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EU Parl Watch

Changes between two versions

What changed between the draft committee report and the plenary report

From · draft committee report· 2 May 2025

AFET-PR-773170

on EU political strategy on Latin America

To · plenary report· 30 Sept 2025

A-10-2025-0171

on EU political strategy on Latin America

These two texts have too little in common to compare paragraph by paragraph: they are different documents rather than versions of one (for example one group’s motion and the joint text that was adopted).

+151 added · −37 removed · 3 changed paragraphs, packaging included.

Part 2 of 5: Paragraphs 61–120

Added:O. whereas external actors, notably China, Russia and Iran, have expanded their footprint in LAC, with Beijing increasing investments in infrastructure and raw materials projects, Moscow reinforcing its diplomatic, political, propaganda, military and security presence, and Tehran increasing intelligence activities in the region; whereas these external actors are supporting local anti-democratic forces and contributing to democratic backsliding; whereas Russia leverages economic dependencies, including on fertilisers and diesel, and spreads disinformation campaigns to destabilise democratic systems; whereas China’s presence is also creating economic dependencies that influence foreign policy in the region;

Removed:Economic cooperation

Added:P. whereas freedom of expression and assembly are crucial components and enablers of democratic, free and participative societies; whereas violence against political opponents poses a direct threat to the foundations of democracy, as exemplified by the assassination of Colombian Senator Miguel Uribe Turbay and the alarming rise of violence in Colombia;

Removed:7. Welcomes the strong economic and trade partnership between the EU and LAC, which is based on shared interests in promoting sustainable growth, strengthening economic resilience and reducing excessive dependencies through diversified trade relations;

Added:Q. whereas the EU and Parliament have been very supportive of the agreement on the peace process in Colombia concluded in 2016, and continue to monitor its implementation; whereas this peace accord ended five decades of armed conflict; whereas continued EU support for the full implementation of the peace agreement should take into account the recent escalation of violence;

Removed:8. Highlights the fact that the EU is the largest investor in the LAC region and the third-largest trading partner;

Added:R. whereas the overall democratic backsliding in autocratic and illiberal regimes enables these regimes’ legitimisation strategies, including by removing effective checks on the enforcement of repressive laws;

Removed:9. Acknowledges the dense network of agreements between the two regions and stresses the fundamental geopolitical importance of enacting new and more ambitious agreements and partnerships;

Added:S. whereas Parliament has recently and unequivocally expressed its position through numerous resolutions concerning non-compliance with the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Cuba; whereas there are currently 1 155 political prisoners in Cuba, and systematic human rights violations are being perpetrated by the Cuban regime;

Removed:10. Welcomes the signing of the EU-Chile Advanced Framework Agreement and calls for its swift and full ratification; welcomes the conclusion of the negotiations on the EU-Mercosur Partnership Agreement and the EU-Mexico Global Agreement and calls for their swift signing and ratification;

Added:T. whereas Parliament denounced the usurpation of the presidency in Venezuela by Nicolás Maduro on 10 January 2025 and recognised Edmundo González Urrutia as the legitimate and democratically elected President of Venezuela, and María Corina Machado as the leader of Venezuela’s democratic forces; whereas Parliament awarded them the 2024 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, symbolising support for the fight for freedom and democracy in Venezuela; whereas sympathy should be expressed for the more than 7 million Venezuelans who have been forced to flee their country since 2015, with around 6 million resettling in LAC; whereas considerable strain has been placed on neighbouring countries; whereas the solidarity and great efforts of host communities, especially Colombia, in providing access to healthcare, education and employment opportunities for Venezuelan refugees should be commended, as this is contributing to regional stability and the protection of fundamental rights;

Removed:EU-LAC cooperation against the backdrop of the Global Gateway initiative

Added:U. whereas since 2018, the Nicaraguan regime has systematically, repeatedly and arbitrarily persecuted human rights defenders, and opposition and religious representatives, among others; whereas over 5 600 NGOs, including religious groups –mainly Catholic – have been dissolved, and their assets confiscated; whereas Parliament has repeatedly condemned the regime imposed in Nicaragua by Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo;

