Changes between two versions
What changed between the draft committee report and the plenary report
From · draft committee report· 6 Jun 2025
on the institutional consequences of the EU enlargement negotiations
To · plenary report· 2 Oct 2025
on the institutional consequences of the EU enlargement negotiations
AI:What changed, in short
The report shifts emphasis from general geopolitical benefits to merit-based accession and economic convergence, adding detailed recitals on GDP growth and convergence.2 It drops calls for intergovernmental cooperation outside the Treaties and instead stresses Treaty-based reforms, including QMV and Article 7 changes.361218 It adds new paragraphs on MFF governance, own resources, and the role of accession countries' parliaments, while removing some previous calls.1416 It rephrases several paragraphs on institutional composition and decision-making, adding references to recent resolutions and Treaty articles.891011 The other changes are formal or wording: minor rephrasing and updates to align with new positions.1457
11 changes of substance · 0 formal · 11 of wording only
Written by AI from the two texts only · read the changes before relying on it · 4 Sept 2026 · Report a problem
+46 added · −23 removed · 12 changed paragraphs, packaging included.
Part 2 of 3: Paragraphs 61–101
The efficiency challenge
Change 8
Changed:14.8. Underlines that, in order to improve the enlarged EU’s efficiency, the composition of the EU institutions mustshould be changedadapted, made more efficient and their functioning enhanced; suggests that the enlargement process should be supported by the early and close involvement of candidate countries in the functioning of the EU institutions, e.g. through observer status; notes that this could be successfully achieved in a similar manner as at the time of the 2004 enlargement; notes, as a positive example of such gradual integration, the Commission’s efforts to involve candidate countries in the areas of security and defence, in particular through their being referred to in the white paper on the future of EU defence and in the internal security strategy;
Change 9
Changed:15.9. Notes that institutional pre-enlargement reforms must address the implications of enlargement for the composition of Parliament; underlines that, while ensuring appropriate democratic representativeness, Parliament should remain a workable size; highlights the need to prioritise internal and interinstitutional work on the identification of a permanent seat allocation mechanism, capable of ensuring fair, transparent and durable demographic and geographical representation; recalls itsrepresentation positionrespecting thatthe Parliament’sprinciple compositionof shoulddegressive beproportionality; therecalls exclusiveits prerogativeposition ofthat ParliamentParliament’s andcomposition should be reconsideredconsidered together with the voting system in the Council;
Change 10
Changed:16.10. Notes that the current composition of the Commission must take enlargement into account; recalls, in this regard, the flexibility provided for in the Treaty of Lisbon; highlights that the inevitableany reduction in the size of the College of CommissionersCommissioners, mustas ensureprescribed ain geographicallyArticle and17(5) demographicallyTEU, balancedmust compositioncontinue ofto theensure Commissiona asgeographically, establisheddemographically byand gender-balanced composition of the Treaties;Commission;
Change 11
Changed:17.11. StressesRecognises the need for areflection swifton the revision of the Council’s functioning and decision-making process in view of enlargement; proposes a review of the system of rotating presidencies of the Council; notes that qualified majority must be redefined to improve the balance between larger and smaller statescountries and to retain higher thresholds for the most important and politically delicate decisions; recalls, in this regard, its resolution of 22 November 2023 on proposals of the European Parliament for the amendment of the Treaties, in particular on voting majorities in the Council; calls for the utmost transparency and integrity of the Council’s decision-making process in the context of enlargement;
Change 12
Removed:18. Is of the opinion that this can be achieved by simplified and more effective decision-making procedures, moving away from unanimity; reiterates that QMV should be implemented in areas such as the protection of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the multiannual financial framework (MFF), sanctions and other relevant foreign policy decisions, such the opening and closing of individual negotiation clusters and the sanctioning of backtracking during enlargement negotiations, but with the exception, for instance, of decisions authorising military missions or operations with an executive mandate, and the decisions to launch and to close the enlargement negotiations;
Added:12. Proposes strengthening and reforming the procedure in Article 7 TEU by ending unanimity in European Council decisions, by introducing a clear time frame and by making the Court of Justice of the European Union the arbiter of violations;
Removed:19. Proposes that the procedure in Article 7 TEU be reformed by ending unanimity in European Council decisions, by introducing a clear time frame and by making the Court of Justice of the European Union the arbiter of violations;
