What changed between the draft committee report and the plenary report

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

11 unchanged paragraphs

on the EU strategy on Central Asia

(2023/2106(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the joint communication by the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 15 May 2019 entitled ‘The EU and Central Asia: New opportunities for a stronger partnership’ (JOIN(2019)0009),

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 17 June 2019 on the New Strategy on Central Asia,

– having regard to the joint communication by the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 19 September 2018 entitled ‘Connecting Europe and Asia – Building blocks for an EU Strategy’ (JOIN(2018)0031),

– having regard to the joint communication by the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 1 December 2021 entitled ‘The Global Gateway’ (JOIN(2021)0030),

– having regard to the outcomes of the 18th EU-Central Asia Foreign Ministers’ meeting, held on 17 November 2022 in Samarkand, which focused on finding solutions to common challenges,

– having regard to the joint press communiqué by the heads of state of Central Asia and the President of the European Council, issued following the second regional high-level meeting held in Cholpon-Ata on 2 June 2023,

– having regard to the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Kazakhstan, of the other part,

– having regard to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement establishing a partnership between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part,

Changed:– having regard to the Commission proposal of 13 June 2022 for a Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part (COM(2022)0277 final),(COM(2022)0277),

6 unchanged paragraphs

– having regard to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement establishing a partnership between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Tajikistan, of the other part,

– having regard to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement establishing a partnership between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Uzbekistan, of the other part,

– having regard to the outcomes of the EU-Central Asia Connectivity Conference, held on 18 November 2022, the second EU-Central Asia Economic Forum, held from 18 to 19 May 2023, the fourth EU-Central Asia Civil Society Forum, held on 10 March 2023, and the seventh EU-Central Asia High-Level Conference on Environment and Water Resources, held from 23 to 24 February 2023,

– having regard to the EU-funded study entitled ‘Sustainable transport connections between Europe and Central Asia’, conducted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and published on 30 June 2023,

– having regard to the Memorandum of Understanding between the EU and Kazakhstan on a strategic partnership in the field of raw materials, batteries and renewable hydrogen, signed on 7 November 2022,

– having regard to the outcomes of the human rights dialogues with the Central Asian states,

Added:– having regard to the Joint Roadmap for Deepening Ties between the EU and Central Asia, endorsed during the 19th EU-Central Asia Ministerial Meeting held on 23 October 2023,

Added:– having regard to the joint declaration by the heads of state of Central Asia and the Federal Chancellor of Germany following their summit on 29 September 2023 in Berlin,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan,

Added:– having regard to the EU Gender Action Plan III 2021-2025,

Added:– having regard to its resolution of 23 October 2020 on Gender Equality in EU’s foreign and security policy,

– having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

Changed:– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0000/2023),(A9-0407/2023),

Change 1

Changed:A. whereas since the adoption of the EU strategy on Central Asia in 2019, the region has been affected by significant external factors, such as Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan,Afghanistan and China’s globalincreasingly ambitions,assertive foreign policy, as well as by internal instability, particularly the violent unrest in Kazakhstan in January 2022, the violent crackdownscrackdown following protests by the Pamiris in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast of Tajikistan in November 2021 and May 2022 and in the Republic of Karakalpakstan, Uzbekistan, in July 2022, and repeated clashes on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border;

Change 2

Changed:B. whereas Central Asia is a region of strategic interest to the EU in terms of security,security connectivity,and connectivity as well as energy and resource diversification, conflict resolution and the defence of the multilateral rules-based international order;order, which has been challenged by Russia’s attack on our values, the exacerbation of the global food crisis, aggression and atrocities, the spread of disinformation, weaponised corruption and meddling in elections;

Change 3

Removed:C. whereas Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (EPCAs) are newgeneration agreements that are the cornerstone of the EU’s engagement with Central Asia;

Added:C. whereas none of the Central Asian states support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and do not recognise Ukrainian regions annexed by Russia as parts of the Russian Federation;

Added:D. whereas on 28 March 2023, the EU’s Special Envoy on Sanctions called on the countries in the region to avoid assisting Moscow’s attempts to evade sanctions imposed on Russia over its war of aggression against Ukraine;

Added:E. whereas Russian officials and propagandists continue to use aggressive rhetoric against some Central Asian states, in particular against Kazakhstan, questioning its territorial integrity and national identity;

