Changes between two versions
What changed between the resolution motion and the adopted text
From · resolution motion· 13 Oct 2025
on the UN Climate Change Conference 2025 in Belém, Brazil (COP30)
To · adopted text· 23 Oct 2025
UN Climate Change Conference 2025 in Belém, Brazil (COP30)
AI:What changed, in short
The adopted text removes a paragraph on defence sector emissions and changes 'gender equality' to 'gender equity'.1512 All other changes are formal: decimal commas are replaced with decimal points throughout.1234
2 changes of substance · 13 formal · 0 of wording only
Written by AI from the two texts only · read the changes before relying on it · 4 Sept 2026 · Report a problem
+3 added · −4 removed · 18 changed paragraphs, packaging included.
Part 3 of 4: Paragraphs 121–180
47 unchanged paragraphs
48. Calls for the EU to further investigate and address ways it contributes to climate change beyond its borders;
The triple planetary crisis: climate change, pollution and biodiversity loss
49. Underscores that the crises of climate change, pollution and biodiversity loss are interlinked and mutually reinforcing and that the responses to these crises need to be aligned; emphasises the importance of protecting, conserving and restoring biodiversity and ecosystems, including existing carbon-rich ecosystems, and of managing natural resources sustainably to enhance nature-based climate change mitigation and adaptation;
50. Recalls the importance of the land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) sector in meeting the EU’s climate and biodiversity targets; recalls that the Nature Restoration Law is one of the EU’s tools for meeting its targets under the LULUCF Regulation and its international biodiversity obligations, notably the Kunming-Montreal GBF;
51. Recalls the importance of environmental policies being designed and implemented in full alignment with the One Health approach, which aims to sustainably balance and optimise the health of people, animals and ecosystems;
52. Stresses the need to support and protect environmental defenders and to hold accountable those who threaten them;
53. Emphasises that soil is the largest terrestrial carbon store and plays an indispensable role in the global climate cycle; welcomes all efforts by governments and non-governmental organisations to maximise the potential of soils to mitigate climate change and improve water availability; underlines, in this regard, the agreement reached at EU level on the Soil Monitoring Law, which serves to improve capacities of the Member States and help the EU meet its international commitments;
54. Stresses the important role of forests in climate action and in climate change mitigation; stresses, in this regard, the importance of global efforts to combat deforestation, as forests provide one of the largest carbon sinks in the world and are essential reservoirs in terms of biodiversity; highlights the urgent need to protect the world’s most vital forest territories, such as the Amazon rainforest, including in the EU’s outermost regions; reaffirms the EU’s commitment to the Glasgow Leaders’ Declaration on Forests and Land Use (COP26); calls on all Parties to set targets to increase net removals of CO2 equivalent through LULUCF activities;
55. Underscores the critical importance of wetlands – including peatlands, mangroves and other coastal and inland wetland ecosystems – as some of the planet’s most effective natural carbon sinks; calls on all Parties to urgently scale up efforts to conserve, sustainably manage and restore wetlands as a central strategy for climate mitigation, adaptation, biodiversity protection and the sustainability of related social and economic activities;
56. Highlights the importance of identifying and maximising potential synergies between biodiversity and climate actions, including by prioritising the protection, restoration and management of ecosystems and species important in carbon cycles, as agreed at COP16 in Cali, Colombia; stresses the importance of implementing the Kunming-Montreal GBF; welcomes, in this regard, the submission of national biodiversity strategies and action plans by 55 Parties and of national targets by 139 Parties and urges all other Parties to swiftly follow suit;
57. Emphasises the importance of protecting, conserving and restoring water and water-related ecosystems; calls for more action on sustainable water usage, including through the use of innovative water technologies, especially in places that are severely impacted by droughts or water scarcity; highlights the devastating environmental, social and economic impacts of desertification, drought, floods and water pollution; welcomes the European water resilience strategy and calls on the Commission and the Member States to swiftly implement it; calls for further action to tackle pollution from per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances; calls for the Commission and the Member States to step up the enforcement of existing laws and ensure compliance with the Water Framework Directive;
58. Welcomes the adoption of the High Seas Treaty and calls for its swift ratification and implementation by the parties thereto; calls on the Parties to continue working on the Ocean and Climate Change Dialogue; stresses that the global climate system depends on the health of the ocean and marine ecosystems, which is losing its regulatory capacity as a result of global warming, pollution, overexploitation of marine biodiversity, acidification, eutrophication, deoxygenation and coastal erosion;
59. Stresses the importance of global efforts to combat the degradation of marine ecosystems, as the ocean absorbs 30 % of all carbon emissions, captures 90 % of excess heat and supplies over 50 % of the world’s oxygen, and is an essential reservoir in terms of biodiversity; welcomes the outcome of the Nice Ocean Week on increased financing commitments for ocean conservation; calls for urgent action to restore marine ecosystems and to ensure the effective protection of marine protected areas; recalls target 3 of the Kunming-Montreal GBF to protect 30 % of seas by 2030;
