What changed between the draft committee report and the plenary report

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

We are at a crucial moment, when Europe faces unprecedented challenges, with the war of aggression at our doorstep. We can see this today more clearly than ever – Russia’s escalation has resulted in violation of EU’s and NATO’s airspace in several countries. The broader geopolitical landscape is undergoing profound changes and shifts. This volatile international environment means major challenges, the security of Europe is at serious risk.

Escalation in the Middle East has led to significant and varied risks for European and global security, and in the long-term, China’s rise as a global power may introduce new strategic complexities.

Change 12

Changed:It is therefore paramount that we maintain strong and unified transatlantic relations within NATO and with partners in the Indo-Pacific, such as Japan and the Republic of Korea. Europeans must take more responsibility for our owntheir security and do more to deter Russia.

Change 13

Changed:Addressing this risk, clearly requires new forms of cooperation and targeted partnerships that deliver concrete results and build real capabilities. This is where the EU and its security and defence partners play a key role. If challenges and threats know no borders, then we need friends to tackle them. The European Union cannot do it alone.

Change 14

Changed:The evolving geopolitical landscape, marked by Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, increasingthe tensionsshifting inrole theof Indo-Pacific,NATO, and theincreasing shiftingtensions rolein ofthe NATOIndo-Pacific has intensified the need for a robust and cohesive European security and defence partnerships.

Change 15

Changed:The report places EU Security and Defence Partnerships in the overall context of EU Common Security and Defence Policy. Overall, the Strategic Compass of the EU commits to engage more with its bilateral partners and thus build tailored partnerships based on shared values and interests.

Change 16

Changed:Cooperation with strategic partners such as the UK, Canada, Norway, South Korea, Japan, Moldova, Albania, North Macedonia, but alsoas suchwell as the US and Ukraine, with which the EU hasdoes not yet have formal partnerships, serves asis a key element of the commonCommon securitySecurity and defenceDefence policy.Policy.

Change 17

Changed:Today, the EU is on a path of an overhaul of its defence policypolicy, –which is critical for Europe to beEurope’s ableability to defend itself and advance its interests globally. This overhaul must also hasextend to reach partnerships in the security and defence sphere.partnerships.

The EU has always sought partners to uphold the rules-based multilateral order – today more than ever the outreach needs to reflect defence and security interests of EU countries. Current volatile international environment poses increased threats and challenges to our common security – which requires more efforts, new forms of cooperation and targeted partnerships that deliver concrete results and build real capabilities.

Promoting partnerships on security and defence is also essential for our capability development, innovation and defence industrial readiness as well as to diversify supplies of raw material or critical components.

In line with the White Paper, the EU has taken concrete steps to advance its partnership agenda in the field of security and defence with allies and like-minded partners, notably NATO, with which the EDA will pursue a technical arrangement for the exchange of classified information.

Change 18

Changed:Partnerships are crucial to help enhance interoperability and reinforce industrial cooperation, as well as diversify supplies of raw material or critical components. This model is pioneered with Unitedthe KingdomUK and Canada, with which bilateral agreements are being negotiated to allow their respective defence industries and products to benefit from joint procurement under the SAFE instrument. Defence industrial cooperations is also at the centre of Defence Industrial Dialogues with Japan and, potentially in the future, with India. The EU should also deepen its security and defence partnership with Moldova.

Change 19

Changed:The report aims to take stock of the current and develop proposals for future defence partnerships – providing concrete policy suggestions and actions for adaptation. It explores alignments with some of the broader objectives of building a strong defence policy of the European Union,EU, including relations with NATO, and alignment with its capabilities, ensuring innovation and rapid advancement of defence industries.

Change 20

Changed:As the EU seeks to bolster its Common Security and Defence Policy strengthened partnerships with NATO and regional partners are becoming increasingly vital. The relation with NATO is a priority one, and needs to keep improving, including through increased intelligence and information sharing. The EU-NATO cooperation will also be important for workingin onaddressing criticalcritical, infrastructure,and transport infrastructure, energy grids, digital communication,communications orand civilian satellites.

