What changed between the draft committee report and the plenary report

Removed:8. Considers that the absence of a harmonised EU export control system continues to generate obstacles to the functioning of a single market for defence through its impact on intra-EU transfers; recalls that defence production today relies heavily on integrated cross-border supply chains, with components sourced from multiple Member States, which, in the event of an export block, creates uncertainty for industry and supply chains;

Added:9. Believes that the current EU legislative frameworks do not provide conditions for procurement of goods with fast innovation cycles, such as in the area of drone development; expresses concern that the single market for defence is still undermined by the insufficiently harmonised application of its rules by the Member States and by disproportionate use of the exemption provided for under Article 346 TFEU, which hampers the push towards joint EU defence procurement; highlights the need for dedicated support for SMEs and small mid-caps to facilitate their involvement in the defence industry supply chain, with a view to increasing innovation while building industrial redundancies that increase the EU’s resilience and security of supply;

Added:10. Expresses concern that the single market for defence is still undermined by the insufficiently harmonised application of its rules by the Member States; is concerned, in particular, by the frequent use of Article 346 TFEU, which the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has ruled in several cases as having been used in an unjustified manner and thus misused; stresses the need to shift towards an approach of safeguarding the EU’s essential security interests, given the current geopolitical situation and the threats to the EU’s unity;

Added:11. Considers that the Member States’ full respect for the EU Common Position on arms exports13 constitutes an important pillar of a functioning single market for defence; considers that the absence of a harmonised EU export control system and a lack of mutual recognition of different permits, licences, certifications and security clearances continue to generate obstacles to the functioning of a single market for defence through their impact on intra-EU transfers; recalls that defence production currently relies heavily on integrated cross-border supply chains in the EU, with components sourced from multiple Member States, which, in the event of an export block, creates uncertainty for industry and supply chains; stresses the need for a practical solution that takes into account the reality of present dependencies on non-EU countries, also given the growing importance of critical raw materials for the EDTIB and the potential exposure to coercive measures by non-EU countries; emphasises that, without guaranteed and planned access to inputs such as rare earths, semiconductors and high-grade metals, Europe’s ambitious defence ramp-up and strategic autonomy objectives cannot be met;

Added:12. Considers coordination between the EU’s and the Member States’ defence capability development processes and NATO’s Defence Planning and Review Process to be essential to ensure coherence and interoperability between Member States and non-EU NATO allies; regrets the lack of a cooperation agreement between NATO and the EU dedicated to the exchange of information on NATO standards (STANAGs), which the EU could then enforce through binding instruments; stresses that the lack of enforcement of standards has led to inefficiencies, duplications and a lack of interoperability in the past decades and continues to pose a problem;

Breaking down the barriers

Change 9

Changed:9. Calls13. onUrges the Council and the Commission to equip EU defence programmes with adequatesufficient funding under the next multiannual financial framework to effectively incentivise the Member States to enterengage intoin joint capability development and procurement agreements and to incentivise their defence industries to engage in closer cross-border cooperation; highlights the potential of new frameworks, such as the European Defence Projects of Common InterestInterest, including the four flagship projects proposed in the Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030, and the Structures for European Armament Programmes, to deliver on those objectives with the assistance of adequatesufficient long-term funding; stresses that funding should prioritise projects with clear European added value, interoperability, long-term industrial sustainability and operational impact;

Change 10

Removed:10. Believes that EU institutions and agencies should enhance their coordinating role between Member States and welcomes the European Defence Agency’s contribution, particularly through the Capability Development Plan and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence, emphasising that its expertise should be fully utilised; welcomes the contribution of multilateral procurement agencies such as the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation, which promote the harmonisation of equipment among EU Member States and partner states;

Added:14. Notes the current limitations in the manufacturing capacity of the European defence industry, which is nevertheless expanding, and calls on the Member States to apply a ‘buy European’ approach, which prioritises the common procurement and increased production of defence products from the EDTIB, Ukraine, European Economic Area/European Free Trade Association (EEA/EFTA) countries and, as an additional complementary layer, other non-EU countries with which the EU has signed a Security and Defence Partnership, as this would ensure a predictable order volume for the EDTIB, drive up private investment in R&D for defence products, and help the EDTIB to deliver innovative defence products in sufficient volumes; calls on the Member States to sign contracts that deliver stable and medium- to long-term aggregated demand signals for European products, thereby creating the investment certainty for the EDTIB to scale up;

