What changed between the draft committee report and the plenary report

DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

Changed:on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the establishment of 'Eurodac' for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of Regulation[Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person,person], for identifying an illegally staying third-country national or stateless person and on requests for the comparison with Eurodac data by Member States' law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes (recast)

9 unchanged paragraphs

(COM(2016)0272 – C80179/2016 – 2016/0132(COD))

(Ordinary legislative procedure – recast)

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2016)0272),

– having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 78(2)(e), Article 79(2)(c), Article 87(2)(a), and Article 88(2)(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C80179/2016),

– having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 19 October 2016,

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee of Regions of 8 December 2016,

– having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 28 November 2001 on a more structured use of the recasting technique for legal acts,

Changed:– having regard to the letter of ...20172 February 2017 from the Committee on Legal Affairs to the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs in accordance with Rule 104(3) of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to Rules 104 and 59 of its Rules of Procedure,

Changed:– having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and the opinion of the Committee on Budgets (A80000/2017),(A8-0212/2017),

A. whereas, according to the Consultative Working Party of the legal services of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, the Commission proposal does not include any substantive amendments other than those identified as such in the proposal and whereas, as regards the codification of the unchanged provisions of the earlier acts together with those amendments, the proposal contains a straightforward codification of the existing texts, without any change in their substance;

1. Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out, taking into account the recommendations of the Consultative Working Party of the legal services of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission;

Changed:2. Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if itreplaces, intendssubstantially toamends amendor itsintends proposalto substantially or replace it withamend anotherits text;proposal;

3. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

Title 1: on the establishment of 'Eurodac' for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of [Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person] , for identifying an illegally staying third-country national or stateless person and on requests for the comparison with Eurodac data by Member States' law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes, and amending Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 (recast)

Change 1

Removed:The initial Commission proposal includes DubliNet and the operational responsibility of eu-LISA in Article 5(5) describing the Eurodac´s architecture, which from the operational point of view is not correct. It would be better to amend Regulation (EU) 1077/2011. Therefore, an amendment is tabled providing for a new chapter containing the Commission text with additional provisions clarifying the operational responsibility (see Amendment 59). The text is relating to an amendment in a non-codified part.

Added:Citation 1: Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Articles 78 (2)(d) and (e), 79(2)(c), 87(2)(a) and 88(2)(a) thereof,

Removed:Recital 5: (5) Biometrics constitute an important element in establishing the exact identity of such persons. It is necessary to set up a system for the comparison of their biometric data. / (This amendment applies throughout the text. Adopting it will necessitate corresponding changes throughout.)

Added:Recital 4 a (new): (4a) It is necessary that all Member States register in Eurodac information on resettled third-country nationals and stateless persons for the purposes of identifying secondary movements of such persons.

Change 2

Changed:Recital 10:4 (10)b To(new): assist(4b) MemberThe Statesregistration overcomein challenges,Eurodac whereof itinformation on resettled third-country nationals or stateless persons is impossibledesigned to takeensure thethat fingerprintssuch ofpersons theenjoy, third-countryin nationalaccordance orwith stateless[Regulation personXXX/XXX], becausethe hissame orlevel herof fingertipsprotection areand damaged,the eithersame intentionallyrights orapplicable not,to orother amputated,beneficiaries thisof Regulationinternational alsoprotection permitsas regards the comparisonprocessing of atheir facialdata. imageThis withoutshould fingerprints.also enable Member States shouldto exhaustverify allwhether attemptsor tonot ensurea thatthird-country fingerprintsnational canor bestateless takenperson fromhas thealready data-subjectbeen beforeresettled ain comparisonanother usingMember State in accordance with Regulation XXX/XXX. Where a facialthird-country imagenational onlyor canstateless person has already been resettled, it should be carriedpossible out.to establish the Member State of resettlement and to monitor any secondary movements.

Change 3

Removed:Recital 11: (11) The return of third-country nationals or stateless persons who do not have a right to stay in the Union, in accordance with fundamental rights as general principles of Union law as well as international law, including refugee protection and human rights obligations, and in compliance with the provisions of Directive 2008/115/EC26, is an essential part of the comprehensive efforts to address migration and, in particular, to reduce and deter irregular migration. To increase the effectiveness of the Union system to return illegally staying third-country nationals or stateless persons is needed in order to maintain public trust in the Union migration and asylum system, and should go hand in hand with the efforts to protect those in need of protection.

