What changed between the draft committee report and the plenary report

Added:(5) Originators, original lenders, sponsors or securitisation special purpose entities (SSPEs) (the ‘sell-side entities’) that are established in the Union are already subject to supervision in the Union and can be sanctioned in case they breach their obligations under Regulation (EU) 2017/2402. It is therefore appropriate that investors are no longer required to verify whether Union sell-side entities, where those entities are responsible on behalf of the sell-side parties in the transaction, comply with due diligence requirements set in Regulation (EU) 2017/2402. Investors should, however, still verify whether transactions that involve sell-side entities established in third countries comply with requirements corresponding to those of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402.

Removed:Even so there is a reference to "repeat transactions" in recital (8), there is no definition of what a “repeat transaction” is, and no specification of what the simplified due diligence on those transactions entails.

Added:(6) Senior tranches, typically benefiting from substantial credit enhancement and posing lower risk, should require a less extensive due diligence review than junior or mezzanine tranches, which bear higher risk and greater exposure to losses. That proportional approach supports more efficient allocation of resources by investors and avoids excessive burdens for low-risk investments.

Removed:Regulation (EU) 2017/2402

Added:(7) Since compliance with the STS requirements is already subject to separate regulatory oversight and notification, the obligation for investors to verify compliance with those requirements is redundant. Moreover, verifying compliance with the STS criteria is not relevant for all types of investors. The corresponding requirement should therefore be deleted.

Removed:Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3 – point b – point ii, Article 5 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1– point c: (ii) point (c) is replaced by the following: / ‘(c) with regard to a securitisation notified as STS in accordance with Article 27, the compliance of that securitisation with Articles 19 to 22 or Articles 23 to 26 or Articles 26a to 26e, and Article 27.’

Added:(8) Investors should be allowed to conduct simplified due diligence to investments in repeat transactions where key risk characteristics are already well understood. For those purposes, investment in repeat transactions should be considered as investment in securitisation positions issued by the same originator, backed by the same type of underlying assets, exhibiting the same structural features, and offering the same or lower level of credit risk compared to previous investments. For that purpose, a definition of repeat transactions should be introduced in Regulation (EU) 2017/2402. Those changes should ensure consistency in due diligence practices while facilitating investor participation in well-known and transparent structures.

Removed:For securitisations notified as STS, compliance with the applicable STS criteria must be ensured. Where a securitisation position has been verified by a supervised third-party verifier, the standard investor compliance check is not required. This maintains high STS standards while reducing administrative burdens through reliance on independent verification.

Added:(9) Multilateral development banks can play a significant role in facilitating investor access to securitisation markets, enhancing liquidity, and supporting the objectives of the Savings and Investments Union. Where a securitisation position is fully, unconditionally and irrevocably guaranteed by a multilateral development bank listed in Article 117(2) of Regulation (EU) 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council, the credit risk arising from the securitisation position is effectively transferred from the pool of underlying assets to the guarantor, resulting in a 0% risk weight of such exposure. In addition, such securitisation position is categorised as Level 1 asset under Article 10(1), point (g), of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/61. In such cases, it is appropriate to exempt institutional investors, except the entity providing the guarantee, from their due diligence requirements in full under Regulation (EU) 2017/2402.

Removed:Regulation (EU) 2017/2402

Added:(10) Transactions where the first loss tranche is either held or guaranteed by the Union, national promotional banks or institutions within the meaning of point (3) of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 of the European Parliament and of the Council inherently possess characteristics that mitigate the need to carry out the full due diligence and fulfil the risk retention requirement. These transactions carry an assurance by the guarantor, who carries out due diligence processes before affording such a guarantee. This assessment removes the need for the institutional investors to perform a full due diligence assessment under Regulation (EU) 2017/2402. Furthermore, the essence of a guarantee is the assumption of risk by the guarantor. Therefore, it is appropriate to lift the risk retention requirement. These changes are expected to crowd in private investment in derisked structures with a public guarantee.

