On the Institutional Framework of the European Union and its interaction with national authorities in the application of Union law, with particular reference to Article 19 TEU

B.whereas the Court’s case-law concerning direct effect, primacy and the internal market has shaped the European Union and the functioning of its legal system;

C.whereas the authority and influence of the Court have grown continuously as a consequence of its rulings and the progressive consolidation of power by the Union;

D.whereas Article 2 TEU provides that the Union is founded on values including democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights; whereas pluralism and respect for the national identities of the Member States are key characteristics of the Union;

E.whereas the principle of conferral, laid down in Article 5 TEU, establishes that the Union may act only within the limits of the powers granted to it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein; whereas competences not conferred upon the Union remain with the Member States;

F.whereas the principle of sincere cooperation laid down in Article 4(3) TEU requires the Union and the Member States to assist each other in carrying out obligations arising from the Treaties in full mutual respect;

G.whereas the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU requires Member States to provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law;

H.whereas Article 47 of the Charter guarantees the right to an effective remedy and to a fair hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal established by law; whereas Article 51(1) of the Charter establishes that the provisions of the Charter are only to be addressed to the Member States when they are implementing Union law; whereas Article 51(2) of the Charter confirms that the Charter does not extend the competences of the Union beyond those conferred by the Treaties and does not establish any new power or task for the Union;

I.whereas the principle of national procedural autonomy constitutes an essential expression of national sovereignty and constitutional identity; whereas according to settled case law, that autonomy must be respected; whereas the principles of equivalence and effectiveness should remain safeguards designed to ensure the practical application of Union law and should not be interpreted as open-ended grounds for intervention in national procedural frameworks;

J.whereas Article 267 TFEU established a mechanism of judicial cooperation between the Court of Justice and national courts and tribunals, in which the Court of Justice is empowered to give preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation of the Treaties; whereas the preliminary ruling mechanism has become one of the cornerstones of the EU legal system;

K.whereas the Court of Justice has linked participation in the preliminary ruling mechanism under Article 267 TFEU to compliance with requirements relating to judicial independence and effective judicial protection;

L.whereas the Court of Justice has interpreted Article 19 TEU as giving concrete expression to the value of the rule of law affirmed in Article 2 TEU and has developed common standards concerning judicial independence and effective judicial protection throughout the Union;

M.whereas this case-law has contributed to the protection of judicial independence and the rule of law in certain Member States; whereas it has at the same time raised important questions concerning the relationship between Union and Member State competences; whereas continuing academic and political debate exists regarding the legal basis, limits and implications of these developments;

N.whereas the Court’s case-law has, in certain instances, required national courts to disregard decisions of constitutional courts, questioned the ability of certain national judicial bodies to participate in the preliminary ruling procedure and developed the principle of non-regression in relation to judicial independence and the rule of law;

O.whereas the organisation of justice falls within the competence of the Member States; whereas the Court has nevertheless taken the view that national courts and tribunals acting in fields covered by Union law must meet certain common requirements;

P.whereas the Court of Justice has progressively assumed functions that entail responsibilities in the areas of fundamental rights, judicial independence and the rule of law;

Q.whereas the exercise of functions of such significance requires particularly high standards of transparency, methodological consistency, institutional legitimacy and procedural accountability; whereas the authority of a court exercising such functions depends not only upon the substantive correctness of its judgments but equally upon the transparency of its procedures, the predictability of its methods, the neutrality of its institutional structure and the openness of its legal reasoning;

R.whereas Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2019 introduced a partial transfer of jurisdiction in preliminary ruling proceedings to the General Court; whereas requests for preliminary rulings continue to be lodged before the Court of Justice, requiring an initial determination as to whether a case remains before the Court of Justice or is transferred to the General Court;

S.whereas this reform has increased the significance of internal decisions concerning the treatment and allocation of preliminary references and has consequently increased the importance of transparent, objective and foreseeable procedural safeguards;

T.whereas the President of the Court exercises significant procedural and organisational powers, including powers relating to the designation of reporting judges, the management of judicial formations and the administration of proceedings; whereas public confidence in judicial impartiality depends not only upon actual independence but also upon the appearance of institutional neutrality;