Added:Recital 5: (5) Biometrics constitute an important element in establishing the exact identity of such persons because they ensure high accuracy of identification. It is necessary to set up a system for the comparison of their biometric data.

Removed:Recital 12: (12) National authorities in the Member States experience difficulties in identifying illegally staying third-country nationals or stateless persons who use deceptive means to avoid their identification and to frustrate the procedures for re-documentation in view of their return and readmission. It is therefore essential to ensure that information on third-country nationals or stateless persons who are found to be staying illegally in the EU are collected and transmitted to Eurodac and are compared also with those collected and transmitted for the purpose of establishing the identity of applicants for international protection and of third-country nationals or stateless persons apprehended in connection with the unlawful crossing of the external borders of the Union, in order to facilitate their identification and re-documentation and to ensure their return and readmission, and to reduce identity fraud. It should also contribute to reducing the length of the administrative procedures necessary for ensuring return and readmission of illegally staying third-country nationals or stateless persons, including the period during which they may be kept in administrative detention awaiting removal. It should also allow identifying third countries of transit, where the illegally staying third-country national or stateless person may be readmitted.

Added:Recital 9: (9) The Communication of the Commission of 13 May 2015, titled "A European Agenda on Migration"25 noted that "Member States must also implement fully the rules on taking migrants' fingerprints at the borders" and further proposed that "the Commission will also explore how more biometric identifiers can be used through the Eurodac system (such as using facial recognition techniques through digital photos)".

Removed:Recital 13: (13) In its Conclusions of 8 October 2015 on the future of return policy, the Council endorsed the initiative announced by the Commission to explore an extension of the scope and purpose of Eurodac to enable the use of data for return purposes27. Member States should have the necessary tools at their disposal to be able to detect illegal migration to and secondary movements of illegally staying third-country nationals or stateless persons in the Union. Therefore, the data in Eurodac should be available, subject to the conditions set out in this Regulation, for comparison by the designated authorities of the Member States.

Added:Recital 10: (10) For the purposes of obtaining high accuracy identification, fingerprints should always be preferred over facial images. Member States should exhaust all attempts to ensure that fingerprints can be taken from the data-subject before a comparison using a facial image only can be carried out. To assist Member States overcome challenges, where it is impossible to take the fingerprints of the third-country national or stateless person because his or her fingertips are damaged, either intentionally or not, or amputated, this Regulation should also permit the comparison of a facial image without fingerprints. Where the physical impossibility to give fingerprints is of a temporary nature, that fact should be recorded and the fingerprinting process should be carried out at a later stage when the physical integrity of the fingertips is restored.

Removed:Recital 14: (14) The Commission’s Communication on Stronger and Smarter Information Systems for Borders and Security28 highlights the need to improve the interoperability of information systems as a long-term objective, as also identified by the European Council and the Council. The Communication proposes to set up an Expert Group on Information Systems and Interoperability to address the legal and technical feasibility of achieving interoperability of the information systems for borders and security. This group should assess the necessity and proportionality of establishing interoperability with the Schengen Information Systems (SIS), the Visa Information Systems (VIS), and other relevant databases in the area of Justice and Home Affairs. In particular, the question whether interoperability should be established between EURODAC and the Entry-Exist-System (EES) database to allow consultation between the systems and the automatic transfer from the EES to Eurodac of the data of third-country nationals or stateless persons having exceeded the maximum duration of authorised stay should be assessed. Given the current lack of information sharing between Member States on return decisions, the Expert Group on Information Systems and Interoperability should also assess the potential benefits of registering return decisions and other measures relating to removal in Eurodac. / 28 COM(2016) 0205

Added:Recital 11: (11) The return of third-country nationals or stateless persons who do not have a right to stay in the Union, in accordance with fundamental rights as general principles of Union law as well as international law, including refugee protection, the principle of non-refoulement and human rights obligations, and in compliance with the provisions of Directive 2008/115/EC26, is an important part of the comprehensive efforts to address migration in a fair and efficient way and, in particular, to reduce and deter irregular migration. To increase the effectiveness of the Union system to return illegally staying third-country nationals or stateless persons is needed in order to maintain public trust in the Union migration and asylum system, and should go hand in hand with the efforts to protect those in need of protection.