Removed:11. Highlights the fact that the EU is the leading contributor to development cooperation in LAC, and calls for the EU and its Member States to leverage major initiatives such as the Global Gateway to increase investment in LAC, ensuring that the EU remains a strong and competitive partner for LAC countries given the growing Chinese presence in the region;

Added:V. whereas the actions taken by the Trump administration in the United States have introduced geopolitical uncertainty, undermined multilateralism and hindered bi-regional cooperation, thereby reinforcing the need for a strong and autonomous EU-LAC alliance; whereas the EU-LAC strategic alliance is key to pushing forward shared values and interests, such as multilateralism and democracy;

Removed:Cooperation on security

Added:W. whereas the LAC region remains under-represented in key international organisations and forums, including the G20 and international financial organisations; whereas Mexico and Brazil occupy a special place in bi-regional relations, being the two largest economies in LAC, wielding significant geopolitical influence and being officially designated as strategic partners of the EU;

Removed:12. Is concerned about the increase in organised crime and drug trafficking in LAC and the unprecedented quantities of illicit drugs trafficked to the EU from the region; highlights the need to increase multilateral cooperation in combating these threats through initiatives such as the EU-LAC Partnership on Justice and Security and EL PAcCTO 2.0;

Added:X. whereas drug trafficking poses a serious threat to security in both regions; whereas since 2020 the Union has become the world’s largest market for cocaine; whereas this cocaine comes largely from LAC and enters the EU primarily through Europe’s Atlantic ports;

Removed:13. Underlines the importance of the strategic engagement between interior and/or security ministers of the EU Member States and the ministers with responsibility for security matters in the member states of the Latin American Committee on Internal Security and of strengthening operational law enforcement cooperation between the EU and LAC;

Added:Y. whereas civic space is shrinking in many LAC countries, which are seeing an unprecedented increase in attacks against human rights organisations, activists and defenders, leading to displacement, violence and impunity;

Removed:14. Welcomes efforts to strengthen regional security cooperation through the expansion of the Latin America Committee for Internal Security and the establishment of AMERIPOL as a formalised law enforcement body, facilitating cross-border coordination;

Added:Z. whereas both the EU and LAC countries share a strategic interest in reinforcing their respective strategic autonomy and in diversifying their supply chains; whereas Latin America is a global leader in the production of sustainable energy, with approximately 69 % of its electricity generated from renewable and clean sources, demonstrating the region’s strategic importance and potential in the global green transition;

Removed:15. Highlights the necessity of addressing the root causes of organised crime, including corruption, weak governance and social inequality, and advocates for an approach that combines law enforcement with long-term social policies;

Added:AA. whereas since the creation of CELAC in 2010, three EU-CELAC summits have been held, in 2013, 2015 and 2023; whereas the EU and CELAC have a long-standing strategic partnership and put in place a network of association and trade agreements; whereas the November 2025 EU-CELAC summit in Colombia will be a key opportunity to reaffirm the EU’s commitment to LAC and demonstrate that Europe is a key, reliable and strategic partner that offers a credible alternative development model rooted in democratic cooperation and shared prosperity, and to show that both regions are firmly committed to bi-regional cooperation and a rules-based international order;

Added:1. Highlights the deep human, historical, cultural and economic, as well as religious, ties between the EU and LAC, which form the foundation of a natural alliance and the basis for developing a strong and enduring European-Latin American transatlantic area of peace, democracy and prosperity;

Added:2. Promotes a policy aimed at encouraging regional cooperation and greater regional integration in LAC; underlines that the new global geopolitical context calls for a qualitative leap in the EU-LAC partnership to further develop a strategic alliance in defence of multilateralism and its founding principles, including dialogue, inclusion, international solidarity and respect for the UN Charter, human rights, humanitarian law and the promotion of sustainable development;

Added:3. Considers that the EU and LAC, as natural strategic partners, have a historic opportunity to strengthen their alliance in the current international context marked by strategic competition; considers that their partnership can represent an important buffer against increasing geopolitical tensions, by building joint policies that foster their strategic autonomy, cooperation and mutual respect;

Added:4. Highlights the fact that the relations between Europe and LAC are also based on deep human connections; recalls that, in an increasingly disconnected world, human capital, which includes shared languages, heritage and cultural ties, is a strategic asset that needs to be preserved;

