Changes between two versions
What changed between the draft committee report and the plenary report
From · draft committee report· 31 Jan 2024
on the nomination of Carlo Alberto Manfredi Selvaggi as a Member of the Court of Auditors
To · plenary report· 26 Feb 2024
on the nomination of Carlo Alberto Manfredi Selvaggi as a Member of the Court of Auditors
+0 added · −0 removed · 2 changed paragraphs, packaging included.
Part 5 of 5: Paragraphs 151–206
56 unchanged paragraphs
As a Member of the European Court of Auditors I would naturally continue to uphold the same highest standards of professional ethics and integrity as I have done over my career as auditor. This dedication to professional integrity and independency is based on 27 years of relevant professional experience performed under a constitutionally guaranteed independence, and in full compliance with the duty of independence set out by the EU Treaty.
8. Do you or your close relatives (parents, brothers and sisters, legal partner and children) have any business or financial holdings or any other commitments, which might conflict with your prospective duties?
Answer:
No. Neither myself nor my close relatives have any business or financial holdings or any commitments that might conflict with my envisaged duties.
9. Are you prepared to disclose all your financial interests and other commitments to the President of the Court and to make them public?
Answer:
Yes. I am prepared to disclose all relevant information in this regard and provide a declaration of interest to be published, in full compliance with the ECA’s Code of Conduct for its members and its ethical guidelines.
10. Are you involved in any current legal proceedings? If so, please provide us with details.
Answer:
No. I am not involved, nor have I ever been involved, in any legal proceedings.
11. Do you have any active or executive role in politics, if so at what level? Have you held any political position during the last 18 months? If so, please provide us with details.
Answer:
No. Throughout my professional life, I have abstained from engaging in any political activity. I am not a member of any political party; nor do I seek to engage in such activity in the future.
All public service that I have performed during my professional career has been based solely on my expertise as a high-ranking and experienced magistrate of the Italian Court of Auditors.
12. Will you step down from any elected office or give up any active function with responsibilities in a political party if you are appointed as a Member of the Court?
Answer:
I have never held or currently hold an elected office or party-political position. In the spirit of complete independence in my duties, I will continue in my path of abstaining from any political activity.
13. How would you deal with a major irregularity or even fraud and/or corruption case involving persons in your Member State of origin?
Answer:
I would like to preface this answer by recalling from my curriculum, that over the last preceding years I have been the contact person for the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in the field of combating fraud against the European Union, following prior experience as member of the Committee for Combating Fraud against the European Union, the Italian point of contact for the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). Based on these experiences I have developed a keen sense of the matters in question here.
Should I, in the course of my prospected duties, encounter a situation of serious allegation, such as major irregularity, fraud or corruption, I will deal with it in the same way that I have dealt with such situations over 27 years as magistrate of the Italian Court of Auditors: With indisputable professionalism, in full compliance with all applicable rules and legislation, and absolutely regardless of the origin or background of the person(s) involved.
Performance of duties
14. What should be the main features of a sound financial management culture in any public service? How could the ECA help to enforce it?
Answer:
It is of foremost importance to understand what we can define as sound financial management. For the sake of my answer here, I would like to recall Article 33 of the Financial Regulation of the EU: “Performance and principles of economy, efficiency and effectiveness”. These three guiding principles, generally referred to as the 3E of financial management, must guide public service in all its action and all spending of citizens money. Every government expenditure, every financial action must withstand the litmus test against these three overarching principles. In a strong culture of sound financial management, budget action must constantly ask itself: Are we doing the right things (effectiveness)? And: Are we doing the things right (efficiency and economy)?
The Court of Auditors, as well as the national counterparts in the supreme audit institutions, contribute to this culture of 3E by formulating audit questions that are based on these principles. While the performance audit could be seen as the most holistic, in addressing all three principles, financial and compliance audit cover more individual aspects of sound financial management, such as Legality and Regularity.
