What changed between the draft committee report and the plenary report

Added:10. Stresses that NATO remains the key collective transatlantic defence alliance, with the EU and NATO playing complementary, coherent and mutually reinforcing roles to ensure security in Europe and enhance international security, and encourages close collaboration and a mutually beneficial partnership with the United States in this area; underlines that a stronger and more capable EU in the field of security and defence will contribute positively to both global and transatlantic security; underscores the need for a strong EU defence pillar within NATO, capable of acting autonomously while complementing NATO, thereby strengthening the transatlantic partnership and providing necessary security guarantees for the EU, its Member States and the international rules-based order; points out, at the same time, that European defence must stand on its own two feet and have a sufficiently strong deterrent capability; warns of the risks posed by the shifting focus of US foreign policy, which could translate into a decrease in its security commitments to Europe; emphasises, therefore, the need for the EU to develop its own planning and operational capacity;

Removed:10. Underlines that the EU-US relationship remains critical for European security and defence; stresses the importance of exploring a formalised SDP with the United States; points out the need for constant dialogue and alignment of threat perceptions; reiterates that our partnership with the United States is of strategic importance and calls for a deepening of our cooperation in a mutually beneficial way, including finding the best paths for collaboration between defence industries;

Added:11. Emphasises that strengthening security hinges on the ability of the Member States to equip themselves with interoperable military instruments, developed jointly through the European defence industry, in order to ensure a rapid and effective response to any threat to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the EU Member States; emphasises, in this context, that military capabilities must be identified in synergy with the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) and in line with the ‘one single set of forces’ principle; notes that the EU plays a key role in the regulatory field and in investments aimed at supporting industrial competitiveness, technological development and European defence logistics; stresses that standardisation remains a crucial pillar of EU-NATO cooperation to guarantee interoperability, complementarity of efforts, and the efficient use of resources, while avoiding unnecessary duplication; calls on the Commission and the Member States to simplify and harmonise the rules on the production, certification, transfer, military mobility and maintenance of defence materials and systems, in order to build a competitive, resilient and integrated European industrial supply chain able to ensure greater operational preparedness and full and effective interoperability between the EU and NATO;

Removed:11. Stresses that there can be no European security without Ukrainian security; affirms that Ukraine is a strategic priority partner for the EU as it prepares to take its place as a member of the Union; reiterates that the EU will provide continued, sustainable support with everything that it takes to secure Ukraine’s victory as soon as possible; insists that the EU must contribute to robust legally-backed security guarantees for Ukraine in order to deter further Russian aggression; stresses that closer cooperation between the EU and the Ukrainian defence industrial sector is a priority; underlines the importance of EU partnerships in coordinating assistance to Ukraine; encourages the use of frozen Russian assets in supporting Ukraine;

Added:12. Highlights NATO’s role as a global actor and reliable partner in the efforts towards the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, and in the fight against global terrorism;

Removed:12. Underlines the strategic importance of EU partnerships with countries in the Indo-Pacific, such as Japan and the Republic of Korea, which have already signed SDPs, and encourages the rapid conclusion of negotiations with Australia and the exploration of further partnerships with other countries in the region;

Added:Necessity of EU SDPs

Removed:13. Calls on the Member States and the European External Actions Service (EEAS) to further explore the setting up of SDPs with other partners, notably with Switzerland and EU candidate countries in the Western Balkans as well as with Türkiye, India, and with countries in Africa and the Middle East that are key for EU border security;

Added:13. Welcomes the fact that the EU is positioning itself as a reliable global security partner by strengthening its CSDP, including through mutually beneficial SDPs and deeper bilateral and multilateral dialogues; notes that SDPs are in place with eight countries so far and more are in the pipeline, including with Iceland; calls for these partnerships to include structured industrial cooperation aimed at scaling up EU-based production capacities for core defence production assets within the context of strengthening the European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB);

Removed:Developing UN and multilateral partnerships

Added:14. Believes that the SDP framework is giving new impetus to ongoing security and defence dialogues and practical cooperation; underlines the importance of having tangible deliverables and milestones with agreed target dates; stresses the need for results monitoring, bilateral reviews and dialogue on multi-domain threat perceptions and mutual interests, which are crucial to the implementation of the partnerships; stresses the importance of securing, through strategic SDPs, a reliable supply of critical raw materials that are vital for European defence; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) to provide Parliament with a regular assessment of the implementation status of SDPs;

Removed:14. Stresses the importance of the EU-UN strategic partnership on peace operations and crisis management; welcomes the new priorities of the EU-UN Strategic Partnership for 2025-2028 and stresses the need for increased coherence between and the effectiveness of EU and UN missions and operations;