Removed:Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3 – point b – point ii a (new), Article 5 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2 a (new): (iia) the following subparagraph is added: / ‘Point (c) of the first subparagraph of this paragraph shall not apply if the securitisation position has been verified by a third-party verifier authorised and supervised in accordance with Article 28.’

Added:(11) An institutional investor that delegates the authority to make investment management decisions to another institutional investor should be able to instruct the delegate to perform the due diligence obligations set out in Regulation (EU) 2017/2402. In such cases, the delegating institutional investor should assess and monitor the effectiveness of the delegate's ability to perform the delegated due diligence tasks. That specification is intended to reflect established regulatory practice and to ensure that obligations are fulfilled effectively while maintaining clear lines of accountability.

Removed:Regulation (EU) 2017/2402

Added:(11a) The ‘sole purpose test’ is an important safeguard to avoid loopholes in risk retention. However, its implementation needs to be recalibrated to avoid creating obstacles for businesses that are considered economically suitable to act as retainers. The EBA should in greater detail specify the criteria whereby an entity should not be considered to have been established or to operate for the sole purpose of securitising exposures. In particular, those criteria should ensure that entities acting as an originator, that provide SME loans, consumer credit or residential mortgages, and that can demonstrate that securitising exposures is a means to finance their business or that of an entity belonging to the same group, which is centred on the provision of goods or non-financial services, should be deemed to satisfy the ‘sole purpose test’. When an entity does not meet the criteria set out in a delegated regulation adopted pursuant to this Regulation, the actual purpose for which the entity was established and operates should be examined by the competent authority on a case-by-case basis to ascertain that it has real substance and that the entity is suitable to act as a retainer in a securitisation transaction.

Removed:Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3 – point c – point i a (new), Article 5 – paragraph 4 – points b and c: (ia) points (b) and (c) are deleted;

Added:(12) The disclosure requirements should consider the granularity of the underlying pool of exposures, i.e. how many loans are in the underlying pool. ▌ Loan level disclosure for highly-granular pools of ▌ exposures can be particularly costly and entails a considerable burden for issuers, often without offering significant benefits in terms of additional information to investors. Therefore, disclosure requirements for ▌ certain types of underlying exposures should not need to encompass reporting at the level of each individual underlying exposure. At the same time, the degree of granularity of underlying exposures which justifies aggregated reporting might differ from asset class to asset class. Therefore, mapping the granularity of pools of exposures, which allows for aggregated reporting, to specific underlying asset classes, including mortgages, corporate loans, credit cards, consumer loans, auto loans and trade receivables, should be trusted to the EBA. However, in duly justified cases, the competent authorities should still have the possibility to ask for additional information to ensure that they have a complete overview of the market, including on the exposures that constitute the underlying pool, in carrying out their duties under Regulation (EU) 2017/2402.

Removed:Regulation (EU) 2017/2402

Added:(13) The current reporting templates both for public and private securitisations are too costly and burdensome. The burden on entities when complying with their reporting obligations should be therefore reduced, without undermining the goal of providing transparency to the market. The reporting templates should be streamlined to reduce the number of mandatory data fields. The revision of the template should aim to bring a reduction of at least 35% of mandatory data fields. The conversion of certain mandatory fields into voluntary fields could add further flexibility, but appropriate attention should be given to ensure that that does not compromise data quality or usability.

Removed:Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3 – point c – point i b (new), Article 5 – paragraph 4 – point c a (new): (ib) the following point is inserted: / ‘(ca) in the case of repeat transactions, document the due diligence solely on the basis of the elements of the transaction that have changed since the last issuance, provided that the investor has purchased a securitisation position in a previous transaction during the previous 24 months;’