Added:F. whereas circumstances such as Russia’s isolation as a result of its war of aggression against Ukraine, the strengthening of trade routes through Central Asia bypassing Russia, the planned enlargement of the EU in Eastern Europe and the growing influence of China in the region call for a complete rethink of the EU’s Central Asia strategy and a more active presence of the democratic EU in the region as an alternative to established autocratic actors;

Added:G. whereas there is a need to ensure connectivity between Europe and Asia in a way that avoids crossing Russian territory; whereas the EU has a strong interest in the deployment of efficient trade and energy corridors between Europe and Asia, as demonstrated by the EU-Central Asia Connectivity Conference held in Samarkand on 18 November 2022;

Added:H. whereas all five Central Asian states ratified the Paris Agreement; whereas they are particularly vulnerable to the consequences of climate change; whereas reckless water mismanagement and pollution of major rivers for the irrigation of cotton fields resulted in the ineffective use and exploitation of water resources in the region; whereas glaciers in Central Asia continue to shrink rapidly, exacerbating one of the most severe water crises on Earth and exposing the vulnerable population of the area to disastrous health, ecological and social problems; whereas frequent water conflicts and political instability have limited unified planning and efficient allocation of transboundary rivers; whereas the geopolitical shifts in the wider region pose opportunities for more meaningful regional cooperation; whereas such regional cooperation has proven impactful in the context of water diplomacy and resolving border disputes, and will be even more crucial to address the growing transboundary threats posed by climate change;

Added:I. whereas Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (EPCAs) are newgeneration agreements that are the cornerstone of the EU’s engagement with Central Asia; whereas Kazakhstan was the first Central Asian state to sign an EPCA in 2015, which came into force on 1 March 2020 following its ratification by all Member States, and should be periodically reviewed; whereas negotiations on the EU-Kyrgyzstan EPCA were concluded on 6 July 2019, but the agreement has still not been signed as a result of a legal dispute between the Council and the Commission; whereas negotiations on the EU-Uzbekistan EPCA were concluded on 6 July 2022; whereas at the beginning of 2023, the EU and Tajikistan started negotiations on an EPCA; whereas a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Turkmenistan was signed in 1998, but Parliament has not given its consent to ratify the agreement because of its deep concern over the short-term benchmarks for Turkmenistan’s progress on human rights and fundamental freedoms;

J. whereas the first EU-Central Asian leaders’ meeting took place in Astana on 27 October 2022, followed by a second such meeting in Cholpon-Ata on 2 June 2023; whereas a leaders’ summit is planned for 2024; whereas these meetings represent further institutionalisation of EU-Central Asian relations and complement the work of existing regional dialogues and platforms;

Change 4

Added:K. whereas the first C5+1 summit between Central Asian leaders and the President of the United States was held in New York on 19 September 2023; whereas the C5+Germany summit took place in Berlin on 29 September 2023;

Added:L. whereas all five Central Asian states have low and declining democracy scores and are classified as authoritarian regimes and as ‘not free’ by Freedom House’s 2023 Freedom in the World report; whereas the 2023 World Press Freedom Index has reported a marked deterioration in the press freedom situation in Central Asia and the average score for Central Asia in the 2022 Corruption Perceptions Index was well below the global average; whereas Reporters Without Borders has reported numerous cases of Central Asian authorities pressuring their media to either cover Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in a ‘neutral’ manner, or to ignore it altogether;

Added:M. whereas Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs visited Tajikistan and Uzbekistan on 21-25 February 2022 and Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan on 21-25 August 2023; whereas its Delegation to the EU-Kazakhstan, EU-Kyrgyzstan, EU-Uzbekistan and EU-Tajikistan Parliamentary Cooperation Committees and for relations with Turkmenistan and Mongolia maintains regular inter-parliamentary relations with the Central Asian countries;

Added:N. whereas in Central Asia, there are well grounded fears of radicalisation, growing extremism and a terrorist threat, with a very high number of former ISIS fighters returning to the region and a dire security situation in Afghanistan;

Added:O. whereas women and girls in Central Asia remain highly vulnerable to abuse, especially as there is a high level of acceptance of violence against women and low awareness of gender stereotypes;

Added:P. whereas child marriage remains common in Central Asia, particularly in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan where one in every eight girls is married before 18 years of age;

