Discharge 2024: EU general budget – Commission

Text as a whole without the words: ‘for sound financial management of the Union budget and that the Commission has a wide range of instruments at its disposal to ensure respect for these principles; notes with serious concern the continued backsliding with regard to the rule of law and systemic corruption and attacks on fundamental rights in several Member States, with direct implications for the sound management of Union funds, notes that the lack of Union funds has an alarming effect on the provision of public services; highlights in particular the deteriorating situation in Hungary, marked by widespread corruption and entrenched oligarchic networks, which requires continued attention; deplores that, while problems persist or worsen, the pressure exerted by the Commission to induce meaningful reforms has diminished as the amounts of funds that remain frozen are decreasing; stresses that the Commission needs to move beyond monitoring and to make full and consistent use of the available instruments to suspend or protect Union funding where rule of law deficiencies affect sound financial management in all Member States concerned;’

‘Notes that, under the Treaties, civil society organisations are legitimate beneficiaries of Union funding and frequently support the attainment of Union objectives;’

‘stresses that budgetary control, safeguards and transparency requirements must be applied in a neutral, proportionate and evidence-based way, with due regard for legal certainty; highlights that selective transparency can undermine confidence in the discharge process, and that effective scrutiny requires the consistent application of comparable standards to all beneficiaries; takes note of the Scrutiny Working Group established within Parliament in this regard;'

‘stresses that, in the context of rising debt levels, the development of genuine new own resources is essential to prevent debt servicing costs from crowding out priorities under future multiannual financial frameworks;’

Text as a whole without the words: ‘the findings in the 2025 Rule of Law Report regarding the rule of law situation in Hungary,’ and ‘and the continuous reporting by the Hungarian Integrity Authority of obstacles in fulfilling its oversight tasks effectively;’

Text as a whole without the words: ‘reminds that on 25 March 2024, the European Parliament brought an action before the Court of Justice in order to review the legality of the Commission decision,’

‘Notes that from the EUR 19,8 billion allocations under the CPR, initially blocked due to fundamental rights concerns, only EUR 7,6 billion remain blocked for the Hungarian government in January 2026; further notes that from the EUR 6,4 billion initially blocked under the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation because of rule of law and corruption concerns, EUR 1 and 1,1 billion have been decommitted at the end of 2024 and 2025 respectively;’

‘expresses deep concern that, while the rule law continues to deteriorate and corruption flourishes through entrenched oligarchic networks in Hungary, the amount of Union funds that remains frozen due to rule of law and corruption concerns decreases, and consequently, the pressure applied by the Commission on the Hungarian government to make reforms shrinks constantly;’

‘Notes the requests by the Hungarian government on 28 and 29 March 2025 to transfer EUR 545 million from two cohesion programmes to new priorities under the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), of which EUR 395 million from funds frozen’

‘due to the failure to meet the horizontal enabling condition under the Charter of Fundamental Rights; deeply regrets the Commission’s approval of the amendments on 25 September 2025, that despite again blocking reimbursements for the new STEP priorities due to non-compliance with Charter requirements, nevertheless gave the Hungarian government access to EUR 317,3 million in pre-financing; reaffirms that the reallocation or reshuffling of frozen appropriations to other programmes or objectives would signal to governments non-compliant with Union values and with their obligations to protect the Union’s financial interests that losses can be offset elsewhere; recalls its position that funds suspended pursuant to the Conditionality Regulation or due to non-fulfilment of horizontal enabling conditions should not be eligible for programme amendments or transfers; calls, therefore, on the Commission to exercise its right of initiative and propose measures to close any existing loopholes in the Union’s legislative framework that may enable governments to transfer funds suspended due to breaches of their rule of law or other Charter of Fundamental Rights obligations, and ensure that any future funding instruments are proofed for circumvention;’

‘Notes that MOL Plc, a publicly listed Hungarian petrochemical conglomerate, is effectively controlled through three so-called public interest trusts affiliated with the Hungarian Government, each holding a 10 % share; recalls that Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022 prohibits the Commission from entering into new legal commitments, under direct or indirect management, with Hungarian public interest trusts and entities maintained by them when implementing the Union budget;'

‘notes with concern that at least one funding agreement appears to have been concluded between the Commission and MOL after the adoption of that Decision; takes note of the Commission’s reply that it is investigating the matter, and expects the Commission to provide the discharge authority without delay with a clear explanation of how such a commitment could have been signed;'

‘Notes that the Hungarian government is set to receive the third-largest allocation under the SAFE instrument, amounting to EUR 16,2 billion, intended to support major defence-industry investments;’

‘recalls that the Commission has the power to withhold approval of national defence investment plans under SAFE where there are concerns regarding the protection of the Union’s financial interests; notes that the Hungarian government recently sold a controlling 75 %+1 vote majority stake in its state defence-industry holding to 4iG, a company widely seen as close to the government; strongly warns that, in light of the continued deterioration of the rule of law, persistent corruption risks and systemic weaknesses in oversight as described above, the Union’s financial interests cannot be considered adequately protected if SAFE funding were to be disbursed to the Hungarian government without, at the very least, setting strict conditions that must be met prior to any disbursement of funds;’

‘Highlights with alarm that since the 2024 Rule of Law Report, Slovakia adopted a series of amendments to the Criminal Code, passed in the second half of 2024, including the closure of specialised anti-corruption entities, the National Crime Agency and the Special Prosecutor’s Office, which resulted in delays in investigations transferred to other bodies and significant drops in the number of corruption cases;’

‘notes with concern Slovakia’s Government plan to replace the current office for whistleblowers with an institution whose chair would be appointed directly by the parliamentary speaker, which risks politicising the office, aligning its work with the Government’s priorities, scaling back protection of whistleblowers, and undercutting scrutiny of how the Government handles Union funds;’

'stresses that these developments pose an increased, substantial risk to the sound financial management of the Union budget; emphasises that the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation is not limited to last-resort measures,’

‘but also allows for early action with partial suspensions where rule of law breaches are identified that pose a serious risk to the sound financial management of the Union budget; fully supports the Commission’s decision and calls on the Commission to start the first step of the conditionality mechanism and to launch an infringement proceeding regarding this matter;’

Text as a whole without the words: ‘considers that Union support for media can contribute to strengthening media pluralism and informed public debate across the Union, provided that strict safeguards are in place to ensure full editorial independence and transparency;’

‘Notes that Commissioners exercise significant political and regulatory authority and their conduct must therefore reflect the highest standards of independence, transparency, accountability, and ethical behaviour; stresses that strict adherence to the Code of Conduct for Members of the European Commission is essential to safeguarding the integrity, credibility, and democratic legitimacy of the Union’s executive; underlines that full compliance with the Code of Conduct is also indispensable to preventing conflicts of interest, avoiding undue influence, and ensuring that decisions are taken solely in the European interest;'

‘considers that, taken together, the past serious and prolonged management failures in DG NEAR, the provision of inaccurate information to Parliament in the context of the discharge procedure, and the additional concerns relating to conduct and independence outlined above demonstrate a pattern that is incompatible with the standards of accountability, reliability and sound administration required of a Member of the Commission;’