What changed between the draft committee report and the plenary report

Change 13

Removed:10. Unwaveringly supports the 10-point peace plan put forward by Ukraine’s President Zelenskyy and recalls that any initiative aimed at ending the Russian war of aggression needs to be based on input provided by Ukraine and ultimately accepted by the Ukrainian people;

Added:11. Appeals for proactive diplomacy with non-EU countries in order to minimise the circumvention of these sanctions; calls on the Commission to critically assess EU assistance to non-EU countries that actively support Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and urges the Council to impose restrictive measures on non-EU countries enabling Russia’s war of aggression, whether through the facilitation of sanction circumvention or through the provision of direct military assistance, such as in the case of Iran or North Korea; calls on all countries to fully align with all EU sanctions packages;

Removed:11. Reiterates that Ukraine, as a victim of aggression, has the legitimate right to self-defence in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter; calls on the VP/HR, the Commission the Council and the Member States concerned to enable effective Ukrainian countermeasures against Russia; recalls that Russia has violated international law and that the full seizure of the frozen Russian assets is an appropriate step towards enforcing Russia’s obligation to abide by international law, and to compensate Ukraine and other injured parties for the losses caused by Russia’s war of aggression;

Added:12. Deplores the ‘no limits’ partnership between Russia and China, in particular the renewed commitment to strengthen their military ties; welcomes the Council’s decision to impose sanctions on Chinese companies for their support of Russia’s war in Ukraine;

Removed:12. Underscores the urgent need for the EU and its Member States to push for the creation of a special international tribunal to prosecute the crime of aggression committed against Ukraine by the political and military leadership of the Russian Federation and its allies;

Added:13. Expresses its most serious concerns over Russia’s and China’s surveillance and sabotage of critical maritime infrastructures, such as seabed communication cables and offshore energy facilities; expresses in particular its strong concern about the damage to two subsea communications cables, one linking Finland and Germany and the other connecting Sweden to Lithuania, within less than 24 hours on 17 and 18 November 2024, and about the damaging by a tanker of the Russian shadow fleet of the EstLink2 power cable, linking Estonia and Finland, on 25 December 2024; calls on the EU to put in place effective monitoring and surveillance systems and regional coastguard cooperation to ensure the prevention and rapid detection of attacks against such infrastructures; welcomes in that regard, the launch of the operation ‘Baltic Sentry’ by NATO, with the participation of several Member States, to improve the security of critical undersea infrastructures in the Baltic Sea; calls on Member States to fully abide by the commitments of the New York joint statement on the security and resilience of undersea cables,

Removed:13. Commends the Commission’s proposal to establish the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism, worth an estimated EUR 35 billion, which responds to Parliament’s call and builds upon the decision of the Council to direct extraordinary revenues stemming from immobilised Russian state assets to the Ukraine Assistance Fund and the Ukraine Facility, as well as upon the G7’s decision to offer Ukraine a USD 50 billion loan secured through immobilised Russian state assets;

Added:14. Calls for the EU and its Member States to exercise strict control over, prevent and limit the activities of Russia’s shadow fleets which, in addition to violating EU and G7 sanctions, poses an immense ecological threat to ecosystems as a result of its technical deficiencies and frequent breakdowns; urges the Commission to take swift action, within the framework of the EU’s cooperation with the International Maritime Organization, and to design more targeted sanctions against the shadow fleet in the next sanctions package against Russia; specifies that such sanctions should designate all possible individual shadow fleet vessels, as well as their owners, operators, managers, etc.; recommends banning tanker sales to countries facilitating trade with Russia; notes that the flag states contributing to the Russian shadow fleet are thereby also helping the Russian war effort;

Removed:14. Recalls the fact that the security of the Republic of Moldova is inextricably linked to the security of Ukraine and deems the Republic of Moldova the second line of defence of the European way of life; believes that both Ukraine’s and Moldova’s accession to the EU would be a geostrategic investment in a united and strong Europe; encourages the VP/HR to enhance the CFSP partnership with Ukraine and Moldova through concrete measures and, in particular, through measures ensuring the inviolability of the state borders of and between both countries;