60. Stresses the need to address the linkages between climate change, air pollution and public health in a comprehensive manner, including at the COP; welcomes the COP28 Declaration on Climate and Health, signed by over 150 governments; calls for air quality improvements to be integrated into climate policies and considered in NDCs; calls on all Parties to accelerate meaningful action contributing to air quality; urges the Parties to ensure that climate finance prioritises clean air solutions with measurable benefits for health, equity and climate;
61. Stresses that climate change will contribute to increased antibiotic resistance; reiterates, in this regard, the need for urgent action to tackle antimicrobial resistance and calls for further efforts by all Parties to achieve a reduction in and more prudent use of antimicrobials to combat the risk of resistance; calls, in this regard, for binding commitments in relevant international treaties; regrets the lack of action taken so far;
62. Stresses the need to combat the environmental impact of plastics over their life cycle, including their impact on the climate; stresses the need for adequate carbon pricing of raw materials to significantly reduce fossil fuels in the plastics sector; notes that work on the global plastics treaty is still ongoing and regrets that the parties were again unable to conclude the treaty in Geneva in August 2025 owing to disagreements over its scope; calls for the adoption of an ambitious agreement that addresses all stages of plastic production, consumption and waste management;
63. Regrets the high costs of worldwide chemical pollution, which is worsening the climate and biodiversity crises; calls on the Parties to implement measures to meet the strategic objectives and targets adopted under the UN Global Framework on Chemicals; underlines the need for the EU and its Member States to spearhead global efforts to tackle chemical pollution, including by revising its policies on chemicals, where necessary;
The rights of indigenous peoples
64. Stresses the need to protect the rights and interests of indigenous peoples and local communities as set out in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; stresses the need to ensure the right to free, prior and informed consent; stresses that all projects under Article 6 affecting indigenous lands or communities must involve these indigenous peoples and respect their rights;
65. Underlines that indigenous peoples are not just stakeholders or vulnerable groups, but are rights holders recognised under the Preamble to the Paris Agreement; stresses the need for the political participation of indigenous peoples at the COPs and in other UNFCCC processes to promote meaningful engagement in all decision-making bodies; acknowledges the need to fund and facilitate the presence of indigenous peoples at the COPs and subsidiary body technical meetings;
66. Recognises that indigenous lands are biodiversity hotspots and that indigenous peoples play a vital role in conservation and sustainable management of resources; recalls that, according to the fifth assessment report of the IPCC, indigenous, local and traditional forms of knowledge are a major resource for adapting to climate change; regrets that indigenous knowledge is not being effectively used; underlines in particular the role of this knowledge in avoiding maladaptation;
67. Stresses the need for indigenous peoples to have direct access to climate finance through international climate funds such as the Green Climate Fund, the Adaptation Fund and the Loss and Damage Fund;
Climate, peace and security
68. Recognises that increased focus has been given to the Climate, Peace and Security agenda at COP meetings, particularly evident at COP29 with the launch of the Baku Call on Climate Action for Peace, Relief and Recovery, and with the previous COP27 Climate Responses for Sustaining Peace Initiative and the COP28 Declaration on Climate, Relief, Recovery and Peace;
69. Notes that the Commission’s progress report on the joint communication entitled ‘A New Outlook on the Climate and Security Nexus’, published in February 2025, recognises the links between climate change, environmental degradation and issues of peace, security and defence, underscoring their significance for foreign policy;
70. Stresses that climate change and environmental degradation are threat multipliers that can lead to food shortages and scarcities of natural resources, increase tensions in international relations and conflicts over natural resources, and cause natural catastrophes, all of which are major drivers of human displacement and migratory flows;
71. Stresses the need for increased international attention to the environmental impacts of conflicts; highlights the environmental devastation caused by military assaults and operations around the world and urges the cessation of these activities in line with international law; stresses that beyond the immediate destruction and loss of human lives, ongoing conflicts disrupt ecosystems, deplete natural resources, pollute the environment, and jeopardise the health of our planet for generations to come, while undermining climate mitigation and adaptation efforts; underlines in particular the latest UNEP reports on the frightening extent of environmental damage caused by the conflicts in both Ukraine and Gaza; recalls, furthermore, the Joint Research Centre report on the environmental damage caused by Russia’s ongoing war of aggression in Ukraine, showing sharp spikes in toxic pollution, soil degradation and disruptions to monitoring systems; believes that entities recognised as being responsible for conflicts by the International Court of Justice must also be held accountable for the climate and environmental costs of war and occupation and post-conflict reconstruction;