Removed:Recital 19: (19) Access for comparisons to Eurodac data by Europol should be allowed only in specific cases, under specific circumstances and under strict conditions.

Added:Recital 12: (12) National authorities in the Member States experience difficulties in identifying illegally staying third-country nationals or stateless persons in view of their return and readmission. It is therefore essential to ensure that information on third-country nationals or stateless persons who are found to be staying illegally in the Union are collected and transmitted to Eurodac and are compared also with those collected and transmitted for the purpose of establishing the identity of applicants for international protection and of third-country nationals or stateless persons apprehended in connection with the unlawful crossing of the external borders of the Union, in order to facilitate their identification and re-documentation and to ensure their return and readmission, and to reduce identity fraud. It should also contribute to reducing the length of the administrative procedures necessary for ensuring return and readmission of illegally staying third-country nationals or stateless persons, including the period during which they may be kept in administrative detention awaiting removal. It should also allow identifying third countries of transit, where the illegally staying third-country national or stateless person may be readmitted. This should be without prejudice to the operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS), which remains the primary system to ensure cooperation and information exchange on return.

Removed:Amendment linked to Article1(1)(c) of proposal (non-codified) which provides that Eurodac will serve not only the purpose of implementation of the Dublin Regulation, but also law enforcement purposes. However, the current ex-ante control by an independent verifying authority of every access by Europol´s operating unit to Eurodac makes it extremely difficult to implement due to legal, data protection and technical reasons. The deletion of this requirement is counterbalanced by a new paragraph 3b in Article 22 reinforcing the obligation to comply with data protection rules and with the control mechanisms provided for therein.

Added:Recital 12 a (new): (12a) Member States should be able to derogate from the provisions of Article 14 in respect of illegally staying third-country nationals who entered the Union by legally crossing the external border where they have overstayed their authorised period of stay by a period of no more than 15 days.

Removed:Recital 22: (22) This Regulation also lays down the conditions under which requests for comparison of biometric or alphanumeric data with Eurodac data for the purposes of preventing, detecting or investigating terrorist offences or other serious criminal offences should be allowed and the necessary safeguards to ensure the protection of the fundamental right to respect for the private life of individuals whose personal data are processed in Eurodac. The strictness of those conditions reflects the fact that the Eurodac database registers biometric and alphanumeric data of persons who are not presumed to have committed a terrorist offence or other serious criminal offence. It is acknowledged that law enforcement authorities and Europol do not always have the biometric data of the perpetrator or victim whose case they are investigating, which may hamper their ability to check biometric matching databases such as Eurodac. In order to contribute further to investigations of those authorities and Europol, search based on alphanumeric data should be allowed in Eurodac in such cases, in particular where those authorities and Europol may possess evidence of the criminal suspect or victim's personal details or identity documents.

Added:Recital 13: (13) In its Conclusions of 8 October 2015 on the future of return policy, the Council endorsed the initiative announced by the Commission to explore an extension of the scope and purpose of Eurodac to enable the use of data for return purposes27. Member States should have the necessary tools at their disposal to be able to detect illegal migration to the Union and to identify secondary movements and illegally staying third-country nationals and stateless persons in the Union. Therefore, the data in Eurodac should be available, subject to the conditions set out in this Regulation, for comparison by the designated authorities of the Member States.

Removed:Under the proposal, national law enforcement authorities and Europol cannot request comparison with specific alphanumeric data, which is highly detrimental to investigations, especially in the counter-terrorism field, trying to establish the places and dates of entry in the EU of suspects for which a used identity is known, but no fingerprint is available. In this context, and given that Art.1.1(c) of the proposal, extends its scope of Eurodac to law enforcement purposes, it would be essential for national law enforcement authorities and Europol to have access to all data contained in Eurodac in order to properly carry out their tasks.

Added:Recital 13 a (new): (13 a) The European Border and Coast Guard Agency, as established by Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council1a, plays a key role in the Union’s efforts for a better management of external borders, and the prevention of illegal immigration and secondary movements. Consequently, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency should be provided with access to Eurodac data in order to be able to undertake risk analyses to the highest possible standard and to assist Member States with return-related tasks. Those data should be processed in compliance with the data protection safeguards provided for in that Regulation. / 1a Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and the Council of 14 September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC (OJ L 251, 16.9.2016, p.1).

Removed:Recital 24: (24) It is also necessary to require the Member States promptly to take and transmit the biometric data of every applicant for international protection and of every third-country national or stateless person who is apprehended in connection with the irregular crossing of an external border of a Member State or is found to be staying illegally in a Member State, if they are at least six years of age.

Added:Recital 13 b (new): (13 b) As one of the tasks of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency and the European Union Agency for Asylum, referred to in this Regulation, is the taking and transmitting of biometric data, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency and the European Union Agency for Asylum should be provided with their own interfaces so that they no longer need to rely on national infrastructures. In the long run, those interfaces could be used as a single search interface, as described in the Commission Communication of 6 April 2016 entitled "Stronger and Smarter Information Systems for Borders and Security"1a . / 1a COM(2016) 0205.

Removed:Recital 30: (30) Member States should refer to the Commission's Staff Working Document on Implementation of the Eurodac Regulation as regards the obligation to take fingerprints adopted by the Council on 20 July 201534, which sets out a best practice approach to taking fingerprints of irregular third-country nationals or stateless persons. Where a Member State's national law allows for the taking of fingerprints by force or coercion as a last resort, those measures must fully respect the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Third-country nationals or stateless persons who are deemed to be vulnerable persons and minors should not be coerced into giving their fingerprints or facial image, except in duly justified circumstances that are permitted under national law.

Added:Recital 14: (14) In line with its Communication on Stronger and Smarter Information Systems for Borders and Security28, which highlighted the need to improve the interoperability of information systems as a long-term objective, as also identified by the European Council and the Council, the Commission set up an Expert Group on Information Systems and Interoperability to address the legal and technical feasibility of achieving interoperability of the information systems which would allow for simpler and quicker access to all relevant information and for improving the quality of service that the relevant databases provide to their users. Therefore, technological solutions should be developed to ensure the interoperability of Eurodac with the Schengen Information Systems (SIS), the Visa Information Systems (VIS), Europol, and any new relevant information systems developed in the area of freedom, security and justice, in order to enhance effective cooperation among Member States in managing external borders and combatting serious crime. In particular, an assessment should be made as to whether interoperability should be established between Eurodac and the Entry-Exist-System (EES) in order to allow consultation between the EES and Eurodac of the data of third-country nationals or stateless persons having exceeded the maximum duration of authorised stay. / 28 COM(2016) 0205

Added:Recital 14 a (new): (14a) Eu-LISA should establish a secure communication channel between the EES central system and the Eurodac central system in order to enable interoperability between them. It is necessary to connect the two central systems to allow for the transfer to Eurodac of the biometric data of a third-country national registered in the EES where registration of those biometric data are required by this Regulation.

Added:Recital 15: (15) It is essential in the fight against terrorist offences and other serious criminal offences for the law enforcement authorities to have the fullest and most up-to-date information if they are to perform their tasks. The information contained in Eurodac is necessary for the purposes of the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of terrorist offences as referred to in Directive (EU) 2017/... of the European Parliament and of the Council [combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA] or of other serious criminal offences as referred to in Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA. Therefore, the data in Eurodac should be available, subject to the conditions set out in this Regulation, for comparison by the designated authorities of Member States and the European Police Office (Europol). / (deleted) / (deleted)

Added:Recital 19: (19) Requests for comparison of Eurodac data by Europol should be allowed only in specific cases, under specific circumstances and under strict conditions, in line with the principles of necessity and proportionality enshrined in Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union1a. / 1a Judgment of the Court of Justice of 8 April 2014, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources and Others and Kärntner Landesregierung and Others, Joined cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:238;Judgment of the Court of Justice of 21 December 2016, Tele2 Sverige AB v. Post-och telestyrelsen and Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Tom Watson and Others, Joined cases C-203/15 and C-698/15, ECLI:EU:C:2016:970.