Added:15. Reiterates its call for the necessary measures to be taken to return forcibly deported and illegally adopted Ukrainian children from Russia or occupied Ukrainian territory;

Added:16. Calls on the Commission and the Council to designate the Russian state-funded private military Wagner Group as a terrorist organisation; draws attention to the so-called ‘Africa Corps’ that was created following the death of the Wagner Group’s former leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, in August 2023, and placed directly under the control of the Russian Ministry of Defence, in an effort to regroup Wagner elements under government control;

Added:17. Expresses its unwavering support for the 10-point peace formula put forward by Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and recalls that any initiative, in particular diplomatic solutions, aimed at ending the Russian war of aggression and achieving a just and lasting peace needs to be based on terms and input provided by Ukraine and ultimately accepted by the Ukrainian people; encourages the Commission and the VP/HR, as well as the Member States, to mobilise international support for the peace formula and the victory plan presented by Ukraine and to engage in security commitments towards Ukraine as recommended in the Kyiv Security Compact;

Added:18. Reiterates that Ukraine, as a victim of aggression, has the legitimate right to self-defence in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter; calls on the VP/HR, the Commission the Council and the Member States concerned to enable effective Ukrainian countermeasures against Russia; recalls that Russia has violated international law and that the full seizure of the frozen Russian assets is an appropriate step towards enforcing Russia’s obligation to abide by international law, and to compensate Ukraine and other injured parties for the losses caused by Russia’s war of aggression; calls on the Commission to establish a sound legal regime for the confiscation of Russian state assets frozen by the EU; reminds the Commission that any such proposal does not take away the need for continued financial, political, military and humanitarian support; calls for the inclusion of all assets of the Russian state, Russian local authorities, Russian state-owned companies, and of individuals on the EU sanctions list, and for those assets to be used to compensate Ukraine for the damage caused by this war;

Added:19. Commends the Commission’s proposal to establish the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism, worth an estimated EUR 35 billion, which responds to Parliament’s call and builds upon the decision of the Council to direct extraordinary revenues stemming from immobilised Russian state assets to the Ukraine Assistance Fund and the Ukraine Facility, as well as upon the G7’s decision to offer Ukraine a USD 50 billion loan secured through immobilised Russian state assets; expresses its conviction that the new Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism is a substantive step towards making Russia financially compensate for the massive damage it continues to cause in Ukraine;

Added:20. Denounces the abusive use by the Hungarian Government of its veto power to delay or effectively block EU essential aid from being granted to Ukraine; condemns the misuse of the position of the EU Presidency by Viktor Orban, in pursuing his so-called peace-mission to the Russian Federation on 5 July 2024, which was an attempt to undermine the unified EU position on Ukraine, and stresses that he did not to any degree or in any capacity represent the EU;

Added:21. Urges the VP/HR and the other Member States to overcome the blockade by the Hungarian Government of the EPF’s funding and disbursement decision and to guarantee that the EU’s only instrument in support of military aid to Ukraine becomes fully functional again; calls on the VP/HR to advance proposals to prevent such blockades in the future or to find an alternative mechanism that is fully reliable;

Added:22. Underscores the urgent need for the EU and its Member States to push for the creation of a special international tribunal to prosecute the crime of aggression committed against Ukraine by the political and military leadership of the Russian Federation and its allies; expresses support for all the activities of the ICC and International Court of Justice in prosecuting the crimes committed on Ukrainian territory;

Added:23. Commends Ukraine for its progress in the EU accession screening process and calls on Ukraine to continue its progress towards EU membership using all the resources made available to it under the Ukraine Facility and to ensure the meaningful involvement of its civil society in the implementation and monitoring phases thereof; recalls that EU accession is a strictly merit-based process that requires the fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership, including those concerning democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental values and the fight against corruption;