Removed:11. Calls on Member States to apply a ‘buy European’ approach, which prioritises the common procurement and increased production of defence products from the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), Ukraine, European Economic Area/European Free Trade Association (EEA/EFTA) countries and, as a close second layer, third countries with which the Union has signed a Security and Defence Partnership, as it would ensure the EDTIB a predictable order volume, drive up private investment in R&D for defence products, and help the EDTIB to deliver innovative defence products in sufficient volumes;

Added:15. Urges the EU and its Member States to treat Ukraine as an integral part of the single market for defence to the utmost extent possible by facilitating industrial partnerships, access to joint procurement mechanisms, and participation in EU programmes, such as the European Defence Fund (EDF) and the dedicated Ukraine Support Instrument under EDIP, to enable Ukraine’s progressive integration into EDTIB supply chains, taking into account the fact that Ukraine’s future lies in the EU and that its integration would provide benefits for both the EDTIB, through Ukraine’s advanced and battle-proven defence technologies and innovative industrial capacities, and for Ukraine’s defence technological and industrial base;

Removed:12. Urges the EU and its Member States to treat Ukraine as an integral part of the single market for defence to the utmost extent possible, taking into account the fact that Ukraine’s future lies in the EU and that it would provide benefits for both the EDTIB and for Ukraine’s Defence Technological and Industrial Base;

Added:16. Believes that the implementation of Directive 2009/81/EC on defence and sensitive security procurement needs to be significantly improved and calls on the Commission to propose an ambitious revision; underlines the usefulness of allowing Member States to make use of each other’s framework contracts to increase the EU’s defence readiness in the short term, as it allows them to procure faster and more efficiently, while expecting that, in the long term, procurement will be conducted through common or joint framework contracts designed in line with European procurement criteria from the outset; calls on the Member States to make use of different contract forms that provide for innovation, competition and private capital investments, ensuring full compliance with competition rules, integrity requirements and anti-corruption standards, and recalls that European capital markets play a key role in financing defence innovation; further believes that aspects linked to security and defence, such as the presence of civilian components in military goods, should be taken into account in any review of Directive 2014/24/EU on public procurement14; calls, in this context, on the Commission to present an updated version of the defence innovation partnerships in the upcoming comprehensive revision of Directive 2009/81/EC, to better adapt this instrument to the specificities of the defence market and the current challenging security context;

Removed:13. Believes that the implementation of Directive 2009/81/EC on defence and sensitive security procurement needs to be significantly improved and calls on the Commission to propose an ambitious revision; calls on the Commission to issue a recommendation for an interpretation of Article 346 TFEU in line with the current reality of an interdependent security architecture in the EU; calls on Member States to make use of different contract forms that stipulate for innovation, competition and private capital investments;

Added:17. Underlines that, in the application of EU competition and State aid rules, the Commission must prioritise the unity and integrity of the single market to avoid distortions of competition and to safeguard the level playing field and cohesion between the Member States, paying particular attention to smaller Member States whose fiscal capacities to support their national defence industries are comparatively more limited; stresses that the extensive use of national subsidies to support defence investment risks fragmenting the single market and undermining the level playing field for companies, especially SMEs, across the EU;

Removed:14. Underlines the need to simplify and abolish hurdles related to intra-EU transfers, including mutual recognition of criteria and certification and a simplification of prior authorisation requests; calls on the Commission to urgently present proposals to further harmonise intra-EU transfers of defence products, to ensure simplification for the circulation of such products inside the Union, in particular eliminating authorisation requirements for components that are already integrated or are to be integrated into a defence product and cannot be transferred or exported as such; further calls on Member States to work towards that same goal; calls on the EU Member States to agree on new common export control rules for arms and defence goods;

