What changed between the plenary report and the adopted text

Removed:(18) The specialised lending business is conducted with special purpose vehicles that typically serve as borrowing entities, for which the return on investment is the primary source of repayment of the financing obtained. The contractual arrangements of the specialised lending model provide the lender with a substantial degree of control over the assets and the primary source of repayment of the obligation is the income generated by the assets being financed. To reflect the associated risk more accurately, those contractual arrangements should therefore be subject to specific capital requirements for credit risk. In line with the internationally agreed Basel III standards on assigning risk weights to specialised lending exposures, a dedicated specialised exposures class should be introduced under the SA-CR, thereby improving consistency with the already existing specific treatment of specialised lending under the IRB approaches. A specific treatment for specialised lending exposures should be introduced, whereby a distinction should be made between ‘project finance’, ‘object finance’ and ‘commodities finance’ to better reflect the inherent risks of those sub-classes of the specialised exposures class. Like for exposures to corporates, two approaches to assign risk weights should be implemented, one for jurisdictions allowing the use of external ratings for regulatory purposes and one for jurisdictions that do not allow it.

Removed:(19) While the new standardised treatment for unrated specialised lending exposures laid down in Basel III standards is more granular than the current standardised treatment of exposures to corporates under this Regulation, the former is not sufficiently risk-sensitive to reflect the effects of comprehensive security packages and pledges usually associated with these exposures in the Union, which enable lenders to control the future cash flows to be generated over the life of the project or asset. Due to the lack of external rating coverage of specialised lending exposures in the Union, the treatment for unrated specialised lending exposures laid down in Basel III standards may also create incentives for institutions to stop financing certain projects or take on higher risks in otherwise similarly treated exposures which have different risk profiles. Whereas the specialised lending exposures are mostly financed by institutions using the IRB approach that have in place internal models for these exposures, the impact may be particularly significant in the case of ‘object finance’ exposures, which could be at risk for discontinuation of the activities, in the particular context of the application of the output floor. To avoid unintended consequences of the lack of risk-sensitivity of the Basel treatment for unrated object finance exposures, object finance exposures that comply with a set of criteria capable to lower their risk profile to ‘high quality’ standards compatible with prudent and conservative management of financial risks, should benefit from a reduced risk weight. EBA shall be entrusted to develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the conditions for institutions to assign an object finance specialised lending exposure to the ‘high quality’ category with a risk weight similar to ‘high quality’ project finance exposures under the SA-CR. Institutions established in jurisdictions that allow the use of external ratings should assign to their specialised lending exposures the risk weights determined only by the issue-specific external ratings, as provided by the Basel III framework.

Removed:(20) The classification of retail exposures under the SA-CR and the IRB approaches should be further aligned to ensure a consistent application of the correspondent risk weights to the same set of exposures. In line with the Basel III standards, rules should be laid down for a differentiated treatment of revolving retail exposures that meet a set of conditions of repayment or usage capable to lower their risk profile. Those exposures shall be defined as exposures to ‘transactors’. Exposures to one or more natural persons that do not meet all the conditions to be considered retail exposures should be risk weighted at 100% under the SA-CR.

Removed:(21) Basel III standards introduce a credit conversion factor of 10% for unconditionally cancellable commitments ('UCC') in the SA-CR. This is likely to result in a significant impact on obligors that rely on the flexible nature of the UCC to finance their activities when dealing with seasonal fluctuations in their businesses or when managing unexpected short-term changes in working capital needs, especially during the recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. It is thus appropriate to provide for a transitional period during which institutions will continue to apply a null credit conversion factor to their UCC, and, afterwards, to assess whether a potential gradual increase of the applicable credit conversion factors is warranted to allow institutions to adjust their operational practices and products without hampering credit availability to institutions’ obligors. That transitional arrangement should be coupled with a report prepared by EBA.

Removed:(22) The financial crisis of 2008-2009 has revealed that, in some cases, credit institutions have also used IRB approaches on portfolios unsuitable for modelling due to insufficient data, which had detrimental consequences for the robustness of the results and thus, for the financial stability. It is therefore appropriate not to oblige institutions to use the IRB approaches for all of their exposures and to apply the roll-out requirement at the level of exposure classes. It is also appropriate to restrict the use of IRB Approaches for exposure classes where robust modelling is more difficult to increase the comparability and robustness of capital requirements for credit risk under the IRB approaches.

