On a European Parliament recommendation to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning EU-China political relations

H.whereas cybersecurity threats, influence operations, political infiltration and hybrid warfare tactics attributed to actors affiliated to the Chinese state increasingly undermine European security, democratic resilience, social cohesion and critical infrastructure;

I.whereas 2025 marks the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the EU and the People’s Republic of China;

1.Recommends that the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy:

a) recognise that China has become more assertive abroad and increasingly repressive domestically; look into additional ways to restrict technology transfers to China, especially for dual-use purposes; unequivocally communicate that EU-China relations will be significantly impacted by China’s geopolitical choices, particularly regarding adherence to the fundamental principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and international law;

b) regard China as a decisive enabler of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and therefore strongly reiterate their condemnation of China’s support for that war; call on China to use its considerable influence on Russia to halt the war and to prevent the circumvention of international sanctions;

c) rigorously pursue the strategy of economic de-risking in EU-China relations, stressing that de-risking should focus on specific strategic sectors such as critical raw materials, industrial magnets and semiconductors, rather than seeking general decoupling; establish robust mechanisms to safeguard critical technologies, infrastructure and supply chains, promoting European strategic autonomy while maintaining pragmatic engagement with China;

d) proactively address the implications of technological and economic competition with China, especially the asymmetry in market access and the lack of legal certainty for European companies in China; underscore the geopolitical ramifications of the US-China trade conflict and its potential spillover effects on the EU economy; actively shape our Indo-Pacific partnerships by coordinating with like-minded actors such as the United States, Japan, South Korea, Australia, India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and seek closer alignment with them on trade, technology standards, and supply chain resilience to work around China’s monopoly in critical areas;

e) further develop the Global Gateway to offer a credible alternative to the Belt and Road Initiative, while realising that the EU has to be bolder in its Global Gateway projects and that this is possible without compromising EU norms and standards regarding transparency, environmental sustainability, labour rights and economic viability; recognise that Africa is a priority partner for the Global Gateway in this effort;

f) actively engage in diplomatic efforts to prevent further escalation in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea and oppose any unilateral change in the status quo; work with Member States on closer security coordination, including naval presence and joint exercises, to reinforce stability in the region; fulfil the pledge made by the Commission before Parliament to work towards deterring China from invading Taiwan; make clear that the EU will continue to develop its relations with the island, while adhering to the EU’s long-standing One China policy; put forward contingency measures, including scenario planning, designed to mitigate risks arising from any possible future developments around Taiwan; keep defending the principle of the prohibition of the use of force codified in the UN Charter that also applies to the Taiwan Strait; oppose the fact that the PRC uses UN Resolution 2758 to support its illegal claims over Taiwan’s territory and sovereignty;

g) bolster EU cybersecurity frameworks to counter growing risks from Chinese cyber activities and influence operations, including those taking place on Chinese social media platforms such as TikTok, Wechat and Xiaohongshu, and fortify server defences against politically motivated cyberattacks;

h) keep the pressure firmly on China with regard to the defence of human rights and avoid a compartmentalisation of human rights in EU-China relations; keep expressing deep concern regarding China’s systemic repression of ethnic and religious minorities, including through forced labour and mass surveillance; strengthen and assess the effectiveness of current EU actions on human rights, including sanctions, confront China over its human rights violations in Hong Kong and insist that it free political prisoners;

i) firmly reject the notion that the EU should seek a closer strategic alliance with China as an alternative to its transatlantic relationship because the latter is currently under heavy pressure; recognise that Europe’s security and prosperity cannot be guaranteed by replacing one dependency with another and that the only way forward for the EU is to strengthen itself from within, in line with the Letta and Draghi reports, by eliminating internal market barriers, building genuine strategic autonomy and completing the European defence union as well as by implementing institutional reform through an ‘urgency convention’;

2.Acknowledges the decision by China in April 2025 to lift restrictions on exchanges with the European Parliament; emphasises that the decision was communicated in an ambiguous way and that the official announcement by the relevant authorities was not made public; notes that in the press conferences of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the term ‘sanctions’ is never mentioned; notes that European think tank staff and former and current national parliamentarians are still under sanctions in China, which makes the full normalisation of the relationship between Parliament and its Chinese counterparts difficult and compromises any chance of improvement; demands that the sanctions imposed in March 2021 be lifted in full for all individuals and organisations concerned;

3.Calls for its own internal Rules of Procedure to be adapted in order to strengthen its ability to address strategic challenges such as EU-China relations, allowing for more comprehensive recommendations or reports, encouraging structured cooperation between different parliamentary committees, in this case the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on International Trade; stresses that such a reform would enhance Parliament’s capacity to provide coherent, strategic guidance to the Council and the Commission on matters of global importance;

4.Instructs its President to forward this recommendation to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and, for information, to the Government of the People’s Republic of China.