Added:18. Calls on the Commission to issue a recommendation for an interpretation of Article 346 TFEU in order to facilitate a harmonised and uniform approach throughout the EU, addressing the need to protect strictly the essential security interests of Member States, and for Article 346 to be used exceptionally, in line with the current reality of an interdependent security architecture in the EU; considers that the Commission should be enabled to assess the overall implementation of Article 346 TFEU, on a case-by-case basis, to remedy any potential structural misuse, in line with the CJEU case-law and with the current reality of an interdependent security architecture in the EU;

Removed:15. Underlines the need for the EU and NATO to sign a cooperation agreement on capability planning and development to ensure coherent and complementary planning and interoperable defence capabilities; calls on the Commission to prepare a legislative proposal that would allow for the use of legally binding instruments to implement and enforce NATO standards for equipment, ammunition and stocks, once such an agreement is concluded, as it would improve interoperability and set a framework for joint European testing and certification of defence equipment instead of having separate national validation for each defence product;

Added:19. Underlines the need to provide targeted support, in particular for the testing of prototypes of new products, and to prioritise investment in emerging and breakthrough technologies; stresses the added value of close cooperation with Ukrainian defence and technological stakeholders in these highly innovative domains; underlines the importance of safeguarding the financial viability of companies, including SMEs, that invest in such innovation; stresses that specific measures should facilitate cross-border SME cooperation, particularly in cyber, AI, and unmanned and dual-use technologies, building on existing excellence centres in Member States;

Removed:16. Stresses the need to develop a more proactive role for the EU in sustaining investment in dual-use technologies and products, in particular when they are part of the supply chains of defence products, as a means of enhancing the EU’s security of supply and resilience against hybrid and emerging threats; advocates the promotion of civilian commercialisation of these technologies as a way to expand market opportunities and strengthen the EDTIB, fostering synergies between military and civilian development; calls on the Commission and Member States to create incentives to localise supply chains in the Union of the most critical inputs for defence products;

Added:20. Calls on the Member States and the Commission to establish a European ‘defence innovation accelerator’ initiative, analogous to concept models such as the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) or NATO’s Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), that would fund high-risk, high-reward defence research projects and provide fast-track pathways for testing and integrating breakthrough technologies into European defence capability programmes; notes that existing EU R&D instruments, including the EDF, the EU Defence Innovation Scheme (EUDIS) and the Hub for EU Defence Innovation (HEDI), leave ownership of results with beneficiaries and grant the Commission and co-financing Member States only limited, non-production related rights; calls on the Commission to design an appropriate intellectual property regime that is tailored to the sensitivities of the defence domain, while also being sufficiently attractive to both national defence ministries and industry, in order to ensure that the programme can address capability needs and priorities;

Removed:17. Firmly believes that in order to guarantee democratic legitimacy and the transparency of EU defence policies in times of hybrid warfare and Russian disinformation campaigns, it is critical that Parliament play a central role in the planning, oversight and scrutiny of this process;

Added:21. Underlines the need to simplify rules and abolish hurdles related to intra-EU transfers of defence products, including mutual recognition of criteria and certification and a simplification of prior authorisation requests; deplores the limited use of general transfer licences under Directive 2009/81/EC and the wide recourse to individual licences and calls on Member States to make full use of the possibilities for simplifying rules and reducing administrative burdens within the current legal framework; calls on the Commission to urgently present proposals to further harmonise intra-EU transfers of defence products, to ensure more simplified circulation of such products within the EU, in particular by eliminating authorisation requirements for components that are already integrated or are to be integrated into a defence product and cannot be transferred or exported as such; calls, furthermore, on the Member States to work towards that same goal and to swiftly transpose and apply the measures proposed in the Defence Readiness Omnibus as regards intra-EU transfers of defence products; calls on the Member States to fully respect the EU Common Position on arms exports and to explore, wherever possible, further harmonisation of export rules for defence goods; suggests, as possible starting points, harmonising export control systems, extending general transfer licences or using the Aachen Treaty, and strengthening the ICT Directive15 to facilitate the intra-EU transfers of defence-related products;

Added:22. Calls on the Commission, the EDA and the Member States to work on a scheme for mutual recognition of security clearances and certifications, so that clearances issued in one Member State are also accepted in other Member States; proposes the establishment of a voluntary convention on mutual recognition agreements on security clearances among EU Member States, whereby a company or individual holding a national security clearance in one Member State would have that clearance recognised by others that join the agreement, subject to appropriate information sharing and oversight; invites the EDA to facilitate the development of this framework and calls on the Member States to conclude it swiftly;

