with identifying, accommodating and returning persons who had entered illegally, it took 26 days after the mass entry for the Spanish Government to declare the crisis a situation of interest for national security and establish a coordinated command structure;

7.Notes that, weeks after the mass entry, significant discrepancies persisted between the figures provided by the central government and those provided by the authorities of Ceuta concerning the number of persons still present in the city, with estimates ranging from around 10 000 to 13 000 or more; considers that this delay placed an excessive burden on the authorities and population of Ceuta, while creating significant security risks linked to a lack of clarity regarding the number, identity and whereabouts of persons who had entered the city, and exposed serious shortcomings in preparedness, coordination and crisis management;

8.Calls on the Spanish Government to provide full and transparent information on the situation in Ceuta, including the number of persons who had entered the territory, the number who were identified and underwent security screening, the number who were returned to Morocco or transferred to mainland Spain, and the number of adults and unaccompanied minors who remain in Ceuta;

9.Expresses serious concern at the large-scale regularisation policy pursued by the Government of President Pedro Sánchez, which acts as a pull factor and sends the wrong signal to potential migrants and criminal smuggling networks; stresses that illegal entry must never become a shortcut to legal residence, and calls on the Commission to assess, in cooperation with the Member States, the possible cross-border impact of national mass regularisation schemes on secondary movements and the functioning and security of the Schengen area;

10.Stresses that the protection of the EU’s external borders requires effective identification, registration and security screening of persons entering illegally, and that the security implications of large-scale illegal entries must be properly assessed, including through appropriate checks against relevant European and national databases and counter-terrorism screening, in order to prevent persons linked to terrorism or representing a security risk from exploiting weaknesses in EU external border controls;

11.Reaffirms that the Schengen area can only be preserved if the EU effectively protects its external borders and all Member States do their part in combating migrant smuggling;

12.Calls on the Commission, Frontex, Europol and the Member States to strengthen early-warning mechanisms, intelligence-sharing and operational cooperation at the EU’s external borders, including the capacity to identify and respond rapidly to coordinated mobilisation facilitated through social media and messaging applications;

13.Stresses that EU relations with neighbouring non-EU countries must be based on reciprocity and effective cooperation; considers that preferential access to the EU market, EU financing and strategic cooperation should be conditional on effective cooperation, including with regard to border management, the fight against migrant smuggling and trafficking, identification and readmission, and should seek clear and measurable commitments in order to prevent illegal crossings, ensure effective returns, protect the EU’s external borders and ensure respect for the territorial integrity of Member States; calls for existing EU partnerships to be used to secure concrete commitments and measurable results;

14.Calls on the Commission to review the use of EU financial assistance, trade preferences and other cooperation instruments where a partner country fails to meet clear and measurable commitments on border management, readmission, good-neighbourly relations or respect for the territorial integrity of a Member State;

15.Calls on the Commission to accelerate the conclusion and enforcement of readmission agreements with countries of origin and transit and to make full use of the leverage available through the EU’s trade, aid and visa policies, in order to secure effective cooperation on readmission;

16.Calls on the Commission to strengthen operational cooperation with the Kingdom of Morocco and other countries of origin and transit;

17.Calls on the Kingdom of Morocco to fully comply with its international obligations and cooperate fully and transparently with the relevant Spanish and EU authorities;

18.Underlines that the instrumentalisation of migration cannot be addressed solely through the management of migratory flows after migrants have reached EU territory; calls for stronger action upstream, including through intelligence cooperation, cooperation with countries of origin and transit, the disruption of smuggling networks and the prevention of organised mobilisation towards the EU’s external borders;

19.Calls on the Commission to urgently propose an effective legal framework that provides the EU and its Member States with the necessary tools for preventing, countering and responding to the instrumentalisation of migration by hostile state and non-state actors;

20.Underlines that the fight against migrant smuggling must remain a central element of the EU’s response; calls for stronger operational capacity to identify, disrupt and prosecute smuggling networks, including networks exploiting social media and messaging applications;

21.Calls on the Commission to deploy the necessary EU operational, technical and financial resources to guarantee the effective protection of Ceuta and Melilla as external borders of the EU, including reinforced permanent cooperation with Frontex, in full respect of the competences and responsibilities of the Member States;

22.Calls for stronger EU support to frontline Member States facing exceptional migratory pressure;

23.Calls on the Council and the Commission to support the Member States facing instrumentalisation by providing appropriate funds, emergency measures and tools in order to enable them to respond swiftly and proportionately, building on the lessons learnt from the instrumentalisation of migrants by the Lukashenko and Putin regimes on the Polish border, which was successfully countered by the Polish Government at the time, despite the lack of adequate support from the Commission, unjustified criticism directed against the Polish authorities and a widespread campaign aimed at discrediting their actions;

24.Recognises that the physical protection of the EU’s external border remains the first and most essential line of defence against instrumentalisation; calls on the Commission to guarantee full, flexible and rapidly disbursed EU financial support for Member States constructing physical barriers and surveillance infrastructure;

25.Calls on the Member States to make full use, where justified by serious threats to public policy or internal security and in accordance with the Schengen Borders Code, of the safeguards available to protect the integrity of the Schengen area and prevent unauthorised secondary movements;

26.Welcomes the recent strengthening of the EU’s return framework and calls for its swift and effective implementation, including through the use of return hubs and stronger cooperation with non-EU countries, giving that effective returns are essential for ensuring that illegal entry cannot result in an automatic or de facto right to remain;

27.Regrets the absence of the Spanish Minister for Home Affairs and Minister for Inclusion, Social Security and Migration from the extraordinary LIBE meeting of 6 August 2026, despite the exceptional nature of the situation and the direct impact of the events in Ceuta on the security of the EU’s external borders;

28.Calls on the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, with the support of the European External Action Service and in cooperation with the relevant Member State authorities, to assess, within their respective competences and on the basis of all available information, including relevant Spanish and EU law-enforcement and intelligence information, the circumstances surrounding the events of 30 and 31 July 2026;

29.Calls on the Commission to report to Parliament on the lessons learnt from the events in Ceuta, the measures taken to prevent their recurrence and the safeguards in place to ensure that similar episodes of mass instrumentalisation cannot destabilise the EU’s external borders or the Schengen area;

30.Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Government and Parliament of Spain, and the Kingdom of Morocco.