Added:5. Highlights the EU’s renewed and growing engagement in the region, exemplified by the pivotal EU-CELAC Summit in 2023, which marked a clear turning point after years of limited involvement; underscores the need for a sustained commitment to advancing the EU’s interests and values; notes that the EU’s engagement has dwindled in recent decades, thus creating a vacuum for the growing influence of China, Russia and Iran; deplores the fact that this greater closeness with authoritarian regimes ultimately undermines democracy in the region;

Added:6. Recognises the urgent need to continue to upgrade and develop the EU-LAC relationship in response to the emerging geopolitical shifts, climate change, technological advancements and growing inequalities and security challenges facing both regions, and to increase both regions’ strategic autonomy;

Added:The geopolitical importance of the EU-LAC strategic alliance, strengthened dialogue and cooperation

Added:7. Calls for the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Member States to step up diplomatic efforts in the region to promote increased convergence between the EU and LAC on crucial foreign policy issues, and in particular to adopt a firmer stance on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and on international efforts to achieve a permanent ceasefire in Gaza, the flow of humanitarian aid and the unconditional release of all hostages; underlines that, given the current international context, the EU-LAC partnership should be built on a logic of shared strategic autonomy, reduced external dependencies and the defence of the multilateral rules-based order as its guiding principles;

Added:8. Encourages deeper EU-LAC collaboration in international forums to promote and defend the multilateral global order, international law and respect for democracy and human rights, humanitarian law and principles, social justice and sustainable development; stresses, in this regard, that the EU must show its partners in LAC that it can offer better conditions for partnership than authoritarian regimes;

Added:9. Stresses, therefore, the importance of ensuring that EU efforts focus on strengthening democratic institutions, the rule of law and political accountability, and calls for progress on reforms and peacebuilding measures aimed at strengthening security and stability across both regions; recalls that the defence of human rights, democracy, the rule of law and gender equality must be a cross-cutting condition for all EU-LAC agreements and funding, including under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI-Global Europe); calls for transparency and accountability, particularly in trade and investment frameworks;

Added:10. Is concerned by the democratic backsliding that has taken place in LAC since 2019 and condemns the violations of human rights and restrictions on fundamental freedoms in the region, particularly by regimes in Nicaragua, Cuba and Venezuela, which are among the world’s most authoritarian; expresses deep concern over the growing trend of authoritarian and populist governance in LAC, and the cumulative erosion of democratic institutions, multilateralism, the rule of law, fundamental rights and freedoms, civic space and essential social protections; stresses the need to strengthen support for democratic actors and civil society, and urges the immediate release of all political prisoners;

Added:11. Condemns, in particular, the Cuban regime’s systematic human rights abuses against protesters, political dissidents, religious leaders and human rights activists and its obstructing the establishment of independent civil society organisations; notes that reliable sources state that the regime holds over a thousand political prisoners, including minors, and urges the Cuban regime to release them without delay; calls for the use of all necessary available instruments, without exclusion of any, to ensure compliance with the democratic and human rights clauses of the EU-Cuba Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA); reiterates its call for the Council to adopt sanctions against those responsible for persistent violations; condemns the participation of Cuban mercenaries in Russia’s military campaign on the front lines in Ukraine;

Added:12. Strongly condemns and fully rejects the electoral fraud orchestrated by the regime in Venezuela in the 2024 presidential elections, and the sham parliamentary elections held in May 2025; demands that the Maduro government cease its policy of repression and attacks on civil society and the opposition; recalls that on 19 September 2024, Parliament recognised Edmundo González Urrutia as the legitimate and democratically elected President of Venezuela and María Corina Machado as the leader of the democratic forces in Venezuela; highlights that various democratic states in the region and worldwide have recognised Edmundo González Urrutia as president-elect; expresses satisfaction that on 17 December 2024, Parliament awarded the 2024 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought to María Corina Machado and Edmundo González Urrutia, who represent all Venezuelans fighting for the restoration of freedom and democracy; commends the Venezuelan people’s commitment to democracy and the democratic opposition’s continued resilience despite increasingly repressive policies by the Maduro regime;

Added:13. Recalls that the Ortega-Murillo regime in Nicaragua passed a constitutional reform in January 2025 eliminating the separation of powers and political pluralism, establishing a co-presidency that controls all branches of government and the media and ignores adherence to international human rights conventions; moreover, stresses that the regime in Nicaragua maintains strong ties with other autocracies, such as those in Iran, Venezuela and Cuba, and strongly condemns it for its systematic human rights abuses, persecution of the democratic opposition, repression of the Catholic Church and civil society, and destruction of the free media and all manifestations of independence from government; urges the Nicaraguan authorities to restore the rule of law, fundamental freedoms and the rights of all Nicaraguans in exile, including the right to safe return without delay; reiterates its demand that the democratic clause of the EU Association Agreement be triggered, rejects any prospect of dialogue with members of Nicaragua’s regime-controlled National Assembly, and calls for increased sanctions against Ortega, Rosario Murillo and their inner circle; calls for the immediate lifting of the ban on international human rights monitoring mechanisms and for restoration of the legal status of over 3 000 NGOs, which was revoked in 2018 by the Nicaraguan government;

Added:14. Expresses deep concern over the erosion of democratic principles and the deliberate circumvention of constitutional safeguards in other LAC countries, most notably in El Salvador; voices alarm over the lack of independence of the judiciary and lack of transparency in government actions, the excessive use of force, undue militarisation, and the growing restrictions on the freedoms of assembly and the press; is gravely concerned by reports of widespread detentions without due cause, torture, forced disappearances of civilians, and the alarming overcrowding in prisons; condemns the authorities for failing to hold security forces accountable for their actions and for their persistent rejection of international requests for oversight and investigation;

Added:15. Firmly condemns the Russian Federation’s use of hybrid tactics, encompassing military, cyber, information and economic operations, particularly in the energy sector, including the evasion of sanctions, non-transparent practices and corruption, as tools for expansion, which undermines regional security, promotes internal destabilisation and leads to the formation of a bloc that poses a threat to democracy, peace and international law; is deeply concerned about the strategic partnership between Venezuela and the Russian Federation, which poses risks to regional and international security; calls for the EU to step up its fight against Russian propaganda in the region; recalls the need for the EU to ensure that EU delegations have the necessary means to counter disinformation;

Added:16. Notes that, since 2005, China has granted loans totalling more than USD 120 billion to the LAC region, with the aim of increasing its geopolitical influence and making LAC countries dependent upon Chinese financing by providing investment capital in exchange for the supply of crude oil, or by funding energy and infrastructure projects; regrets that these energy and infrastructure projects often result in lower environmental and labour standards being applied; recalls that, unlike other global powers, the EU does not seek an extractive or unbalanced relationship, but rather partnerships based on reciprocity, sustainability and the generation of added value; highlights that it is precisely this model of cooperation, prioritising respect for sovereignty, transparency and the rule of law, that makes the EU a preferred partner for the region;

Added:17. Supports the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of all LAC countries and rejects global powers’ ambitions to impose relations of political and economic dependence; emphasises that respect for states’ territorial integrity is a fundamental principle of international law, the UN Charter and the rules-based international order;

Added:Economic cooperation for sustainable growth

Added:18. Welcomes the strong economic and trade partnership between the EU and LAC, which is based on a shared interest in promoting sustainable growth and human development, strengthening economic resilience and reducing excessive dependencies through diversified trade relations;

Added:19. Highlights the EU’s ambition to lead the global green transition and its recognition of Latin America as a key partner in this effort; supports LAC in combating illegal deforestation and devising reforestation projects;

Added:20. Stresses the need to address growing inequalities, promote peace and strengthen democratic processes and institutions in both regions, and highlights the importance of economic cooperation that promotes gender equality and women’s economic empowerment; expresses concern about backsliding on women’s rights, particularly with regard to their sexual and reproductive health; calls for closing the gender pay gap and supports actions to enhance female representation in political leadership and legislatures, and emphasises the need to align EU-LAC economic relations with the UN 2030 Agenda and ensure stronger coherence between economic and social-environmental objectives;

Added:21. Highlights the fact that the EU is the largest investor in the LAC region and the third-largest trading partner; notes that LAC is the EU’s fifth-largest trading partner; underlines that this strong economic cooperation should not only serve the interests of large financial entities, but also ensure that all benefit, especially SMEs, workers, vulnerable people, and populations from rural and remote areas;

