What changed between the resolution motion and the adopted text

6. Expresses concern at the findings of the UNEP’s 2023 emissions gap report that fully implementing current unconditional NDCs would put the world on track for 2.9 °C global warming while the additional implementation and continuation of conditional NDCs would lead to 2.5 °C global warming this century; draws attention to the fact that this trajectory is far from the 1.5 °C target agreed to by all Parties in the GST at COP28, putting the world on a path toward irreversible climate change and the crossing of critical tipping points;

7. Notes that the current NDCs of the Parties collectively fall far short of what is needed to achieve the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement; calls on all Parties to adhere to the COP26 decision regarding common time frames and to communicate, in 2025, an NDC for 2035, and to submit this NDC by the deadline laid down in the Paris Agreement; recalls that all Parties should urgently scale up their climate targets and accompanying policies to achieve a swift and just transition to climate neutral economies and pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C in line with the Paris Agreement and the outcome of the first GST; welcomes the ‘Roadmap to Mission 1.5 °C’, aimed at stimulating ambition in the next round of NDCs, launched by the COP Presidencies Troika; calls for the global stocktake dialogue to support the Parties’ update of their NDCs through the identification of tools, methodologies and sector-specific guidance; stresses the importance of the comprehensive and timely delivery of the seventh assessment cycle for the next GST;

8. Urges all Parties to come forward in their next NDCs for 2035 with ambitious, quantified economy-wide absolute, as opposed to relative, emissions reduction targets covering all greenhouse gases, sectors and categories and aligned with the goal of limiting global warming to 1.5 °C, as informed by the latest science, and in the light of different national circumstances; stresses that these revised NDCs should include transparent mechanisms for monitoring and accountability to ensure progress is tracked effectively on national climate commitments and sectoral targets; underlines the need for all climate targets to be clear and transparent and calls on the Commission to propose separate sub-targets for gross emissions reductions, land-based removals and technological removals as part of the 2040 target; calls on all other Parties to also provide similar clarity in their NDCs;

9. Urges all Parties to engage constructively at COP29 in order to come to an agreement on robust and rigorous rules for cooperative mechanisms under Article 6 that contributes to the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement, fosters private sector involvement and increases the mobilisation of financial and non-financial resources for climate action, including voluntary carbon market action and non-market approaches; calls for the EU and its Member States to strictly defend a high level of climate integrity in the negotiations, based on the best available science; stresses that cooperative mechanisms should set the highest level of accountability, monitoring and transparency, and prevent double counting and loopholes that could undermine climate ambition, while achieving real and verifiable emissions reductions and supporting the transition to renewable energy, particularly in developing countries; stresses that the provision of finance and other non market-based support for the implementation of NDCs, should be redistributive, sustained and predictable over long time frames;

10. Insists that rules under Article 6 related to carbon removals must ensure environmental integrity by setting strict criteria for quantification, additionality and baselines, liability, permanence and sustainability as well as respect for human rights, and that these must be implemented using independent certification and verification, similar to the EU’s recently adopted certification framework; underlines that a strict separation of temporary and permanent removals must be made in line with the EU framework; welcomes the agreement that emissions avoidance will not be eligible to generate credits under Article 6 and insists that this rule must be strictly upheld;

International climate finance and sustainable finance

11. Acknowledges that the EU, its Member States and the EIB are together the largest providers of public climate finance, providing roughly one third of global public climate finance, with European climate finance reaching an all-time high in 2022 of EUR 28.5 billion from public sources – half of it through grants and half of it through non-grant instruments, particularly loans – and mobilising an additional EUR 11.9 billion of private finance in total;

12. Notes that developed countries provided and mobilised a total of USD 115.9 billion in climate finance for developing countries in 2022, of which 69 % was extended as loans and 28 % as grants, exceeding the UNFCC annual USD 100 billion climate finance goal for the first time; urges countries to ensure that the USD 100 billion goal continues to be met through to 2025; recalls the COP26 outcome urging developed nations to at least double their collective provision of adaptation finance from 2019 levels by 2025, in order to achieve balance between adaptation and mitigation in line with the Paris Agreement;

13. Calls on all Parties to agree on a post-2025 new collective quantified goal (NCQG) on climate finance at COP29, which should be based on a global effort and a variety of sources, instruments and channels, including public, private and innovative sources of finance; calls on all Parties to ensure that the NCQG addresses mitigation, adaptation and loss and damage in a balanced way, which could include exploring stand-alone targets;

