What changed between the draft committee report and the plenary report

Added:61. Welcomes the deployment of the EU CSDP Partnership Mission in the Republic of Moldova (EUPM Moldova), the first ever CSDP civilian mission dedicated to strengthening the resilience of Moldova’s security sector in crisis management and countering hybrid threats; underlines the importance of this innovative CSDP Mission and calls on the Member States to provide the expertise and capabilities necessary for the mission to support Moldova in the face of Russia’s use of hybrid warfare; calls on the EEAS to explore the creation of similar missions to other candidate, associate and partner countries, aimed at increasing their resilience against hybrid threats, including cyber threats and FIMI;

Added:62. Reiterates the EU’s support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova and for the efforts in the framework of the 5+2 negotiation process to reach a peaceful, lasting, comprehensive, political settlement of the Transnistrian conflict, based on respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova within its internationally recognised borders, with a special status for Transnistria that would ensure the protection of human rights also on the territories currently not controlled by constitutional authorities; expresses concern that Transnistria continues to serve as a safe haven for human smugglers and organised crime, while recognising that EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) plays an important role in helping to re-open rail freight through Transnistria and has thwarted multiple smuggling operations;

Added:63. Welcomes the Council’s decision of 4 May 2023 to allocate EUR 40 million under the EPF to support the Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova and EUR 30 million to support the Georgian Defence Forces; stresses the need to further increase support to these partner countries, according to their needs;

Added:64. Strongly condemns the illegal occupation of the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali/South Ossetia by the Russian Federation and stresses that the Russian Federation continues its illegal occupation and effective control over the occupied territories of Georgia through its military presence, continued installation of barbed wire fences and other artificial barriers along the occupation line, frequent illegal detentions and kidnappings of Georgian citizens and other human rights violations on the ground; calls on the Russian Federation to fulfil its international obligations under the EU-mediated ceasefire agreement of 12 August 2008, in particular its obligation to withdraw all of its military and security personnel from Georgia’s occupied territories and to allow the establishment of international security mechanisms therein, and to allow the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) unhindered access to the whole territory of Georgia pursuant to its mandate; reiterates its calls for the EU to continue to pursue its engagement for the peaceful resolution of the Russia-Georgia conflict by effectively using all the instruments available, including the Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia, the Geneva International Discussions, the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms, the EUMM, and its policy of non-recognition and engagement; welcomes EU’s assistance to Georgia under the EPF and calls for the EU to further engage in security cooperation with Georgia across the priority areas identified in the Strategic Compass, in particular to strengthen the resilience of Georgia’s security sector in the area of crisis management, counter hybrid threats and upgrade defence capabilities;

Added:65. Welcomes the extension of the mandate and underlines the importance of the work of EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in training and supporting the armed forces of BiH (AFBiH); welcomes, further, the cooperation and training contract for 2023 concluded between the AFBiH and EUFOR; calls on BiH to work towards forming multi-ethnic units of the AFBiH; recalls the EU engagement in supporting BiH’s defence capacity-building, in particular via the EUR 20 million that has been allocated through the EPF so far; supports the extension of the mandate of EUFOR Althea by the UN Security Council as an established and proven mission; strongly condemns any divisive and/or secessionist rhetoric which further contributes to increasing the vulnerability of the country and emphasises that candidate country status is an opportunity and an obligation for BiH elected representatives to fulfil citizens’ expectations and concretely improve the daily life of ordinary people; calls for the further strengthening of EUFOR Althea, particularly through the deployment of further troops and assets, as well as through the creation of a credible presence in the Brčko District;

Added:66. Welcomes the high levels of alignment with the CFSP achieved by most of the countries of the Western Balkans, with the relevant exception of Serbia; calls for the meaningful participation of the Western Balkans in the EU initiatives for cooperative development and procurement of defence capabilities; calls for the conclusion of administrative arrangements between the EDA and the Western Balkan countries that have not yet reached this milestone; welcomes the continued presence of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo and calls on the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) to strengthen its cooperation with KFOR to prevent organised criminal gangs, paramilitary groups and other disruptive forces from destabilising Kosovo;