Added:15. Underlines that SDPs include cooperation with CSDP missions, as they are intended to create synergies, enhance interoperability and coordination, and strengthen the EU’s overall security and defence capabilities;

Removed:15. Notes that the EU and the African Union maintain a strategic partnership, particularly in peace and security; stresses the need to deepen strategic partnerships with other regional organisations, including the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the League of Arab States and the Organization of American States, in areas of mutual interests through joint initiatives, dialogue and increased diplomatic activity;

Added:16. Underlines the strategic importance and need for prioritisation of the SDPs signed with Norway, the UK and Canada, which are NATO allies and the EU’s crucial defence partners; encourages the deepening of these partnerships, including in the area of the defence industry, cyberthreats and hybrid threats and maritime security and in building joint military capabilities and encouraging closer collaboration; emphasises that industrial cooperation should prioritise projects contributing to strategic autonomy and resilience, ensuring balanced geographical distribution of investments across the Member States, with particular attention to the eastern flank; encourages the EU to also sign similar agreements with like-minded partners, including those that are not NATO members;

Removed:Boosting wide and tailor-made ways of cooperation

Added:17. Underlines that the EU-US relationship remains a cornerstone of European security and defence; stresses the importance of exploring a formalised SDP with the United States that would align with EU interests and values and promote a rules-based international order; points out the need for constant dialogue and cooperation on threat perceptions; reiterates that our partnership with the United States is of strategic importance and calls for a deepening of our cooperation in a mutually beneficial way, and exploring the possibilities for optimum collaboration between defence industries;

Removed:16. Stresses that the EU’s integrated approach to CSDP includes the legal frameworks for the participation of third countries and regional organisations in missions and operations;

Added:18. Stresses that there can be no European security without Ukrainian security; stresses the importance of exploring a formalised SDP with Ukraine; affirms that Ukraine is a strategic priority partner for the EU as it prepares to take its place as a member of the Union; reiterates that the EU will provide continued, sustainable support with everything that it takes to secure Ukraine’s victory as soon as possible; insists that the EU must contribute to robust legally-backed security guarantees for Ukraine in order to deter further Russian aggression; stresses that closer cooperation between the EU and the Ukrainian defence industrial sector is a priority, including alignment with European standards and transparency; underlines the importance of EU partnerships and of the nine-point joint security commitments between the EU and Ukraine in coordinating assistance to Ukraine; reiterates its call for the urgent use of frozen Russian assets in supporting Ukraine, while respecting international law; underlines the importance of systematically drawing on the lessons learnt from Ukraine’s operational experience, notably in the area of drones/unmanned aircraft systems and electronic warfare;

Removed:17. Underlines the strategic role of the European Peace Facility (EPF) as a key instrument in strengthening military and defence capacities, supporting military aspects of peace operations as well as to providing equipment to the armed forces of EU partners;

Added:19. Calls on the Member States to actively cooperate and establish synergies with Ukraine, particularly in the fields of air and missile defence and drone and counter-drone warfare, acknowledging its groundbreaking operational expertise and advanced capabilities, thus strengthening both EU and Ukrainian defence capabilities;

Removed:18. Deplores Hungary’s ongoing obstruction of the use of this instrument to assist Ukraine and urges the Member States to actively pressure the Hungarian Government to end its irresponsible blockade of the EPF;

Added:20. Commends the conclusion on 21 May 2024 of the EU-Moldova SDP with a focus on combating hybrid threats;

Removed:19. Welcomes the strengthening of the EEAS network of military advisors in EU Delegations, which strengthen relations with partners’ military and civilian institutions;

Added:21. Underlines the strategic importance of EU partnerships with countries in the Indo-Pacific, such as Japan and the Republic of Korea, which have already signed SDPs, and encourages the rapid conclusion of negotiations with Australia and the exploration of further partnerships with other countries in the region, notably New Zealand; emphasises that Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security challenges are closely intertwined; emphasises that deepening cooperation with India could be mutually beneficial; underlines the need to deepen cooperation on security and defence with Taiwan;

Removed:20. Insists that the EU’s defence readiness 2030 requires partnerships; stresses that achieving this requires securing supply chains, including of raw materials and critical components, reinforcing the European defence technological and industrial base and reducing the EU’s strategic dependencies, without creating new ones;

Added:22. Underlines the need to explore enhanced cooperation at different levels and in various formats on energy security, connectivity and critical infrastructure protection with countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia; notes the strategic importance of these regions for diversifying energy supplies, developing secure transport corridors and strengthening Europe’s overall resilience;