14. Recalls that many developing countries’ NDCs are conditional on international climate finance; highlights, therefore, that the provision of adequate climate finance is key to achieving the goal of the Paris Agreement; notes that climate finance needs are increasing substantially, with estimates of the costed needs identified by the UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance consistently well above the current USD 100 billion goal, and reaching on average over USD 1 trillion annually up to 2030, with estimates varying by type of needs and subset of developing countries; underlines, therefore, that the NCQG should clearly reflect the increased need for climate finance globally, in particular of small island developing states and least developed countries, should be set in a science-based manner, and should be new and additional to official development assistance;

15. Believes that the responsibility to deliver on the post-2025 NCQG should encompass a broadened contributor base reflecting Parties’ evolving financial capabilities and historical emission levels; insists that emerging economies with high emissions and high GDP should contribute to the new goal;

16. Stresses the importance for the NCQG differentiating funding levels in a way that better reflects the needs and priorities of countries most vulnerable to global warming and with limited capabilities, notably the least developed countries and small island developing states;

17. Reiterates its call for a predictable EU finance mechanism that provides additional and adequate support and ensures that the EU delivers its fair share towards the international climate finance goals; calls on the EU Member State climate finance negotiators to get clear mandates from their respective finance ministries to make meaningful financial contributions to the NCQG;

18. Believes that the core goal of the NCQG should clearly prioritise grants-based finance; highlights the need to identify new and innovative sources of finance; stresses that such sources should be socially fair and aligned with the polluter pays principle, ensuring that the costs of climate change are borne by those with the greatest capacity to pay as well as the greatest responsibility for causing it; points to potential financial contributions from the fossil fuel supply chain; calls for the NCQG to have a structure that responds to lessons learned from the annual USD 100 billion goal and to be equipped with solid transparency and accountability mechanisms to track the delivery of the agreed quantum by the agreed deadlines, and to avoid double counting and greenwashing;

19. Notes with concern that many climate-vulnerable countries are in or at risk of debt distress, experiencing a dual crisis of a growing debt burden and escalating climate change impacts; also notes with concern that mitigation and adaptation costs and needs are rising, leading to a widening finance gap, while developing countries are under particular fiscal constraints; underlines therefore the need to jointly tackle the climate and debt crises; calls for international climate finance to prioritise grant-based and non-debt inducing instruments and measures to ensure that these countries are able to implement necessary mitigation and adaptation measures without increasing their debt burden, including in the design of the NCQG; calls, moreover, for an effective debt workout mechanism, including the principle of comparable treatment for creditors, as well as for the inclusion of climate resilience debt clauses in the future lending of multilateral development banks;

20. Recalls the conclusions of COP27, which stated that delivering the necessary funding for the climate transition will require a transformation of the financial system and its structures and processes, engaging governments, central banks, commercial banks, institutional investors and other financial actors; considers that facilitating climate transition efforts globally will require the involvement of domestic and international financial systems in removing barriers to access to finance for clean technologies and shifting public and private finance flows away from emission-intense activities;

21. Considers it essential to advance the Bridgetown Initiative without delay; believes that the NCQG represents a pivotal opportunity to accelerate reform of the international financial architecture by incorporating the principles of the Bridgetown Initiative; calls on all the major international financial institutions and multilateral development banks to align their portfolios and lending policies with the Paris Agreement;

22. Recalls the role of the European Investment Bank (EIB) as the EU’s climate bank and its Climate Bank Roadmap and updated energy lending policy, as well as the additional efforts of the European Investment Fund to spearhead climate investments; welcomes the fact that the European Central Bank has committed to integrating climate change considerations into its monetary policy framework;

23. Notes that the high risk profile of many countries impedes their capacity to attract and mobilise private investments in mitigation and adaptation to climate change; calls on the international financial institutions, multilateral development banks and governments to coordinate and propose adequate financial de-risking plans for climate mitigation and adaptation projects in the context of COP29; calls on countries and multilateral development banks, including the EIB, to adopt climate resilience debt clauses in future lending;

24. Recalls that fossil fuels are responsible for over 75 % of all GHGs and are therefore the largest contributor to climate change, with their emissions still growing; notes that fossil fuels are still used to meet over 80 % of the world’s energy needs; stresses that the phase-out of fossil fuels is both necessary and technologically feasible; notes that the pathway under the IEA’s Net Zero by 2050 Roadmap to keep the global temperature increase below 1.5 °C requires no new oil, gas or coal developments;

25. Stresses that one of the aims of COP29 should be to coordinate an unambiguous signal that follows up on the outcome of the first global stocktake at COP28 to transition away from fossil fuels and towards renewables and energy efficiency in a just, orderly, equitable manner; highlights the importance of introducing clarifying quantifications and timelines to accelerate action in this decade; calls on all Parties, including the EU, to adopt plans to phase out fossil fuels in keeping with the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement; calls on all the Parties to explore options to increase fossil fuel companies’ contributions to the Paris goals;

26. Stresses the importance of phasing out fossil fuels as soon as possible; notes that in meeting this objective, the EU should aim to maximise its energy security, industrial competitiveness and citizens’ welfare by reducing energy bills, and to build an energy-efficient and a renewables-based economy; notes in particular the urgent need to end EU imports of Russian fossil fuels, including natural gas, which subsidise Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; calls on the G7 countries to lead the energy transition by example, and on all Parties to decarbonise their energy system and to halt all new investments in fossil fuel extraction; welcomes all initiatives to reduce the EU’s dependency on fossil fuels and to increase the diversity of its energy suppliers; notes the ongoing work of the EU with international partners to diversify energy supplies;

27. Notes with concerns that fossil energy subsidies in the EU remained stable between 2010 and 2020, at around EUR 50 billion per year, and even increased to EUR 123 billion in 2022; stresses the need for the Commission and the Member States to implement the requirement in the 8th EAP to ‘set a deadline for the phasing out of fossil fuel subsidies consistent with the ambition of limiting global warming to 1.5 °C’; calls on the Commission and all Member States to improve their national reporting of all direct and indirect fossil fuel subsidies and plan for their phase-out without delay through concrete policies, timelines and measures in a way that supports the Union’s energy and food security, industrial competitiveness and citizens’ welfare, and reduces energy bills; calls on the Commission to develop a framework in this regard in line with this requirement of the 8th EAP;

28. Is concerned that governments worldwide spent more than USD 620 billion on fossil fuel subsidies in 2023, significantly more than the USD 70 billion spent to support clean energy; encourages all Parties to phase out all direct and indirect fossil fuel subsidies as soon as possible and to reallocate these harmful subsidies to climate action, including international climate finance for the most vulnerable developing countries; calls on all Parties to ensure transparent reporting of their fossil fuels subsidies and to adopt concrete plans for their phase-out as soon as possible;

29. Reiterates its support for the work of the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action and encourages all governments to adopt the coalition’s commitments to align all policies and practices in the remit of finance ministries with the goals of the Paris Agreement and to adopt effective carbon pricing;

Adaptation

30. Underlines the need to step up adaptation action within the EU and globally to minimise the negative effects of climate change and biodiversity loss; points out that while mitigation finance and implementation have progressed, adaptation efforts continue to lag behind, with a widening gap in both funding and concrete action; stresses that adaptation finance flows have declined since 2020, and that the gap is widening; recognises that without immediate action, the costs of adaptation will continue to rise due to severe weather and climate-related extreme events;

31. Welcomes the first EUCRA and the Commission communication of 12 March 2024 on managing climate risks, which highlights the need for resilience in the face of escalating climate risks; calls on the Commission, therefore, to present a European climate adaptation plan, including concrete legislative proposals and actions, particularly regarding infrastructure resilience, water management and nature-based solutions, while prioritising the protection of vulnerable communities, to make the EU more resilient and to lead by example; stresses the importance of the development, implementation and regular updating of national adaptation plans, including with a focus on financial and technical assistance; calls on Parties that have not yet done so to put in place their national adaptation plans by 2025, and to have progressed in implementing them by 2030;

32. Advocates the integration of nature-based solutions in urban areas to improve air quality to rein in rising temperatures, address the urban heat island effect and improve air quality to protect the public and reduce energy costs;

33. Welcomes the agreement on the framework for the global goal on adaptation at COP28, namely the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience; highlights the need to translate the framework into measurable outcomes with robust tracking systems in place to monitor progress towards achieving the targets; encourages all Parties to swiftly agree on indicators for measuring progress towards the targets as part of the two-year UAE–Belém work programme established at COP28; highlights the importance of inclusive indicators in ensuring adaptation takes place in a socially just manner;

34. Stresses that early warning systems are critical to effective adaptation and calls for the rapid implementation of both the Climate Risk and Early Warning Systems (CREWS) initiative, which focuses on vulnerable countries such as least developed countries and small island developing states, and the Early Warnings for All initiative, which seeks to ensure global access to early warning systems by 2027;

35. Expresses deep concern about the increasing intensity and frequency of extreme weather events in the EU and globally, including wildfires, droughts, heatwaves and floods, their impact on human health and the increasing loss of life they cause, as was expressed in the findings of the first EUCRA; stresses the urgent need to strengthen the collective global response to climate change in this critical decade through ambitious mitigation and adaptation action taken by all Parties with a view to protecting people, their livelihoods, the economy and our ecosystems; recalls the need to account for future climate conditions when investing in infrastructure and assets;

Loss and damage

36. Welcomes the decision at COP28 to establish the loss and damage fund to address and respond to the economic and non-economic impacts of climate change for particularly vulnerable developing countries; appreciates the progress made in operationalising the fund since COP28, including through the acceptance of the offer of the Government of the Philippines to host the fund; stresses the need for the fund to receive funding from a variety of sources in a coordinated manner, including from new and innovative sources; strongly believes that loss and damage funding should prioritise grants and be additional to and distinct from official development assistance;

37. Calls on the loss and damage (L&D) fund Board to agree on all the necessary arrangements so that the fund can provide funding to affected communities, if not in 2024, then at least at the beginning of 2025; calls for the preparation of an initial capitalisation effort as well as a long-term fundraising and replenishment strategy by COP29; calls for representatives of affected local communities to be able to contribute to the design of the fund and calls for the Fund to deliver support to local communities in a fast and targeted manner;

38. Urges all major emitters to contribute their fair share to the fund to ensure global climate justice; welcomes the pledges of the EU and its Member States for the initial capitalisation of the fund of more than EUR 400 million, which covers over half of the initial total funding pledges;

39. Reiterates its call for L&D to be a standing agenda item at COPs, in order to monitor and make progress on this issue, and for the full use of the Santiago Network in order to effectively catalyse technical assistance for adequately addressing L&D;

40. Calls on all Parties to assess and quantify their L&D related vulnerabilities and needs in order to respond to the most severe impacts of climate change in the next round of NDCs; calls on all Parties to establish and implement rules on the transparency of spending within the L&D framework to ensure the impact and effectiveness of the financial support;

Participation of stakeholders at COP29

41. Recalls the importance of the full involvement of all Parties in the UNFCCC decision-making processes; calls on the COP29 presidency and future presidencies to better enable the participation of developing countries and delegates from the least developed countries and to allocate additional resources to this; encourages Parties to include young people in their delegations to ensure that future generations have an active role in shaping decisions concerning their future; calls for the increased use of virtual platforms at COPs to enhance global inclusiveness and participation of delegates and civil society representatives;

42. Stresses that climate goals cannot be achieved without the support and involvement of the public; calls on all Parties to raise awareness and public understanding of climate change and related issues, combat both misinformation and disinformation and work with public representatives to gain public support for mitigation and adaptation measures;

43. Recalls its resolution of 25 April 2024 on Azerbaijan; stresses its profound concern regarding the human rights situation in Azerbaijan; calls on Azerbaijan to respect the rights of and immediately and unconditionally release all political prisoners, human rights defenders and journalists and insists on making partnership agreements conditional on this and the improvement of the overall human rights situation in the country; considers that the ongoing human rights violations in Azerbaijan are incompatible with the country’s role as COP29 host; urges the EU to use COP29 as an occasion for the international community to remind Azerbaijan of its international obligations and to condemn and meaningfully address Azerbaijan’s human rights violations in all interactions with the Azerbaijani authorities when in Baku for COP29;

44. Demands that the organisers ensure that human rights, fundamental freedoms, full and unrestricted participation for citizens and civil society organisations, and equitable access to this and future COPs are fully enshrined and guaranteed in the Host Country Agreement, which should be made public as soon as possible after signing; calls on the UNFCCC secretariat to monitor compliance and to take action in the event of breaches of such human rights criteria;

Conflict of interest, transparency and integrity

45. Welcomes the preparation of the first biennial transparency reports under the Paris Agreement; stresses the importance of granular and transparent reporting to assess progress on the NDCs; takes note of the launching of the Baku Global Platform for Climate Transparency;

46. Expresses concern that more than 2 400 fossil fuel lobbyists were accredited attendees at COP28; calls for the UNFCCC and the Parties to ensure that the decision-making process is protected from interests that run counter to the goal of the Paris Agreement; urges the UNFCCC to take the lead in proposing an ambitious accountability framework that would protect the UNFCCC’s work from undue influence from actors with proven vested interests, based on the model contained in the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control with regard to the tobacco industry;

47. Expresses strong concern that Azerbaijan’s Minister of Ecology and Natural Resources, Mukhtar Babayev, who, prior to becoming minister, spent 26 years working for the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (Socar), has been appointed as the president of COP29; expresses deep concern at the declaration of Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev that he would defend the interests of countries rich in fossil fuels to continue their investments and production; considers that this constitutes a serious risk of conflict of interest; urges the Commission and the Member States to take all necessary actions to ensure that upcoming COP presidencies are free of conflicts of interest;

EU climate policy aligned with the Paris Agreement

48. Takes note of the EU’s updated NDC, which is the Union’s response to the request in the Glasgow Climate Pact to revisit and strengthen Parties’ NDCs for 2030; highlights that the EU’s current climate legislation is expected to reduce the EU’s net GHG emissions by around 57 % compared to 1990 by 2030, when fully implemented; stresses, therefore, the need to implement the existing legal framework for 2030 in the coming years in a simple, fair and cost-efficient way, while continuing to support citizens and economic sectors throughout this transition; stresses the importance of a stable and predictable policy framework to provide clarity for investors, businesses and citizens; notes that any additional efforts above 55 % would considerably decrease the Union’s cumulative emissions by 2050; strongly urges the Member States, therefore, as well as the private sector, to take all necessary actions to ensure that the target is reached; expresses concern, in this regard, at the gap in ambition in the current national energy and climate plans submitted by the Member States and calls on all Member States to step up their climate action; calls on the Member States and the Commission, in this regard, to ensure that the national energy and climate plans and long-term strategies of the Member States include sufficient action and financial means to achieve the EU’s 2030 targets and long-term objectives;

49. Stresses the importance of the NDCs for 2035 being proposed in the preparatory phase of COP30, in accordance with the UNFCCC’s five-year common time frames and in keeping with the submission deadline laid down by the Paris Agreement; calls on the Commission to propose an NDC for 2035 in due time, firmly keeping the EU on a pathway to 2040 and to net-zero in 2050 and based on a proper assessment;

50. Underlines the need to adopt a science-based EU climate target for 2040 in accordance with the European Climate Law and in keeping with the conclusions of the first global stocktake and recalls the recommendations of the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change; welcomes the commitment of the Commission to propose a 2040 climate target, accompanied by enabling policies;

51. Considers it important for the EU to remain a leader in international climate negotiations and calls on the EU to step up its green diplomacy in order to encourage other Parties to step up their climate action towards the achievement of the Paris Agreement goals, which will also help create an international level playing field, avoid carbon leakage and increase public support for climate action;

52. Reiterates the need to mainstream climate ambition into all EU policies and the measures transposing them, and underlines that Article 6(4) of the European Climate Law obliges the Commission to assess the consistency of any draft measure or legislative proposal, including budgetary proposals, with the EU’s climate targets; urges the Commission to fully implement this provision in the way it conducts impact assessments in all EU policy areas;

53. Reiterates the principle of policy coherence for development, to which the EU and its Member States have committed and which aims to minimise contradictions and build synergies between different EU policies; insists on a coherent approach to the implementation of the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in both internal and external policies;

54. Stresses that the current geopolitical situation further highlights the urgent need to end the EU’s dependence on fossil fuels and the need to transition away from a fossil fuel-based economy and boost the deployment of renewable and low carbon energy sources; stresses that the EU must avoid being energy dependent on non-EU countries; welcomes the progress made since the launch of RePowerEU on both of these aspects; calls for the EU and its Member States to accelerate the transition; underlines that this will require increasing the targets for renewable energy and energy efficiency as part of the post-2030 framework; calls on the Commission to address the recommendation by the EU Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change to ensure the consistency of EU policies with the need to transition away from a fossil fuel-based economy, avoiding carbon lock-ins and stranded assets;

55. Recalls that it gave its consent on 24 April 2024 to the Council Decision on the approval of the withdrawal of the European Atomic Energy Community from the Energy Charter Treaty;

The triple planetary crisis: climate change, pollution and biodiversity loss

56. Underscores that the crises of climate change, pollution and biodiversity loss are all interlinked and that the responses to these crises need to be aligned; points to their serious consequences, such as desertification, water scarcity, ocean degradation and drought; emphasises the importance of protecting, conserving and restoring biodiversity and ecosystems and of managing natural resources sustainably in order to enhance nature-based climate change mitigation and adaptation, avoid extreme weather phenomena and build resilience;