Added:Recital 20: (20) Since Eurodac was originally established to facilitate the application of the Dublin Convention, access to Eurodac for the purposes of preventing, detecting, investigating or prosecuting terrorist offences or other serious criminal offences constitutes a further development of the original purpose of Eurodac. In line with the requirements of Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, any interference with the fundamental right to respect for the private life of individuals whose personal data are processed in Eurodac must be in accordance with the law, which must be formulated with sufficient precision to allow individuals to adjust their conduct and it must protect individuals against arbitrariness and indicate with sufficient clarity the scope of discretion conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of its exercise. Any interference must be necessary to genuinely meet an objective of general interest and proportionate to the legitimate objective it aims to achieve.

Added:Recital 22: (22) This Regulation also lays down the conditions under which requests for comparison of biometric or alphanumeric data with Eurodac data for the purposes of preventing, detecting or investigating terrorist offences or other serious criminal offences should be allowed and the necessary safeguards to ensure the protection of the fundamental right to respect for the private life of individuals whose personal data are processed in Eurodac. The strictness of those conditions reflects the fact that the Eurodac database registers biometric and alphanumeric data of persons who are not presumed to have committed a terrorist offence or other serious criminal offence. Law enforcement authorities and Europol do not always have the biometric data of the suspect, perpetrator or victim whose case they are investigating, which can hamper their ability to check biometric matching databases such as Eurodac. In order to contribute further to the investigations carried out by those authorities and Europol, searches based on alphanumeric data should be allowed in Eurodac in such cases, in particular where those authorities and Europol possess evidence of the personal details or identity documents of the suspect, perpetrator or victim.

Added:Recital 23: (23) With a view to ensuring equal treatment for all applicants and beneficiaries of international protection, as well as in order to ensure consistency with the current Union asylum acquis, in particular with Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council32 and with [Regulation XXX/XXX] establishing a Union Resettlement Framework and Regulation (EU) No […/…], this Regulation includes in its scope applicants for subsidiary protection and persons eligible for subsidiary protection, as well as persons granted international protection on the basis of resettlement in accordance with [Regulation XXX/XXX].

Added:Recital 24: (24) It is also necessary to require the Member States promptly to take and transmit the biometric data of every applicant for international protection, of every resettled third-country national or stateless person in accordance with [Regulation XXX/XXX] and of every third-country national or stateless person who is apprehended in connection with the irregular crossing of an external border of a Member State or is found to be staying illegally in a Member State, if they are at least six years of age.

Added:Recital 25: (25) In view of strengthening the protection of all migrant and refugee children, including unaccompanied minors who have not applied for international protection and those children who may become separated from their families, it is also necessary to take biometric data for storage in the Central System and assist a Member State to trace any family or links they may have with another Member State. Biometric data should be taken for that sole purpose, and should be processed and used accordingly. Establishing family links is a key element in restoring family unity and must be closely linked to the determination of the best interests of the child and eventually, the determination of a sustainable solution. In the performance of those tasks, Member States should observe the principles laid down in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989. Improved identification procedures for missing children should assist Member States in guaranteeing that adequate protection of children is ensured. To that end, Member States, upon the identification of a missing child or of a child who is the victim of crime, should promptly contact the competent national child protection authorities, which should undertake a needs assessment with a view to finding a sustainable solution for the child in accordance with his or her best interests.

Added:Recital 26: (26) The best interests of the minor should be a primary consideration for Member States when applying this Regulation. Where the requesting Member State establishes that Eurodac data pertain to a child, those data may only be used for law enforcement purposes, in particular those relating to the prevention, detection and investigation of child trafficking and other serious crimes against children, by the requesting Member State and in accordance with that State's laws applicable to minors and in accordance with the obligation to give primary consideration to the best interests of the child.

