Changes between two versions
What changed between the resolution motion joint and the adopted text
From · resolution motion joint· 7 Oct 2025
on a united response to recent Russian violations of the EU Member States’ airspace and critical infrastructure
To · adopted text· 9 Oct 2025
United response to recent Russian violations of the EU Member States’ airspace and critical infrastructure
AI:What changed, in short
The resolution now includes Lithuania and Latvia in solidarity, adds calls for drone countermeasures and southern flank coverage, and emphasizes societal resilience.2345 It also adds a new paragraph on Russian overflight fees and bilateral agreements with China, while removing details on European Peace Facility funding and Council voting.67 The other changes are formal: a date format update.1
6 changes of substance · 1 formal · 0 of wording only
Written by AI from the two texts only · read the changes before relying on it · 4 Sept 2026 · Report a problem
+6 added · −2 removed · 6 changed paragraphs, packaging included.
Part 2 of 2: Paragraphs 61–84
13. Highlights the need to support the Member States along NATO’s eastern flank and in the Black Sea region in developing capabilities for intelligence gathering and the detection and tracking of threats originating beyond the EU’s external borders, such as hybrid operations, attacks on critical infrastructure, instrumentalised migration or drone incursions, with a view to boosting the EU’s situational awareness and capability to effectively anticipate threats; points out that such capabilities should include drone surveillance systems and other technologies allowing for aerial surveillance in EU border regions, as well as for the interception of incoming airborne threats; underlines that an effective, layered reconnaissance and defence system is essential for the protection of citizens and critical infrastructure and for successful deterrence;
14. Calls on the Member States and the European Defence Agency (EDA) to urgently consolidate the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) project entitled Integrated Multi-Layer Air and Missile Defence System (IMLAMD), especially against the threat posed by low-cost UAVs and in line with NATO’s Integrated Air and Missile Defence architecture, to detect and intercept all incoming airborne threats from outside the EU, especially along the eastern flank; insists that European investment in long-range precision weapons systems and enhanced air defence is crucial to ensure deterrence, reduce the risk of Russia exploiting vulnerabilities and protect citizens and critical infrastructure; stresses that increased EDF funding rates should apply to projects relating to those capabilities, as is already the case for PESCO projects;
15. Calls on the Commission to work closely with the European Investment Bank Group and the EDA on ensuring a comprehensive approach combining capability development and funding and to adapt its defence and defence industrial policy instruments to ensure that they are fit for purpose; calls on the Member States to significantly increase the staff and budget of the EDA to facilitate adequate and timely capability development and joint procurement, and calls on the EDA to establish a dedicated, flexible budget for UAVs that spans the full capability life cycle; emphasises the urgent need to heavily invest in drones and counter-drone equipment; welcomes the use of the SAFE instrument and the Defence Equity Facility to scale production, secure supply chains and support the participation of small and medium-sized enterprises in the unmanned vehicles sector;
Change 4
Changed:15.16. Welcomes the EU drone wall initiative, as announced by Commission President von der Leyen, Commissioner Andrius Kubilius and Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security (VP/HR) Kaja Kallas, and the Eastern Flank Watch initiative, noting that the ambitious deadline mentioned by Commissioner Kubilius for its completion requires rapid implementation as part of a broader defence shield along the EU’s and NATO’s eastern flank in response to repeated Russian airspace violations;violations, while underlining the need to ensure comprehensive coverage of all Member States facing direct security challenges along the southern flank; calls on the Commission, the VP/HR and the Member States, in close coordination with NATO, to accelerate the development of a concrete and operational plan for its swift deployment; calls on the Commission to present a coherent plan at the European Council meeting on 23-24 October 2025; recognises the challenge posed by the high cost of intercepting drones and calls for joint programmes to promote the development of cost-effective counter-UAV capabilities;
8 unchanged paragraphs
17. Calls on the Commission to swiftly process any requests from Member States regarding voluntary adaptation of their national recovery and resilience plans to meet the funding requirements of UAV capability development;
18. Stresses the urgent need for enhanced maritime surveillance and believes that the new operational dimension of hybrid warfare requires the integration of maritime security and counter-UAV strategies, also through enhanced underwater surveillance capabilities; welcomes the launch of NATO-led operations, such as the Baltic Sentry Operation, to protect critical undersea infrastructure and enhance maritime situational awareness; highlights the importance of the EU’s Black Sea strategy and of the maritime security hub, aimed at enhancing maritime safety and security;
19. Calls on the Commission to fully engage with the representatives of UAV manufacturers in the Member States, including with manufacturers of dual-use UAVs and satellites;