The Court of Auditors does and should continue to enforce and strengthen sound financial management in the EU institutions and, more broadly, wherever EU funds are spent. It can achieve this by continuously asking strong audit questions based on the 3E to remind all levels of public budget and expenditure of their obligation to adhere to these principles.
With a view on performance audit, and to be impactful in promoting sound financial management, it is fundamental for the ECA to translate such strong audit questions, through collecting relevant and reliable audit evidence, into actionable recommendations. To add real value, these recommendations shall address truly relevant issues and be viable in terms of cost-benefit ratio.
15. Under the Treaty, the Court is required to assist Parliament in exercising its powers of control over the implementation of the budget. How would you further improve the cooperation between the Court and the European Parliament (in particular, its Committee on Budgetary Control) to enhance both the public oversight of the general spending and its value for money?
Answer:
Currently I do not possess a sufficient operational insight into the cooperation between this Committee and the European Court of Auditors and I therefore believe it would be presumptuous to allow myself to suggest improvements thereto. As the experienced magistrate that I am, however, I seek and draw answers from the law, and would therefore like to recall Art 287 of the TFEU here, the legal basis and mandate of the Court.
The Committee of Budget Controls’ sharpest blade is the annual discharge procedure, and it is linked to the annual report and the obligation of ECA to provide the Parliament with a statement of assurance. Therefore, when thinking of ‘public oversight of the general spending’, in my view it is clearly linked to the very core duty of the ECA as auditor of the EU budget, i.e., to provide assurance to its stakeholders and the public on the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions. Based on such information, this Committee will be able to form its discharge procedure and opinion, hence the quality of ECA’s annual report must be impeccable and must provide the Parliament, and notably this Committee, with the information it needs to exercise its power by relying on appropriate, i.e., relevant, and reliable, audit evidence, and independent, factual audit conclusions.
Controlling the aspect of ‘value for money’ in my view is linked to special reports based on performance audit that the ECA may additionally provide. Here it will be key for the ECA to enhance and facilitate the communication and exchange with this Committee. In its audit planning, the Court should regularly seek the exchange with the Parliament to establish, e.g., an agreed upon working program, overarching objective themes of interest, and a continuous flow of information that allows the Committee to continuously monitor the impact and value that is created through the EU budget and call for corrective action where needed.
A powerful parliamentary oversight over the EU budget implementation must be based on the ECA providing the Parliament with the best possible audit work and, should I be appointed as member of ECA, I will fully commit myself to supporting, facilitating, and improving, where necessary, the cooperation between the ECA and the Committee of Budgetary Control. Where appropriate, I would welcome the opportunity to engage with, listen to and learn from members of the CONT Committee to improve cooperation between the ECA and the EP to strengthen the oversight on EU spending and deliver the best possible value for money for EU citizens.
16. What added value do you think performance auditing brings and how should the findings be incorporated in management procedures?
Answer:
During my professional career, I had the opportunity to look at the European Court of Auditors’ final reports that result from the performance audits and I am convinced that the audit recommendations formulated by the Court provide the biggest, tangible added value of the performance audit approach.
The ECA has a strong competence in developing recommendations based on relevant and reliable audit evidence, as I have experienced many times myself. When this audit evidence is translated in conclusions and actionable recommendations, they can significantly contribute to improving the sound financial management of the EU.
But to be incorporated by the auditee into the management procedures and for implementing the auditors’ recommendations, they need to be impactful in order to add value. From my national and European experience, as auditors we must always seek to make truly relevant and practical recommendations that are understood and shared by our auditee. Recommendations should be addressed to the right management level with the competence to implement them and should be viable in terms of time, cost, and resources. Here I would like to refer to my answer to question 14 and recall article 33 of the Financial Regulation on sound financial management. Art 33 (3) calls for objectives to be “specific, measurable, attainable, relevant and time-bound”. The same should apply to the recommendations we provide as auditors to the management as objectives to achieve.
If we understand performance audit as a process to identify potential shortcomings and to formulate valuable and viable recommendations to the relevant level of management, the ECA can help ensure spending programs that create and add value to the EU and its citizens.
