Changes between two versions
What changed between the draft committee report and the plenary report
From · draft committee report· 6 Feb 2026
on the control of the financial activities of the European Investment Bank Group — annual report 2024
To · plenary report· 10 Apr 2026
on the control of the financial activities of the European Investment Bank Group – annual report 2024
These two texts have too little in common to compare paragraph by paragraph: they are different documents rather than versions of one (for example one group’s motion and the joint text that was adopted).
+103 added · −20 removed · 10 changed paragraphs, packaging included.
Part 4 of 4: EXPLANATORY STATEMENT
Change 19
Added:EXPLANATORY STATEMENT
Added:This report is anchored in the core mandate of the Committee on Budgetary Control: assessing value for money spent, holding the Bank accountable for results and ensuring that external scrutiny keeps pace with the Bank's expanding role. The EIB is entirely owned by the Member States, and a growing share of its operations is additionally backed by EU budget guarantees. The guiding principle throughout is that success must be measured by demonstrable economic outcomes, not merely by volumes signed or percentage targets met.
Added:The report acknowledges the EIB Group's solid results in 2024 and its AAA credit rating; however, sound headline figures alone do not demonstrate that investments achieve their intended purpose, and the lack of adequate accountability structures may itself pose a risk to the Bank's credit standing. The Contact Committee of the Supreme Audit Institutions formally identified critical gaps in the external public audit of the Bank, confirming a paradox: the mandate and EU budget guarantees keep expanding while audit arrangements remain essentially unchanged. The report calls for the European Court of Auditors' full and unrestricted access to all EIB operations and for greater involvement of national supreme audit institutions. Conflict-of-interest prevention receives strengthened attention, prompted by internal audit findings flagging relevant provisions as needing significant improvement and by documented revolving-door cases.
Added:The bankruptcy of Northvolt, after having benefited from a substantial EIB lending package, exposed serious questions regarding due diligence, risk monitoring and early-warning capacity. The report demands a thorough review of lessons learned and enhanced stress-testing for large projects considered strategic.
Added:The report acknowledges the EIB's role in defence and security financing and recognises nuclear energy on equal terms under the principle of technological neutrality, and calls for ensuring that the Bank's reporting and evaluation frameworks are applied consistently. On additionality, it takes a firm position: the EIB must fund projects that the private sector alone would not finance and must guard against crowding out private capital. EIB lending outside the Union must be subject to robust safeguards on transparency, anti-fraud and sanctions compliance, taking into account cooperation on return agreements with partner countries.
Added:The report recognizes that the EIB has become a major implementing partner of EU financial support to Ukraine. While recognising the extraordinary circumstances of the ongoing war, the report insists that continued EIB support must be accompanied by effective oversight, traceability of funds and cooperation with anti-corruption authorities. Taxpayer confidence in the sustained commitment to Ukraine depends on demonstrating that these resources are properly safeguarded.
Added:The EIB is entrusted with resources that belong to European taxpayers. Its growing role in delivering EU policy objectives must be matched by a corresponding growth in accountability, transparency and independent scrutiny.