EU engagement with Central Asia

Change 5

Changed:1. Underlines that the EU and Central Asia are facing profound global and regional geopolitical shifts,shifts and challenges, which provide significant impetus for them to engagework intowards strongerlong-term, structured and mutually beneficial cooperation;cooperation in matters of common interest; strongly encourages the EU to intensify its engagement with Central Asia, given the geostrategic importance of the region;region, and to promote a strategic partnership with these countries by expanding cooperation at political and economic level; welcomes the increased high-level contact between the EU and Central Asia, in particular the meetings between the Central Asian heads of state and the President of the European Council, and the work of the EU Special Representative for Central Asia; welcomescalls thefor intentionfollow-up to adoptall athese jointhigh-level meetings and declarations with concrete actions; welcomes, in this context, that the first EU-Central Asia roadmapsummit is planned for 2024, as well as the endorsement of the Joint Roadmap for Deepening Ties between the EU and Central Asia, which serves as a strategic blueprint to advance dialogue and cooperation in specific areas;areas, including building cultural, social and economic resilience; encourages the EU to continue promoting political and economic reforms that strengthen the rule of law, democracy, good governance and respect for human rights; notes that Parliament is ready to promote parliamentary cooperation with Central Asia;

Change 6

Changed:2. Notes that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine hasand its increased nationalistic narratives have weakened itsRussia’s standing in the region and hashave encouraged Central Asia to pursue cooperation with other actors, and that these actors have stepped up their cooperation with Central Asia; takes note also of Chinese engagement in the region; stresses that the EU now has the opportunity to expand its ties with Central Asia and play a more prominent role in the region; underlines that the EU should use this window of opportunity to foster mutually beneficial cooperation;cooperation and offer Central Asia a partnership that can become a special track in a broader strategy towards the EU’s Eastern neighbours; considers that strengthening this cooperation would also contribute to counteracting Russia’s influence in the region;

Change 7

Removed:3. Recognises that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its implications present both challenges and opportunities for the Central Asian states, which have traditionally maintained close relations with Russia; expresses deep concern about Central Asian states’ circumvention of EU sanctions against Russia, which are intended to stop the war in Ukraine; calls on the authorities of the Central Asian states, particularly Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, to cooperate closely with the EU, in particular its Sanctions Envoy;

Added:3. Underlines the importance of transatlantic cooperation on Central Asia and invites the EU to take initiative in working out a joint strategy for Central Asia with the United States, which should include cooperation in the areas of democracy promotion, investments and trade, economy and regional security;

Removed:4. Reiterates the key role of EPCAs as the framework for cooperation with the Central Asian states; notes with concern that the EPCA with Kyrgyzstan, negotiations on which were concluded in 2019, remains unsigned; calls on the Council and the Commission to resolve the outstanding issues and to sign the EPCAs with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan without further delay in order for Parliament to exercise its prerogatives regarding the ratification of these agreements; stresses that failure to sign such agreements after the conclusion of negotiations calls into question the EU’s credibility as a global actor;

Added:4. Reiterates the commitment of the EU to work together with the countries of Central Asia for peace, security, stability, prosperity and sustainable development in full respect of international law, as well as the principles of respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries, non-use of force or threat of its use and the peaceful settlement of international disputes;

Added:5. Rejects any attempt to facilitate or assist in any way the international recognition of the secessionist entity in occupied Cyprus, including in relation to its alleged acceptance as an observer in the Organization of Turkic States; encourages the Central Asian states concerned to effectively uphold the respect of the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states and to not ratify the amended Statute of the Organization of Turkic States, which would put into effect the decision to grant observer status;

Added:6. Recognises that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its implications present both challenges and opportunities for the Central Asian states, which have traditionally maintained close relations with Russia; underlines the EU’s interest in increasing economic relations and intensifying political ties with the countries of Central Asia, in part to minimise the circumvention of sanctions against Russia and Belarus; emphasises the significance of continued close exchange on sanctions and calls on the authorities of the Central Asian states, particularly Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, to cooperate closely with the EU, in particular its Sanctions Envoy, in order to intensify their efforts to prevent sanctions circumvention; condemns the procedure of Russia recruiting Central Asian migrants and citizens to fight in Ukraine and supports actions aimed at putting an end to it; notes the individual efforts of the Central Asian states to ensure that their territories are not used to circumvent the EU sanctions and welcomes Kazakhstan’s administrative measures and high-level political commitment in this regard; invites the EU to use a differentiated approach in its Central Asia strategy, which will assess the level of cooperation with the EU on the sanctions policy towards Russia; notes the role that Member States themselves play in ensuring that export goods that will likely still make their way to Russia via Central Asia undergo the appropriate preventive controls;