72. Stresses that strengthened climate diplomacy under the UNFCCC is key to contributing to reaffirming multilateralism, especially amid rising geopolitical tensions and declining trust in global cooperation; highlights the symbolic significance of COP30 as the 10th anniversary of the Paris Agreement; calls for the EU and its Member States to support the COP30 Presidency in its commitment to multilateralism; highlights that with its presidency of both the BRICS and COP30, Brazil can leverage the opportunity to drive a stronger, more coordinated agenda to deliver progress on economic, political and environmental issues;
73. Stresses that climate goals cannot be achieved without the support and involvement of the public; calls on all Parties to raise awareness and public understanding of climate change and related issues and to work with public representatives to gain public support for mitigation and adaptation measures; is concerned by the increasing spread of climate misinformation and disinformation, including by state actors, and urges all governments to address this as a matter of urgency in view of the threat it poses to both meaningful climate action and democracy; highlights the importance of access to science-based information and of safeguarding independent media; stresses the importance of the work conducted by the IPCC to provide sound scientific advice and data; calls on the UNFCCC to intensify efforts to combat climate disinformation; calls on the Commission to join the Global Initiative for Information Integrity on Climate Change to fight climate disinformation;
Efforts across all sectors
74. Stresses that all sectors must contribute to reducing emissions and to achieving climate neutrality in line with the Paris Agreement;
75. Welcomes the fact that almost 160 countries have become signatories to the Global Methane Pledge; urges those EU Member States that have not yet joined the Pledge to do so before COP30; calls on the Commission and the Member States to take further action to meet the Methane Pledge target; calls on all Parties to adopt specific methane reduction targets and to include these in their NDCs; calls for a quantified, science-based assessment of the progress made since its adoption at COP26;
76. Recalls that methane has over 80 times the warming power of carbon dioxide during its first 20 years in the atmosphere and stresses therefore the importance of accelerating the reduction in methane; notes with concern the findings of the 2025 IEA report, highlighting the continued rise in methane emissions, the weak implementation of the Global Methane Pledge and the fact that countries are considerably underestimating their energy sector methane pollution, with the IEA estimating that emissions are around 80 % higher than the total reported by governments; recalls that methane emissions from the energy sector remain one of the easiest and most economically beneficial emission categories to abate globally; calls for the EU’s support in establishing a methane reduction buyers’ club together with other major importers of fossil fuels, inspired by the First Movers Coalition, adopting a common maximum methane intensity value, in line with Regulation (EU) 2024/1787, and thus accelerating the global reduction in methane;
77. Recalls the adopted Regulation (EU) 2024/1787 on the reduction of methane emissions in the energy sector, which will also apply from 1 January 2027 to EU importers of crude oil, natural gas and coal; stresses the critical role of this regulation and its implementation in driving upstream methane abatement, securing investor confidence and setting global standards;
78. Notes with concern that the transport sector is the only sector in which emissions have risen at EU level since 1990 and that a more substantial reduction will be needed to meet the EU’s climate goals; stresses the importance of further measures to support the electrification of road transport as a way of reducing road transport emissions, in conjunction with further measures supporting the modal shift, intermodal transport and public transport in general; calls on the Commission to include emissions from international transport in NDCs; is concerned by the fact that the Commission’s 2025 NECP assessment report showed that some Member States still have support schemes for fossil-fuel powered vehicles and calls on those Member States to phase them out;
79. Reiterates its call on the Commission to ensure the social fairness of transport decarbonisation measures, including by incorporating emissions from superyachts, private jets and business planes into EU climate policies; reiterates, furthermore, its call on all Parties, including the EU Member States, to take measures to discourage the use of private jets; highlights the disproportionate climate impact of private jets, which are up to 14 times more polluting per passenger than commercial flights; underlines the importance of leading by example and urges all participants attending COP30, including those from the EU institutions, to refrain from using private jets and to choose the least polluting transport option possible to reach their destination;
80. Welcomes the progress made at international level to impose carbon levies on international shipping; considers nevertheless that there is still a gap between the agreement reached by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the long-term objectives set by the IMO; highlights the EU emissions trading system (ETS) in this regard, which applies to maritime traffic progressively from 2025 onwards;
81. Calls on the Commission to submit a report to Parliament, once the decarbonisation measures adopted by the IMO at the 83rd session of the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC 83) are formally adopted, assessing their overall environmental integrity and their contribution to the objectives of the Paris Agreement, as well as a comparison with the level of environmental integrity provided by the EU ETS provisions;