Removed:(23) Institutions’ exposures to other institutions, other financial sector entities and large corporates typically exhibit low levels of default. For such low-default portfolios, it has been shown that it is difficult for institutions to obtain reliable estimates of a key risk parameter of the IRB approach, the loss given default (‘LGD’), due to an insufficient number of observed defaults in those portfolios. This difficulty has resulted in an undesirable level of dispersion across credit institutions in the level of estimated risk. Institutions should therefore use regulatory LGD values rather than internal LGD estimates for those low-default portfolios.

Removed:(24) Institutions that use internal models to estimate the own funds requirements for credit risk for equity exposures typically base their risk assessment on publically available data, to which all institutions can be assumed to have identical access. Under those circumstances, differences in own funds requirements cannot be justified. In addition, equity exposures held in the banking book form a very small component of institutions’ balance sheets. Therefore, to increase the comparability of institutions’ own funds requirements and to simplify the regulatory framework, institutions should calculate their own funds requirements for credit risk for equity exposures using the SA-CR, and the IRB approach should be disallowed for that purpose.

Removed:(25) It should be ensured that the estimates of the probability of default (‘PD’), the LGD and the credit conversion factors (‘CCF’) of individual exposures of institutions that are allowed to use internal models to calculate capital requirements for credit risk do not reach unsuitably low levels. It is therefore appropriate to introduce minimum values for own estimates and to oblige institutions to use the higher of their own estimates of risk parameters and those minimum values. Such risk parameters’ ‘input floors’ should constitute a safeguard to ensure that capital requirements do not fall below prudent levels. In addition, they should mitigate model risk due to such factors as incorrect model specification, measurement error and data limitations. They would also improve the comparability of capital ratios across institutions. In order to achieve those results, input floors should be calibrated in a sufficiently conservative manner.

Removed:(26) Risk parameter floors that are calibrated too conservatively may indeed discourage institutions from adopting the IRB approaches and the associated risk management standards. Institutions may also be incentivised to shift their portfolios to higher risk exposures to avoid the constraint imposed by the risk parameter floors. To avoid such unintended consequences, risk parameter floors should appropriately reflect certain risk characteristics of the underlying exposures, in particular by taking on different values for different types of exposure where appropriate.

Removed:(27) Specialised lending exposures have risk characteristics that differ from general corporate exposures. It is thus appropriate to provide for a transitional period during which the LGD input floor applicable to specialised lending exposures is reduced. The transition period should be extended only if necessary and justified and for four years at the most.

Removed:(28) In accordance with the Basel III standards, the IRB treatment for the sovereign exposure class should remain largely untouched, due to the special nature and risks related to the underlying obligors. In particular sovereign exposures should not be subject to the risk parameters input floors.

Removed:(29) To ensure a consistent approach for all RGLA-PSE exposures, a new RGLA-PSA exposure class should be created, independent from both sovereign and institutions exposure classes▌.

Removed:(30) It should be clarified how the effect of a guarantee could be recognised for a guaranteed exposure where the underlying exposure is treated under the IRB approach under which modelling for PD and LGD is allowed but where the guarantor belongs to a type of exposures for which modelling the LGD, or the IRB approach is not allowed. In particular, the use of the substitution approach, whereby the risk parameters of the underlying exposures are substituted with the ones of the guarantor, or of a method whereby the PD or LGD of the underlying obligor are adjusted using a specific modelling approach to take into account the effect of the guarantee, should not lead to an adjusted risk weight that is lower than the risk weight applicable to a direct comparable exposure to the guarantor. Consequently, where the guarantor is treated under the SA-CR, recognition of the guarantee under the IRB approach should lead to assigning the SA-CR risk weight of the guarantor to the guaranteed exposure.

Removed:(30a) In the context of removing unwarranted variability in capital requirements, existing discounting rules applied to artificial cash flows should be clarified in order to remove any unintended consequences. A mandate should be given to EBA to update its guidelines by 31 December 2025.