U.whereas the principle of the ‘lawful judge’ as reflected in Article 47 of the Charter and Article 6 ECHR, requires that the allocation of cases and the composition of judicial formations be governed by objective, predetermined and transparent rules; whereas concerns have been raised regarding the degree of discretion involved in the allocation of cases, the designation of reporting judges and the constitution of chambers within the Court;

V.whereas legal certainty, foreseeability and effective judicial dialogue require judicial decisions to be based upon clearly identifiable legal reasoning and coherent doctrinal standards; whereas legal scholarship has repeatedly criticised the Court’s reliance on broad teleological reasoning, flexible Treaty interpretations, the absence of a clearly articulated hierarchy of interpretative methods and the limited doctrinal elaboration of judgments with significant constitutional consequences for Member States;

W.whereas the absence of dissenting and concurring opinions, the secrecy of deliberations and the increasing practice of dispensing with opinions of Advocates General limit transparency and make it more difficult for citizens, national courts, legal practitioners and academia to understand the full range of legal arguments considered in constitutionally sensitive cases;

X.whereas opinions of Advocates General frequently constitute the only publicly accessible alternative legal assessment within proceedings before the Court and therefore represent an important source of doctrinal transparency, legal pluralism and methodological development;

Y.whereas the internal deliberations of the Court are conducted exclusively in French despite the absence of any explicit Treaty provision establishing French as the Court’s sole internal working language; whereas concerns have been raised regarding linguistic equality and the equal participation of judges from different legal and linguistic traditions;

Z.whereas several constitutional and supreme courts of the Member States have emphasised the importance of maintaining a constructive judicial dialogue concerning constitutional identity, the limits of Union competences and the relationship between Union law and national constitutional law; whereas several such courts have reserved the right to review whether Union institutions have acted within the limits of the competences conferred upon the Union by the Member States;

AA.whereas Article 267 TFEU was conceived as a mechanism of judicial dialogue between the Court of Justice and national courts rather than as an instrument of judicial reform; whereas the Court does not possess the institutional means necessary to replace national judicial structures where deficiencies have been identified;

AB.whereas the growing significance of disputes concerning constitutional identity, fundamental constitutional structures and the allocation of competences has prompted discussion concerning more reciprocal forms of constitutional dialogue between the Court of Justice and the constitutional or supreme courts of the Member States;

AC.whereas the legitimacy and authority of the Court depends on the confidence of the Member States and their national courts, legal practitioners, academia and citizens alike;

1.Reaffirms the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union in ensuring the uniform interpretation and application of Union law and protecting the rights conferred upon individuals under the Treaties; stresses that this role must remain firmly anchored within the competences conferred by the Member States and must respect the balance established by the Treaties;

2.Considers that the Court’s very role in shaping the foundations of the Union and interacting with the Member States in matters of constitutional significance has increased the importance of ensuring the highest standards of transparency, methodological consistency, procedural legitimacy and institutional accountability;

3.Notes that constitutional and supreme courts in several Member States have expressed concerns regarding the limits of Union competences and the scope of judicial authority, including, but not limited to, the Danish Supreme Court in Ajos (15/2014, U.2017.824H), the German Federal Constitutional Court in PSPP (BVerfGE 154, 17), the Conseil d’État in Ministre de l’intérieur c. Cohn-Bendit (n° 11604) and French Data Network (n° 393099), the Polish Constitutional Tribunal in case K 3/21 and the Czech Constitutional Court in Holubec (Pl. ÚS 5/12);

4.Stresses the importance of maintaining constructive dialogue with the constitutional and supreme courts of the Member States, particularly in cases concerning constitutional identity, judicial independence, ultra vires review and questions relating to the limits of Union competences;

5.Underlines that interpretations of Union law should not result in an effective extension of Union competences beyond those conferred by the Member States in the Treaties;

6.Reaffirms that the principle of conferral remains a cornerstone of the Union’s legal order and stresses that judicial interpretation should remain firmly anchored in the Treaties;

7.Highlights that Treaty provisions relating to the internal market and free movement should not be interpreted in a manner that circumvents the distribution of competences established by the Treaties or undermines the constitutional responsibilities of the Member States;

8.Stresses the importance of maintaining an appropriate balance between the effectiveness of Union law and respect for national constitutional identities in accordance with Article 4(2) TEU;