Added:67. Recognises Israel’s right to self-defence, as enshrined in and constrained by international law, and emphasises that the actions of Israel must therefore strictly comply with international humanitarian law; reiterates the EU’s strong support for the International Criminal Court’s work; underlines the importance of differentiating between the Palestinian people and their legitimate aspirations on the one hand, and the Hamas terrorist organisation and its acts of terror on the other hand; calls for opening channels for providing humanitarian aid to civilians in the Gaza Strip and for these to be kept permanently open; reiterates its unwavering support for a negotiated two-state solution on the basis of the 1967 lines with two sovereign, democratic states living side by side in peace and guaranteed security, with Jerusalem as the capital of both states, and in full respect of international law; calls for a thorough investigation into the role of Iran, Qatar and Russia in financing and supporting terrorism in the region; strongly disagrees and expresses its disappointment about recent statements made by the President of Türkiye in which he wrongfully claimed that Hamas was not a terrorist organisation;

Added:68. Supports the ongoing work by the EU Police and Rule of Law Mission for the occupied Palestinian territory (EUPOL COPPS) and the EU Border Assistance Mission in Rafah in assisting with the Palestinian Authorities’ security and justice sector reform and integrated border management; expresses its appreciation for the missions’ officials and staff who continue working under extremely difficult conditions; calls on the EEAS and the Member States to review the two missions’ mandates and strengthen their future role, in view of the current situation and their unique position where they maintain dialogue with both the State of Israel and the Palestinian Authority, in an effort to enhance the EU’s peace efforts;

Added:69. Welcomes the joint communication on the EU cyber defence policy and calls on the Member States to stay committed to and implement the ambitious but realistic set of actions proposed by the Commission, including the proposal for a cyber solidarity act to enhance their ability to detect and respond to cybersecurity threats and incidents in the EU, but also to enhance information-sharing and to support the production of high-quality intelligence along with dedicated platforms, resources and funding; notes that the mutual cooperation between the EU Member States, as well as with our allies and partners around the world, is essential for our cybersecurity; urges caution when sharing data, which should only be available to partners with the same values, while management and infrastructure should be entrusted to trusted companies and service providers; notes, in this regard, that the use of Huawei technology in the development of 5G seriously undermines the EU’s cyber resilience;

Added:70. Calls for strengthening the resilience and capabilities of the EU institutions in combating cyberattacks, which is an important security issue, particularly ahead of the EU elections;

Added:71. Demands that the Union take effective measures to protect European critical infrastructure, valuable supply chains and democratic institutions from hybrid threats; calls for the EU to put in place effective monitoring and surveillance systems for critical infrastructure such as pipelines and fibre optics cables to ensure the prevention and rapid detection of attacks;

Added:72. Welcomes the findings and high level of ambition in the recommendations proposed in the new EU space strategy in the area of security and defence; considers safe, secure and autonomous access to space to be a critical aspect of the EU’s security and defence, as demonstrated by its importance in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; welcomes, in that regard, the proposal set out in the strategy to draw up a classified annual space threat analysis document;

Added:73. Recalls the need for enhanced intelligence sharing and information exchange among Member States and EU institutions, including Parliament, to improve situational awareness, better anticipate, counter collective security threats and better inform policy making; stresses the need to improve the security protocols of the services working on intelligence and/or with sensitive information in the EU; calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to reinforce the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC) and the European Union Satellite Centre (SatCen); reiterates the call for the deployment of intelligence capacities in all CSDP missions and operations, which would provide information provided to the EU Intelligence and Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN), EUMS and the CPCC; underlines the importance of secure communications for reliable intelligence and welcomes efforts to streamline security rules and regulations in this respect to better protect information, infrastructure and communication systems from foreign interference and attacks; calls on the Member States to reinforce the EU INTCEN as an effective intelligence-sharing body in order to share intelligence safely, formulate a common strategic culture and provide strategic information to better anticipate and respond to crises within and outside the EU;