Added:23. Stresses the imperative of strengthening the resilience of the European defence supply chains and reducing single points of failure and exposure to potential coercive measures by non-EU countries, exemplified by China’s threats to limit exports of raw materials; demands that the implementation of the Critical Raw Materials Act16 place specific emphasis on defence needs;

Added:24. Calls for the Commission and the Member States to create incentives for supply chain diversification, including support for new market entrants and SMEs; stresses that the pursuit of cost efficiency must not undermine national security of supply; calls on the Commission to monitor supply chain risks and identify areas of dangerous concentration, reporting regularly on progress in supply diversification; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to address situations in which sub-suppliers from non-EU countries refuse to deliver materials if they are to be used in military applications; stresses the need for a legal framework ensuring contractual reliability throughout defence supply chains; calls for the Commission to establish strategic stockpiles in line with the EU Preparedness Union Strategy; emphasises, in that regard, the importance of the security of supply regime established under EDIP;

Added:25. Underlines the need to ensure that defence industrial production, investment and value creation are geographically balanced and contribute to economic and social convergence within the EU while enhancing resilience through geographical diversification and reflecting the reality of security threats faced by the Member States in their respective neighbourhoods; calls for defence investment planning to be carried out in a manner that strengthens social cohesion within and between regions and Member States, while at the same time enhancing resilience in times of defence crises, provided that this does not undermine the aim of cost efficiency, speed and competition;

Added:26. Invites the Commission to issue clear guidance on how defence and security considerations are to be weighed in merger control decisions affecting the EDTIB, in line with EU competition policy; further invites the Commission to explore targeted adaptations of EU competition rules to better support the defence industry’s unique needs, such as the introduction of a targeted block exemption for defence R&D projects financed by EU programmes; emphasises that security of supply and reduction of strategic dependencies should be treated as positive criteria when assessing mergers or as aid measures in the defence sector;

Added:27. Stresses the need to develop a more proactive role for the EU in sustaining investment in dual-use technologies and products, in particular when they are part of the supply chains of defence products, as a means of enhancing the EU’s security of supply and resilience to hybrid and emerging threats; advocates the promotion of civilian commercialisation of these technologies as a way to expand market opportunities, create positive spill-overs and strengthen the EDTIB, fostering synergies between military and civilian development; calls on the Commission and the Member States to create incentives to limit to the EU the supply chains of the most critical inputs for defence products, including through a strengthened Defence Equity Facility, focused on late-stage commercialisation, scale-up finance and SME access to testing corridors and cyber ranges; stresses that the emerging ‘new space’ sector and its innovative potential regarding dual-use technologies should be fully exploited with regard to defence and civilian developments;

Added:28. Calls on the Commission to assess the legal, procedural and regulatory adjustments that would be necessary to ensure that the EU and its Member States can rapidly adapt defence procurement and production rules in the event of war or a major security crisis and to ensure no disruption of the single market; further calls on the Commission to ensure that such an exercise is aligned with the security of supply regime included in EDIP; emphasises the importance of preparedness in the form of a contingency framework for emergency procurement and industrial ramp-up, which could be activated swiftly if needed;

Added:29. Believes that the EU institutions and agencies should enhance their role of facilitating coordination between the Member States and welcomes the EDA’s contribution, particularly through the Capability Development Plan and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence, emphasising that its expertise should be fully exploited; underlines the crucial role of the EDA in promoting a single market for defence and calls on the Member States to strengthen the EDA’s mandate and resources in this respect; supports a greater involvement of the EDA in EU defence initiatives and in identifying persisting barriers to the single market for defence; calls for the development and regional deployment of HEDI within the EDA, with a view to expanding its role as a central platform connecting SMEs, start-ups, research centres and prime contractors; firmly believes that reinforcing the EDA will help to foster the mutual trust and cooperation needed to advance the single market for defence, as the EDA is uniquely positioned to bridge national and European interests; welcomes also the contribution of multilateral procurement agencies, such as the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation, which promote the harmonisation of equipment among Member States and non-EU partner states;