The power and resources challenge
Change 13
Changed:20.13. Reiterates its call to revise the governance of the MFF, namely by attributing full co-legislative powers over both the expenditure and revenue sidesside of the EU budget, including the adoption of the MFF and the system of own resources;MFF;
Change 14
Removed:21. Urges the Commission and the Member States to abandon the self-imposed and outdated principle according to which the size of the EU’s long-term budget must not exceed 1 % of aggregated gross national income in its 2028-2034 MFF proposal;
Added:14. Is convinced that the current mandatory revision clause in the event of enlargement should be maintained in the next MFF and that national envelopes should not be affected; underlines that the next MFF will also have to put in place appropriate transitional and phasing-in measures for key spending areas, such as cohesion and agriculture, based on a careful assessment of the impacts on various sectors;
Removed:22. Stresses that the MFF should be adequately financed to deliver on the basic principles and strategic objectives that the EU is based on, including completing the upcoming rounds of enlargement and meeting the EU’s competitiveness objectives; calls on the Commission to propose a roadmap for the introduction of new own resources in the context of the 2028-2034 MFF, while ensuring sound financial management;
Added:15. Considers that the next MFF will be crucial for preparing the EU for enlargement and the candidate countries for accession;
Added:16. Recalls the Parliament position expressed in its resolution of 7 May 2025 on a revamped long-term budget for the Union in a changing world that the EU’s long-term budget must move away from the historically restrictive, self-imposed level of 1 % of aggregated gross national income; stresses that the Draghi and Letta reports have shown that significant additional own resources are required for the EU to become more competitive, complete the just and green transition and be in a position to defend itself autonomously from Russian aggression by 2030;
Added:17. Stresses that the post 2027 MFF and a more effective budget, including the new own resources package, should enable the EU to move decisively towards enlarging while safeguarding current policies, programmes and priorities;
The democracy challenge
Change 15
Changed:23.18. Stresses the importance of bolstering the democratic legitimacy of EU policies by reinforcing the decision-making and scrutiny rightsrights, including a strong right of inquiry, of the European Parliament, which is the only directly elected institution representing EU citizens;
Change 16
Removed:24. Stresses that reforming the EU decision-making processes requires the empowerment of Parliament by placing it on an equal footing with the Council; reiterates its call for Parliament to gain the full right of legislative initiative – the power to introduce, amend or repeal Union law;
Added:19. Underlines the key role that EU accession countries’ parliaments play in the EU accession process, in particular by passing accession-related legislation, and emphasises the importance of parliamentary cooperation and consensus-building on EU accession matters in this regard; reiterates the European Parliament’s readiness to use its political and technical resources to help parliaments in accession countries make progress on the EU-related reform agenda, including through democracy support activities; welcomes the progress made in a number of candidate countries, including through mediation activities and the Jean Monnet Dialogue process;
Removed:25. Considers it essential to improve the transparency and democratic accountability of Parliament, by strengthening the European dimension of the elections and by laying down uniform electoral rules across the EU; calls on the Council to work on the suggestions put forward in Parliament’s position of 3 May 2022; reiterates its call for Parliament and the Council to make progress in discussions on the introduction of a permanent mechanism for the allocation of seats of the European Parliament;
Added:20. Stresses that reforming the EU decision-making processes requires the empowerment of Parliament by placing it on an equal footing with the Council; reiterates its call for Parliament to gain the full right of legislative initiative – the power to introduce, amend or repeal Union law; is convinced that a general and direct right of initiative would further strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the EU and empower EU citizens;
Removed:26. Reiterates its call for the strengthening of the instruments for citizens’ participation in EU decision-making processes;
Added:21. Recognises that Parliament’s direct rights of initiative are far from sufficient to allow it to represent EU citizens, civil society and social partners within the European institutions, effectively leaving the Commission with a monopoly on legislative initiative;
Added:22. Underlines that the Treaty of Lisbon already bestows direct rights of initiative on Parliament, acknowledging its competence to self-organise, its scrutiny function and its democratic legitimacy as the only directly elected EU institution;
