What changed between the draft committee report and the plenary report

Added:43. Calls on the EIB to systematically evaluate and publicly report on the incidence of late payments and beneficiary bankruptcies across its lending portfolio; insists that such evaluation should include root-cause analysis to identify whether failures stem from inadequate due diligence, external shocks, or systemic issues in project selection methodologies; stresses that transparent reporting is essential in order to assess value for money and maintain taxpayer confidence;

Added:44. Strongly insists on strengthening conflict of interest prevention in the light of recent revolving-door cases and European Ombudsman recommendations; calls for the revision of the code of conduct to enforce stricter cooling-off periods for EIB vice-presidents, empower the Ethics and Compliance Committee to impose risk-mitigating measures, and establish clearer rules for the participation of EIB vice-presidents in decisions concerning their countries of origin; underlines the recently published information identifying five cases since 2019 of former members of EIB decision-making bodies allegedly involved in revolving-door situations, including a case in which an EIB vice-president was appointed a board member of an entity for which he had signed an EIB loan; notes that the cooling-off period has been extended to 24 months; recalls that Management Committee members are asked to inform the Ethics and Compliance Committee of and seek approval for any negotiations regarding prospective employment; shares the view of the European Ombudsman that the role of the EIB Ethics and Compliance Committee should be strengthened; recalls that mitigating measures, such as ring-fencing and cooling-off periods, should be perceived as unquestionable;

Added:45. Notes with concern the existence of a leaked EIB internal audit flagging conflict of interest provisions as ‘needing significant improvement,’ including failure to cover apparent and potential conflicts; emphasises that declarations of interest by EIB and EIF governing and audit bodies are misaligned with other multilateral development banks and the European Central Bank and must be rectified without delay; underlines the lack of authority, independence and scope of EIB and EIF ethics compliance functions and the risks posed by complex reporting lines exposing sensitive personal data; urges the EIB to align its rules with the Ethics Network of Multilateral Organisations and report on the follow-up actions taken;

Added:46. Is aware that Regulation (EC) No 1049/20015 does not formally apply to the EIB and that the EIB Transparency Policy, based on the ‘presumption of disclosure’, is intended to operate separately from, but aligned with, this regulation; calls on the EIB, in the context of its 2026 Transparency Policy review, to limit the exceptions to the ‘presumption of disclosure’ to strictly necessary and justified cases; calls on the EIB to publish more detailed minutes of its Board of Directors’ meetings, including voting records and project-specific justifications, while respecting legitimate confidentiality where necessary;

Added:47. Notes the increasing number of cases handled by the EIB complaints mechanism (113 cases in 2024, 104 in 2023 and 97 in 2022); stresses that the complaints mechanism remains a self-referential dispute-solving process fully embedded in the EIB’s structure, at the cost of its independence, whose findings are subject to review and approval by the same management structures that it is supposed to scrutinise; notes that appointments are made internally without external oversight; regrets that it does not report individual cases to the Board of Directors but only aggregate summaries in twice-yearly reports; calls on the EIB to reform the complaints mechanism to ensure genuine independence and external accountability;

Added:48. Notes the increased workload of the Investigations Division (IG/IN) in 2024 (244 new allegations, of which 49 were referred to OLAF and EPPO); regrets that the IG/IN annual report continues to lack adequate information on the financial magnitude, affected funds and mandates, project types, mitigating measures, and Member States concerned; again invites the EIB Inspector General and the Head of the IG/IN to improve data quality and engage with Parliament to better contribute to the protection of the involved financial interests, pursuing a proper balance between transparency and confidentiality; stresses that such reporting should include root-cause analysis to identify whether failures stem from inadequate due diligence, external factors or systemic issues in project selection;

Added:49. Welcomes the EIB Group’s cooperation with OLAF, the EPPO and Europol and notes its reported 29 referrals to OLAF and 20 referrals to EPPO in 2024; welcomes the EIB’s interest in gaining access to the Commission’s ARACHNE risk-scoring tool; calls on the Commission to facilitate such access without delay, in order to strengthen fraud detection and prevention across all EIB operations;

Added:50. Notes with concern that the EIB’s autonomous exclusion system and the Commission’s Early Detection and Exclusion System (EDES) are not fully equivalent and do not operate with automatic reciprocity; calls on the EIB to fully align its Exclusion Policy with the Commission’s EDES in terms of decision-making standards, results and remedies, including systematic cross-recognition of exclusion decisions where legally possible; reiterates its call on the EIB Group and the Commission to cooperate in identifying potential gaps and proposing remedies, including an expedited procedure to enforce EIB exclusion decisions via the EDES;

Added:51. Welcomes the EIB’s sanctions compliance programme and calls for regular reporting on sanctions-screening controls and anti-circumvention safeguards in EIB-financed operations; calls on the EIB Group to improve screening procedures for equity investments made through financial intermediaries, including venture capital funds;

