On tackling China’s critical raw materials export restrictions

A.whereas critical raw materials are essential inputs for a wide array of industrial products and processes, including in critical sectors such as clean technologies, digital technologies, healthcare and defence; whereas a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials is fundamental to achieving the Union’s climate, digital, competitiveness and defence objectives;

B.whereas the EU remains overly reliant on third countries for the supply of critical raw materials, notably being 100 % dependent on China for the supply of certain rare earth elements (REEs);

C.whereas China has significantly expanded its dominance in the global mining, processing and refining of critical raw materials and intermediate products, creating strategic dependencies along key value chains; whereas such dependencies have, at times, been deliberately leveraged through restrictive trade measures, as seen in the July 2023 export controls on gallium and germanium; whereas this underscores the need for the EU to reduce vulnerabilities and strengthen its resilience through diversification and strategic partnerships; whereas in April 2025, China introduced export controls on samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium, yttrium oxides, metals and alloys, as well as on compounds, mixtures, magnetic powders and permanent magnets containing these elements, requiring licences for exports; whereas this has caused delays in the supply of REEs to European companies, which, if continued, might cause disruptions to production for European industries in the coming months;

D.whereas, based on the Commission communication of 2 February 2011 entitled ‘Tackling the challenges in commodity markets and on raw materials’ (COM(2011)0025), the EU has known about the dependency on REEs from China since at least 2011, yet has been unable to successfully address this issue; whereas although the Critical Raw Materials Act serves as a starting point for this, the EU today does not have any operational REE mines and only very limited processing and manufacturing capacity;

E.whereas external dependencies in the REE value chain persist, particularly in the production of key components such as permanent magnets; whereas below-market pricing practices, state support and market access restrictions introduced by certain third countries have led to significant distortions in global competition, undermining the EU’s efforts to establish resilient and fair supply chains;

1.Expresses concern over China’s near monopoly in the global supply of REEs, including its use of export restrictions and other unfair trade practices; emphasises that such actions severely disrupt supply chains and pose a serious risk to the EU’s industrial base and calls on the Commission and the Member States to explore retaliatory or compensatory trade measures in response;

2.Expresses deep concern over the requirement imposed by the Chinese authorities to disclose sensitive data when applying for export permits; warns that such practices put European security and technology leadership at risk, and considers it essential that the Commission and the Member States assess and mitigate the security implications of such data transfers, in line with the European economic security strategy;

3.Calls on the Commission to use the upcoming EU-China Summit as an opportunity to engage in dialogue on the importance of a stable, rules-based trading relationship; underlines the need to use this high-level platform to express the EU’s concerns regarding China’s export restrictions on critical raw materials and the broader implications of these restrictions for global supply chains, and to raise concerns about the systematic introduction of licensing requirements, which constitute a significant barrier to trade;

4.Takes note of the current proposal by the Chinese authorities to establish so-called green lanes aimed at simplifying procedures for European companies; urges the Commission to seek concrete improvements regarding current licensing practices, including the duration of licences, processing times and the scope of information required; asks the Commission to convey to the Chinese authorities that these measures can only be temporary and that there is an urgent need to return to regular trade practices;

5.Takes note of the recent agreement reached between the People’s Republic of China and the United States regarding the management of critical raw materials trade, including enhanced transparency mechanisms, improved licensing procedures and joint efforts to stabilise global supply chains; calls on the Commission to assess the implications of this agreement for the EU’s strategic autonomy and to enhance its raw materials diplomacy efforts in order to prevent similar export bans in the future;

6.Underscores the urgent necessity of establishing a vertically integrated and independent EU supply chain that spans all steps of the REE value chain for the production of permanent magnets, including mining, processing, separation, refining, alloy manufacturing, component manufacturing and recycling, in order to decrease the EU’s vulnerability to measures taken by third countries; emphasises the potential of recycling and urban mining to alleviate supply constraints in the short term; asks the Commission to take immediate measures to better collect and retain REEs in the internal market;

7.Welcomes the adoption of the first strategic projects under the Critical Raw Materials Act, as well as the Commission’s competitiveness and simplification agenda, including the Omnibus packages; stresses the urgent need for the Commission and the Member States to accelerate the implementation of the CRMA; stresses the important role of the European Raw Materials Board and its sub-groups with regard to the accelerated implementation of the CRMA; draws attention to the potential of the EIT RawMaterials investment pipeline and activities in the field of REE projects and innovation promotion;

8.Requests the Commission to dedicate further EU-level support to the diversification of REE and critical raw materials production, including dedicated funding under the forthcoming EU Competitiveness Fund and the use of preference clauses for EU-sourced REEs in relevant procurement legislation, in line with WTO rules; underlines the necessity of ensuring that the long-term business case to invest in the REE magnet and other critical raw materials supply chains actually comes to fruition, including through direct financial support such as price floors, offtake support or EU rolling strategic stockpiling;

9.Calls for reinforced coordination with like-minded international partners, in particular within the G7 and NATO frameworks and with the Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security, to improve knowledge transfer and to align supply chain security, joint investments and stockpiling strategies; calls, furthermore, for stronger and accelerated engagement to conclude clean trade and investment partnerships, and bilateral strategic partnerships on raw materials;

10.Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.