Removed:(30b) The introduction of the output floor could have a significant impact on own funds requirements for securitisation positions held by institutions using the Securitisation Internal Ratings Based Approach(SEC-IRBA). Although such positions are generally small relative to other exposures, the introduction of the output floor could affect the economic viability of the securitisation operation because of an insufficient prudential benefit of the transfer of risk. This would come at a juncture where the development of the securitisation market is part of the action plan on capital markets union and also where originating banks might need to use securitisation more extensively in order to manage more actively their portfolios if they become bound by the output floor. A mandate should be given to EBA to report to the Commission on the need to eventually provide for a specific arrangement increasing the risk-sensitivity of the standardised approach of the purpose of the calculation of the output floor.

Removed:(31) Regulation (EU) 2019/876 of the European Parliament and of the Council amended Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 to implement the final FRTB standards only for reporting purposes. The introduction of binding capital requirements based on those standards was left to a separate ordinary legislative initiative, upon the assessment of their impacts for Union banks.

Removed:(32) In order to complete the reform agenda introduced after the financial crisis of 2008-2009 and to address the deficiencies in the current market risk framework, binding capital requirements for market risk based on the final FRTB standards should be implemented in Union law. Recent estimates of the impact of the final FRTB standards on Union banks have shown that the implementation of those standards in the Union will lead to a large increase in the own funds requirements for market risk for certain trading and market making activities which are important to the EU economy. To mitigate that impact and to preserve the good functioning of financial markets in the Union, targeted adjustments should be introduced to the transposition of the final FRTB standards in Union law.

Removed:(33) As requested under Regulation (EU) 2019/876, the Commission should take into account the principle of proportionality in the calculation of the capital requirements for market risk for institutions with medium-sized trading book businesses, and calibrate those requirements accordingly. Therefore, institutions with medium-sized trading books should be allowed to use a simplified standardised approach to calculate own funds requirements for market risk, in line with the internationally agreed standards. In addition, the eligibility criteria to identify institutions with medium-sized trading books should remain consistent with the criteria set out in Regulation (EU) 2019/876 for exempting such institutions from the FRTB reporting requirements set out in that Regulation. A derogation is included to allow the banks to classify several types of instruments usually held in the trading book (including listed equities) as banking book positions, subject to the approval of the competent authority and when that position is not held with trading intent or does not hedge positions held with trading intent.

Removed:(34) Institutions’ trading activities in wholesale markets can easily be carried out across borders, including between Member States and third countries. The implementation of the final FRTB standards should therefore converge as much as possible across jurisdictions, both in terms of substance and timing. If that would not be the case, it would be impossible to ensure an international level playing field for those activities. The Commission should therefore monitor the implementation of those standards in other BCBS member jurisdictions and, where necessary, should take steps to address potential distortions of those rules.

Removed:(35) The BCBS has revised the international standard on operational risk to address weaknesses that emerged in the wake of the 2008-2009 financial crisis. Besides a lack of risk-sensitivity in the standardised approaches, a lack of comparability arising from a wide range of internal modelling practices under the Advanced Measurement Approach were identified. Therefore, and in order to simplify the operational risk framework, all existing approaches for estimating the operational risk capital requirements were replaced by a single non-model-based method. Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 should be aligned with the revised Basel standards to ensure a level playing field internationally for institutions established inside the Union but also operating outside the Union, and to ensure that the operational risk framework at Union level remains effective.

Removed:(36) The new standardised approach for operational risk introduced by the BCBS combines an indicator that relies on the size of the business of an institution with an indicator that takes into account the loss history of that institution. The revised Basel standards envisage a number of discretions on how the indicator that takes into account the loss history of an institution may be implemented. Jurisdictions may disregard historical losses for the calculation of operational risk capital for all relevant institutions, or may take historical loss data into account even for institutions below a certain business size. To ensure a level playing field within the Union and to simplify the calculation of operational risk capital, those discretions should be exercised in a harmonised manner for the minimum own funds requirements by disregarding historical operational loss data for all institutions.

Removed:(36a) When measuring capital requirements for operational risk, insurance policies should be allowed to be used as effective risk mitigation techniques. To that end, within 24 months after the entry into force of the Regulation EBA shall report to the Commission on a standardised formula, based on specific criteria, to be used for the calculation of operational risk capital requirements. The Commission should be empowered to submit a legislative proposal within the following 36 months, to the European Parliament and Council of the EU taking into account insurance policies for the calculation of capital requirements on operational risk. EBA should identify eligible insurance contracts.