Added:22. Underlines that both the Letta Report on the future of the single market and the Draghi Report on the future of European competitiveness emphasise the need to intensify efforts to secure the EU’s supply of critical raw materials and stresses the potential of LAC to be a key partner in diversifying supply chains; welcomes the signing of memorandums of understanding with partners on critical raw materials and highlights that these are crucial to achieving more diversification in the EU’s supply chains; believes that these agreements, together with deepening economic and political cooperation through bilateral agreements, should lead to increased investment in this sector that will benefit both regions;

Added:23. Calls for greater regulation and transparency in key economic areas, such as the mining sector, where weak regulation can lead to conflicts and exploitation; calls on all partners to strengthen labour rights and promote cooperatives and other initiatives that foster worker participation and empowerment in the economy; highlights the importance of ensuring that the extraction, trade in and processing of critical raw materials adhere to high standards of environmental protection, social responsibility and human rights, and supports the development of alternative, resilient, sustainable and transparent value chains that contribute to the prosperity of all the societies involved;

Added:24. Calls on the Commission to intensify the dialogue with the LAC countries on the implications of EU legislation for their local economies;

Added:Strategic partnerships and international agreements

Added:25. Acknowledges the dense network of agreements between the two regions and stresses the fundamental geopolitical importance of enacting new and more ambitious agreements and partnerships that are inclusive, sustainable and mutually beneficial, grounded in shared values and firmly rooted in respect for human rights; emphasises the role of those agreements in contributing to further economic integration to achieve an area of shared prosperity and increased economic security; emphasises the importance of bi-regional trade between the EU and LAC in diversifying food systems and strengthening food security;

Added:26. Recalls the special role that Mexico and Brazil play in bi-regional relations, bearing the status of strategic partners of the EU; strongly encourages both parties to make better use of the potential of these strategic partnerships; highlights the need to fulfil the commitment to hold bilateral summits with both countries every two years;

Added:27. Welcomes the full ratification of the EU-Central America Association Agreement, and the entry into force of its three pillars of political dialogue, cooperation and trade in May 2024; calls for the adoption of robust and inclusive mechanisms for civil society participation in the implementation and monitoring of the EU-Central America Association Agreement, upholding democratic principles, transparency and social cohesion; calls for the EU and the Central American countries to pursue active policies and ensure appropriate funding to optimise the agreement’s positive impact on SDGs in both regions;

Added:28. Welcomes the signing of the EU-Chile Advanced Framework Agreement and calls for its swift and full ratification; welcomes, too, the conclusion of negotiations on the EU-Mexico Global Agreement, which will reinforce political cooperation, open new trade opportunities and strengthen ties in strategic sectors such as digitalisation, innovation, and security, and calls for its swift signing and ratification; recognises Mexico’s pivotal role in LAC and its ambition to diversify trade and political partnerships; underlines that the EU-Mexico agreement will reinforce the EU’s role as a strategic partner in the region and its capacity to respond to global challenges;

Added:29. Welcomes the conclusion of the negotiations on the EU-Mercosur Partnership Agreement and highlights the geopolitical importance of the adoption and implementation of this agreement; highlights the fact that the agreement would be a real game changer for the relationship between the two regions, as it would be the largest trade agreement ever signed by the EU in terms of population, covering more than 700 million citizens, and the most significant in terms of its economic impact; stresses its geopolitical value as an essential tool for advancing the EU’s strategic interests in the current international context;

Added:30. Underlines the importance of meeting the targets set by the Paris Climate Agreement and welcomes the inclusion of a binding clause in the EU-Mercosur Agreement on upholding its commitments; underscores that the EU-Mercosur Partnership Agreement will provide an opportunity to significantly strengthen EU-Mercosur bi-regional cooperation on addressing common challenges, while serving to counteract the growing influence of authoritarian actors in the region and to help the EU diversify its supply of critical raw materials;

Added:Multilateral cooperation

Added:31. Recalls that the Euro-Latin American alliance represents a bridge designed not only to prevent a dangerous drift toward closed and ideologically polarised blocs, but above all to open a space for international dialogue that reduces tensions and fosters shared solutions;