Added:(14) The reporting framework should account for the specific characteristics of private securitisations. A dedicated and simplified reporting template for private securitisations should be developed since it should not be required to report the same amount of information for private securitisations as that for public securitisations. In specifying the details of reporting requirements, the information required to be reported should be aligned as closely as possible with other well-established templates, in particular with the guide on the notification of securitisation transactions developed by the European Central Bank in accordance with Article 6(5), point (a), of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013. Any future changes to the European Central Bank guide should be assessed and the reporting templates may need to be reviewed, where appropriate. To allow for basic visibility for supervisors over the private market, private securitisations should report to repositories. Leveraging securities repositories for private securitisations will allow national competent authorities to reduce costs and to benefit from existing reporting infrastructure established under Regulation (EU) 2017/2402. Private securitisations should not need to report the same amount of information as public securitisations. Requiring private transactions to report to securitisation repositories, using a simplified template, would improve supervisory oversight and market monitoring. However, to ensure the required high level of confidentiality of private transactions, data from those transactions should not be publicly disclosed.

Removed:To ensure the workability of "repeat transactions" in recital (8), it should be specified that investors in repeat transactions conduct their due diligence on the sole elements of the securitisation that have changed since the last issuance.

Added:(15) The securitisation sub-committee of the Joint Committee of the European Supervisory Authorities (the “Joint Committee Securitisation Committee - JCSC”), referred to in Article 36(3) of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402, under the leadership of the European Banking Authority (EBA), should develop draft regulatory technical standards to further specify the information that the originator, sponsor and SSPE are to provide to comply with the reporting obligation. Those draft regulatory technical standards should take into account the usefulness of the information for the holder of the securitisation position, whether the securitisation is public or private, whether the securitisation position is of a short-term nature and, in the case of an asset-backed commercial paper programme (ABCP) transaction, whether it is fully supported by a sponsor. The Commission should be empowered to supplement Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 by adopting those regulatory technical standards by means of delegated acts pursuant to Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council. Moreover, the JCSC, under the leadership of the EBA, should develop draft implementing technical standards to specify the format for the provision of the information to repositories. The Commission should be empowered to adopt those implementing technical standards by means of an implementing act pursuant to Article 291 TFEU and in accordance with Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010, (EU) No 1094/2010 and (EU) No 1095/2010.

Removed:Regulation (EU) 2017/2402

Added:(16) To support access to market-based financing for SMEs, and to facilitate the development of cross-border securitisations involving exposures from multiple Member States, the criteria for the homogeneity of asset pools should be revised. While it is possible to have securitisations involving exposures from multiple Member States, the requirement of homogeneity, as defined at present, is considered as an obstacle for SMEs securitisations. To overcome that obstacle, a pool of underlying exposures should be deemed homogeneous where at least 70 % of the exposures at origination consists of exposures to SMEs. That lower threshold recognises the specific financing needs and characteristics of SMEs and ensures that mixed pools with a predominant SME component can benefit from the legal certainty and operational efficiencies associated with homogeneous pools. The remaining portion of the pool should be allowed to include other types of exposures, also from different Member States, without affecting the securitisation’s status as STS.

Removed:Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3 – point c – point i c (new), Article 5 – parargraph 4 – point d: (ic) point (d) is replaced by the following: / ‘(d) ensure internal reporting to its management body, or an internal entity designated by the management body, so that the management body or the internal entity designated by the management body is aware of the material risks arising from the securitisation position and so that those risks are adequately managed;’

Added:(17) In 2021, Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 was amended by Regulation (EU) 2021/557 of the European Parliament and of the Council to extend the STS framework to synthetic securitisations. As indicated in the report of the Joint Committee of European Supervisory Authorities, that extension of the STS label has led to satisfactory results in terms of opening the way for new issuance and encouraging greater activity in this market segment. However, the practical implementation of the STS requirements has revealed the necessity to further improve the clarity and consistency in specific requirements with some technical adjustments.

Removed:(Regulation (EU) 2017/2402)

Added:(18) To ensure the consistent selection of the underlying exposures in a securitisation and to enable investors to assess the credit risk of the asset pool prior to investment, active portfolio management on a discretionary basis of a securitisation exposure is prohibited. Article 26b of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 contains an exhaustive list of permitted management activities and stipulates that certain activities should not be considered active portfolio management on a discretionary basis and therefore not be prohibited. It is necessary to update that list to include removals due to sanctions imposed on an entity during the life of the transaction or fraudulent practices, or amendments to the loan due to a change in the law affecting the enforceability, which are outside the control of the originator. Both circumstances would have an impact on the enforceability of the underlying exposures (beyond the control of the originator) and the removal of those underlying exposures should not be considered as active portfolio management on a discretionary basis.