Removed:21. Welcomes the fact that privileged access to the Security Action for Europe instrument (SAFE) could be granted, further to specific bilateral agreements, to those countries with which there is an SDP; notes that SAFE-compliant agreements for the UK and Canada are under negotiation; underlines the importance of Ukraine’s participation in SAFE;

Added:23. Stresses the strategic importance of the Black Sea region for European security; calls for enhanced security and defence cooperation with like-minded partners in the Black Sea region and for the development of a comprehensive EU Black Sea security strategy; supports increased EU investment in Black Sea naval capabilities, coastal defence, and maritime area awareness;

Removed:22. Notes that the European Defence Agency also cooperates with third countries, organisations and entities in the framework of tailor-made administrative arrangements;

Added:24. Calls on the Member States and the EEAS to explore the setting up of additional SDPs, on the basis of clear, mutually beneficial engagements, with other like-minded partners that share our values and are committed to upholding a rules-based international order;

Added:25. Stresses the importance of establishing structured SDPs with Western Balkan countries, notably Bosnia and Herzegovina, to enhance regional stability, counter hybrid threats and strengthen the European security architecture in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood; emphasises that such partnerships should build on the existing CSDP engagement in the region, including the EUFOR Althea operation, political and security dialogues, and joint participation in EU missions, while providing a more strategic and long-term framework for cooperation in areas such as cyber resilience, countering disinformation, and defence capacity building;

Added:Developing UN and other multilateral partnerships

Added:26. Stresses the importance of the EU-UN strategic partnership on peace operations and crisis management; welcomes the new priorities of the EU-UN Strategic Partnership for 2025-2028 and stresses the need for increased coherence between, and effectiveness of, EU and UN missions and operations, including through joint planning and lessons-learnt processes; calls for the full implementation and the systematic integration of the Women, Peace and Security agenda, in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1325, in particular regarding the protection of civilians, full, equal and meaningful participation of women in peace processes, and the prevention of conflict-related sexual violence; calls for the functioning of the UN to be reformed to ensure that missions and operations are effective and have the desired effect;

Added:27. Notes that the EU and the African Union maintain a strategic partnership, particularly in peace and security; stresses the need to deepen strategic partnerships with other regional organisations, including the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the League of Arab States, the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Organization of American States, in areas of mutual interests through joint initiatives, dialogue and increased diplomatic activity; highlights the importance of cooperation with Latin American partners in addressing international organised crime, transnational trafficking, hybrid threats and maritime security, and in promoting democratic resilience and regional stability;

Added:28. Calls for strengthening the operational dimension of EU security and defence cooperation with like-minded and other partners in the Southern Neighbourhood, particularly in the Mediterranean, with a focus on maritime security, counter-terrorism, border management and the protection of critical infrastructure, and building on the commitments set out in the Pact for the Mediterranean to deepen security cooperation with Mediterranean partners; underlines that instability in the region has a direct impact on the EU’s internal security and therefore requires a more strategic and coordinated response;

Added:Boosting broad and tailor-made ways of cooperation

Added:29. Stresses that the EU’s integrated approach to CSDP includes the legal frameworks for the participation of third countries and regional organisations in CSDP missions and operations; stresses that these partners need to uphold our values and share our interests; encourages the Commission and the EEAS to further streamline administrative procedures to ensure faster and more flexible participation of like-minded partners, particularly in training, capacity building and crisis response missions;

Added:30. Underlines the strategic role of the European Peace Facility (EPF) as a key instrument in strengthening military and defence capacities, supporting military aspects of peace operations and providing equipment to the armed forces of EU partners; calls for full transparency and democratic scrutiny of this instrument;

Added:31. Deplores the Hungarian Government’s ongoing obstruction of the use of this instrument to assist Ukraine, including through legal action before the General Court, and its continued blocking of EPF support to Armenia; urges the Member States to actively put pressure on the Hungarian Government to end its irresponsible blockade of the EPF; calls on the VP/HR to find alternative solutions to overcome this situation;

Added:32. Welcomes the strengthening of the EEAS network of military advisers in EU Delegations, which strengthen relations with partners’ military and civilian institutions; calls for the establishment of regular coordination meetings among these advisers to share best practice, improve situational awareness and foster coherence in EU external action;

Added:33. Insists that the EU’s defence readiness 2030 requires partnerships and EU involvement with like-minded partners; stresses that achieving the EU’s proclaimed goals requires securing supply chains, including of raw materials and critical components, reinforcing and strengthening the EDTIB and reducing the EU’s strategic dependencies, without creating new ones; highlights, by way of example, the EU’s dependence on China for critical raw materials, which represents a significant geopolitical and economic vulnerability; calls for democratic oversight and transparency in defence industry partnerships, among other things to ensure compliance with labour and environmental standards; acknowledges that the realisation of a genuine single market for defence is of decisive importance and will strengthen both the EU’s military capabilities and its strategic autonomy;