Added:24. Believes that both Ukraine’s and Moldova’s accession to the EU would be a mutually beneficial investment in a united and strong Europe; stresses that the newly proposed growth plan for the Republic of Moldova serves the purpose of accelerating EU-related reforms; calls on all co-legislators to advance the relevant legislative acts as soon as possible; encourages the VP/HR to additionally enhance the CFSP partnership with Ukraine and Moldova and in this context welcomes the signature of the security and defence partnership between the EU and Moldova in May 2024; recalls the fact that the security of the Republic of Moldova is inextricably linked to the security of Ukraine; underscores, hence, the need to increase financial contributions from the EPF to further enhance Moldova’s defence capabilities;

Added:25. Praises the Moldova for running the presidential election and the referendum professionally and with an extraordinary sense of duty and dedication, despite the continued massive interference from Russia and its proxies; welcomes the outcome of the 2024 Moldovan European Union membership referendum which enshrined the commitment to joining the EU in the country’s constitution; expresses its support to Moldova in defending its democracy; strongly condemns such constant and coordinated attempts by the Russian Federation, pro-Russian oligarchs and Russian-sponsored local proxies to destabilise the Republic of Moldova, sow divisions within Moldovan society and derail the country’s pro-European direction through hybrid attacks, the weaponisation of energy supplies, disinformation campaigns, bomb threats and staged protests as well as the threat or use of violence; commends the establishment and operations of the EU Partnership Mission in Moldova which have enhanced the Moldovan authorities’ capabilities to address Russian interference; calls on the Council, the Commission and the EEAS to provide the additional resources, including human and financial resources, equipment and civilian experts, necessary to continue implementing the mission’s mandate beyond May 2025;

Added:26. Stresses the importance of the EPF for enhancing the EU’s ability to prevent conflicts, build peace and strengthen international security;

Added:27. Welcomes the launch of the Belarus-EU consultative group to enable continuous dialogue between the EU and the Belarusian democratic forces; reiterates its support for the release of all political prisoners and the brave activists and journalists in Belarus who continue to resist the regime of the illegitimate leader in spite of ongoing crackdowns, notably the refusal to renew the passports of Belarussians abroad, and who have expressed their desire for democratic development in Belarus and for membership of the EU, including at the New Belarus Conference held in Warsaw in August 2023; underlines that such efforts demonstrate the fundamental role of civil society in strengthening democracy;

Resolving conflict and supporting peace in the Middle East

Change 14

Changed:15.28. Affirms the right of Israel to defend itself as enshrined in and constrained by international law; calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages and arecalls subsequentlythat imminentIsrael andhas permeantthe ceasefireobligation to address the risk of mass starvation and the outbreak of a healthdisease epidemicepidemics in Gaza; recalls that Israel also has the obligation to protect the civilian population and that military operations must be proportionate and in line with international humanitarian law; expresses in the strongest terms its concern about the disproportionate military action by the Israeli Defence Forces in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank and in Lebanon; calls for an immediate and permanent ceasefire including the unconditional release of all hostages;