Removed:The delegation to an entity designated by the management body provides the management body greater flexibility without having any effect on the quality of the information processing. Inclusion of the management body in individual decisions is also not necessary. Indeed, this obligation only serves to slow down the transaction.

Added:(19) The criteria relating to standardisation laid down in Article 26c of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 outline the mechanisms for loss allocation to securitisation position holders and determine the application of various amortisation methods to tranches. The central aim of those criteria is to ensure that non-sequential amortisation is employed only when accompanied by distinctly specified contractual triggers. Those triggers are intended to prompt a switch to sequential payments based on the hierarchy of seniority, thereby protecting the transaction from the premature amortisation of credit enhancement in the event of a decline in credit quality. Such premature amortisation could expose originators holding those tranches to risks associated with a diminishing credit enhancement cushion. However, those criteria fail to adequately consider the loss-bearing capacity of tranches subordinated to the protected tranches within a securitisation, leading to misapplication when interpreted literally in the context of synthetic securitisations that include mezzanine tranches. Those criteria inadvertently assume that all associated losses fall solely on the protected tranche, and thus ignoring an assignment to more junior tranches. It should therefore be specified that, in instances where junior tranches absorb portions of the underlying exposure losses, their loss-bearing capacities should be taken into consideration for the application of the criteria.

Removed:Regulation (EU) 2017/2402

Added:(20) Article 26e(3) of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 currently specifies that the credit protection premiums to be paid under the credit protection agreement are to be structured as contingent on the outstanding nominal amount of the performing securitised exposures at the time of the payment and reflect the risk of the protected tranche. To ensure the effectiveness of the credit protection agreement from the originators’ perspective and at the same time provide legal certainty for investors on the termination date to make payments by specifying the maximum extension period for the debt workout, it should be specified that only credit protection premiums contingent on the size of the outstanding tranche and credit risk of the protected tranche are allowed.

Removed:Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3 – point d, Article 5 – paragraph 4b: deleted

Added:(21) Article 26e(7) of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 specifies the conditions under which an originator may commit synthetic excess spread as credit enhancement for investors. One of those conditions is that, for originators not using the IRB Approach referred to in Article 143 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, the calculation of the one-year expected loss of the underlying portfolio is to be clearly determined in the transaction documentation. In order to specify the requirements for the synthetic excess spread committed by the originator and available as credit enhancement for the investors, a specific criterion has been introduced in the 2021 amendment to Regulation (EU) 2017/2402. The application of this criterion has shown that it requires further clarification. In addition, an inconsistency has been identified regarding the requirements for originators not using the IRB Approach. That requirement should be amended to align with the intent to set a cap, equivalent to one year's expected loss, on the total amount of synthetic excess spread that the originator should commit per year, thereby ensuring consistency and clarity in the application of that provision.

Removed:Regulation (EU) 2017/2402

Added:(22) The current criterion requiring credit protection is to be funded in the STS framework for on-balance-sheet synthetic securitisation under the STS regime has limited the ability of insurance or reinsurance companies to participate in the on-balance-sheet STS securitisation market. That is detrimental to the development of the STS market and the ability of originators to transfer credit risk outside the banking system. Allowing unfunded credit protection to be eligible for the STS label should, however, not undermine the quality of the STS label or the reliability of the credit protection agreement, nor should it create incentives for inexperienced or undiversified insurance or reinsurance undertakings to become exposed to high levels of risk. It is therefore appropriate to put in place safeguards to ensure that participation is limited to insurers with a certain level of robustness and diversification. Therefore, eligibility for providing unfunded credit protection under the STS label should be accompanied by requirements related to diversification, solvency, risk measurement, and minimum size of the protection provider. Specifically, when it comes to risk measurement, the insurance or reinsurance undertaking should use an approved internal model to calculate capital requirements for such credit protection agreements. When it comes to solvency, the insurance or reinsurance undertaking should comply with the Solvency Capital Requirement and Minimum Capital Requirement referred to in Articles 100 and 128 of Directive 2009/138/EC, respectively, and should have been assigned to credit quality step 2 or better at the time the credit protection was first recognised. When it comes to diversification, the insurance or reinsurance undertaking should have significant business activities in ▌classes of non-life insurance that are not correlated with the provision of credit protection, which should reduce overexposure to any single risk type. Finally, when it comes to minimum size, the value of the total assets of the insurance or reinsurance undertaking should be laid down at solo and consolidated level and should take account of the market structure.