Added:7. Considers that a review of the EU-Central Asia strategy is necessary in order to update it in the light of the geopolitical events that have taken place in recent years; reiterates the key role of EPCAs as the framework for cooperation with the Central Asian states; notes, with concern, that the EPCA with Kyrgyzstan, negotiations on which were concluded in 2019, remains unsigned; calls on the Council and the Commission to rapidly advance the ongoing negotiations on an EPCA with Tajikistan, and to resolve the outstanding issues and sign the EPCAs with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan without further delay in order for Parliament to exercise its prerogatives regarding the ratification of these agreements; stresses that failure to sign such agreements after the conclusion of negotiations calls into question the EU’s credibility as a global actor;

Added:8. Notes that the EPCAs with the Central Asian states negotiated to date put a strong emphasis on respect for democratic principles, human rights and the rule of law; stresses the importance of mainstreaming human rights, democratic values, gender equality, free media and the green transition in interactions with the Central Asian governments;

Regional cooperation

Change 8

Changed:5.9. Underlines the great potential of mutually beneficial cooperation on sustainable development, connectivity, energy, critical raw materials and security, with Central Asia being a key region for connectivity between East and West; stresses thatrecalls, in order tothis makecontext, the Globalsignificant Gatewaygeopolitical aconsequences success,of theRussia’s EUwar mustof backaggression upagainst itsUkraine, ambitiouswhich planshave withreinvigorated deedsthe andMiddle mobiliseCorridor funds;not underlinesonly theas importancea ofregional developingeconomic thezone, Trans-Caspianbut Corridoralso as an alternative connectionand sustainable route between Asia and Europe that avoids crossing Russian territory; recalls that the New Eurasian Land Bridge passes through sanctioned Russian and Belarusian territory; stresses the significance of workingpromoting onregional attractingintegration investmentalong the Middle Corridor and eliminatingnotes that in order to attract much needed financing for infrastructure projects under the Global Gateway, the bottlenecks identified in the study conducted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development;Development must be eliminated; calls on the Commission to investigate the possibility of the European Investment Bank’s support for investments in infrastructure development in Central Asian states, especially in the Middle Corridor;

Change 9

Removed:6. Notes the Central Asian states’ long-standing close relations with Afghanistan and their evolving pragmatic engagement with the Taliban, which they nevertheless do not recognise, since the takeover in 2021; underlines that the Central Asian states play a key role in ensuring stability in Afghanistan through the provision of humanitarian aid, electricity, trade opportunities and joint connectivity projects; encourages the EU Special Envoy for Afghanistan to continue cooperating closely with counterparts in the Central Asian states as part of the EU-Central Asia dialogue on Afghanistan; recognises that Central Asia is a crucial area for containing religious extremism, terrorism and drug trafficking networks and faces increased migratory pressure due to the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan;

Added:10. Believes that the EU’s policy towards Central Asia in the fields of energy, connectivity and resource diversification should be inspired by the European Green Deal and based on mutually beneficial strategic partnerships that take into account the peculiarities of each of the Central Asian states, ensuring their access to modern technologies and quality jobs, while guaranteeing secure and competitive access to raw materials and energy for the EU; is concerned, in this regard, with the creation of dependency on Russia as a result of the signing of the natural gas deal between Gazprom and Uzbekistan through Kazakhstan;

Removed:7. Highlights the EU’s role as an important donor of aid to the region; underlines the importance of taking a united approach as Team Europe, as this makes it possible to create synergies and maximise the impact of the action taken and showcases the benefits of multilateral cooperation; stresses the need to ensure the visibility of EU assistance and investment;

Added:11. Recognises the crucial role of the EU in financing Central Asia’s sectoral reforms, improving its energy efficiency and reducing its greenhouse gas emissions; welcomes the launch of the Sustainable Energy Connectivity in Central Asia (SECCA) project in 2022, and looks forward to its positive impact on strengthening national policies for transitioning to a sustainable energy system and increasing investment, capacity and awareness in renewable energy and energy efficiency in the region;