What changed between the draft committee report and the plenary report

Added:3. Recalls that the EU should be guided in its external action by the values and principles enshrined in Article 2, Article 3 (5) and Article 21 TEU, which have inspired the EU’s own creation, development and enlargement, including democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity and respect for the principles of the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, the European Convention on Human Rights and international law; regrets that the Union at times falls short of these objectives, with a negative impact on its interests, security and international reputation; underscores that the ambitious commitment of the EU’s external human rights policy requires it to be consistent and exemplary;

Added:4. Believes that the EU should shape its CFSP accordingly, and on the basis of the following four objectives:

Added:(a) addressing the consequences of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine,

Added:(b) progressively adapting EU structures, instruments, capabilities, funds and decision-making procedures,

Added:(c) reinforcing and defending a rules-based multilateralism, and

Added:(d) asserting interests through the development of robust strategic alliances and like-minded partnerships;

Addressing the consequences of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine

Change 5

Changed:3.5. ReiteratesIs concerned that the illegal, unprovoked and unjustified Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, enabled and supported by the illegitimate Lukashenka regime in Belarus and the regime in Iran, has brought war back to the European continent; reiterates its condemnation, in the strongest possible terms, of Russia’sthe waractions of aggressionthe againstRussian Ukraine;leadership, which include breaking international law, violating recognised borders, unlawfully transferring and deporting protected persons and children and committing land theft and serious war crimes; demands that Russia and its proxy forces cease all military action and that the Russian leadership immediately and unconditionally withdraw its troops from the internationally recognised territory of Ukraine and from any other country whose territory, or parts thereof, it unlawfully occupies; condemns any hybrid attacks used by Russia in Ukraine and strongly denounces the spread of Russia’s propaganda about its war in Ukraine;

Change 6

Removed:4. Pays tribute to the brave people of Ukraine, who are not only courageously defending their country, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, but also the European way of life;

Added:6. Condemns the role of the illegitimate regime of Aliaksandr Lukashenka for de facto surrendering national sovereignty to the Kremlin in order to maintain its grip on Belarus;

Removed:5. Emphasises that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine destabilises the Eastern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans, which in turn jeopardises the security of the EU itself; considers that the EU should therefore prioritise the enlargement process and the reform of the neighbourhood policy;

Added:7. Reiterates that Georgia experienced Russian military aggression as early as August 2008; strongly condemns Russia’s ongoing illegal occupation of the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia and similarly condemns the undermining of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Moldova through the presence of Russian troops in Transnistria; reaffirms its support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia and Moldova and underlines that Russia’s malicious attempts to forcibly change the borders of sovereign states in Europe pose a serious threat to the EU’s security; encourages the EU and the Member States to strengthen security cooperation with Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova, particularly in countering hybrid threats, disinformation and cybersecurity;

Removed:6. Reiterates the need for the Member States to make collective investments in defence and calls for the full implementation of the Strategic Compass;

Added:8. Pays tribute to the brave people of Ukraine, who are not only courageously defending their country, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, but also European values and security, and are upholding the norms and principles of the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act; expresses its respect and gratitude for the support provided by individuals and civil society organisations to the people of Ukraine; commends the actions of the people of Georgia and Belarus who actively support the Ukraine’s fight; welcomes the extension of the temporary protection for people fleeing Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

Removed:7. Commends the Council and the Member States for the determined response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; calls for the Russian Federation to be isolated further by reinforcing the application of restrictive measures, also against Belarus; appeals for proactive diplomacy with third countries in order to minimise the circumvention of these sanctions; encourages the Commission, the VP/HR and the Member States to mobilise international support for the peace formula presented by Ukraine; underscores the urgent need for the EU and its Member States to push for the creation of a special international tribunal to prosecute the crime of aggression against Ukraine perpetrated by the political and military leadership of the Russian Federation and its allies; urges the Commission to come up with a legally sound proposal for using immobilised Russian assets to finance the reconstruction of Ukraine;

Added:9. Emphasises that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine destabilises and threatens the security and stability of the Eastern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans, which in turn jeopardises the security of the EU itself; considers that the EU should therefore prioritise the reform of its neighbourhood policy and accelerate the enlargement process in parallel with the institutional and decision-making reforms necessary to safeguard the Union’s integration capacity;

Removed:8. Welcomes the rapid creation of the European Union Military Assistance Mission; notes that this mission is a tangible demonstration of the EU’s unwavering support for Ukraine;

Added:10. Calls for a more active communication strategy in order to promote the role and benefits of enlargement in the Western Balkans and the Eastern Partnership, as well as promoting the EU’s financial and technical assistance;