The Strategic Compass: ‘PARTNER’

Change 12

Removed:25. Emphasises that the EU must further develop its own capabilities in all domains to protect the sovereignty of all Member States while enhancing its security cooperation with partners across the globe;

Added:74. Expresses its grave concern about the difficult and serious situation in the Sahel, following numerous coups, such as in Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, but also in Sudan; deplores the military coup of 26 July 2023 in Niger and calls for the immediate and unconditional release of President Mohamed Bazoum, his family and all those arbitrarily detained, and for the charges against him to be dropped; demands the immediate reinstatement of democratically elected President Bazoum and the restoration of constitutional order;

Removed:26. Underlines the importance of the partnership dimension of the Strategic Compass in reinforcing cooperation between the EU and its allies and partners around the world in order to counter foreign strategies aimed at undermining the EU and destabilising the rules-based international order; welcomes the long-awaited third Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation which confirmed that the EU and NATO are essential partners who share common values and strategic interests, and who work in complementarity to ensure Euro-Atlantic and global security and stability; calls in particular for synergies and coherence between NATO’s Strategic Concept and the EU’s Strategic Compass, particularly in the areas of countering Russian aggression, hybrid and cyber warfare, and providing support to partners;

Added:75. Recalls that stability in the Sahel has direct repercussions for security and stability in Europe; underlines that the EU and its Member States need to re-evaluate their policy towards the strategic region of the Sahel and learn from past mistakes, especially with regard to Russia, but also with regard to the necessity to include holistic approaches to the way in which these policies address long-term social, economic and development variables; considers it necessary, against this backdrop, to provide adequate resources to African partners; calls on the EEAS and the Member States to ensure that their security policies take into account regional and local aspects, including through dialogue with the local population, civil society and democratically elected authorities and regional organisations where possible, adhering to the principle of ‘African solutions to African problems’; acknowledges that the various international missions have not yet achieved their primary goal of lasting peace in the region; welcomes the VP/HR’s announcement about revising the EU’s strategy towards the Sahel; calls for this revision to take place as swiftly as possible and to further strengthen the status of CSDP missions in the region;

Removed:27. Underlines the importance of developing security and defence dialogues with partners around the world, in particular in the Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership but also with key partners in strategic maritime areas such as those stretching from the Red Sea and Horn of Africa to the Indo-Pacific;

Added:76. Strongly supports the decisions made by ECOWAS and the AU in response to the coups and calls on the Member States and the EEAS to explore how to effectively assist them in their efforts where possible;

Added:77. Condemns the presence of PMCs and/or state sponsored proxies, such as the Wagner Group which has played a destabilising role in the Sahel region and has supported various repressive regimes in an attempt to increase Russian influence in Africa; considers that all coup d’états are the result of various, multi-dimensional causes which are not identical in each country and therefore require careful considerations; is nevertheless appalled by expressions of strong anti-European sentiments in certain countries and calls on the Member States and the EEAS to consider increasing people-to-people contact through closer exchanges with local populations and national authorities, more targeted strategic communication in local languages to counter-balance adverse effects and honestly addressing their colonial past where necessary;

Added:78. Encourages the EEAS to continue the progress already made by the European Union Military Training Mission in Mozambique (EUTM Mozambique) in the response to the growing terrorist threat in Cabo Delgado and in the training of Mozambican forces on the ground; is still concerned about the risk of this threat spreading in the area; calls for immediate action to speed up the delivery of non-lethal equipment;

Added:79. Underlines that of the EU’s five training missions (EUTM) and military partnership missions (EUMPM) in Africa, three of them (Central African Republic, Mali, Niger) are now proceeding at a much slower pace or have been officially suspended; also points out that some civilian missions providing assistance to domestic security forces are at a standstill (EUCAP Sahel Mali) or functioning poorly (EUAM RCA); underlines the urgent need for deployed personnel to have access to tools, training, equipment and resources enabling them to provide information and intelligence to the EU and its Member States; considers that the concept of support remains essential in training missions in order to allow European advisers to verify as accurately as possible, on the ground, whether training programmes have been properly conducted and whether they are in line with the operational needs of local armed forces;

Added:80. Calls, further, on the EEAS and the Member States to examine closely the mandate of all CSDP missions in Africa, including their potential termination if necessary, with the aim of providing achievable goals and milestones for each mission given the current political context, as well as exploring whether these missions could be amended in order to more effectively serve a new multi-dimensional and tailored EU strategy in the Sahel and Africa, as part of its integrated approach;

Added:81. Deplores the continued lack of support from a large number of African countries for a UN general assembly resolution condemning Russia, supporting Ukraine’s territorial integrity and calling for peace;

Added:82. Welcomes the update of the EU Maritime Strategy and Action Plan and the commitment to strengthen the Union’s role as a provider of international maritime security; welcomes the fact that the review includes the reinforcement of current naval operations; is pleased that the update proposes to explore new areas of interest at sea in which to implement the CMP concept based on the experience gained in the Gulf of Guinea and the North-West Indian Ocean; calls on the Member States to engage actively with those initiatives and to build up their military naval capabilities with a view to enhancing the EU’s presence and visibility in the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Atlantic, the Indo-Pacific and the global maritime sector;

Added:83. Highlights the need to ensure the security of the Black Sea region by assisting in demining Ukraine’s seawaters and to encourage Member States to offer training exercises in this regard with an emphasis on the development of maritime mine counter measure capabilities and critical seabed infrastructure protection;

Added:84. Stresses that, given the growing geopolitical maritime tensions, the EU must ensure freedom of navigation, the safety of maritime lines of communication and of its vessels and crews, offshore infrastructure and action to counter illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and ensure that its external maritime borders are monitored effectively in order to prevent illegal activities; stresses the need to step up cooperation between the EU and NATO on maritime security in order to cover all issues of mutual interest in this field;

Added:85. Stresses that, given the growing geopolitical tensions at sea, the EU must ensure that its external maritime borders are monitored effectively to prevent illegal activities; regrets that despite the restrictive measures framework established by the EU on 11 November 2019 in response to Türkiye’s illegal drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean, these have continued;

Added:86. Welcomes Türkiye’s vote in favour of condemning the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine in the UN General Assembly and its commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, but deplores, at the same time, the fact that circumvention of EU sanctions by Türkiye undermines their effectiveness and calls on the Commission to examine this; reiterates its call on Türkiye to align with the EU sanctions against Russia;

Added:87. Regrets, while recognising that Türkiye is a country of strategic relevance, Türkiye’s positions and policies in certain areas of concern for the EU and in its neighbourhoods, which threaten regional peace, security and stability; strongly condemns Türkiye’s illegal activities in Cyprus, such as the continued violation of UN Security Council resolutions 550(1984) and 789(1992), which call on Türkiye to transfer the area of Varosha to its lawful inhabitants under the temporary administration of the UN, and the recent assaults against UN peacekeepers within the buffer zone near the bi-communal village of Pyla/Pile; denounces Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s call for the international community to recognise the secessionist entity in occupied Cyprus, thus abandoning relevant UN Security Council resolutions calling for a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation with a single international legal personality, single sovereignty, single citizenship and political equality which is also in accordance with the EU acquis;

Added:88. Deplores the fact that despite de-escalation efforts, Türkiye continues its unilateral provocative actions and non-compliance with the UN Security Council resolution on the arms embargo on Libya with regard to operation IRINI, violating international law, including UNCLOS and the sovereign rights of EU Member States, in particular Greece and Cyprus, in the Eastern Mediterranean; notes that Türkiye is increasingly present in areas where the EU has key security interests and CSDP missions, and calls upon Türkiye to refrain from undermining EU interests and missions in these areas; reiterates its condemnation of the signature of the memoranda of understanding between Türkiye and Libya on comprehensive security and military cooperation and on the delimitation of maritime zones, which are interconnected and are clear violations of international law, the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and the sovereign rights of EU Member States;