Added:34. Welcomes the fact that privileged access to the SAFE instrument could be granted, further to specific bilateral agreements, to those countries with which there is an SDP; notes that the negotiations of the SAFE-compliant agreement with Canada have been concluded; regrets that the agreement with the UK has not yet been finalised; stresses that the inclusion of the two countries in EU defence initiatives would be mutually beneficial and would leverage the added value of each industry; underlines the importance of Ukraine’s participation in SAFE;

Added:35. Notes that the European Defence Agency also cooperates with third countries, organisations and entities in the framework of tailor-made administrative arrangements; stresses the need to ensure that these arrangements contribute to the consolidation of the EDTIB and to the protection of disruptive technologies; calls for a reassessment of the administrative arrangements and their effectiveness;

Added:36. Calls for the EEAS to have the necessary human and financial resources to implement existing SDPs, ensuring that they deliver tangible results;

Strengthening key areas of collaboration within SDPs

Change 8

Changed:23.37. Underlines SDPs’ role in integrated border management andwith maritimea security,number of partners, which areis especially important given Russia’s recent provocations and violations of NATO airspace,airspace by the Russian and continuedBelarusian managementregimes, particularly affecting the eastern flank states, and external aspects of illegalirregular migration; recalls that external aspects of irregular migration flows;also affect Member States of the southern flank; calls for increased EU financial and operational support for the border management capabilities of front-line states;

Change 9

Removed:24. Calls for more joint maritime security exercises to promote interoperability and operational readiness in strategically important waterways and chokepoints around the world; insists on the importance of the surveillance of critical maritime infrastructure, including undersea cables and pipelines;

Added:38. Encourages the European Council to consider the participation of countries that have signed SDPs, particularly Norway, the UK and Canada, in EU flagship projects such as the Eastern Flank Watch, the European Drone Defence Initiative, the European Air Shield and the European Space Shield;

Removed:25. Underlines the importance of SDPs for CSDP missions and operations, as they remain the cornerstone of EU external security engagement, and are a key pillar of the EU’s work on conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict stabilisation;

Added:39. Stresses that EU funding priorities should reflect the need for balanced geographical distribution of industrial capacities, with particular attention to strengthening defence production on the eastern flank of the EU to address proximity to high-risk areas;

Removed:26. Stresses that cyberattacks and foreign information manipulation and interference, including disinformation, are a growing security threat for the EU; calls for further cooperation; underlines the importance of SDPs for building societal and democratic resilience;

Added:40. Calls for more joint maritime security exercises with relevant allied partners to promote interoperability and operational readiness in strategically important waterways and choke points around the world, especially in areas where the EU’s vital interests are under threat; insists on the importance of the surveillance and protection of critical maritime infrastructure, including undersea cables and pipelines to prevent increasingly frequent hybrid attacks;

Removed:27. Emphasises the importance of counterterrorism and the prevention of violent extremism, addressing both state and non-state threats through integrated security frameworks;

Added:41. Underlines the importance of SDPs for CSDP missions and operations, as they remain the cornerstone of EU external security engagement, and are a key pillar of the EU’s work on conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict stabilisation;

Removed:28. Insists that partnerships are essential to promote peaceful and responsible behaviours in outer space, respond to space threats and support the use of space services for security and defence;

Added:42. Stresses that cybersecurity attacks, disinformation and foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), the activities of transnational criminal organisations involved in drug smuggling and human trafficking, and the instrumentalisation of migration by belligerent third countries are a growing security threat for the EU; calls for further cooperation with the EU’s partners to strengthen its resilience, protect its critical infrastructure and exchange best practice on tackling FIMI; underlines the importance of SDPs for building societal and democratic resilience; encourages the creation of joint cyber-response exercises and the development of secure information-sharing channels between the EU and its partners to counter hybrid threats;

Removed:29. Underlines that the SDPs contain an effective review clause that allows for adjustments related to implementation and to respond to new security developments; highlights that these partnerships are constantly being strengthened and are delivering concrete results;

Added:43. Points out that the EU’s approach to the protection of critical underwater infrastructure also reflects growing awareness of non-traditional security challenges;

Added:44. Emphasises the importance of counterterrorism and the prevention of violent extremism, addressing both state and non-state threats through integrated security frameworks; emphasises that extensive intergovernmental cooperation and information sharing, both within the EU and with third countries, are needed to effectively combat and prevent terrorism and violent extremism;