Removed:9. Calls on the Member States to maintain the resolve that they have already demonstrated and to provide Ukraine with further political, humanitarian, military, infrastructurerelated, economic and financial support for as long as it takes; welcomes, in this respect, the Commission proposal on establishing the Ukraine Facility;

Added:11. Notes with particular concern the spillover effect of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, notably in the Southern Neighbourhood, the wider Mediterranean, the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Africa and the Middle East; deplores Russian malign influences, hybrid warfare and disinformation campaigns in these regions and calls for greater EU involvement and assistance;

Removed:10. Insists that the EU cannot persistently rely on ad hoc mobilisation and recalls, in this context, the need to improve the EU’s capacity to act in response to global crises;

Added:12. Welcomes the third meeting of the European Political Community (EPC) as a platform for discussion, dialogue and cooperation with partner countries; calls for the close involvement of Parliament in clarifying the scope and the future work of the EPC; underlines that, for the future success and coherence of this format, some level of alignment on democratic values and principles is essential; reiterates that the EPC may under no circumstances form a pretext for delays to the accession of enlargement countries to the EU;

Removed:Adapting EU structures and decision-making procedures

Added:13. Reiterates the need for the Member States to make collective and well-coordinated investments in defence and calls for the full and swift implementation of the Strategic Compass, integrating the lessons learnt from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, with the objective of achieving a genuine European Defence Union that is interoperable and complementary with the NATO alliance and can act independently when needed;

Removed:11. Regrets that the potential for fast, efficient and effective foreign, security and defence action, as provided for by the passerelle clauses of the TEU, has been used only in a very limited manner; reiterates its call for the Council to gradually switch to qualified majority voting for decisions in areas of the CFSP that do not have military or defence implications;

Added:14. Highlights, in particular, the need to engage further with NATO on the establishment of the Rapid Deployment Capacity and urges the Member States to ensure that the Military Planning and Conduct Capability is fully operational by 2025; strongly encourages the VP/HR to propose a Council decision on an EU Rapid Deployment Capacity to protect the Union’s values and serve the interests of the Union as a whole, to respond to imminent threats and to react rapidly to a crisis situation outside the Union, including in non-permissive environments and during all stages of a conflict cycle; underlines that the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity should be set up as a force that is permanently available and trains together with the goal of becoming a standing force;

Removed:12. Reiterates that Parliament plays an integral role in the CFSP, making a specific contribution thereto by virtue of its distinct instruments, channels and contacts;

Added:15. Stresses the need to increase the production of military ammunition in the EU, which should be achieved through increased industrial cooperation and joint production; reiterates the urgent need to reach the 35 % European collaborative defence equipment procurement benchmark and the 20 % European collaborative defence research and technology benchmark agreed by all Member States within the European Defence Agency; calls for the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre and the European External Action Service (EEAS) Crisis Response Centre to be strengthened through the establishment of a system of automatic flows of intelligence from Member States to the EEAS and to the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre on foreign and security issues occurring outside the EU;

Removed:13. Calls for full use to be made of the ‘Team Europe’ approach in order to ensure the effective allocation of resources; insists that Parliament is part of ‘Team Europe’ and should be treated as such;

Added:16. Welcomes the additional funding for the European Peace Facility and calls on the Member States to improve the Facility’s ability to act through sustainable and appropriate funding; welcomes the decisions to establish the Act in Support of Ammunition Production and the European defence industry reinforcement through common procurement act in order to reinforce European defence capacities; reiterates its call to urgently launch a discussion with a view to establishing another off-budget financial facility that would address the entire life cycle of military capabilities at EU level;

Removed:14. Believes that there is a need for stronger parliamentary oversight of EU external action, including regular access to confidential information;

Added:17. Notes that the EU’s response to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine is being closely watched by autocratic actors around the world and will have a decisive influence in shaping their behaviour on the international stage; commends the Council and the Member States for the determined response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; welcomes the mobilisation of unprecedented amounts of macroeconomic, financial, economic and humanitarian assistance for Ukraine, the delivery of weapons and ammunition by Member States, which was also made possible by the European Peace Facility, and the adoption, in unison with like-minded partners, of 11 packages of sanctions that should have a devastating impact on the Russian economy; is concerned, however, by the fact that Hungary is still blocking the eighth tranche of the European Peace Facility dedicated to Ukraine; calls for the Russian Federation to be isolated and pressured further by reinforcing the application of restrictive measures, also against Belarus; appeals for proactive diplomacy with third countries, in concert with like-minded partners, most notably the US, Canada and the UK, in order to minimise the circumvention of these sanctions and close all remaining legal loopholes to stop this practice; regrets the lack of restrictive measures on Russian diamonds;

Removed:15. Urges the Member States to dedicate sufficient funding to the CFSP;

Added:18. Welcomes the resolve displayed by the Union and most Member States in the pursuit of full energy independence from the Russian Federation; reiterates its call for an immediate and full embargo on Russian imports of fossil fuels and products made with Russian crude oil; urges the Commission and the Council to enhance monitoring capacities for fossil fuels in order to prevent re-export; expresses concern about the fact that, in the past year, some Member States have increased their imports of Russian natural gas and LNG;

Removed:Reinforcing rules-based multilateralism

Added:19. Recalls that the consistent and uniform application of restrictive measures in all Member States is a precondition for the credibility and effectiveness of the EU’s external action; calls on all third countries, and in particular EU candidate countries, to show unambiguous commitment to international law and EU strategic interests and values and to align with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia; calls for the Commission to critically assess EU assistance to third countries that actively support Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and urges the Council to impose restrictive measures on third countries enabling Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, whether through the facilitation of sanction circumvention or through the provision of direct military assistance, such as in the case of Iran;

Removed:16. Emphasises that multilateral forums, chief among them the UN and its agencies, should be considered the EU’s format of cooperation of choice; expresses concern, in this respect, about the increasing relevance of exclusive formats of cooperation, which bear witness to increasing competition between great powers; calls on the Member States to reinforce inclusive forms of multilateral governance and encourages, in this context, the Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Council to step up interinstitutional cooperation with multilateral organisations that are integral to the international rules-based system and the management of global commons;

Added:20. Encourages the Commission, the VP/HR and the Member States to mobilise international support for the peace formula presented by Ukraine and to engage in security commitments towards Ukraine as recommended in the Kyiv Security Compact; underscores the urgent need for the EU and its Member States to push for the creation of a special international tribunal to prosecute the crime of aggression and war crimes against Ukraine, including conflict-related sexual violence, perpetrated by the political and military leadership of the Russian Federation and its allies, in particular Belarus; calls on the Commission and the Council to designate the Russian state-funded private military Wagner Group as a terrorist organisation; welcomes the newly established International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine, hosted by the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust), which will facilitate case-building for future trials; urges the Commission to locate and map immobilised Russian assets and to come up with a legally sound and effective proposal for using these assets to finance the reconstruction of Ukraine, ensuring that this legally sound proposal is developed in close coordination with the G7 partner countries; highlights that demining and the clearance of unexploded ordnance are prerequisites for Ukraine’s reconstruction, including its agricultural production, which is vital for the country’s economy and for global food security; highlights that these efforts will require comprehensive, long-term funding;

Removed:17. Underlines that the EU must remain a reliable ally in development cooperation worldwide; expresses its concern that the EU is facing increasing scepticism and disengagement; calls for the EU to respond to partner countries’ expectations and to deliver quickly on political agreements with them in order to demonstrate that the international rules-based system can meet contemporary challenges;

Added:21. Welcomes the rapid creation and successful implementation of the European Union Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine and suggests that the EU consider strengthening it; notes that this mission is a tangible demonstration of the EU’s unwavering support for the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; calls for work to be done towards setting up other international missions in order to safeguard freedom of navigation and support humanitarian corridors and the safe passage of Ukrainian grain;

Removed:18. Calls on the Commission to effectively use the Global Gateway as an instrument to increase the EU’s presence and visibility worldwide by means of infrastructure investment that creates national value in partner countries, in line with the Sustainable Development Goals;

Added:22. Calls on the Member States to maintain the resolve and unity that they have already demonstrated and to provide Ukraine with further political, humanitarian, military, infrastructure-related, economic and financial support to win this war; welcomes, in this respect, the assistance provided by the Member States, both individually and through EU instruments, including the Commission proposal on establishing the Ukraine Facility; underlines the need for full transparency in the Facility’s implementation; calls on the Member States to continue to provide the necessary military aid for Ukraine to expel Russian forces from its territory; urges the Member States to produce ammunition and provide it to Ukraine’s armed forces, along with other necessary resources for Ukraine to service its military hardware; encourages the Member States to continue providing financial and political support for civil society in and around Ukraine;

Removed:Asserting interests through the development of robust strategic partnerships

