On the political situation in Myanmar including the humanitarian crisis of the Rohingya

F.whereas since 2023, Rakhine State has been the epicentre of intense clashes between the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army resulting in, among other things, in the obstruction of humanitarian aid to civilians and the continued fleeing of the Rohingya to Bangladesh;

G.whereas an estimated 1.2 million Rohingya refugees now reside in Cox’s Bazar, in Bangladesh, which has become the world’s largest and most overcrowded refugee settlement; whereas the influx of refugees continues amid the ongoing violence and the dire humanitarian situation in Rakhine State; whereas the humanitarian situation in the Cox’s Bazar settlements continues to deteriorate due to limited access to clean water, healthcare and sanitation, the rising prevalence of malnutrition, growing insecurity, trafficking and the presence of radical and criminal groups;

H.whereas the Government of Bangladesh does not allow any economic activities or freedom of movement outside of the refugee camp for the Rohingya, which means that Rohingya rely solely on humanitarian aid for their survival;

I.whereas the United States and the EU and its Member States have consistently, over the years, been the leading donors to the Rohingya humanitarian crisis, with the United States being the single largest donor; whereas since 2017, the EU’s humanitarian and development support for the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar, Bangladesh and the broader region came to over half a billion euros;

J.whereas continuous humanitarian aid and EU engagement is necessary and indispensable for the survival of the Rohingya, particularly in the Cox’s Bazar settlements, but a more comprehensive, sustainable solution to the deepening crisis is needed; whereas the root of the crisis lies in Myanmar and the military regime’s long-standing discrimination, killings, displacements and persecution of the Rohingya; whereas stronger international pressure on the Myanmar military junta is necessary;

K.whereas countries in the Middle East and the broader Muslim world, despite their repeated political declarations, have not sufficiently contributed to practical, financial or logistical support for the Rohingya refugees or to meaningful diplomatic pressure on Myanmar;

L.whereas on 24 April 2021, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Leaders’ Meeting resulted in a Five-Point Consensus on the situation in Myanmar, consisting of (i) an immediate cessation of violence, (ii) constructive dialogue to seek a peaceful solution, (iii) a Special Envoy of the ASEAN to facilitate mediation of the dialogue process, (iv) the provision of humanitarian assistance and (v) the Special Envoy’s planned visit to Myanmar to meet with all parties concerned; whereas no meaningful progress has been achieved under the framework of the Five-Point Consensus so far, while the situation in Myanmar continues to deteriorate and a peaceful solution remains elusive;

M.whereas the EU has increased its restrictive measures against Myanmar since the 2021 military coup, adopting eight packages of sanctions targeting Myanmar’s military regime so far; whereas these packages of sanctions include travel bans for individuals, an arms embargo, an export ban on dual-use goods, asset freezes for individuals and entities, and other restrictive measures;

N.whereas the EU, the United States, the UK, Australia, Canada and Switzerland are some of the key actors imposing sanctions against the military junta in Myanmar; whereas there are no binding sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council, which demonstrates the insufficient international pressure exerted currently on Myanmar’s military regime;

O.whereas the Myanmar Law on the Protection of Multiparty Democratic General Elections from Obstruction, Disruption and Destruction criminalises criticism of the election by banning all speech, organising, or protest that disrupts any part of the electoral process; whereas the Myanmar’s Political Party Registration Law effectively bars any opposition group from participating in elections; whereas over 40 political parties have been dissolved following the enactment of this law;

P.whereas an estimated 30 000 political prisoners have been jailed by the Myanmar junta since the 2021 coup, well over 20 000 of whom remain behind bars; whereas the junta arrested ministers and members of parliament following the coup, and ordinary citizens for running social media campaigns, distributing leaflets and opposing the junta; whereas people convicted of breaking these oppressive laws can be sentenced to up to 20 years in prison or even face capital punishment;

Q.whereas the Myanmar junta plans to hold general elections from December 2025 through January 2026; whereas ongoing repression and violence make it impossible to hold free, transparent and fair elections; whereas the 2024 attempt at holding a nationwide census aimed at compiling voter lists took place in fewer than half the country’s townships due to the junta’s lack of territorial control;

1.Strongly condemns the military coup that took place on 1 February 2021 in Myanmar, the ongoing repression at the hands of the Tatmadaw and the grave human rights violations committed against civilians, ethnic minorities and political opponents;