Added:Recital 30: (30) In order to ensure that all the persons referred to in Article 10(1), 12a, 13(1) and 14(1) are registered in Eurodac, Member States should refer to the Commission's Staff Working Document on Implementation of the Eurodac Regulation as regards the obligation to take fingerprints adopted by the Council on 20 July 201534, which sets out a best practice approach to taking fingerprints of irregular third-country nationals or stateless persons. When carrying out that process, Member States should also take account of the guidelines established by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights in its focus paper of May 2015 entitled "Fundamental rights implications of the obligation to provide fingerprints for Eurodac". Where a Member State's national law allows for the taking of fingerprints by force or coercion as a last resort, those measures must fully respect the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Where a minor, in particular an unaccompanied or separated minor, refuses to give his or her fingerprints or facial image and there are reasonable grounds for believing that there are child safeguarding or protection risks, that minor should be referred to the competent national child protection authorities, national referral mechanisms, or both. Those authorities should undertake an assessment of the minor´s special needs in accordance with the relevant law with a view to finding a sustainable solution for the minor in full respect of the best interests of th…

Recital 31: (31) Hits obtained from Eurodac should be verified by a trained fingerprint expert in order to ensure the accurate determination of responsibility under Regulation (EU) No […/…], the exact identification of the third-country national or stateless person and the exact identification of the criminal suspect or victim of crime whose data might be stored in Eurodac. Hits obtained from Eurodac based on facial images should also be verified by an official trained in accordance with national practice, in particular where the comparison is made with a facial image only. Where a fingerprint and facial image comparison is carried out simultaneously and a hit is received for both biometric data sets, Member States may check and verify the facial image result, if needed.

Change 4

Removed:Recital 34: (34) The storage period should be shorter in certain special situations where there is no need to keep fingerprint and facial data and all other personal data for that length of time. Fingerprint and facial image data and all other personal data belonging to a third-country national or a stateless person should be erased immediately once third-country nationals or stateless persons obtain citizenship of a Member State.

Added:Recital 32: (32) The maximum period during which biometric data of third-country nationals or stateless persons who have requested international protection can be kept by the Central System should be limited to the extent strictly necessary and should be proportionate, in line with the principle of proportionality enshrined in Article 52(1) of the Charter and as interpreted by the the Court of Justice. Given that most third-country nationals or stateless persons who have stayed in the Union for several years will have obtained a settled status or even citizenship of a Member State after that period, a period of five years should be considered a reasonable period for the storage of biometric data.

Removed:Recital 41: (41) For the purposes of protection of personal data, and to exclude systematic comparisons which should be forbidden, the processing of Eurodac data should only take place in specific cases and when it is necessary for the purposes of preventing, detecting or investigating terrorist offences or other serious criminal offences. A specific case exists in particular when the request for comparison is connected to a specific and concrete situation or to a specific and concrete danger associated with a terrorist offence or other serious criminal offence, or to specific persons in respect of whom there are serious grounds for believing that they will commit or have committed any such offence. A specific case also exists when the request for comparison is connected to a person who is the victim of a terrorist offence or other serious criminal offence. The designated authorities should thus only request a comparison with Eurodac when they have reasonable grounds to believe that such a comparison will provide information that will substantially assist them in preventing, detecting or investigating a terrorist offence or other serious criminal offence.

Added:Recital 32 a (new): (32 a) In its conclusions on Statelessness of 4 December 2015, the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States recalled the Union's pledge of September 2012 that all Member States were to accede to the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and were to consider acceding to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. In its resolution of 25 October 2016 on human rights and migration in third countries, the European Parliament recalled the importance of identifying stateless persons in order to afford them the protections available under international law.

Removed:Amendment linked to Article1(1)(c) of proposal (non-codified) which provides that Eurodac will serve not only the purpose of implementation of the Dublin Regulation, but also law enforcement purposes. However, the current ex-ante control by an independent verifying authority of every access by Europol´s operating unit to Eurodac makes it extremely difficult to implement due to legal, data protection and technical reasons. The deletion of this requirement is counterbalanced by a new paragraph 3b in Article 22 reinforcing the obligation to comply with data protection rules and with the control mechanisms provided for therein.