Change 15

Changed:16.29. Reiterates its unwavering support for a negotiated two-state solution on the basis of the 1967 borders, with two sovereign, democratic states as peaceful neighbours and with Jerusalem as their shared capital;capital, which remains the most viable path to lasting peace and security for both Israelis and Palestinians; calls for the VP/HR to support all efforts to this end, and in particular the Global Alliance for the Implementation of the two-State Solution; calls on all parties to renew efforts to remove the obstacles to this solution and to engage in dialogue aimed at achieving mutual understanding and respect; regrets the fact that the Palestinian Authority has not held elections since 2005, which hampers its credibility, and expects elections to be held soon; is convinced that there can be no prospect for peace, security, stability and prosperity for Gaza as well as for reconciliation between the Israeli and Palestinian populations as long as Hamas and other terrorist groups play a role in the Gaza Strip; calls, therefore, on the EU Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process to support efforts to counteract the further radicalisation of young people in the region; condemns the acceleration of the illegal Israeli settlement of Palestinian land,territory, which constitutesviolates international law, undermines efforts towards achieving a violationtwo-state solution, and poses a significant obstacle to lasting peace; reiterates in this context the important role of internationalthe law;Abraham Accords as a framework for achieving durable peace, stability and prosperity in the Middle East; expresses concern over the rising violence committed by Israeli forces and extremist settlers in the West Bank and East Jerusalem;Jerusalem expressesand supportwelcomes forsanctions USadopted against extremist Israeli settlers; supports President Biden’s three-phase Peacepeace Planplan and regrets the lack of will on both sides to ensure its implementation; regrets, further, that the latest rounds of peace talks did not bring any tangible results; is aware of the fact that international stakeholders, including the US, the UN, the EU and Arab states, need to complement each other’s efforts in order for negotiations to resume and to be constructive; is committed to the future normalisation efforts between Israel and Arab states in the region;

Change 16

Removed:17. Expresses concern about rising tensions in the Middle East and the destabilising role that the Iranian regime and its network of non-state actors play in the region; urges all parties to show maximum restraint, commit to de-escalation and refrain from any further escalation, as a regional conflict must be avoided at all costs; calls upon the VP/HR and the Member States to continue and step up their diplomatic efforts with international partners, including with the Gulf countries, in order to encourage urgent de-escalation and meaningful dialogue;

Added:30. Supports a just and viable solution to the question of Palestinian refugees; underscores that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) plays an important role in providing humanitarian aid and essential services which in the present circumstances must not be interrupted, and considers that all UN agencies active in the region must be supported in their efforts; recalls, however, its concern regarding serious allegations made against staff members of UNRWA which suggest that UNRWA has employed members of the terrorist organisation Hamas; welcomes the actions taken by the UN following the allegations regarding the Agency’s staff and welcomes UNRWA’s full commitment to implement the recommendations stemming from the ‘Colonna report’; echoes the European Council conclusions of 17 October 2024 which condemn any attempt to abrogate the 1967 agreement between Israel and UNRWA; insists that the Commission ensure that no funds from the EU budget finance, contribute to or support the activities of Hamas or Hezbollah; stresses that additional measures may be needed in the future to strive for even more transparency and accountability;

Removed:18. Welcomes the EU’s decision to renew sanctions against Iran until July 2025, including by sanctioning Iran’s production of unmanned drones and missiles and its supply thereof to Russia and the wider Middle Eastern region; points out that the sanctioning options that have not yet been exhausted include a much more restrictive approach to technology transfers through exports of products that are not categorised as ‘dual-use’; recalls that the European Parliament has called for Hezbollah and the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to be added to the EU list of terrorist organisations;

Added:31. Welcomes the recent ceasefire in Gaza and the progress made towards the phased release of hostages; emphasises that this represents a significant step towards relieving the immense suffering endured by civilians on both sides over the past months; praises the commitment of mediators, including the US, Egypt and Qatar, whose efforts were pivotal in achieving this breakthrough; considers that it is crucial that all obligations made under the deal are upheld, ensuring the release of all hostages and establishing a lasting cessation of violence, as well as allowing unrestrained access for humanitarian and medical assistance into the Gaza Strip; calls for all parties to fully commit to their obligations and to prioritise the protection of civilians; urges all European and international actors to actively oversee the implementation of the ceasefire and hold accountable those who fail to comply;

Removed:19. Highlights the strong links between Iran and the IRGC, its proxies such as the Houthis, Iraqi and Syrian militias, and organisations on the EU terrorist list, namely Hamas and Hezbollah’s military wing; calls on the Council and the VP/HR to add Hezbollah in its entirety to the EU list of terrorist organisations; deplores Hezbollah’s attacks against Israel which have resulted in an Israeli ground invasion in Lebanon; is deeply concerned about the situation in Lebanon and recalls the need for a cessation of hostilities as soon as possible to create space for a diplomatic solution along the Blue Line, consistent with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, as the only path to de-escalate tensions and stabilise the Israel-Lebanon border in a durable manner;