Added:89. Stresses the urgent need to significantly increase investment in regional and global arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament, particularly in multilateral approaches; stresses the need for greater transparency and convergence at national and European level on arms exports; calls on the Member States to fully comply with Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment as amended by Council Decision (CFSP)2019/1560; acknowledges the Member States’ competences in their defence procurement policies;

Added:90. Reaffirms its full support for the EU and its Member States’ commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime; insists on the need to ensure that the EU plays a strong and constructive role in developing and reinforcing global rules-based non-proliferation efforts and arms control and disarmament architecture;

Added:91. Emphasises that the EU must further develop its own capabilities in all domains to protect the sovereignty of all Member States, but also pave the way for burden shifting in the long run with the EU taking more responsibility for its defence while enhancing its security cooperation with NATO and like-minded partners across the globe; welcomes the establishment of the Schuman Forum for Security and Defence as a platform of exchange among partners based on equality and mutual appreciation;

Added:92. Underlines, in the strongest terms, the importance of the EU-US alliance, which is based on the shared values of democracy, freedom and the rule of law; values the United States’ strong commitment and engagement to the territorial defence of Europe, especially in the light of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine that threatens the whole continent; strongly welcomes the intensified partnership with the United States, especially the signing of an administrative arrangement between the EDA and the Department of Defense of the United States (DoD) in April 2023, the EU-US dialogues on security and defence, as well as on China; calls for the EU to continue its active cooperation with the US in the framework of the EU-US strategic dialogue on security and defence, such as on mutual security and defence initiatives, disarmament and non-proliferation, the impact of disruptive technologies, climate change, hybrid threats, cyber defence, military mobility, crisis management and relationships with strategic competitors;

Added:93. Notes the importance of greater collaboration in defence product production and procurement, including through equal market access for the defence industries; welcomes, in this regard, efforts made by the EU to improve its own defence capabilities and take greater responsibility for its own defence;

Added:94. Reiterates its calls for institutionalised security and defence cooperation with the United Kingdom, including through closer collaboration on information sharing, military mobility, mutual security and defence initiatives, crisis management, cybersecurity, hybrid threats, FIMI and our relationship with common strategic competitors; encourages the United Kingdom to seriously engage with the EU on pressing strategic challenges; encourages the VP/HR to invite the United Kingdom to informal Council meetings of foreign affairs (and defence) ministers to exchange views on issues of common concern, while fully protecting the EU’s decision-making autonomy;

Added:95. Underlines the importance of the partnership dimension of the Strategic Compass in reinforcing cooperation between the EU and its like-minded allies and partners around the world in order to counter foreign strategies aimed at undermining the EU and destabilising the rules-based international order; welcomes the long-awaited third joint declaration on EU-NATO cooperation which confirms that the EU and NATO are essential partners that share common values and strategic interests and that work in complementarity to ensure that NATO allies benefit from a strong European pillar within NATO; calls, in particular, for synergies and coherence between NATO’s Strategic Concept and the EU’s Strategic Compass, particularly in the areas of countering Russian aggression, military mobility, hybrid and cyber warfare, including FIMI campaigns, global maritime security, the fight against traditional threats, such as terrorism, and providing support to partners;

Added:96. Welcomes the accession of Finland to NATO; strongly deplores the delaying of the ratification of Sweden’s NATO accession; denounces, in this context, further, attempts to undermine democratic freedoms in EU Member States through the instrumentalisation of granting consent to Sweden’s accession to NATO; takes note that Türkiye finally agreed on 10 July 2023 to forward the NATO Accession Protocol of Sweden to its Grand National Assembly and to work closely with the Assembly to ensure ratification; regrets, however, that this process is still pending and that there is no clear timeline, as is the case in Hungary; urges Hungary and Türkiye to ratify Sweden’s NATO membership without any further delay; urges the Turkish authorities to deliver on their promise of a more constructive partnership in NATO, including in the Eastern Mediterranean:

Added:97. Welcomes the joint communication on an action plan on military mobility 2.0 as a key contribution to strengthening European security, as recognised in the Strategic Compass; highlights the accelerated adoption of dual-use transport infrastructure projects following Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; recalls the importance of ensuring the sufficient availability of financial resources to continue the project pipeline in the coming years;

Added:98. Underlines the importance of developing security and defence dialogues with partners around the world, in particular in the Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership, but also with key partners in strategic maritime areas such as those stretching from the Southern Neighbourhood and the Indo-Pacific, from the east coast of Africa to the South Pacific and the Far East; calls for deepening military-security cooperation with countries in the immediate European neighbourhood by strengthening the security dimension and enhancing security and defence policy dialogues; reiterates the call for deeper cooperation with international organisations, such as, but not limited to, the UN, the AU and its peacekeeping missions in joint theatres, and the OSCE on security;

Added:99. Recognises that the Arctic region carries significant strategic and geopolitical importance due to its emerging maritime routes, rich natural resources and opportunities for economic development unlocked by global warming, while being increasingly contested; considers alarming the growing activities and interest by authoritarian regimes, including Russia and China, in the Arctic; underlines the importance of preserving security, stability and cooperation in the Arctic; stresses that the region must remain free from military tensions and natural resource exploitation, while respecting the rights of indigenous peoples; reiterates the need to include the Union’s Arctic policy in the CSDP and engage in effective cooperation with NATO; calls for the Arctic to be addressed regularly within the Political and Security Committee and Council meetings;

Added:100. Strongly condemns the numerous missile tests conducted by North Korea in 2023; underlines the particular responsibility of China and Russia when it comes to North Korea and calls on them to use their influence to prevent any further escalation; expresses its profound concern about the recent meeting between the North Korean and Russian leaders; expresses grave concern about likely deliveries of North Korean arms and missiles to Russia and raises considerable concerns that, through its likely enhanced military cooperation, Russia is violating UN sanctions and resolutions on North Korea; strongly condemns Iran for supplying Russia with drones and missiles to use in its war of aggression against Ukraine, and underlines that further international efforts, in close cooperation with our partners, are needed regarding Iran;

The role of the European Parliament

101. Calls for the reinforcement of parliamentary democracy and improved scrutiny of non-EU partner countries through parliamentary dialogues on security and defence issues and by building parliamentary resilience against hybrid threats, including cyber and FIMI;

Change 13

Changed:29.102. Notes that the recent increase in spending on defence policies and programmes at an EU level and among the Member States requiresis of particular importance for European defence and security, reflects the necessities of the current security context and indicates the evolution of defence as a genuine EU policy field requiring full parliamentary scrutiny and accountability;accountability underlinesto ensure that these programmes and policies contribute in the existingmost callseffective way to the achievement of EU strategic objectives and to the protection of European security and defence interests; reiterates, in this respect, its demand for delegated acts for work programmes of EU-budget funded defence industrial programmes; strongly reiterates its call for the establishment of a fully-fledged European Parliament Committee on Security and Defence,Defence inwith recognitionfull oflegislative and budgetary responsibilities on European defence matters, including measures for strengthening the EDTIB, provided that this committee takes a lead on the emerging defence acquis in the framework of the EU with scrutiny, legislation and budgetary responsibilities;

Change 14

Added:103. Stresses, in reference to the successful cooperation between SEDE and the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy in the process of establishing the EDIRPA regulation, that until a fully-fledged committee is established, the subcommittee should be included in all legislative procedures with relevant implications for European defence;

Added:104. Calls on the EEAS to regularly and comprehensively report on the implementation of the Strategic Compass to SEDE;

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Change 15

Changed:30.105. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President of the Commission and competent Commissioners, the UN Secretary-General, the NATO Secretary-General, the President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the EU security and defence agencies and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.