2.Denounces the Tatmadaw’s widespread violent response to all forms of protest and the gross human rights violations it committed and still commits against the people of Myanmar, which amount to crimes against humanity, including against ethnic and religious minorities; expresses its deep concern at the frequent attacks on churches, schools and medical facilities, and the arrests of religious leaders;

3.Calls for an immediate ceasefire and the end of all violence as a prerequisite for sustainable, lasting peace for the people of Myanmar; emphasises that no transparent, inclusive electoral process is possible without bringing the violence in Myanmar to an end; stresses that any elections held in the current atmosphere of fear and repression and in breach of all international standards cannot be considered free and fair;

4.Rejects, in this context, the Myanmar junta’s plans to hold general elections from late December 2025 through January 2026 and urges the international community to follow suit; denounces any results of these sham elections, which represent the junta’s attempt to gain international legitimacy;

5.Calls on the Myanmar junta to immediately release all political prisoners; condemns the Political Party Registration Law and the Law on the Protection of Multiparty Democratic Elections from Obstruction, Disruption and Destruction, which are tools of blatant political and social oppression, and calls for their immediate repeal;

6.Insists that full, unimpeded humanitarian access must be granted to all regions of Myanmar, including Rakhine State; condemns any deliberate obstruction of aid;

7.Expresses deep concern at the ongoing humanitarian crisis facing the Rohingya, who remain stateless, marginalised and persecuted, and are subjected to killings and forced displacement;

8.Commends Bangladesh for hosting over one million Rohingya refugees in the Cox’s Bazar settlements, while recognising the enormous economic and social pressures this exerts; calls for sustained international assistance to support host communities;

9.Expresses grave concern at the deteriorating situation and deepening humanitarian crisis of Rohingya refugees in the Cox’s Bazar settlements, aggravated by reduced international funding, the ongoing violence in Rakhine State, and continuous persecution at the hands of the military regime in Myanmar, which forces Rohingya to continuously flee their homeland and seek refuge in Cox’s Bazar;

10.Calls for enhanced measures to address insecurity in the Rohingya camps, including the presence of armed groups, criminal networks, trafficking, and growing radicalisation; insists that humanitarian aid must be protected from extremist infiltration;

11.Calls for continuous, sustained EU humanitarian assistance, which is indispensable for ensuring that the basic human rights of the Rohingya are respected; calls, in this respect, for increased humanitarian assistance from the international community, particularly from countries in the region affected by the crisis; urges the United States to continue its significant humanitarian aid to the Rohingya;

12.Emphasises that humanitarian funding alone cannot cover the needs of over one million refugees; underlines that resolving the Myanmar crisis, which is the root cause of the Rohingya killings and displacements and the dire humanitarian crisis, is indispensable for achieving long-term, sustainable improvements in the situation of the Rohingya;

13.Supports, in this regard, the ASEAN countries’ efforts towards achieving the Five-Point Consensus that aims to bring a durable solution to the ongoing crisis in Myanmar; regrets, however, that the Five-Point Consensus has not brought tangible results four years after its conception; encourages the ASEAN countries to fully operationalise the Five-Point Consensus, apply concrete and meaningful consequences for junta non-compliance, and coordinate their efforts in addressing the Myanmar crisis, which has significant humanitarian, political and security consequences and undermines regional stability;

14.Encourages other countries in the region, and Muslim-majority countries including the Gulf states, to step up their humanitarian assistance to the Rohingya and to increase their efforts to resolve the Myanmar crisis, including through exerting strong diplomatic, political and economic pressure on the Myanmar junta;

15.Supports the continuation and expansion of targeted EU sanctions against those responsible for the coup, atrocities and abuses, including military commanders, economic entities and arms suppliers; calls for renewed and strengthened international efforts to impose sanctions on the Myanmar junta and to prevent sanctions circumvention;

16.Calls for robust support for international accountability mechanisms, including the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar and proceedings before the International Court of Justice.

17.Stresses the need to address the root causes of the Rohingya crisis, including discrimination, denial of citizenship and exclusion from political life; calls for reform of the 1982 Citizenship Law, which denies the Rohingya their Myanmar citizenship rights;

18.Calls for a comprehensive EU strategy that integrates diplomatic pressure, humanitarian relief, targeted sanctions, regional cooperation and support for democratic forces;

19.Condemns Russia and China for their political, economic and military backing of the Myanmar junta;

20.Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the legitimate President and National Unity Government of Myanmar, the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, the State Counsellor of Myanmar, the Tatmadaw, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commission, the Council, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Government of Bangladesh, the member states, Secretary-General and Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar.