What changed between the draft committee report and the plenary report

Added:29. Acknowledges the recent important discovery by the Turkish Government of large reserves of rare earth elements in Eskişehir province, which could position Türkiye as an important actor in a strategic global market; highlights the potential of this discovery in contributing to diversification and resilience in global rare earth element supply chains as well as the major challenges it implies, including access to advanced extraction and processing technologies and the need to ensure high standards of environmental protection and sustainable resource management;

Added:30. Calls on Turkish authorities to implement Türkiye’s international obligations in relation to the fight against corruption, in particular the UN Convention Against Corruption and the relevant Council of Europe conventions, and to ensure effective responses to the recommendations issued by GRECO, including by adopting the necessary legislation, which is one of the remaining benchmarks for visa liberalisation; stresses the need to improve the integrity of public procurement processes, political party financing, the judiciary, public administration and the construction sector, which remain particularly vulnerable to corruption; deeply regrets that the recent high-level corruption cases launched by the authorities have exclusively targeted opposition mayors and municipalities, further diminishing trust in the effectiveness and real will of the authorities in the fight against corruption; urges the Turkish authorities to ensure impartiality and transparency in their anti-corruption efforts; calls on the Turkish authorities to enhance the fight against counterfeiting and to restore the property rights regime according to international standards;

Added:31. Welcomes the removal of Türkiye from the grey list of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in June 2024, following significant progress in improving its anti-money laundering regime and combating the financing of terrorism; calls for Türkiye to align more closely with the EU acquis and FATF recommendations to further strengthen its anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing framework, including on the traceability of transfers and the prevention of misuse of new payment and crypto-asset channels for illicit finance;

Added:32. Points out that a number of critical challenges concerning the labour market remain unaddressed, such as informal employment, the gender pay gap and income inequality; continues to be worried about the low coverage of collective bargaining and the serious impediments to unionisation in the private sector; believes that more efforts are needed to enhance social dialogue mechanisms and address emerging occupational safety challenges; recalls that trade union freedom and social dialogue are crucial to the development and prosperity of a pluralistic society; calls on the Turkish authorities to remove obstacles that limit unionisation and collective bargaining rights by using social dialogue mechanisms effectively, and to recognise the right to strike for civil servants; deplores the repeated detention of trade unionists in Türkiye for merely performing their duties; condemns, in this regard, the recent detention of Mehmet Türkmen, chair of the textile sector union BİRTEK-SEN, on 15 March 2026, noting that he was also imprisoned for over a month in 2025; calls for his immediate release and for an end to the judicial harassment against him;

Added:33. Takes note of Türkiye’s new 2025 climate law, which went into effect in July 2025, and welcomes the inclusion of an emissions trading system, while noting that some improvements, such as for certificate caps, still need to be addressed; deplores that Türkiye remains a very poor performer in the field of climate mitigation and calls on Ankara to work on a credible legal framework for emissions reduction; highlights that the plan by the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources to uphold subsidies for domestic coal generation and carbon-intensive electricity generation slows down progress on the roll-out of renewables; calls on the Turkish Government, also in the light of its hosting of the 31st UN Climate Change Conference in 2026, to decide on a coal phase-out pathway and pull forward its CO2 peak from 2038; calls for the EU and the Turkish authorities to deepen and prioritise cooperation on the Green Deal, notably for carbon pricing in the context of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, to address the implications for Turkish exporters, and to support industrial decarbonisation financing and grid modernisation as well as just transition policies;

Added:34. Expresses concern over animal welfare in transport from and through the Republic of Türkiye; calls for compliance with international standards and the prevention of overcrowding and heat stress; is concerned by the reported killing and mistreatment of stray dogs and cats; calls for their population control in line with international standards;

Regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations

Change 13

Removed:20. Continues to commend Türkiye for hosting around 2.7 million refugees, including 2.3 million Syrians under temporary protection;

Added:35. Continues to commend Türkiye for hosting around 2.7 million refugees, including 2.3 million Syrians under temporary protection as at January 2026; notes that, according to Frontex reporting in January 2025, irregular migration along the Türkiye–EU border declined by approximately one quarter in absolute numbers; reiterates the importance of Türkiye’s collaboration for the effective and orderly management of migration flows; further notes the fact that since 2011, the EU has contributed close to EUR 12.5 billion to assist Türkiye in supporting refugees and host communities; supports the continuation of EU funding to further sustain the healthcare, education, protection and integration of refugees in Türkiye; calls for the EU and the Member States to maintain and, where possible, scale up financial assistance for the humanitarian and protection space in Türkiye, increasing efforts to support Turkish civil society organisations and refugee-led organisations;

Removed:21. Welcomes the continued dialogue between Greece and Türkiye, which can foster a constructive environment and further de-escalation in the Eastern Mediterranean;

Added:36. Expresses concern about the deterioration of the protection environment for Syrian refugees in Türkiye, including the suspension of health insurance, the closure of refugee camps without adequate alternatives and the downscaling of services provided by international non-governmental organisations and the UN; furthermore, remains concerned about the situation of minority groups, refugees and migrants who continued to face discrimination, violence and forced returns in 2025; highlights that Türkiye must continue to protect Syrian refugees until the conditions for their return are met; calls on the Turkish authorities to reinstate ‘go-and-see’ visits or equivalent mechanisms enabling informed return decisions; notes with concern that there are credible reports uncovering human rights violations at EU-funded removal centres in Türkiye and calls on the Commission to launch a transparent and independent investigation into the matter; calls on the Commission to ensure utmost transparency and accuracy in the allocation of funds and to make sure that EU-funded projects, particularly those related to removal centres and border control, comply with all relevant human rights standards; calls on Türkiye to ensure the full and non-discriminatory implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement of 2016 and the EU-Türkiye Readmission Agreement vis-à-vis all Member States; stresses that migrants’ vulnerability must not be instrumentalised for political purposes against the EU or its Member States; urges Türkiye to continue cooperating in good faith with all EU Member States in the field of migration, ensuring that a clear signal is sent to human smugglers to deter further illegal flows;

Removed:22. Strongly reaffirms its view that the only solution to the Cyprus problem is a fair, comprehensive, viable and democratic settlement, within the agreed UN framework, on the basis of a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation with a single international legal personality, single sovereignty, single citizenship and political equality;

Added:37. Reiterates its call on Türkiye to work on a constructive, and not assertive or aggressive, approach in its neighbourhood; welcomes the continued dialogue between Greece and Türkiye, including high-level meetings such as the summit between Prime Minister Mitsotakis and President Erdoğan in February 2026, which can foster a constructive environment and further de-escalation in the Eastern Mediterranean, which is of paramount importance amid the dangerous escalation of conflicts in the wider region; reiterates its strong interest in stability and security in the region and encourages all sides to further advance in this line of dialogue and cooperation with the aim of resolving any pending dispute and difference within the framework of international law; expresses its deep concern that Türkiye continues to uphold a formal threat of war against Greece (casus belli), which is inconceivable among allies and good neighbours; deplores the fact that Türkiye continues to violate the sovereignty and sovereign rights of EU Member States, such as Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, including through the promotion of the Blue Homeland doctrine, the significant increase in violations of Greek airspace compared to 2024 – although these remain at relatively low levels – the political instrumentalisation of the NAVTEX system, the violation of the Greek Exclusive Economic Zone by impeding the progress of projects for EU connectivity, such as the Great Sea Interconnector and EastMed Pipeline, which have been designated as a EU project of common interest, the objection to Greece’s establishment of a marine park in the Aegean Sea entirely within Greek territorial waters, or the considerable increase, since 2024, of illegal fishing activities by Turkish vessels within Greek territorial waters; reiterates its call on Türkiye to fully respect the sovereignty of all EU Member States over their territorial sea and airspace in accordance with EU and international law, including under UNCLOS, and including the right to delimitate Exclusive Economic Zones; reiterates its view that the memorandum of understanding between Türkiye and Libya on the delimitation of the maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranean infringes upon the sovereign rights of third countries, does not comply with the law of the sea and cannot produce any legal consequences for third countries;

Removed:23. Stresses the key relevance of reinforcing EU-Türkiye cooperation in global security matters, particularly in the light of the changing geopolitical landscape and potential shifts in US foreign policy;

Added:38. Strongly reaffirms its view that the only solution to the Cyprus problem is a fair, comprehensive, viable and democratic settlement, within the agreed UN framework, on the basis of a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation with a single international legal personality, single sovereignty, single citizenship and political equality, as set out in the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, the agreed areas of convergence and the framework of the UN Secretary-General, as well as in accordance with international law and the principles and values on which the EU is founded; calls, as a matter of urgency, for the resumption of negotiations on the reunification of Cyprus under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General as soon as possible, from the point at which they were interrupted in Crans-Montana in 2017; calls on Türkiye to abandon the unacceptable proposal for a two-state solution in Cyprus and to return to the agreed basis for a solution and the UN framework;

Removed:24. Regrets the low alignment of Türkiye with the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP), which has decreased from 6 % in 2024 to a record low of 4 % in 2025;

Added:39. Welcomes the steps taken by the UN Secretary-General towards a resumption of comprehensive settlement talks, including his appointment of a Personal Envoy on Cyprus; calls on the Commission to rapidly appoint a new European Commission Special Envoy for Cyprus; welcomes the two informal meetings held in a broader format, under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General, in Geneva in March 2025 and New York in July 2025, as well as the meetings in Cyprus of President Nikos Christodoulides and leader of the Turkish Cypriot community Tufan Erhürman in December 2025, in which a joint statement emphasised that ‘the real aim is the solution of the Cyprus problem with political equality as described in the UNSC Resolutions’ and in February 2026; further welcomes the stance of both sides, following on from the fact that there is a new leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, which has contributed to renewed hope for the creation of a conducive environment for the resumption of settlement negotiations; warmly welcomes the agreement on further confidence-building measures as a positive and relevant step and encourages their implementation; strongly supports the continuation of contact between both sides under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General and the work of his Personal Envoy on Cyprus; calls for the EU and its Member States to firmly support the continuation of this dialogue and to stand ready to support, in any way needed, the potential success of this process; encourages all sides to use this momentum to move towards the resumption of negotiations and not to miss this window of opportunity;

Added:40. Calls on Türkiye to respect the status of the buffer zone and the mandate of the UNFICYP, to cease and reverse all unilateral actions and violations within and in the vicinity of the buffer zone, and to refrain from any further such actions and provocations, including harassment and intimidation of farmers; reiterates its call for cooperation among the Republic of Cyprus, Türkiye, the United Kingdom and the UN to implement concrete measures for a demilitarisation of the buffer zone, in order to reduce tensions and contribute to a conducive environment for the resumption of the UN-led negotiations; calls on Türkiye to withdraw from Strovilia and facilitate the full implementation of the Pyla Understanding; further calls on Türkiye to withdraw its troops from Cyprus and refrain from any unilateral action that would entrench the permanent division of the island and from action altering the demographic balance; strongly condemns Türkiye’s attempts to upgrade the status of the secessionist entity in occupied Cyprus, including via the Organisation of Turkic States and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, and calls on all states to respect Cyprus’ sovereignty as outlined in UNSC resolutions; condemns the ongoing efforts by Türkiye to ‘open’ Varosha and have it settled by people other than its lawful inhabitants, in violation of the relevant UNSC resolutions; calls on Türkiye to reverse its illegal actions and to transfer the area of Varosha to its lawful inhabitants under the temporary administration of the UN, as called for by UNSC Resolutions 550(1984) and 789(1992); deplores any effort to turn Varosha into a dark tourism attraction, which sensationalises tragedy and insults the dignity and rights of the lawful inhabitants; condemns the continued usurpation, sale and illegal development of properties belonging to Greek Cypriots in the occupied areas; remains deeply concerned about the education and religious restrictions and impediments faced by the enclaved Greek Cypriots; calls on Türkiye to step up its cooperation with the Council of Europe and its relevant bodies and institutions, to address their key recommendations, to fully implement the ECHR with regard to respecting freedom of religion, freedom of opinion and expression and the right to access and worship, including the right to conduct religious ceremonies and enjoy cultural heritage, and to stop the deliberate destruction of cultural and religious heritage; commends the work of the bi-communal technical committee on cultural heritage in restoring many of the affected monuments; regrets Türkiye’s continuing refusal to comply with international civil aviation law and establish a channel of communication between air traffic control centres in Türkiye and the Republic of Cyprus, the absence of which entails real safety risks and dangers as identified by the European Union Aviation Safety Agency and the International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations; reiterates its call on Türkiye to fulfil its obligation to fully implement, in a non-discriminatory manner, the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement in relation to all Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus, and to implement the obligations it assumed with regard to the EU as per the negotiating framework of October 2005;

Added:41. Reiterates its call on Türkiye to give the Turkish Cypriot community the necessary space to act in accordance with its role as a legitimate community of the island, which is a right guaranteed by the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus; reiterates its call on the Commission to step up its efforts to engage with the Turkish Cypriot community, with a view to facilitating the resolution of the Cyprus problem and recalling that its place is in the European Union; calls for all parties involved to demonstrate a more courageous approach to bringing the communities together; stresses the need for the EU body of law to be implemented across the entire island following a comprehensive resolution of the Cyprus problem; takes note of the annual report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN Secretary-General on Cyprus; remains concerned by restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including violence or threats of violence against Turkish Cypriot human rights activists and particularly journalists who have criticised the influence of Türkiye, such as the Turkish Cypriot journalist Şener Levent and Ali Kişmir, the President of the Turkish Cypriot Journalists’ Union; takes note of the significant work of the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus and calls for improved access to military zones occupied by the Turkish army, access to its military archives and information as to the transfer of remains to new burial sites;

Added:42. Stresses the importance of reinforcing EU-Türkiye cooperation on regional security matters, particularly in the light of the changing geopolitical landscape; reaffirms, in this context, the strategic and geopolitical importance of Türkiye, which is also an ally in NATO, and its increasing presence, influence, mediation and facilitation role in areas critical to international security and EU strategic interest, such as the Black Sea region, including Ukraine, the South Caucasus and the Middle East, as well as in other relevant areas of cooperation such as migration management, counterterrorism and energy security; acknowledges that Türkiye continues to actively participate in and contribute substantially to EU crisis management missions and operations; stresses that pragmatic cooperation with Türkiye on security and defence can be strengthened where it serves mutual strategic interests; remains duly concerned, nevertheless, that Türkiye continues to exclude a Member State from cooperation with NATO; calls on Türkiye to refrain from using its NATO membership to block cooperation between the EU and NATO;

Added:43. Regrets Türkiye’s low level of alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP), which has decreased from 6 % in 2024 to a record low of 4 % in 2025; notes, however, that this indicator, based solely on statistics regarding alignment with the statements by the VP/HR and Council decisions on sanctions, might not fully capture all levels of engagement and dialogue in the framework of foreign and security cooperation; welcomes, in this sense, the recently increased level of dialogue with the EU and the active participation and substantial contribution to EU crisis management missions and operations under the common security and defence policy; takes note of the growing anti-Western stance of the Turkish authorities; expresses concern about its possible implications for the EU’s interests in the Western Balkans, the Black Sea region, the South Caucasus, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East; believes, however, that, in the current geopolitical landscape, it is important to explore the possibilities for cooperation with Türkiye in the context of current and future EU policies in the field of security and defence; urges Turkish authorities, nevertheless, to urgently address the country’s extremely low level of alignment with the CFSP and to remove other key obstacles to ensuring the necessary trust among partners and allies, such as maintaining a casus belli against an EU Member State, questioning the sovereignty of others or maintaining the Russian-made S-400 air defence system; notes with concern that Türkiye has applied to become a member of BRICS+ while it currently holds a partnership status, and is considering the same for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation; expresses serious concern about the fundamental incompatibility of Türkiye's potential full membership of BRICS+ with the EU accession process; underlines that such an engagement, reflecting a non-liberal model of global and regional governance, could complicate efforts for a more comprehensive EU-Türkiye partnership;

Added:44. Recognises, as regards Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, Türkiye’s efforts in terms of its facilitation and potential mediation role, as underpinned by its hosting of several direct talks between both sides in Istanbul, as well as through the provision of military, diplomatic and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, including defence equipment, which has contributed to Ukraine’s defence efforts; acknowledges that Türkiye has traditionally maintained a position of not supporting sanctions adopted outside the UN framework; nevertheless continues to regret the fact, that Türkiye does not align with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia, while welcoming the measures it has taken to prevent the circumvention of sanctions via Turkish territory, such as to prevent the re-export of common high priority items, which are delivering some results, and calls for alignment with the EU sanctions framework against Russia; urges the Turkish authorities to increase their efforts to detect and prevent the circumvention of restrictive measures, in particular on advanced technology items used for military purposes by Russia, to prevent the ‘false transit’ of these items to Russia via Central Asia, to extend these measures to other economically critical goods, to reduce the use of energy resources originating from Russia, and to address the risks linked with Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’ in terms of maritime and environmental safety; further expresses concern that Türkiye has not restricted the operations of Russian state-controlled media in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; notes the widespread presence of pro-Russian narratives and Russia-linked disinformation in the Turkish information space, particularly on Ukraine, NATO and energy security; calls on Türkiye to strengthen efforts to counter foreign information manipulation and disinformation; notes with concern that, through the TurkStream and Blue Stream pipelines, Türkiye is a major importer of Russian natural gas, as well as a major source of oil and petroleum products; reiterates its concern about Türkiye’s close cooperation with Russia on the development of large nuclear power plants, including the Akkuyu nuclear power plant, which is expected to become operational in 2026, and which is owned and will be operated by Russia’s State Atomic Energy Corporation, Rosatom; urges the Turkish Government to join the Espoo Convention, which commits its parties to notifying neighbouring countries on major projects under consideration that are likely to have a significant adverse environmental impact across boundaries;

Added:45. Expresses concern over Türkiye’s close diplomatic, economic and energy relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran, including regular high-level contact, sustained trade relations and the continued import of Iranian gas; regrets Türkiye’s lack of alignment with the EU’s response to Iran’s crackdown on protesters, including restrictive measures regarding the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); takes note of the recent judicial developments in the United States concerning Halk Bankası A.Ş. (Halkbank), including proceedings related to sanctions evasion and money laundering schemes; calls on Türkiye to progressively align with the EU’s CFSP positions and sanctions regime; notes with concern that the military operations against the Iranian regime will have implications for Türkiye as a result of its geographic proximity, including through spill-over effects, in particular with regard to renewed migration pressures; underlines the importance of regional coordination and close cooperation with Türkiye and other international partners in this context;

Added:46. Welcomes Türkiye’s long-standing position in favour of a two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which aligns with the EU’s position, and its active participation in the ‘Global Alliance for the Two-State Solution’ for its implementation; welcomes Türkiye’s contribution to mediation efforts in the Gaza ceasefire and with regard to the Gaza peace summit of October 2025 in Sharm El-Sheikh; deeply regrets, at the same time, the Turkish authorities’ active support for the EU-listed terror group Hamas and its refusal to designate it as a terrorist organisation, which is not compatible with the EU’s foreign and security policy; deplores the fact that Türkiye did not condemn the attack on 7 October 2023 against Israel conducted by Hamas; warns against Türkiye’s engagement with regional actors associated with extremist agendas, noting that such ties could complicate EU-Türkiye relations and affect regional stability; calls on Türkiye to remain firmly anchored in the multilateral system, with the United Nations at its core, as the essential framework to advance a comprehensive, just and lasting solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict;

Added:47. Notes Türkiye’s increased leverage over developments in Syria following the fall of the Assad regime and its intensive engagement with the current Syrian transitional authorities, which includes providing them with military training and advisory support; remains concerned about the continued presence of Turkish forces in the country and about the involvement of Turkish-backed armed groups in the latest episodes of violence in the north and north-east of Syria, including against groups that played a decisive role in the international fight against Daesh; condemns the establishment of long-term military infrastructure and administrative structures in occupied areas under Turkish control; calls on Türkiye to engage constructively with the Syrian authorities, to respect Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and to address its security concerns in full accordance with international law while ensuring that all Syrians, including Kurds, can enjoy security and fundamental rights, and to refrain from any interference in Syria’s internal processes; condemns the attacks on the civilian population during the latest episode of violence between the Syrian army and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), causing numerous deaths and the displacement of large numbers of civilians, as well as the lack of access to humanitarian aid; expresses its hope that the latest agreement between the Syrian transitional government and the SDF, which envisages the gradual integration of Kurdish forces and institutions into the state and the historic recognition of Kurdish cultural, linguistic and civil rights, will allow for stability in the north-east region of Syria, which is key for the success of an inclusive political transition in the country; warns that any serious deterioration in regional security could promote a resurgence of Daesh; stresses that any transfer to Türkiye, or via Türkiye, of adult Daesh fighters or suspects originating from detention facilities in Syria must remain subject to effective custody, monitoring and information-sharing arrangements, including in any cross-border transfers; notes the significant investment required for the reconstruction of Syria’s economy and acknowledges Türkiye’s interest in contributing to these efforts; expresses its support for close and constructive cooperation between the EU and Türkiye in this regard;

Added:48. Reaffirms its support for the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Türkiye in the interests of reconciliation, good neighbourly relations, regional stability and security, and socio-economic development, and welcomes the progress achieved so far, including the easing of certain visa procedures, the preparations for the upcoming opening of the border for third-country nationals and holders of diplomatic passports and the resumption of direct flights by Turkish Airlines; encourages Türkiye to firmly advance in this process on its own merits without making it dependent on its relations with a third country; calls on both countries to continue to work towards better connectivity in order to facilitate the land connection between Europe and Asia, as well as to promote historical reconciliation, an improved business climate, and stronger people-to-people contacts; supports the Commission’s efforts in bringing forward an EU Cross-Regional Connectivity Agenda involving Türkiye, Armenia and Azerbaijan – including projects such as the Kars-Tbilisi-Baku railway line – which has great potential to contribute to regional stability and economic and social development; encourages Türkiye to support the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan and encourages Türkiye once again to acknowledge the Armenian Genocide in order to pave the way for genuine reconciliation between the Turkish and Armenian peoples, and to fully respect its obligations to protect Armenian cultural heritage;

Wider EU-Türkiye relations

Change 14

Changed:25.49. Reiterates its firm conviction that, beyond the accession process, which is currently at a standstill because of non-compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and a lack of democratic reforms, Türkiye is a country of strategic relevance; stresses the importance of maintaining constructive dialogue and deepening cooperation in areas of mutual strategic interest;interest, including in relation to Cyprus, and in a phased proportionate and reversible manner and in line with the European Council conclusions of April 2024; reaffirms that the EU continues to be committed to pursuing the best possible relations with Türkiye, based on dialogue, respect and mutual trust, in line with international law and good neighbourly relations;

Change 15

Removed:26. Supports deepening the connectivity agenda with Türkiye in the fields of energy, transport, digital and people-to-people contacts, as an example of good pragmatic and mutually beneficial cooperation with the potential to foster peace and stability in the region;

Added:50. Welcomes, in this view, the enhancing of EU-Türkiye relations beyond the accession process in areas of mutual interest and in line with the recommendations of the joint communication on EU-Türkiye relations of 23 November 2023, in a phased proportionate and reversible manner; further welcomes the recent high-level dialogues on trade and the economy, migration and security, climate, and science, research, technology and innovation; calls again for the resumption of all relevant high-level dialogues and for the establishment of structured high-level dialogues on sectoral cooperation if needed to address other common challenges;

Removed:27. Reiterates its view that modernisation of the EU customs union is needed, particularly given the current geopolitical landscape; underlines the fact that for Parliament to give its consent at the end of the process, such a modernisation would need to be based on strong conditionality related to human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for international law and good neighbourly relations;

Added:51. Supports deepening the connectivity agenda with Türkiye in the fields of energy, transport, digital and people-to-people contacts, in accordance with EU and international law, as an example of good pragmatic and mutually beneficial cooperation with the potential to foster peace and stability in the region; stresses the strategic importance of accelerating the completion of key infrastructure projects improving the connectivity between the EU and Türkiye, in line with the extended Trans-European Networks; stresses the relevance of Türkiye for the development and functioning of transcontinental connectivity initiatives, including the increasingly important alternative trade route between Europe and Asia (the Middle Corridor), which could contribute significantly to strengthening the EU’s supply chain resilience and economic cooperation and can play an important role in advancing the EU’s broader strategic autonomy objectives; urges the timely development of the Black Sea ring highway and railroad connections; welcomes Türkiye’s readiness to invest in the construction of a Black Sea highway connecting Türkiye, Bulgaria and Romania;

Removed:28. Welcomes recent progress in facilitating mobility for Turkish citizens towards the EU through the visa cascade framework; calls on the Turkish Government to address the remaining obstacles preventing the reopening of the visa liberalisation dialogue;

Added:52. Calls on the Commission, following the successful experience with other candidate countries, to undertake the necessary arrangements in order to extend as soon as possible the ‘roam like at home’ programme to Türkiye; calls on the Commission to consider working towards the extension of the Single Euro Payments Area and other relevant programmes so as to enhance people-to-people contacts; welcomes the good progress made on science and research cooperation in the reporting period, in particular linked to participation in Horizon Europe; supports Türkiye´s participation in the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and calls for the deepening of EU-Turkey cooperation in the fields of civil protection and resilient infrastructure putting emphasis on the need to strengthen decentralised municipal capacity, civil society participation, better coordination and public communication;

Added:53. Reiterates its view that full implementation and modernisation of the EU customs union is needed, particularly given the current geopolitical landscape; is aware of the importance that large sectors of the EU and Turkish economies attach to the updating of this instrument, which has been in force for more than 30 years; stands ready to support an upgraded customs union with a broader, mutually beneficial scope, which could encompass substantial economic and strategic benefits for both partners, strengthening trade, investment and supply chain resilience, boosting digital and green transition, public procurement and sustainable development commitments, and contributing to the economic security of both the EU and Türkiye; underlines, however, that for Parliament to give its consent at the end of the process, such a modernisation would need to be based on strong conditionality related to human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for international law, adherence to the CFSP, and good neighbourly relations, including Türkiye’s full implementation of the Additional Protocol on extending the Ankara Agreement to all Member States without exception and in a non-discriminatory fashion, and include measures to support the green transition and to help small and medium-sized enterprises adjust; welcomes the positive steps, including the decrease in trade barriers, observed in the most recent period, which also followed the holding of the high-level dialogue on trade;

Added:54. Underlines the relevance for EU-Türkiye trade of upcoming initiatives from the Commission such as the industrial accelerator act and the ‘Made in Europe’ approach, with possible strong requirements that could eventually require an overhaul of EU procurement rules and severely affect the already outdated customs union between the EU and Türkiye; welcomes the fact that the Commission’s proposal for the industrial accelerator act already provides that content from partners with which the EU has concluded an agreement establishing a free trade area or a customs union – such as Türkiye – will be deemed to be of EU origin; supports this approach and calls for any other relevant legislation to be proposed in the same vein in the future to keep taking into account the importance of further integrating the markets and economies of the candidate countries, particularly those that have a customs union with the EU;

Added:55. Notes with deep regret that Türkiye has made no progress towards meeting the required benchmarks for visa liberalisation; reiterates its willingness to start the visa liberalisation process as soon as the Turkish authorities fully satisfy the six clearly outstanding benchmarks in a non-discriminatory manner vis-à-vis all EU Member States while aligning with EU visa policy; regrets the fact that Turkish citizens are facing problems with visa requests and applications to EU Member States owing to a marked increase in demand and fears of abuse of the system; recognises, however, the political commitment to improving access to visas and calls for intensified efforts on both sides to address the remaining technical and administrative barriers; calls on the Member States to increase the resources allocated to this matter; supports measures on visa facilitation, particularly with regard to business activities and Erasmus students; deeply regrets the constant attempts by the Turkish authorities to blame the EU for not making progress on this dossier, while they themselves have not taken any of the necessary steps to comply with the remaining benchmarks; reminds Türkiye that the lack of tangible and cumulative progress on the pending conditions has a direct impact on business activities and Erasmus students; regrets the Turkish Government’s abusive use of service passports, the number of which is unknown, while not taking the necessary actions to advance towards a framework that could benefit the whole population; calls on the Turkish Government to address the remaining obstacles preventing the reopening of the visa liberalisation dialogue, and equally calls on the Council to do its share once such steps are taken; takes note of the EU and Member States’ decision to introduce a visa cascade framework on 15 July 2025;

Added:56. Welcomes the reengagement of the European Investment Bank in Türkiye and the Turkey Investment Platform under the European Fund for Sustainable Development, which enables stronger investment support through guarantee programmes in the three overarching policy priorities, namely the Green Deal, the Global Gateway strategy as well as jobs and growth, in accordance with the relevant conditions on respect for EU values; highlights the need to ensure that no EU programmes benefit entities in Türkiye that fail to respect fundamental EU values;

Added:57. Supports the decision taken by the EU component of the EU-Türkiye Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) to postpone its 82nd meeting, scheduled to take place on 14 and 15 April 2025 in Ankara, in the aftermath of the detention and arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu and others; retains the view that parliamentary dialogue remains a crucial part of EU-Türkiye relations and expresses the hope that the work of the JPC will resume soon when conditions allow; regrets the Turkish authorities’ decision not to invite the European Parliament to observe the presidential and parliamentary elections in May 2023 amid allegations of unfair treatment, noting that the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe were invited; expresses its hope that a European Parliament mission will be invited to observe any upcoming elections in the country ;

The way forward for EU-Türkiye relations

Change 16

Changed:29.58. Reiterates its view that the Turkish Government has neglected to take the necessary steps to address the existing fundamental democratic shortcomings within the country and therefore maintains that Türkiye’s EU accession process cannot be resumed in the current circumstances, despitewhile recognising the democratic and pro-European aspirations of a large part of Turkish society; takes note of recent calls by relevant Turkish opposition figures advocating renewed engagement;engagement and the reopening of accession talks; expresses appreciation for this innovative and bold approach; remains, however, sceptical about supporting it unless there is a clear signal from the Turkish Government of its willingness to recommit to the EU path through concrete and credible actions;

Change 17

Removed:30. Continues to urge the Turkish Government and the EU institutions and Member States to keep working, beyond the currently frozen accession process, on the basis of the relevant Council and European Council conclusions and the established conditionality, towards a closer, more dynamic and strategic partnership;

Added:59. Recalls that, as in the case of any other candidate, the accession process is contingent on full compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and on the normalisation of relations with all EU Member States; stresses that Türkiye’s constructive engagement, including in relation to the Cyprus problem, remains key to advancing closer cooperation between the EU and Türkiye; considers, in this regard, that when advancing their declared EU aspirations, the Turkish authorities should place less emphasis on the country’s capabilities in security and defence and instead address the grave state of democracy in the country; notes that it is committed to advancing the accession process provided that the Turkish Government takes these necessary steps;

Removed:31. Urges all the other EU institutions and the Member States to be vocal in addressing the democratic backsliding in Türkiye;

Added:60. Continues to urge the Turkish Government to engage constructively with the EU institutions and Member States and to keep working towards a closer, more dynamic and strategic partnership, beyond the currently frozen accession process, on the basis of the relevant Council and European Council conclusions and the established conditionality; insists on the need to begin a process of reflection on how this new constructive and progressive framework for EU-Türkiye relations grounded in respect for democratic principles, the rule of law and fundamental rights, can encompass the interests of all parties involved; stresses the need to strengthen the EU-Türkiye partnership by, for example, the modernisation and enhancement of the current Association Agreement;

Removed:32. Reiterates its utmost commitment to sustaining its support for Türkiye’s independent civil society;

Added:61. Is of the opinion, nevertheless, that continued backsliding on democracy and the rule of law in the near future will only make the country drift further away from the EU, eroding the trust that is needed for the real enhancement of cooperation and partnership in areas of mutual interest, such as trade, energy or security

Added:62. Believes that it is in the EU’s interest to reassess ways in which Türkiye can remain anchored to the EU, not only in terms of standards but also in terms of values and principles, and to design political initiatives according to that goal; urges all EU institutions, the Member States and the European Council to be vocal in addressing the persistent democratic backsliding and human rights violations in Türkiye, as doing so is not incompatible with pursuing the best possible relations between the EU and the country; calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service to ensure that the agendas of high-level officials visiting Türkiye include a plural representation of political and civil society stakeholders in order to obtain a more complete vision of the country;

Added:63. Reiterates its utmost commitment to sustaining its support for Türkiye’s independent civil society; calls on the Commission to uphold and increase its political and financial support to the vibrant and pro-democratic civil society in Türkiye, whose efforts can contribute to generating the political will necessary for deepening EU-Türkiye relations; is of the opinion that while incentives-based and transactional approaches work in many areas of EU-Türkiye cooperation, they have failed to advance the democratisation of the country; highlights, in this view, that the resumption of the accession process depends mainly on the unwavering political will of Türkiye’s authorities and society to become a full-fledged democracy, which cannot be forced upon it by the EU;

Added:64. Reiterates its call to strengthen and deepen mutual knowledge and understanding between the societies of Türkiye and the EU, promoting cultural growth, socio-cultural exchanges and combating all manifestations of social, religious, ethnic or cultural prejudice; stresses, in this context, the importance of facilitating people-to-people exchange for EU-Türkiye relations, notably for the promotion of democracy, the rule of law and human rights; encourages Türkiye and the EU to promote shared values, particularly by supporting young people;

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Change 18

Changed:33.65. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Council and the Commission.Commission; asks that this resolution be translated into Turkish and forwarded to the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Türkiye.