Added:52. Notes that, on 10 June 2024, the EIB published an Annex XII to its Staff Rules, entitled ‘Framework for recognition of trade unions at the European Investment Bank’; notes the EIB’s ongoing efforts regarding staff well-being, including mental health, and equal opportunities; calls on the EIB to strengthen diversity and inclusion policies, including measures addressing disability inclusion and equal opportunities; recalls the importance of fair geographical representation and gender balance in recruitment and management positions, while reaffirming that merit-based selection should be the primary criterion and asks the EIB to report on geographical and gender representation at all levels;

Added:53. Recalls the importance of whistleblower protection and strong anti-corruption frameworks;

Transparency, scrutiny and oversight

Change 17

Removed:21. Regrets that the EIB failed to follow up on Parliament’s annual report on its financial activities in 20231; stresses that interinstitutional agreement is essential for predictable cooperation;

Added:54. Acknowledges that the main relevant audit tasks are entrusted to the EIB’s Audit Committee; believes that the participation of qualified external representatives in specific Audit Committee tasks could enhance the objectivity of the Audit Committee’s analyses;

Added:55. Notes that transparency and access to information have improved in recent years, such as efforts to improve documentation of decision-making, including the indication of required majorities where applicable; observes that project-level disclosures and traceability remain uneven, especially for operations involving financial intermediaries and complex guarantee structures; calls on the EIB to better align its internal indicators with EU-wide sustainability standards (for instance, by rectifying the discrepancy between the EIB’s Climate Action Ratio and EU Green Asset Ratio metrics); recalls that adequate reporting is a necessary precondition to transparency and regrets that reporting to Parliament relies on voluntary and occasional appearances by the EIB President, either in plenary or at a meeting with the committee with sectoral competences;

Added:56. Notes the findings of the 2025 Development Finance Institutions Transparency Index, which indicate that the EIB scores below other multilateral development banks, such as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and African Development Bank, on overall transparency metrics; recognises, however, the EIB’s significant strengths identified in the November 2025 ‘Behind the Billions’6 report, which labels the EIB’s disclosure as ‘good practice’ for providing nearly complete traceability of its climate finance; emphasises that the EIB should now leverage its demonstrated leadership in data coverage to provide the granular impact data and standardised methodologies required to verify the effectiveness and value for money of its investments;

Added:57. Is aware that EIB loans are not subject to the same visibility obligations as grants; asks, however, the EIB to ensure that the applicable contractual and legal frameworks provide for transparency in all projects financed with support from the EIB and a clear indication that they are funded with the support of citizens of the Member States, so as to enhance public awareness of the tangible benefits delivered by EU investment and strengthen taxpayers’ confidence in the use of public resources;

Added:58. Reiterates its observations on the importance of fully implementing a policy on tax fraud, evasion and avoidance; welcomes the testing of a new tax integrity risk rating tool in 2024 to assess tax risks in projects and looks forward to assessing the group-wide implementation in 2025; reiterates its call on the EIB to refrain from funding beneficiaries or financial intermediaries that have been found to be, or are at high risk of being, involved in tax malpractices and underlines that double taxation of cross-border investments, as well as complex tax environments, constrain investments;

Added:59. Regrets the EIB’s delay in providing follow-up to Parliament’s annual report on the control of its financial activities for the year 20237, which is traditionally provided in line with a practice established in many previous years; stresses that more structured and predictable cooperation would be beneficial to both parties; maintains that a memorandum of understanding or an interinstitutional agreement is essential for establishing such cooperation on information exchange, hearings and follow-up, which would formally put in place the practices mostly already established with the EIB; welcomes the EIB’s declared availability to engage in dialogue to ensure that cooperation is based on predictable institutional commitments rather than on informal arrangements; reiterates its call for this arrangement to be finalised quickly; calls for further ways to be explored to improve coordination between Parliament, the national parliaments and the supreme audit institutions and for an enhanced exchange with civil society and academia, which would foster greater transparency;

Follow-up on Parliament’s recommendations

Change 18

Removed:22. Calls for timely follow-up on: (a) investment impact; (b) conflict of interest prevention; (c) transparency; (d) this resolution;

Added:60. Urges the EIB to follow up, in a timely manner, on the recommendations issued by Parliament and to report on the outcomes achieved and on the impact of the actions taken to implement its priorities and the EU’s policies, with special regard to: (a) the impact (economic, environmental and social) of its investment strategy and the results achieved in contributing to the balanced and steady development of the internal market in the interests of the EU; (b) actions adopted to enhance the prevention and countering of conflicts of interest, fraud, corruption and other potential forms of misconduct; (c) new measures to strengthen transparency; (d) measures to strengthen support for SMEs and eligible economic operators during the implementation of EU policies;

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61. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission, and asks that the Council and the EIB Board of Directors hold a debate on Parliament’s positions presented herein.