Added:30. Highlights the need for further European funding dedicated to tackling the commercialisation gap in innovation of defence products; calls for strengthened instruments to ensure that SMEs and mid-caps have real and scalable access to private capital and defence programmes, including through streamlined procurement, innovation-friendly rules and cross-border matchmaking support, thus ensuring their increased participation and a fairer allocation of funds; stresses the importance of establishing regional defence tech incubators under HEDI’s umbrella to support cross-border SME consortia, provide mentorship on navigating defence procurement, and facilitate the testing and validation of innovative technologies in collaboration with military end users;

Added:31. Underlines the need for the EU and NATO to sign a comprehensive cooperation agreement on capability planning and development to ensure coherent and complementary planning and interoperable defence capabilities, and on standardisation; emphasises that such cooperation must respect the autonomy of both organisations while avoiding duplication and promoting fair burden-sharing; calls on the Commission, in cooperation with the EDA, to prepare a legislative proposal that would create a harmonised EU framework for legally binding technical standards and certification of defence products, drawing on the European Defence Standards Reference System (EDSTAR) and, where appropriate, by codifying selected NATO STANAGs into EU legislation; further calls on the Commission to propose a framework for joint European testing and certification of defence equipment instead of having separate national validation for each defence product, including common testing and certification facilities; calls on the Member States to align their procurement and capability development efforts with NATO defence planning priorities, ensuring full interoperability of systems and avoiding parallel structures; underlines that a stronger and more integrated European defence industry should enhance Europe’s contribution within NATO and transatlantic burden-sharing, while maintaining open cooperation with trusted partners such as Ukraine, EEA/EFTA countries and Security and Defence Partnership states; encourages the implementation of NATO’s Rapid Adoption Action Plan aimed at accelerating national procurement processes and efforts to reform acquisition cycles, testing protocols and certification frameworks, ensuring that military innovation keeps pace with the threat environment;

Added:32. Takes note of the defence-related recommendations presented by former Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta in 2024 in his report entitled ‘Much More Than a Market'; notes that tax obstacles and different procedures on value added tax in collaborative procurement programmes hamper the achievement of the objectives of Defence Readiness 2030, the ramping up of defence industries and the expansion of joint programmes; calls on the Commission to follow up on the Letta report and increase efforts to reduce tax obstacles;

Added:33. Calls on the Member States to promote careers in defence technology to young professionals, including through awareness campaigns about the sector’s contribution to Europe’s security and technological innovation; encourages the establishment of public-private partnerships between defence companies, educational institutions and governments to create talent pipelines; urges the Member States and the Commission to propose, in dialogue with social partners, including unions, sector-specific skills strategies such as training programmes and opportunities for life-long learning to fill current and future skill gaps in the defence industry; suggests, to that effect, that the Union of Skills agenda explicitly include the defence sector, facilitating the mobility of skilled workers across Member States to where they are most needed;

Added:34. Calls on the Commission to further quantify the potential financial and operational benefits of a single market for defence, including efficiency gains and an increase in collective military capability, through an independent impact assessment; calls for the creation of a single contact point where stakeholders can report obstacles, gather evidence and monitor compliance by the Member States;

Added:35. Welcomes the European Council conclusions of October 2025 calling for an annual report on EU defence industrial readiness, and calls for this to be complemented by a ‘defence single market scoreboard’, published by the Commission in cooperation with the EDA; stresses that this scoreboard should track indicators such as the share of defence procurement conducted jointly or through open, EU-wide competition, levels of cross-border industrial cooperation, SME participation rates and reductions in system duplication; underlines that it should also capture the socio-economic benefits of EU defence programmes across the Member States and regions, including job creation and industrial development, in order to guide policy refinement and reinforce public trust;

Added:36. Firmly believes that, in order to guarantee democratic legitimacy and the transparency of EU defence policies in times of hybrid warfare and disinformation campaigns, Parliament must play a central role in the planning, oversight and scrutiny of those policies; underlines that transparency and accountability must be ensured; calls on the Commission, the Council, the Member States and the EDA to ensure secure channels for exchange of classified and confidential information with Parliament, the defence industry and national authorities;

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37. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.