Added:32. Expresses concern about rising tensions in the Middle East and urges all involved parties to uphold international humanitarian law, to show maximum restraint and to commit to de-escalation, as a regional conflict must be avoided at all costs; deplores the loss of thousands of civilian lives; urges the disarmament of Hezbollah as part of broader measures to reduce hostilities and ensure regional stability; calls on the VP/HR to come forward with a comprehensive EU Middle East strategy, to increase the EU’s effective presence in the region, to promotes long-term stability and peace in the region and to strengthen partnerships with key regional stakeholders; stresses that the strategy must be fleshed out within the first months of the new Commission’s mandate and should be reflected in the forthcoming MFF for it to have any tangible impact on a rapidly deteriorating situation; underscores the need for Member States to step up their diplomatic efforts with international partners, including with the Gulf countries, in order to encourage urgent de-escalation and meaningful dialogue; underlines the need to prioritise and strengthen civil society organisations in the region, particularly organisations working on the protection of human rights and peacebuilding;

Removed:20. Shares the objective of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons at all costs; points, however, to the fact that the regime in Tehran has clearly rejected a revival of the JCPOA and, at the same time, increased its nuclear weapons capability; regrets the fact that there is currently no strategy in place to persuade Iran to refrain from building military nuclear capacity, nor a plan of action for the event that Iran does cross the nuclear threshold; calls upon the VP/HR to put forward a revised strategy towards Iran;

Added:33. Strongly condemns the destabilising role that the Iranian regime and its network of non-state actors play in the region; recalls that Iran has stepped out of the shadow of its proxies and condemns Iran’s two direct and open attacks on Israel’s territory in 2024, to which Israel retaliated both times, representing an unprecedented scaling up of the conflict; strongly condemns Hezbollah’s attacks against Israel which led to an Israeli ground invasion in Lebanon causing a high number of civilian casualties, forced displacement and escalating violence in Lebanon; takes note of the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, agreed on 27 November 2024 for a period of 60 days; urges Israel to withdraw from southern Lebanon in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1701; recalls the need for a permanent cessation of hostilities as soon as possible to create space for a diplomatic solution along the Blue Line; demands the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 in its entirety, as the only path to de-escalate tensions and stabilise the Israel-Lebanon border in a durable manner and fully restore the sovereignty, territorial integrity and stability of Lebanon;

Change 17

Changed:21. Underlines that the EU needs to increase its effective34. presenceCalls inon the region, by all means at its disposal,Council and calls on the VP/HR to makeadd thisHezbollah ain priorityits forentirety histo officethe andEU thelist forthcomingof MFF;terrorist organisations;

Change 18

Added:35. Takes note of the arrest warrant issued by the ICC on 21 November 2024;

Added:36. Highlights the need for the EU to follow up on its election observation and assist in finding solutions to electoral crises such as the one in Lebanon;

Added:37. Strongly condemns recent attacks against the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) by the Israeli Defence Forces and Hezbollah; reiterates the inviolability of all UN personnel and premises and reaffirms the essential stabilising role played by UNIFIL in southern Lebanon, to which 16 Member States contribute, and calls for an immediate end to these attacks;

Added:38. Welcomes the EU’s decision to renew sanctions against Iran until July 2025, including by sanctioning Iran’s production of unmanned drones and missiles and its supply thereof to Russia and the wider Middle Eastern region; highlights the strong links between Iran and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), its proxies such as the Houthis and militias operating in Iraq and Syria; strongly condemns the high number of terrorist and assassination attacks, or attempted attacks, perpetrated by the IRGC all over the world, including on European soil, over the past few decades; reiterates its call for the IRGC to be added to the EU list of terrorist organisations; points out that the sanctioning options that have not yet been exhausted include a much more restrictive approach to technology transfers through exports of products that are not categorised as ‘dual-use’;