17. How could cooperation between the Court of Auditors, the national audit institutions and the European Parliament (Committee on Budgetary Control) on auditing of the EU budget be improved?
Answer:
Over the course of my professional career at the Italian Court of Auditors, at various occasions I had the pleasure of engaging with Members of the European Court of Auditors in the organizational framework of the INTOSAI (International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions) and the EUROSAI (European Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions).
The role of ECA in these forums is of the highest value to the work of the national supreme audit institutions and I believe that the ECA serves as a crucial linchpin in the exchange of best practices on the audit of the EU budget. The regular exchange of information, the creation of working groups and shared knowledge and resulting publications and compendia significantly enhance the quality of our daily work. It also contributes to a harmonization of knowledge and practices when it comes to the SAI’s role in safeguarding the financial interests of the EU and protection of the EU budget.
I can see how the ECA, in the role of a linchpin between the European audit institutions will also be beneficial to the European Parliament and this Committee. Enhancing the dialogue with the main stakeholder at the Parliament would further elevate the quality of our work. The Parliament could contribute by expressing their view and, e.g., indicate preferences on future audit areas of particular interest, whereas the audit institutions could share their views and experiences to create a better understanding for the stakeholders. Such better understanding of stakeholder’s expectation matched against auditors’ performance and methodology will add value to a resource efficient, performance oriented, system of public accountability and oversight in the EU.
18. How would you further develop the reporting of the ECA to give the European Parliament all the necessary information on the accuracy of the data provided by the Member States to the European Commission?
Answer:
This question is of utmost importance and its relevance has significantly increased since the launch of the “Next Generation EU”. Data quality and availability is fundamental for the auditor to perform his duties, just as much as it is to the discharge authority to execute its budgetary oversight.
It is my understanding, that thanks to the outstanding and well-established cooperation between the European Court of Auditors, the European Commission and the Member States in financial and compliance audit, the availability and quality of data should be of satisfactory quality. During the Statement of Assurance work of the Court, communication, and flow of information, appears adequate and the different methods of budgetary implementation (direct, indirect, shared) appear to have harmonized reporting processes. Accuracy needs to be constantly controlled and upheld, e.g. ECA could provide a recurring assessment in the annual report on the accuracy of data based on sampling methods and could cooperate or even create a common knowledge node with EUROSTAT on data quality and analysis.
What I have experienced, however, while working on the supervision of the new budgetary approach of performance-based instruments such as the Recovery and Resilience Facility, is that there appear to be shortcomings in the accuracy of the data between the Member States, the Commission and the Parliament or at least diverging views on the interpretation of the data. I have experienced first-hand how challenging the discussion can be between the European Commission and Member States on providing and interpreting availably data, especially when it comes to assessing satisfactory achievement of performance, targets, and milestones. Consequently, it might be even more challenging for the Committee to exercise its oversight over potentially disputed data interpretation.
Learning from this experience and with a view on the future of performance-based budget, it is crucial that progress is achieved, and best practices established on the flow and exchange of information between Member States, the European Commission, the ECA and the European Parliament, to make sure that the interpretation of the data is held in a transparent matter. Due public accountability expects and requires nothing short of that, and should I be appointed as a Member of ECA, I will contribute my experience to the continuous improvement and harmonization of reporting structures and channels, to create value for the EU taxpayers and assure accountability.
Other questions
19. Will you withdraw your candidacy if Parliament’s opinion on your appointment as Member of the Court is unfavourable?
Answer:
The trust of the European Parliament and the Members of this Committee is the crucial cornerstone for the work of the European Court of Auditors. I am embarking here on a mission to obtain this trust, expressed through a favourable opinion, in the strong believe that trust is the most valuable currency of professional interaction.
Should I not be able to obtain the trust of the European Parliament, I will fully respect its opinion on my appointment as Member of the Court of Auditors and will withdraw my candidacy in case of a Parliament’s unfavourable opinion.