20. Calls for the supply of raw materials to be strengthened and diversified further, in view of the expansion of UAV manufacturing, and highlights, in this context, the importance of the EU Critical Raw Materials Act which serves as a starting point for comprehensive, cohesive and strategic action; stresses the strategic importance of the EU’s partnerships with Ukraine, Canada and Latin America;
21. Underlines that UAV technological evolution requires flexibility and rapid upgrades, which need to be facilitated by future EU initiatives; notes that the EU is likely to favour sophisticated, expensive and cutting-edge solutions that often come with major delays; calls for continuous investment in defence innovation and technology to support the EDTIB and close the investment and research gaps in defence technology, noting that planning, research, development, procurement and management of capabilities should be done jointly and through a European lens; highlights the strategic importance of defence-related production and the need to ensure that production output can be rapidly scaled up in times of crisis; calls on the Member States to pursue a regulatory environment and procurement processes that coordinate and integrate the existing European ecosystem with strategic partners;
22. Notes that UAV capabilities require significant acceleration of military mobility capabilities as well as fast cross-border movement of equipment and personnel, particularly focusing on border checks, customs procedures and clearance processes; stresses that credible deterrence requires enhanced, genuine and effective military mobility over all EU corridors, and border protection; calls for the EU institutions to approve the proposed tenfold increase in funding for military mobility in the next MFF and to invest heavily in dual-use infrastructure, particularly in frontline regions; notes, in this regard, the continued need for a military Schengen area to facilitate the efficient movement of defence resources across the EU; takes note of the Commission’s proposal for an omnibus on military mobility as a step toward addressing these requirements;
23. Underlines the need for targets for both UAV and counter-UAV development, to ensure comprehensive UAV capabilities; calls on the Commission to propose exemptions from EU environmental legislation for UAV manufacturing facilities;
24. Calls on the Member States and the Commission to fully engage in amending relevant EU and national regulatory frameworks to facilitate any future UAV and counter-UAV capabilities, especially in view of the engagement of armed forces; welcomes all concrete projects to fill capability gaps in the areas of drone and anti-drone warfare and to create a multilayered, deep zone of technologically advanced systems; invites the Member States to consider using the framework of European Defence Projects of Common Interest to set up such projects;
Change 5
Changed:24.25. CallsEmphasises that Russia’s clear provocations are an active strategy of hybrid warfare to sow fear and distrust, and are intended to test and destabilise the societies of EU Member States and NATO allies; stresses, therefore, the importance of societal resilience and preparedness, as highlighted in the recommendations of the Niinistö report on European civilian and military preparedness and readiness; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure swift implementation of the European internal security strategy (ProtectEU) and the preparedness strategy to ensure comprehensive readiness and protection against threats posed by Russia’s breaches of European airspace and other threats; stresses the need for sufficient EU funding in this respect under the current and next MFFs; recommends the development of comprehensive national civil defence strategies against aerial and missile threats, including UAVs, ensuring preparedness at the national, regional, municipal, community and household levels, and that these strategies emphasise early warning systems for local populations, clear instructions regarding response behaviour, and protected spaces (sheltering);
Change 6
Added:26. Recalls that, in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, aircraft registered in Russia or operated by Russian operators are not allowed to fly into the European Union, with limited exceptions; recalls that although no EU airlines currently fly to, from or over the airspace of the Russian Federation, following the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, a number of carriers from non-EU countries continue to do so despite the war-related risks, and despite paying overflight fees to Russia; stresses that such overflight fees result in an estimated EUR 18 million being paid to Russia yearly from Chinese-operated flights departing from Schiphol Airport alone; recalls that air transport between the EU and China is currently governed by bilateral agreements between the Member States and China; calls on the Commission and the Member States, in the light of the full-scale war of aggression in Ukraine, to re-examine the bilateral agreements and propose measures to stop Russia from benefitting from overflight fees;
27. Emphasises the need for stronger civil-military airspace coordination; stresses, in this context, the need for a holistic approach that also focuses on better equipping police forces and civilian authorities with the means to detect and defend against drones; supports the expansion of joint simulation and interception exercises involving civilian, law enforcement and military organisations to enhance preparedness for multi-domain threats; underlines that such exercises should be conducted regularly to ensure sustained readiness and interoperability;
28. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to jointly develop secure, reliable and resilient systems of communication and information sharing to be used by law enforcement, security agencies and civilian institutions for matters of security, in particular in times of crisis; reiterates the importance of enhancing cybersecurity and strategic communication on risks and protection measures for strengthening collective resilience;
Change 7
Changed:27.29. Calls on the Member States to activate Article 42(7) TEU where such gross aggressive actions amount to an armed attack or contribute to preparing an imminent attack; urges the EU and its Member States to set out operational procedures and mechanisms for the event that a Member State triggers Article 42(7) TEU, and calls for military support for the Member States concerned to be funded from the European Peace Facility; is convinced that any Member State that opposes recourse to the European Peace Facility in such cases contravenes its duty of loyalty and solidarity under Article 24(3) TEU and its obligation of mutual aid and assistance enshrined in Article 42(7) TEU; considers, therefore, that an opposing vote may not be considered in the Council; recalls that constructive abstention should be possible for those Member States whose constitutional prerogatives require it;
7 unchanged paragraphs
30. Calls for the EU’s eastern border to be reinforced, in the light of the continuous pressure exerted by Russia and Belarus on the EU’s external borders through instrumentalised migration, in order to provide swift and flexible support to Member States by addressing any technological and operational gaps when they arise, whether in the air, on land or in water;
31. Calls for defence cooperation with Ukraine to be substantially stepped up, in particular regarding both drone technology and countermeasures, including enhancing industrial cooperation between Member States and Ukraine; calls on the Commission and the Member States and their defence industries to consider supporting, investing in and partnering with the Ukrainian defence industry to make use of the full potential of production capacities in Ukraine, in line with the ‘Danish model’; urges the Member States and their defence industries to set up joint ventures and develop partnerships with Ukraine for the joint development of defence products in the EU, particularly in the areas of drones, counter-drone technologies and long-range strike capabilities;
32. Welcomes the announcement by Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy that Ukraine will begin foreign production and exporting of proprietary defence technologies to preferred European and NATO partners; acknowledges the significant knowledge and experience that Ukraine has developed in the production of drones and counter-drone technologies and expects the EU and its Member States to learn from this expertise and knowledge, noting the potential contribution of Ukraine’s military and industrial know-how accumulated during Russia’s invasion; calls on the Commission, together with the EDA, to coordinate the purchase of UAV licenses from Ukraine, to enable willing Member States to produce the UAVs; calls on the Member States to formalise cooperation and set up structures to facilitate the exchange of lessons learned, technical knowledge and best practice, including in the framework of the EU and NATO; calls for EU-NATO cooperation in institutionalising the lessons learned from Ukraine’s battlefield experience by integrating the doctrinal and technological innovations in their preparations for modern combat conditions;
33. Calls for the EDIP legislation to be finalised swiftly and for it to be used, alongside the SAFE instrument, to commit financial resources to learning from Ukraine and to supporting Ukraine in UAV warfare; recognises the ongoing role the Drone Coalition plays in the standardisation of UAVs, its critical aid to Ukraine and its role in ensuring that Member States keep pace with fast-changing requirements on the battlefield;
34. Reiterates that the recent aggressive actions by Russia must not, and will not, deter the EU and its Member States from their enduring commitment to supporting Ukraine in the exercise of its inherent right to self-defence, recalling that Ukraine’s security contributes to that of Europe as a whole; emphasises that assisting Ukraine in strengthening its air defence capabilities is crucial, as engagement in Ukrainian skies reduces the risk of drones reaching EU territory; believes that the outcome of the war and the stance taken by the international community will play a crucial role in influencing future aggressive action by Russia in Europe and beyond; urges all Member States to immediately provide additional military assistance and to engage in joint procurement of additional capabilities for Ukraine, in particular ammunition for air defence; calls for the lifting of restrictions on the use of Western weapons systems delivered to Ukraine against military targets on Russian territory, as these are used for launching attacks on Ukraine’s population and critical civilian infrastructure;
35. Reiterates its call on the Member States, together with their G7 partners, to immediately endorse the Commission proposal to use all frozen Russian assets as a foundation for a substantial grant and loan to Ukraine, with reimbursement contingent on the future payment of war reparations by Russia, as a legally sound and financially significant way to maintain and increase EU support for Ukraine’s military needs, including counter-drone defence;
36. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Secretary General of NATO, and the President and Parliament of Ukraine.