Added:39. Strongly condemns the destabilising Houthi attacks against commercial vessels transiting the Red Sea; stresses that these have caused significant disruption to global trade as shipping companies are forced to reroute much of the Red Sea’s traffic around the southern tip of Africa; calls for collective action and encourages enhanced EU engagement and international cooperation, and strongly urges for continued action to ensure the freedom of navigation in one of the world’s most critical waterways; calls for the immediate cessation of these illegal attacks;

Added:40. Shares the objective of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons at all costs; points, however, to the fact that the regime in Tehran has clearly rejected a revival of the JCPOA and has refused to cooperate in its ongoing dispute with the International Atomic Energy Agency; highlights that, at the same time, Iran has increased its nuclear weapons capability; regrets the fact that there is currently no strategy in place to persuade Iran to refrain from building military nuclear capacity, nor a plan of action for the event that Iran does cross the nuclear threshold; calls upon the VP/HR to put forward a revised strategy towards Iran that prepares for all events;

Added:41. Expresses concern regarding the inflammatory rhetoric, fuelled by mis- and disinformation, that surrounds this conflict, and its instrumentalisation by malicious actors to sow distrust and hatred including within European societies, as illustrated notably, but not solely, by the worrying rise of antisemitism; warns that it should be a primary focus of the EU fight against disinformation and calls for a coordinated approach by the Commission, taking into account the external and internal dimensions of its policies, including but not limited to the forthcoming strategic communication plan to promote the EU’s role in the Southern Neighbourhood;

Added:42. Welcomes the historic fall of the Assad regime in Syria; recalls that it only survived so long thanks the support of its Russian and Iranian allies and that its collapse shows they are weakened; welcomes the nomination of a new Chargé d'Affaires of the EU Delegation to Syria, who made early contact with the transition authorities; reiterates its unwavering support for the people in Syria and highlights the need to urgently step up humanitarian aid and protection for the 16.7 million people in need; calls on all parties to contribute to a peaceful and Syrian-led transition towards an inclusive, democratic governance model that ensures the representation, participation and equal rights of women, minorities and all members of Syrian society regardless of ethnicity or religion and that puts the good functioning of the state institutions and the wellbeing of the Syrian people at the heart of their actions; calls on the Commission and the VP/HR to swiftly organise the ninth Brussels Conference on Syria without delay and come up with a comprehensive plan for EU support for the reconstruction of Syria, taking into account the lessons learned from Iraq and Libya, among others; urges the VP/HR to urgently present to the Council an action plan towards the swift yet reversible easing of sanctions that are not linked to the previous regime, with a review process conditional on the progress of the political transition; stresses that the fight against impunity in Syria is a moral and political imperative for Europe and the international community; calls on the EU and its Member States to support the work of the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011; calls on the EU and its Member States to consider the establishment of a special mission, in cooperation with international partners, to help document cases of serious crimes by the Assad regime, as well as by all other factions; stresses the importance of preserving the territorial integrity of Syria, also to help preserve stability in the region; calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to take immediate steps to prevent any re-establishment or reinforcement of Russian forces, paramilitaries or intelligence in the country;

Incentivising cooperation with like-minded partners

Change 19

Removed:22. Highlights that the world is becoming more multipolar and less multilateral; emphasises that multilateral forums, chief among them the United Nations and its agencies, should be considered the EU’s format of cooperation of choice; expresses concern, in this respect, about the increasing relevance of exclusive formats of cooperation, which experience increasing competition; observes, at the same time, that international institutions and norms are increasingly being instrumentalised; stresses that this trend puts the EU in a delicate position, which balances the need to appeal for a broad and inclusive concept of multilateralism while prioritising cooperation with selected, like-minded partners at the same time;

Added:43. Acknowledges that the requirement for unanimity forces the Member States to work relentlessly to achieve compromise and unity, which is the source of the EU’s political leverage on the world stage; points out, however, that the trade-off between the ideal of unity and the high costs of unanimity in terms of credibility on the global stage should be assessed critically, particularly bearing in mind the effective functioning of an enlarged EU;