Added:23. Considers it essential to improve the transparency and democratic accountability of Parliament, by strengthening the European dimension of the elections and by laying down uniform electoral rules across the EU; calls on the remaining Member State to ratify Council Decision 2018/994; calls on the Council to work on the suggestions put forward in Parliament’s position of 3 May 2022; reiterates its call for Parliament and the Council to make progress in discussions on the introduction of a permanent mechanism for the allocation of seats of the European Parliament;
Means of implementing institutional pre-enlargement reforms
Change 17
Changed:27.24. Considers that the above objectives of the institutional pre-enlargement reforms can be implemented by differentvarious means, including by activating the flexibilities offered by the current Treaties,Treaties through one or more targeted Treaty amendments or through accession Treaties and intergovernmental cooperation outside of the Treaty framework;amendments;
25. Recalls that a number of flexibility instruments, such as passerelle clauses, enhanced cooperation, constructive abstentions, PESCO and opt-out mechanisms, are already possible under the current EU legal framework, as evidenced by the experiences of the Schengen area, one of the greatest achievements of the EU, and the single currency; recalls that phasing-in solutions, temporary derogations and transition periods can be negotiated for certain policy fields in the context of accession procedures;
Change 18
Removed:29. Argues that enhanced cooperation is part of the solution for an efficient and deepened enlarged EU; notes that Member States willing to move forward with European integration in a wider array of policy areas should be allowed to do so; underlines that under such a system of differentiated integration, while all Member States would take part in decisions about issues in the area of common ground, only Member States willing to participate in areas of deepened integration would take part in the decisions concerned; notes that differentiated integration also implies differentiated financial arrangements;
Added:26. Reiterates its position that differentiated integration should always take place within the Treaty framework, should maintain the unity of the EU institutions and should not lead to the creation of parallel institutional arrangements or arrangements that indirectly contravene the spirit and the fundamental principles of EU law, but should instead enable specific bodies to be established where appropriate, without prejudice to the competences and role of the EU institutions;
Removed:30. Highlights that flexibilities provided by the current Treaties are essential for the creation of a defence union;
Added:27. Highlights that flexibilities provided for by the current Treaties allow for more to be done to advance towards a European defence union, without requiring a comprehensive Treaty reform process; underlines that the establishment of a permanent European defence union will ultimately require a unanimous decision in line with Article 42(2);
Change 19
Changed:31.28. Stresses that, in the field of defence, PESCO (ex Article 46 TEU) allowsenables a group of Member States to move forward towards the creation of thea European defence system; notes that, despite the fact that PESCO has mainly been used for industrial defence projects, it has the broader potential to allowenable willing Member States to institutionalise common defence without delay, even in the absence of unanimity within the European Council;
29. Underscores that, pursuant to existing Treaty provisions, a decision taken by qualified majority would allow the creation of a European defence system under Article 42(6) TEU and Article 1(b) of Protocol 10, while leaving the door open for other Member States to join at a later stage, as was the case with the economic and monetary union; calls, in this respect, on the Commission and on willing Member States to activate PESCO provisions to this end without delay;
Change 20
Changed:33.30. Insists, that, in order to effectively reform the EUEU’s institutional framework in view of European unification, some targeted key Treaty changes are indispensable; recallsrecalls, in this respectrespect, its suggestions from its resolution of 22 November 2023 on proposals of the European Parliament for the amendment of the Treaties, in particular with regard to the reform of decision-making in the EU, increasing the use of QMV and the ordinary legislative procedure, changes in the composition of the Commission, and further empowering the European Parliament; reminds the European Council of its Treaty obligation to follow-up on Parliament’s activation of the ordinary Treaty reform procedure under Article 48 TEU;
Change 21
Removed:34. Calls on the Member States to consider intergovernmental cooperation outside the framework of the Treaties through an additional Treaty among willing Member States, without prejudice to existing treaty law, and paving the way for differentiated integration within the EU as a last resort only; notes that differentiated integration of this kind, based on recent experiences, should subsequently be rapidly enshrined in the EU Treaties;
Added:31. Calls on the Commission and the Council to clearly communicate the findings of the policy reviews and to develop, in cooperation with Parliament, a realistic, sequenced roadmap for implementing the necessary institutional reforms in conjunction with the enlargement process;
Added:°
Added:° °
32. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.