What changed between the draft committee report of 3 Oct 2023 and the draft committee report of 10 Mar 2026

DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

Changed:on the proposalCouncil forposition at first reading with a view to the adoption of a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 as regards early intervention measures, conditions for resolution and funding of resolution action

Changed:(COM(2023)0226(15389/1/25 – C90139/2023 – 2023/0111(COD))

Changed:(Ordinary legislative procedure: firstsecond reading)

The European Parliament,

Changed:– having regard to the CommissionCouncil proposalposition toat Parliamentfirst andreading the(15389/1/25 Council– (COM(2023)0226,C90139/2023),

Removed:– having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C90139/2023),

Removed:– having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Removed:– having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinion of the European Central Bank of 5 July 2023,

– having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 13 July 2023,

Changed:– having regard to theits reportposition ofat thefirst Committeereading on Economicthe Commission proposal to Parliament and Monetarythe AffairsCouncil (A90000/2023),(COM(2023)0226),

Change 1

Removed:1. Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

Added:– having regard to Article 294(7) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Removed:2. Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

Added:– having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 75(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

Removed:3. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments;

Added:– having regard to Rule 68 of its Rules of Procedure,

Removed:Recital 1 a (new): (1a) At present, the banking union rests on just two of its intended three pillars, namely, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). It therefore remains incomplete, due to the absence of its third pillar, the European deposit insurance scheme (EDIS). The completion of the banking union forms an integral part of economic and monetary union and of financial stability, most notably by mitigating the risks of so-called ‘doom loop’ that arise as a result of the bank-sovereign nexus.

Added:– having regard to the recommendation for second reading of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A100000/2026),

Removed:Recital 2: (2) Several years into its implementation, the Union resolution framework as currently applicable does not deliver as intended with respect to some of those objectives. In particular, while institutions and entities have made significant progress towards resolvability and have dedicated significant resources to that end, in particular through the build-up of the loss absorption and recapitalisation capacity and the filling-up of resolution financing arrangements, the Union resolution framework is seldom resorted to. Failures of certain smaller and medium-sized institutions and entities are instead mostly addressed through unharmonised national measures. Regrettably, taxpayer money is still used rather than industry-funded safety nets, including resolution financing arrangements. That situation appears to arise from inadequate incentives. Those inadequate incentives result from the interplay of the Union resolution framework with national rules, whereby the broad discretion in the public interest assessment is not always exercised in a way that reflects how the Union resolution framework was intended to apply. At the same time, the Union resolution framework saw little use due to the risks for depositors of deposit-funded institutions to bear losses to ensure that those institutions can access external funding in resolution, in particular in the absence of other bail-inable liabilities. Finally, the fact that there are less stringent rules on access to funding outside resoluti…

Added:1. Approves the Council position at first reading;

Removed:Recital 2 a (new): (2a) The current legislative review seeks to reinforce the conditions for an orderly bank resolution that provides more protection for depositors. It firmly upholds the insurance to covered deposits, while reinforcing the policy toolbox for resolution, thus allowing for smoother alternatives that provide additional safeguards to depositors and financial stability.

Added:2. Notes that the act is adopted in accordance with the Council position;

Removed:Recital 4: (4) The intensity, and level of detail, of the resolution planning work needed with respect to subsidiaries that have not been identified as resolution entities varies depending on the size and risk profile of the institutions and entities concerned, the presence of critical functions, and the group resolution strategy. The Single Resolution Board (the ‘Board’) should therefore be able to consider those factors when identifying the measures to be taken in respect of such subsidiaries and it should be able to decide to follow a simplified approach, after consulting with the respective national authority, where appropriate, as long as the simplified approach does not, under any circumstances, result in a reduction of required standards.

Added:3. Instructs its President to sign the act with the President of the Council, in accordance with Article 297(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union;

Removed:Recital 11: (11) Where the resolution strategy envisages the use of resolution tools other than bail-in, the recapitalisation needs of the entity concerned will generally be smaller after resolution than in case of open bank bail-in. The calibration of the MREL in such a case should take that aspect into account when estimating the recapitalisation requirement. Therefore, when adjusting the level of the MREL for resolution entities the resolution plan of which envisages the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and its exit from the market, the Board should take into account the features of those tools, including the expected perimeter of the transfer to the private purchaser or to the bridge institution, the types of instruments to be transferred, the expected value and marketability of those instruments, and the design of the preferred resolution strategy, including the complementary use of the asset separation tool. Since the resolution authority has to decide on a case by case basis on any possible use in resolution of funds from the deposit guarantee scheme and since such decision cannot be assumed with certainty ex ante, the Board must not consider the potential contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme in resolution when calibrating the level of the MREL. That approach also reduces the likelihood of moral hazard by ensuring that entities are not pre-emptively assuming that funds from the respective deposit guarantee scheme will be used to reach the 8% total liabi…

Added:4. Instructs its Secretary-General to sign the act, once it has been verified that all the procedures have been duly completed, and, in agreement with the Secretary-General of the Council, to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union;

Removed:Recital 14 a (new): (14a) Where the Board requires information that is necessary for the purposes of updating resolution plans, preparing for the possible resolution of an entity or of carrying out a valuation, the ECB or the relevant national competent authorities should provide the Board with that information to the extent that it is available to them. Where the relevant information is not already available to the ECB or the relevant national competent authorities, the Board and the ECB or the relevant national competent authorities should cooperate and coordinate to collect the information considered necessary by the Board. In the context of such cooperation, the authorities should collect the necessary information having due regard to the principle of proportionality.

Added:5. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

Removed:Recital 15: (15) It is necessary to ensure timely action and early coordination between the Board and the ECB, or the relevant national competent authority, with respect to less significant cross-border groups when an institution or entity is still a going concern but where there is a material risk that that institution or entity may fail. The ECB or the relevant national competent authority should therefore notify the Board as early as possible of such risk. That notification should contain the reasons for the assessment of the ECB or of the relevant national competent authority and an overview of the alternative private sector measures, supervisory action or early intervention measures that are available to prevent the failure of the institution or entity within a reasonable timeframe. Such early notification should not prejudice the procedures to determine whether the conditions for resolution are met. The prior notification by the ECB or by the relevant national competent authority to the Board of a material risk that an institution or entity is failing or likely to fail, or the end of the timeframe for the implementation of the measures to address such material risk of failure of an institution or entity, should not be a condition for, nor imply, a subsequent determination that an institution or entity is actually failing or likely to fail. Moreover, if at a later stage the institution or entity is assessed to be failing or likely to fail and there are no alternative solutions to pr…