Removed:23. Stresses, in this context, that the geopolitical context in which the EU is operating remains marked by radical uncertainty and a shift from cooperation to competition; observes with concern how all types of interaction are being weaponised and notes that this trend impairs international cooperation at a time when global transitions need to accelerate in order to effectively address global challenges; recalls that the EU cannot afford to turn inwards and must remain open and engaged in the world;

Added:44. Regrets, in this context, the fact that individual Member States have used their veto right to water down agreements, delay decision-making or thwart a common policy altogether; regrets that the potential for fast, efficient and effective foreign, security and defence action, as provided for, inter alia, by the passerelle clauses of the TEU, has never been used;

Removed:24. Recalls the importance of a strong and constructive partnership with the UK; welcomes the renewed impetus from the new UK Government to reflect with the EU on possibilities for closer foreign policy and security cooperation, which would be of added value for both the EU and the UK; demands that Parliament be duly involved and informed in such reflections;

Added:45. Reiterates its call for the Council to gradually switch to qualified majority voting for decisions in areas of the CFSP that do not have military or defence implications; acknowledges the concerns of some Member States, which fear a decreased ability to influence foreign and security policy at EU level; encourages, pending the full application of qualified majority voting to decisions without military or defence implications, the full use of all currently existing possibilities to enhance decisiveness in this regard, including the use of constructive abstention in line with Article 31(1) TEU; recognises that progress towards the application of qualified majority voting can only be gradual, building on the formation of a European strategic culture;

Removed:25. Recalls that the transatlantic relationship remains the most important and strategic relationship for the EU and its Member States, which has been emphasised by the unity and strength of the partnership demonstrated following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; underlines that a strong transatlantic relationship remains indispensable for the security of the partners on both sides of the Atlantic; calls on the Commission to foster closer ties with key partners in both the US and Canada in order to counter global challenges that affect our shared values, interests, security and prosperity;

Added:46. Highlights that the world is becoming more multipolar and less multilateral; emphasises that multilateral forums, chief among them the UN and its agencies, should be considered the EU’s format of cooperation of choice; calls on the Member States to reinforce inclusive forms of multilateral governance and encourages, in this context, the Commission, the EEAS and the Council to step up interinstitutional cooperation with multilateral organisations that are integral to the international rules-based order and thereby protect the UN and the multilateral system as a whole; expresses concern, in this respect, about the increasing relevance of exclusive formats of cooperation, which experience increasing competition; expresses concern at the growing membership of the BRICS group, which currently includes 45 % of the world’s population; stresses that such cooperation provides Russia with the means to circumvent measures intended to politically isolate the country and enables China to further extend its influence through its modus operandi of financing infrastructure projects; observes, at the same time, that international institutions and norms are increasingly being instrumentalised and undermined by autocratic regimes; stresses that this trend puts the EU in a delicate position, having to balance the need to appeal for a broad and inclusive concept of multilateralism while reinforcing cooperation with selected, like-minded partners;

Removed:26. Welcomes the close relationship with non-EU western European countries and, in particular, the excellent cooperation in certain areas of EU external action; urges the Commission to modernise and deepen bilateral relations between the EU and Switzerland; stresses the importance of fostering even stronger relations with Norway; calls for a swift signature of the Association Agreement between the EU and Andorra and San Marino;

Added:47. Stresses, in this context, that the geopolitical context in which the EU is operating remains marked by radical uncertainty and a shift from cooperation to competition; observes with concern how all types of interaction are being weaponised and notes that this trend impairs international cooperation at a time when global transitions need to accelerate in order to effectively address global challenges; recalls that the EU cannot afford to turn inwards and must remain open and engaged in the world to defend its values and its interests; underlines that, in light of intensified efforts by third countries to destabilise the international order and undermine multilateralism through the spread of disinformation, enhanced cooperation and coordination with like-minded partners is essential;