82. Welcomes the analysis published by the Commission on 18 March 2025 showing that there is no evidence pointing to an increase in the use of smaller ships outside the scope of the EU ETS or ship-to-ship transfers as a way of circumventing the recent extension of the EU ETS to maritime transport; recalls the EU ETS 2026 review clause providing for the possibility of extending the scope to smaller ships, including offshore ships with a gross tonnage of between 400 and 5 000;
83. Notes that the agricultural sector accounted for 10-12 % of global anthropogenic emissions and 11 % of total EU emissions in 2020; acknowledges the significant potential for GHG emissions reduction in the agricultural sector; stresses that farmers and the agricultural sector are particularly vulnerable to climate change, with climate change posing a significant threat to food security worldwide; stresses that policies to achieve emission reductions in the agricultural sector should do the utmost to guarantee food security; stresses the need to implement a policy framework that incentivises sustainable farming methods and supports farmers, particularly small-scale farmers, in the shift to resilient practices and that rewards farmers who support mitigation efforts and protect biodiversity; highlights the environmental benefits of rewetting drained peatlands, and other measures that promote on-farm biodiversity, soil health and water quality while contributing to climate mitigation and adaptation;
84. Welcomes the fact that according to the World Bank, 28 % of global emissions are now covered by carbon pricing; regrets, nevertheless, that both the coverage and the average pricing levels remain far too low to meet the goals set in the Paris Agreement; highlights that carbon pricing raises revenues, which should be used for climate action and a just transition;
85. Welcomes the fact that Brazil is introducing an ETS, and that several EU trading partners have introduced or are planning to introduce carbon trading or other carbon pricing mechanisms, including in response to the introduction of CBAM; invites the Commission to further encourage and support other Parties in introducing or improving carbon pricing mechanisms, and to explore links and other forms of cooperation with existing carbon pricing mechanisms outside the EU; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to ensure that any links with the EU ETS will continue to deliver additional and permanent mitigation contributions and will not undermine the EU’s domestic GHG emissions commitments;
86. Stresses that the GST highlights the importance of transitioning to sustainable lifestyles and sustainable patterns of consumption and production, including through a more circular economy; stresses the need to intensify efforts to develop and improve the EU’s circular economy; urges the Commission to propose a 2030 target as soon as possible, following an impact assessment, for the EU’s material and consumption footprints, as per the 8th EAP commitment;
87. Stresses the need to address the climate and environmental impacts of the textile sector, which is responsible for around 8-10 % of global GHG emissions and substantial consumption of resources, particularly water and energy; reiterates that the textile industry needs to play an important role in the shift to a circular economy and that it needs to tackle challenges related to waste prevention, waste management, microplastic shedding, water usage, overproduction, ultra-fast and fast-fashion practices, the overall durability and non-toxicity of the production process, and recyclability in the textile sector; highlights, in this regard, the importance of the recent amendment to the EU Waste Framework Directive; stresses the need to urgently improve human rights standards throughout the textile value chain;
88. Stresses the impact of climate change on the tourism sector, as both a contributor and a vulnerable sector, and the need for destinations to adapt to climate risks and to develop climate-resilient tourism; calls for the promotion of a shift to more sustainable tourism, with environmentally responsible and low-carbon practices;
89. Notes that there is growing scientific and political interest in solar radiation modification (SRM), a proposed set of climate engineering approaches, such as stratospheric aerosol injection, to artificially reflect sunlight and cool the planet; stresses that SRM does nothing to address the root cause of climate change, that there is no scientific certainty regarding its effects and that it endangers climactic and geopolitical stability, potentially in a catastrophic fashion; recalls that a UN resolution on global governance has been blocked; emphasises that, in the absence of robust scientific evidence regarding safety, effectiveness and governance, any pursuit of climate engineering must be guided by the precautionary principle;
90. Recalls the recommendations of the Group of Chief Scientific Advisors of the Commission published in December 2024 and accordingly calls on the Commission to take a proactive role in negotiating a global governance framework for SRM based on a firm stance of non-deployment, and to strengthen the capability to detect and quantify any undeclared deployment of SRM; further calls on the Commission and the Member States to agree on an EU-wide moratorium on the use of SRM, and to ensure that any potential public funding for responsible scientific research and comprehensive international assessments of the risks, potential effects and impacts of this technology, does not replace public funding for research on adaptation and mitigation;
Change 15
Removed:Defence sector