Added:23. Insists that the EU cannot persistently rely on ad hoc mobilisation and recalls, in this context, the need to improve and clearly define the EU’s capacity to act in response to global crises in a sustainable manner; stresses, in this regard, that the EU should continue to develop its own autonomous and resilient instruments in its external action and within the CFSP; recalls that the Strategic Compass sets an ambitious course of action and gives the EU the tools to be both an effective security provider and a more assertive global actor, and therefore calls for its swift and full implementation; calls for the EU institutions to strengthen their capacity for strategic foresight in order to prepare for future challenges;

Removed:19. Emphasises the need to strengthen existing partnerships with like-minded countries and highlights the significance of building alliances with other countries in the Global South;

Added:24. Calls for a more dynamic and consistent use of the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (EU Magnitsky Act), which remains underutilised in the EU’s foreign policy toolbox; welcomes the VP/HR’s proposal for an anti-corruption sanctions regime, which would allow the EU to target serious acts of corruption worldwide; insists that corruption has a verifiable impact on the state of human rights and undermines the functioning of state institutions and the rule of law; calls, in this context, for the swift adoption of the proposed anti-corruption sanctions regime by the Council;

Removed:20. Stresses the importance of strong and strategic transatlantic cooperation; calls on the Commission to foster closer ties with key partners in both the United States and Canada in order to counter global challenges that affect our shared values, interests, security and prosperity;

Added:Progressively adapting EU structures, instruments, capabilities, funds and decision-making procedures

Removed:21. Welcomes the conclusion of the Windsor Framework; calls for more structured engagement with the UK in foreign affairs and for greater involvement of the UK in European security and defence projects;

Added:25. Acknowledges that the requirement for unanimity forces the Member States to work relentlessly to achieve compromise and unity, which is the source of the EU’s political leverage on the world stage; points out, however, that the trade-off between the ideal of unity and the high costs of unanimity in terms of credibility should be assessed critically, particularly bearing in mind the effective functioning of an enlarged EU; regrets, in this context, the fact that individual Member States have used their veto right to water down agreements, delay decision-making or thwart a common policy altogether;

Removed:22. Welcomes both the launch of the Belarus-EU consultative group to enable continuous dialogue between the EU and Belarusian democratic forces, and the ongoing support provided to Russian human rights defenders and to independent media inside and outside Russia;

Added:26. Reminds the Member States to adhere to the principles of the Treaties¸ particularly Articles 24 and 42(7) TEU and Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which call for the Member States to support the European Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity; underlines that the conditions for the activation of Article 42(7) TEU and the modalities for support have never been clearly defined; considers it necessary to urgently develop a solidarity policy strategy and operational implementation measures for the mutual assistance clause established in Article 42(7) TEU;

Removed:23. Recalls the need to demonstrate genuine political commitment to accession negotiations with Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia, conditional on the implementation of EU-related reforms;

Added:27. Regrets that the potential for fast, efficient and effective foreign, security and defence action, as provided for, inter alia, by the passerelle clauses of the TEU, has been used only in a very limited manner; reiterates its call for the Council to gradually switch to qualified majority voting for decisions in areas of the CFSP that do not have military or defence implications; acknowledges the concerns of some Member States, which fear a decreased ability to influence foreign and security policy at EU level; recognises that progress towards the application of qualified majority voting can only be gradual, building on the formation of a European strategic culture; encourages, in this context:

Removed:24. Welcomes the granting of EU candidate status to Ukraine, Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina and the lifting of visa requirements for Kosovo citizens; recalls that Georgia’s bid for accession to the EU will be assessed on the basis of its own merits and of the country’s success in meeting the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership;

Added:(a) the introduction of qualified majority voting in identified priority areas, such as the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (EU Magnitsky Act), and on issues pertaining to the adoption and implementation of the next EU action plan on human rights and democracy, in line with Article 22(1) TEU;

Removed:25. Believes that Ukraine’s and Moldova’s accession to the EU would be a geostrategic investment in a united and strong Europe; commends the progress already achieved on reforms and urges the Commission to present an ambitious roadmap for accession negotiations to start before the end of this year, as well as for Ukraine’s and Moldova’s gradual integration into EU policies and programmes;

Added:(b) the application of the passerelle clauses provided for in the Treaties, except for the creation of military missions or operations with an executive mandate under the common security and defence policy (CSDP), for which unanimity will still be required;

Removed:26. Stresses that in the absence of a drastic change of course by the Turkish Government, Türkiye’s EU accession process cannot be resumed; calls for the EU and the Turkish Government to move forward towards a closer, more dynamic and strategic partnership; calls on the Commission to find a parallel and realistic framework for EU-Türkiye relations that encompasses the interests of all parties involved;

Added:(c) the use of constructive abstention in line with Article 31(1) TEU, pending the full application of qualified majority voting to decisions without military or defence implications;