Removed:27. Reiterates that a peaceful, stable and rules-based Indo-Pacific is of vital European interest; encourages, to this end, closer foreign, security and defence policy ties with like-minded partners in the region in line with the EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific; encourages the VP/HR to promote the visibility and effect of the EU’s external action together with our Indo-Pacific partners, particularly Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and Japan;

Added:48. Calls for the EU institutions and the Member States to actively support a comprehensive institutional reform of multilateral institutions, first and foremost the UN system and particularly the UN Security Council, which should include measures aimed at limiting the use of veto powers, boosting regional representation, making the executive body accountable to the assembly that elects it and redefining the composition to better reflect geopolitical reality, including by establishing a permanent seat for the EU; stresses that such reforms are essential to strengthen multilateralism, improve global governance and values-based decision-making, and address international challenges more inclusively and responsively;

Removed:28. Recalls, in this context, the deep and comprehensive partnership the EU enjoys with Japan, which should serve as a role model for a fruitful bilateral partnership that allows effective policy-shaping in multilateral contexts; notes that the EU and Japan are celebrating 50 years of diplomatic relations in 2024 and strongly emphasises the EU’s interest in deepening and broadening this partnership bilaterally in the 50 years to come; acknowledges the fundamental role of the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement and the EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) in their relationship at a time of geopolitical upheaval; encourages both sides to demonstrate the required political will to ratify the SPA, in particular the remaining EU Member States that have not yet done so;

Added:49. Recalls the importance of a strong and constructive partnership with the UK; welcomes the renewed impetus from the new UK Government to reflect with the EU on possibilities for closer and more permanent foreign policy and security cooperation, underpinned by concrete actions and building on the good cooperation at UN level as well as the effective coordination between the EU and the UK on the adoption and monitoring of the implementation of sanctions against Russia; believes that such coordination is of added value for both the EU and the UK and hence welcomes the agreement to work towards the creation of an EU-UK security partnership based on shared interest and collective responsibility; believes that in the scope of such a partnership, topics such as maritime security should be consulted on; demands that Parliament be duly involved and informed in such reflections;

Removed:29. Considers that the rise of China remains one of the primary geopolitical challenges of the 21st century and requires a multi-dimensional response through which the EU maintains its engagement with China on a number of key issues; calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to maintain diplomatic engagement while increasing the EU’s assertiveness towards China in order for it to assume its responsibility as a permanent member of the UN Security Council;

Added:50. Takes note of the result of the presidential and congressional elections in the United States; recalls that the transatlantic relationship remains one of the most important and strategic relationship for the EU and its Member States, which has been emphasised by the unity and strength of the partnership demonstrated following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; underlines that a strong transatlantic relationship remains indispensable for the security of the partners on both sides of the Atlantic; calls on the Commission to foster closer ties with key partners in both the US and Canada in order to counter global challenges that affect our shared values, interests, security and prosperity; in this context reiterates its call for EU-US summits to be held on a regular basis to provide top-level impetus to the future cooperation; fully supports the deepening of cooperation in the framework of the EU-US transatlantic dialogue, such as through transatlantic parliamentary diplomacy; calls for stronger transatlantic cooperation on trade, on foreign and security policy and on combatting challenges caused by rapid technological changes and growing cyber threats; welcomes in that regard the work of the Transatlantic Trade and Technology Council;

Removed:30. Reiterates that Taiwan is a key EU partner and a democratic ally in the Indo-Pacific region; recognises the importance of Taiwan in securing global supply chains, especially in the high-tech sector, and urges the EU and its Member States to engage in closer cooperation with Taiwan; calls for the EU and its Member States to ensure, through clear and consistent signalling, that any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, particularly by means of force or coercion, cannot be accepted and will have high costs; highlights that China’s territorial claims have no basis in international law; denounces, furthermore, China’s blocking of Taiwan’s participation in multilateral organisations; calls on the Commission and the Member States to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in relevant international organisations;