Removed:91. Stresses that the defence sector must contribute to tackling climate change by reducing its emissions intensity while maintaining operational effectiveness and meeting Member States’ defence spending targets where agreed, and that the development of decarbonisation technologies and strategies in the defence sector should be accelerated; notes that the inclusion of disaggregated data on military emissions in UNFCCC submissions is voluntary, and that it is not currently possible to identify reported military GHG emissions from the submitted UNFCCC data; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commission and the Council to formulate a proposal to increase the transparency of the accounting of military emissions to the UNFCCC that takes into account national security concerns and that acknowledges the adoption of the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, and in order to fully implement the Climate Change and Defence Roadmap;
11 unchanged paragraphs
Climate change and gender
91. Underscores the importance of gender perspectives and inclusive approaches in the UNFCCC process, including the Just Transition Work Programme; calls for all Parties, including the EU and its Member States, to increase efforts to integrate gender equality into their revised NDCs and national adaptation plans and into their climate and environmental policies, in particular those related to mitigation, adaptation and loss and damage; emphasises the need for more concrete actions by all Parties, including the EU and its Member States, to deliver on the commitments under the renewed Gender Action Plan agreed at COP25; urges the Member States and the Commission to increase efforts to achieve the goals set out in the EU Gender Action Plan III;
92. Calls for the development of a new ambitious gender action plan ahead of COP30 that is intersectional, inclusive, measurable, human rights-based and cohesive across all areas of climate action; calls on the Parties to ensure that climate funding becomes gender-responsive and that the gender action plan includes an adequate and dedicated plan for funding; calls on all Parties to support the adoption of a new gender action plan during COP30;
93. Reiterates that adaptive capacity and vulnerability differ across gender, age, ability, racial and occupational lines; calls, therefore, on all Parties to assess, respond to and prioritise the needs of vulnerable populations in their national adaptation plans, adaptation communications and NDCs;
94. Recognises the disproportionate impact of climate change on women and girls, exacerbating existing gender inequalities and posing unique threats to their livelihoods, health and safety; reiterates the need to accelerate action for gender-responsive disaster risk reduction and, therefore, for gender-responsive implementation of the Sendai Framework; calls for further efforts to be made to prioritise and account for gender in disaster preparedness, particularly through the use of disaggregated disaster risk reduction datasets;
95. Considers that women’s access to inclusive climate finance must be increased and facilitated, noting that women receive disproportionately less access to financial resources for climate adaptation and mitigation projects; urges the EU and its Member States to report on the gender responsiveness of their climate finance contributions and to enhance the consistency between gender and climate support through external action instruments and the European Investment Bank;
96. Reiterates the importance of increasing women’s participation in decision-making in the climate diplomacy context, including in COP delegations and in leadership at all levels of climate action; calls on all Parties to aim for gender parity in their delegations and at all levels of climate change decision-making and negotiations; urges all Parties to nominate a national gender and climate change focal point and to increase the associated resources, training and support, including within the EU;
Participation of stakeholders at COP30
97. Recalls the importance of the full involvement of all Parties in the UNFCCC decision-making processes in the spirit of sincere collaboration, and recognises that protecting space for civil society and local- and regional-level actors to operate and participate in climate governance is fundamental to accountability and transparency; acknowledges that there are many barriers to the participation of civil society organisations at COPs; stresses that civil society and local- and regional-level actors play a vital role in advancing the implementation of NDCs by ensuring actions are effective, locally tailored and responsive to community needs;
98. Calls on the COP30 presidency and future presidencies to better enable the participation of developing countries and delegates from the least developed countries and to allocate additional resources to this end; encourages Parties to include young people in their delegations to ensure that future generations have an active role in shaping decisions that affect their future; welcomes the creation of the Youth Climate Champion role at COP28 as a step towards the stronger inclusion of young people in the UNFCCC process; calls for COP30 to institutionalise the meaningful participation of children and young people, including through structured dialogue mechanisms and official representation; calls for the increased use of virtual platforms at COPs to enhance global inclusiveness and participation of delegates and civil society representatives;
99. Demands that the organisers of the COPs ensure that human rights, fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of expression, full and unrestricted participation for citizens and civil society organisations, including the right to peaceful assembly and association, and equitable access to this and future COPs are fully enshrined and guaranteed in the Host Country Agreement, which should be made public as soon as possible after signing; calls on the UNFCCC secretariat to monitor compliance and to take action in the event of breaches of such human rights criteria;