Removed:Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3 – point e, Article 5 – paragraph 5: (5) Without prejudice to paragraphs 1 to 4 of this Article, where an institutional investor has authorised another institutional investor to make investment management decisions that might expose it to a securitisation, the institutional investor may instruct that authorised institutional investor making investment management decisions to fulfil its obligations under this Article in respect of any exposure to a securitisation arising from such decisions. Member States shall ensure that, where an institutional investor is authorised under this paragraph to fulfil the obligations of another institutional investor and fails to do so, any sanction laid down in Article 32 or 33 shall be imposed on the authorised institutional investor making the investment management decisions and not on the institutional investor that is exposed to the securitisation. Before authorising another institutional investor under this Article, the institutional investor shall ensure that the institutional investor to be authorised has prior experience in conducting due diligence as required by this Article for its own account or on account of other parties.

Added:(23) Third-party verifiers have a role in assessing the compliance of securitisations to the STS criteria. Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 only requires third-party verifiers to be authorised by national competent authorities. Such authorisation is, however, of limited assurance if competent authorities are not in position to assess whether those third-party verifiers continue to comply with the conditions for their authorisation on an ongoing basis. To ensure consistency in the supervision of third-party verifiers and monitoring on an ongoing basis, it is therefore appropriate to lay down that ESMA is responsible for the authorisation and ongoing supervision of such third-party verifiers and adequately empowered to do so. Doing so would also strengthen investor confidence and ensure a level playing field in terms of authorisation requirements and ongoing supervision and eliminate the risk of regulatory arbitrage across Member States.

Removed:Compliance with due diligence should remain primarily the responsibility of the entity conducting the checks. While the Article could be clarified to require the delegating investor to ensure the delegated entity has sufficient experience, removing the obligation could discourage new investors and undermine the market.

Added:(24) To ensure the effective implementation and enforcement of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402, it is necessary to clarify the responsibilities of competent authorities in supervising the compliance of all relevant parties involved in a securitisation. Competent authorities should oversee the conduct of originators, sponsors, original lenders, and SSPEs. ▌

Removed:Regulation (EU) 2017/2402

Added:(25) In order to strengthen compliance with, and to enhance the effectiveness of, Regulation (EU) 2017/2402, the scope of sanctioning powers under Article 32 of that Regulation should be broadened to explicitly include infringements of due diligence obligations. Institutional investors play a key role in ensuring the soundness and transparency of the securitisation market by conducting appropriate due diligence before and during their exposures. To ensure consistent enforcement across the Union of those due diligence requirements, it should be specified that failure to comply with those requirements is to be subject to remedial measures and administrative sanctions by competent authorities. However, if the sanctioning regime for infringements of the due diligence requirements is too harsh, new investors might be disincentivised from participation. Therefore, a more proportionate sanctioning regime vis-à-vis institutional investors as compared to the sanctions applicable to the sell-side requirements would be better suited to achieving the objective of widening the investor base in securitisation markets.