Change 21

Changed:There is consensus among EU Member States on the importance of EU Partnerships. EUThe conclusions state that “The European Council conclusionsunderlines alsothe outlineimportance of working together with like-minded partners, who share our foreign and security policy goals. It welcomes in that regard the EU’s recent Security and defenceDefence Partnerships with the UK and Canada”. This forms a clear direction from Member States to move forward robustly on implementing the partnerships. The EU Council conclusions also set out the priorities for thesecurity EU.and defence. They state that “Europe must become more sovereign, more responsible for its own defence and better equipped to act and deal autonomously and in a coordinated way with immediate and future challenges and threats, with a 360° approach”.

Change 22

Removed:The conclusions also state that “The European Council underlines the importance of working together with like-minded partners, who share our foreign and security policy goals. It welcomes in that regard the EU’s recent Security and Defence Partnerships with the UK and Canada”. This forms a clear direction from Member States to move forward robustly on implementing the partnerships.

Added:The report calls for alignments with some of the broader objectives of building a strong European Defence Union, including improving relations with NATO, and consistent with its capabilities.

Removed:The report calls for alignments with some of the broader objectives of building a strong European Defence Union, including improving relations with NATO, and alignment with its capabilities.

Added:The partnerships vary in their scope, as highlighted in the report, but they are critical for depending on the assessed mutual interests of the EU and each partner. However, several areas can be outlined as thematic components.

Removed:The partnerships vary in their scope, as highlighted in the report, but they are critical for depending on the assessed mutual interests of the EU and each partner, but several areas can be outlined as thematic components:

Common areas of focus for the partnerships will be the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations – as they remain the cornerstone of its external security engagement. These missions, both civilian and military, are also linked EU’s work on conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict stabilisation, areas which will also be evaluated in the report.

Closely aligned with these are efforts in integrated border management and maritime security. In these domains, and other ones, operational presence, intelligence sharing, and strategic foresight are increasingly vital – and should be shared among partners.

Change 23

Changed:As indicated in the report – sustained long-term support for Ukraine is vital for EU defence and security. This also goes for building a direct partnership with Ukraine defence industry – where a lot of lessons can be learned from each other, especially on usage of drones and new technique on the battlefield.

The partnerships should have an important component of responding to emerging threats and resilience building. The EU’s approach to hybrid threats and cybersecurity reflects a growing recognition of non-traditional security challenges. Coordination and cooperation on (cyber) capacity building, particularly for partners, demonstrates the EU’s dual focus on internal resilience and external projection.

This also includes efforts to bolster the resilience of critical infrastructure and improve strategic communication (STRATCOM) and foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) responses.

Change 24

Changed:In the partnerships, the EU should continue to emphasise counterterrorism and the prevention of violent extremism, reflecting the need to address both state and non-state threats through integrated security frameworks – developed with partners. Preventing trafficking inhuman humanstrafficking and small arms proliferation are also important areas.

Partnerships should also be strengthened through structured consultations on relevant defence initiatives, tools, and instruments. These should include cooperation of defence industries (including financing).

Change 25

Changed:Training, education, and capacity building—whetherbuilding – whether cyber-specific or more broadly defence-related —– are key levers for deepening cooperation with partner states and organisations. These initiatives aim to elevate shared standards, interoperability, and strategic alignment.

It will be important to implement a well-coordinated engagement in international forums to promote the partnerships and reflect a multilateral approach to global security governance.

An important component will be ensuring that partnerships can support innovation and rapid advancement of defence industries and working towards industry effectiveness and economic efficiency.

Change 26

Changed:A multi-stakeholder process is needed, involving the European Parliament, Council and Commission, along with Member States and should launch a process of broader consultations and engagement on EU securitySecurity and defenceDefence partnershipsPartnerships – which will also have the aim to move the monitor existing and encouraging new partnerships.

Change 27

Changed:In summary – the report shows where progress needs to be consistent in order to build up EU Security and Defence Partnerships – and importantly, that theythese align with the defence priorities and political goals of EUthe EU’s external engagement. This is key for its priorities and its responses to the changingevolving global landscape.