9.Notes that the Court’s case-law concerning Article 19 TEU has developed common standards relating to judicial independence and has articulated the principle of non-regression in this field; underlines that a development of such significance should be accompanied by clear reasoning, precise doctrinal limits and full respect for the constitutional responsibilities and needs of the Member States;

10.Underlines that the organisation of justice falls within the competence of the Member States and recalls that Article 267 TFEU was conceived as a mechanism of judicial dialogue rather than as an instrument of judicial reform;

11.Observes that where national judicial structures are found to be incompatible with requirements arising under Union law, the Court may identify deficiencies but does not possess the institutional means necessary to establish replacement judicial structures, thereby potentially leaving the jurisdiction courtless;

12.Notes with concern that the current framework governing the allocation of cases, the designation of reporting judges and the constitution of judicial formations does not always provide a level of transparency comparable to standards associated with the principle of the lawful judge in several Member States;

13.Encourages the Court to consider additional safeguards aimed at ensuring greater transparency, objectivity and foreseeability in relation to the allocation of cases and the constitution of judicial formations;

14.Calls for a review of the concentration of procedural and organisational powers within the office of the President of the Court with a view to strengthening institutional neutrality, transparency and public confidence in the administration of justice;

15.Notes that the 2024 reform of the Statute of the Court of Justice has increased the institutional significance of internal decisions concerning preliminary references; stresses that decisions determining whether a reference is examined by the Court of Justice or by the General Court should be based upon transparent, objective and foreseeable criteria consistent with the principle of a tribunal established by law;

16.Requests that any future evaluation of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2019 includes a specific assessment of its effects on the allocation of preliminary references, legal certainty, the role of the President of the Court and the principle of a tribunal established by law;

17.Regrets that the Court’s reasoning is often characterised by a high degree of abstraction and by limited methodological transparency; encourages the Court to identify more explicitly the interpretative methods relied upon in its judgments and to explain how competing methodological considerations have been weighed;

18.Notes that legal scholarship has repeatedly criticised the Court’s reliance on broad teleological reasoning, the absence of a clearly articulated hierarchy of interpretative methods and the limited doctrinal elaboration of judgments with significant constitutional consequences; takes the view that purposive reasoning, while remaining a feature of Union law, should complement rather than obscure textual, systematic and historical interpretation;

19.Regrets that the absence of dissenting and concurring opinions, the secrecy of deliberations and the non-publication of voting results limit transparency and make it more difficult for citizens, courts and legal practitioners to understand the full range of legal arguments considered in legal cases;

20.Invites reflection on possible reforms capable of strengthening the openness and intelligibility of judicial reasoning, including the publication of concurring or dissenting opinions;

21.Notes with concern the increasing practice of dispensing with opinions of Advocates General pursuant to Article 20(5) of the Statute of the Court of Justice; stresses that such opinions frequently constitute the only publicly accessible, fully reasoned and independent alternative legal assessment within proceedings before the Court; encourages the Court to ensure that opinions of Advocates General remain available in cases raising novel, constitutionally sensitive or methodologically complex questions;

22.Notes that the exclusive use of French as the Court’s internal working language, despite the absence of any explicit Treaty basis, raises concerns regarding linguistic equality, the equal participation of judges from different legal traditions and the potential privileging of particular modes of legal reasoning; stresses that multilingualism is an expression of the equality of Member States, legal cultures and constitutional traditions;

23.Encourages consideration of a structured reciprocal constitutional dialogue mechanism under which the Court of Justice could invite the constitutional or supreme courts of the Member States to provide observations prior to delivering its judgment, in particular in cases concerning constitutional identity, fundamental constitutional structures or unresolved questions concerning the distribution of competences within the Union; takes the view that such a mechanism would strengthen mutual trust and constitutional dialogue;

24.Calls on the Council and the Commission to ensure that future reforms concerning the Court of Justice remain fully consistent with the principle of conferral and the institutional balance established by the Treaties; emphasises that future developments of the Court should neither contribute to a de facto centralisation of judicial authority at Union level nor facilitate an expansion of Union competences through excessively broad interpretations of the Treaties;

25.Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the Court of Justice of the European Union.