Removed:Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point b a (new), Article 6 – paragraph 5 b (new): (ba) the following paragraph is inserted: / ‘5b. This Article shall not apply to synthetic securitisations that meet all of the following conditions: / (a) the synthetic securitisation is originated by a national promotional bank or institution as defined in Article 2, point (3), of Regulation (EU) 2015/1017; / (b) the first-loss tranche is guaranteed by any of the entities referred to in points (a), (b), (d), (e) and (f) of paragraph 5 of this Article; / (c) the non-guaranteed tranches are fully retained by the originator until maturity; / (d) the guarantor has established and approved the eligibility criteria for the underlying exposures prior to the creation of the exposures, and no other party has discretion to alter or override such criteria; and / (e) the entity referred to in point (b) guarantees the first-loss tranche on a continuous basis and cannot hedge or otherwise transfer the credit risk associated with that tranche to an entity not referred to in points (a), (b), (d), (e) or (f) of paragraph 5 of this Article.’

Added:(26) Fostering supervisory convergence is essential to the proper functioning and further development of the securitisation market which brings together a wide range of economic actors often based in different jurisdictions, even for the same transaction. The involvement of several competent authorities, combined with the current complexity of the decision-making process, highlights the need to strengthen the supervisory coordination. Simplifying and reinforcing existing frameworks for supervisory coordination, where feasible, should support the broader aim of simplification in regulation and supervision. Stronger convergence can be achieved by using more efficiently and effectively existing powers that allocated to the ESAs and the competent authorities. This outcome should be also supported by giving a more prominent role to the EBA, which should assume permanent stewardship of supervision coordination issues for the securitisation market in the Union.

Removed:Regulation (EU) 2017/2402

Added:(27) The Joint Committee Securitisation Committee, composed of market and prudential competent authorities, should focus on issues stemming from supervision and should facilitate and promote supervisory convergence through common supervisory practices. The current mandate of the JCSC should be reviewed to put emphasis on supervisory convergence and work related to Article 44 of this Regulation. The JCSC can meet in different formats or establish subgroups for specific tasks according to the issues to be discussed. The EBA should provide the secretariat and a vice-chairperson for the Joint Committee Securitisation Committee on a permanent basis, deputising and supporting the chairperson in the exercise of his or her duties. In the absence of the chairperson, the vice-chairperson should perform the tasks of the chairperson, including in situations where no chairperson is elected. Representatives to this body from participating market and prudential competent authorities should have the appropriate level of knowledge and experience in matters under discussion. The regular monitoring of the state of the market and evaluation of the supervisory securitisation framework in the Union through monitoring reports, development of guidelines and regular peer reviews would further strengthen the supervisory framework promoting best (supervisory) practices.

Removed:Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point b b (new), Article 6 – paragraph 5 c (new): (bb) the following paragraph is inserted: / ‘(5c) By way of derogation from the fifth sentence of the first subparagraph of paragraph 1, for non-performing exposure securitisations where one or more tranches are either held by, or fully, unconditionally and irrevocably guaranteed by, one of the entities listed under points (a) to (f) of paragraph 5, the requirement to retain a material net economic interest of not less than 5 %, as set out in paragraph 1, shall also be deemed to be fulfilled where the retention of not less than 5 % of the nominal value of each of the remaining tranches sold or transferred to investors is achieved in accordance with paragraph 3, point (a).’

Added:(28) Given that securitisation activity in the Union is primarily concentrated in the banking sector, it is appropriate that the EBA assumes the permanent stewardship role in the Joint Committee Securitisation Committee. In the exercise of its permanent role in the Joint Committee Securitisation Committee, the EBA should attach particular attention to nourishing strong and collaborative working relationships with the European Securities Markets Authority (ESMA) and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and duly taking account of their sectoral perspectives. It should be expected that such reinforced supervisory coordination will result in more robust and consistent supervision of the securitisation market in the Union. In this capacity, the EBA should also lead the work on the development of the disclosure templates as provided for in Article 7 of this Regulation. This will be instrumental in preparing the market for the anticipated growth and developing supervisory capacity and preparedness to support this expansion. Assigning a stewardship role to EBA in this supervisory capacity aligns with the strategic vision of an efficient and simplified regulatory landscape.

Removed:The proposed paragraph 5c introduces a flexible compliance option for NPE securitisations with public guarantees, allowing risk retention via a vertical slice on non-guaranteed tranches. This supports NPE resolution, enhances flexibility, and aligns with the prudential framework.

Added:(29) In case of cross-border securitisations, appointing a lead supervisor would streamline the supervision of compliance with Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 and ensure consistency and better coordination among the different competent authorities. The lead supervisor should be appointed from among the competent authorities of the entities involved in the transaction, with the decision taken by the competent authorities concerned. In case of disagreements the matter should be dealt with at the level of the Joint Committee Securitisation Committee. Whenever a new transaction involves entities supervised by the same competent authorities, the lead previously appointed can keep that role.

Removed:Regulation (EU) 2017/2402

Added:(29a) In line with the Commission’s objectives of simplification, reducing reporting burdens, ensuring consistent and effective supervision across the Union and advancing the Savings and Investments Union agenda, the EBA should be responsible for supervising compliance with Articles 18 to 27 of this Regulation by originators, sponsors, and SSPEs to ensure consistent supervision and enforcement at Union level. On the other hand, to achieve the above objectives, ESMA is better suited to authorise and supervise third-party verifiers, for which it should be granted the necessary investigatory and enforcement powers, including the ability to request information, carry out on-site inspections and impose administrative measures and sanctions where appropriate.

Removed:Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5 – point a, Article 7 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 4: In the case of a public securitisation of highly-granular pools of short-term exposures, or of a private securitisation of highly-granular pools of short-term exposures or of ABCPs, the information described in points (a), (c)(ii) and (e)(i) of the first subparagraph shall be made available in aggregate form to holders of securitisation positions and, upon request, to potential investors.;

Added:(29b) To ensure appropriate funding of their new supervisory tasks in accordance with this Regulation, the EBA and ESMA should be empowered to levy annual fees on entities submitting STS notifications and on third party verifiers. Those fees should reflect the supervisory costs of the EBA and ESMA and be proportionate to the turnover of the entity, relative to the total turnover of all such entities for that period.

Removed:Clarification is needed to resolve the apparent conflict, as ABCP transactions are referenced under Art. 7(1) reporting requirements but should be exempt under the new Art. 7(2), given that ABCP transactions are always private.

Added:(29c) Close cooperation and timely information exchange between ESMA, national competent authorities, and the European Central Bank — particularly in relation to the supervision of significant institutions under Articles 6 to 9 — should be ensured. Governance-related findings and risk indicators should be shared to avoid duplication and ensure an efficient and coordinated supervisory approach across prudential and investor protection mandates.

Removed:Regulation (EU) 2017/2402

Added:(30) It is important to ensure that the regulatory framework for securitisations remains effective and adapts to the evolving financial landscape. For that reason, the Commission should comprehensively review the impact and functionality of this Regulation within 5 years after its adoption, with careful attention to its influence on the securitisation market and its broader economic implications. That review should focus on critical aspects, including market dynamics, the accessibility of credit in particular for SMEs, investments, and the interconnectedness of financial institutions which is vital for maintaining the stability of the financial sector. Combining insights from the reports referred to in Article 31 and Article 44 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 and further analyses, the Commission should determine the necessity for legislative updates to safeguard the role of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 in supporting a resilient and dynamic economy within the European Union.

Removed:Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5 – point b, Article 7 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3: Private securitisations shall be subject to a distinct reporting framework that acknowledges their unique characteristics, differing from public securitisation, in a dedicated and simplified reporting template. That dedicated and simplified reporting template shall ensure that essential information relevant to national competent authorities is adequately reported, without imposing the full extent of reporting obligations applicable to public securitisations. Private securitisations shall fulfil their obligations under this subparagraph as of [date set in the fourth subparagraphs of paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article.]. By way of derogation from the second subparagraph of this paragraph, private securitisations shall not be subject to the obligation to report to a securitisation repository set up in accordance with Article 10 or 17 of this Regulation. The reporting obligations for private securitisations shall be fulfilled exclusively through the dedicated and simplified reporting template referred to in this paragraph and shall be made available solely to national competent authorities, without requiring submission to or publication by a securitisation repository.