Removed:(36b) The severe, double economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian-Ukrainian war might have far-reaching impacts on the European economy and disrupt businesses. Institutions will have a key role in contributing to the recovery by extending concessions towards worthy debtors facing or about to face difficulties in meeting their financial commitments. In that respect, EBA should adopt guidelines to specify what constitutes a material diminished financial obligation in the case of distressed restructuring, providing adequate flexibility to institutions. In particular, due consideration should be given to the kind of concession granted, the residual maturity of the exposure and the length of the postponement.

Removed:(37) Information on the amount and on the quality of performing, non-performing and forborne exposures, as well as an ageing analysis of accounting past due exposures should also be disclosed by small and non-complex institutions and by other non-listed credit institutions. This disclosure obligation does not create an additional burden on these credit institutions, as the disclosure of such limited set of information has already been implemented by EBA based on the 2017 Council Action Plan on Non-Performing Loans (NPLs), which invited EBA to enhance disclosure requirements on asset quality and non-performing loans for all credit institutions. This is also fully consistent with the Communication on tackling non-performing loans in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Removed:(38) It is necessary to reduce the compliance burden for disclosure purposes and to enhance the comparability of disclosures. EBA should therefore establish a centralised web-based platform that enables the disclosure of information and data submitted by institutions. That centralised web-platform should serve as a single access point on institutions’ disclosures, while ownership of the information and data and the responsibility for their accuracy should remain with the institutions that produce it. The centralisation of the publication of disclosed information should be fully consistent with the Capital Market Union Action Plan and represents further step towards the development of an EU-wide single access point for companies’ financial and sustainable investment-related information.

Removed:(39) To allow for a greater integration of supervisory reporting and disclosures, EBA should publish institutions’ disclosures in a centralised manner, while respecting the right of all institutions to publish data and information themselves. Such centralised disclosures should allow EBA to publish the disclosures of small and non-complex institutions, based on the information reported by those institutions to competent authorities and should thus significantly reduce the administrative burden to which those small and non-complex institutions are subject. At the same time, the centralisation of disclosures should have no cost impact for other institutions, and increase transparency and reduce the cost for market participants to access prudential information. Such increased transparency should facilitate comparability of data across institutions and promote market discipline.

Removed:(40) To ensure convergence across the Union and a uniform understanding of the environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors and risks, general definitions should be laid down. Assets or activities subject to impacts from environmental and/or social factors should be defined by reference to the ambition of the Union to become climate-neutral by 2050 as set out in the EU Climate Law, the EU Nature Restoration Law, and the relevant sustainability goals of the Union. The technical screening criteria for ‘do no significant harm’ adopted in accordance with Article 17 of Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of the European Parliament and of the Council, as well as specific Union legislation to avert climate change, environmental degradation and biodiversity loss should be used to identify assets or exposures for the purpose of assessing dedicated prudential treatments and risk differentials. The exposure to ESG risks is not necessarily proportional to an institution’s size and complexity. Level of exposures across the Union are also quite heterogeneous, with some countries showing potential mild transitional impacts and others showing potential high transitional impacts on exposures related to activities that have a significant negative impact on the environment. The transparency requirements that institutions are subject and the sustainability reporting requirements laid down in other pieces of existing legislation in the Union will provide more granular data in a few years. However, to properly assess the ESG risks that institutions may face, it is imperative that markets and supervisors obtain adequate data from all entities exposed to those risks, independently of their size, including on the pool of loans underlying covered bonds issued by institutions. In order to ensure that competent authorities have at their disposal data that are granular, comprehensive and comparable for an effective supervision, information on exposures to ESG risks should be included in the supervisory reporting of institutions. The scope and granularity of that information should be consistent with the principle of proportionality, having regard to the size and complexity of the institutions.

Removed:(40a) Level of exposures across the Union are also quite heterogeneous, with some countries showing potential mild transitional impacts and others showing potential high transitional impacts on exposures related to activities that have a significant negative impact on the environment. The transparency requirements that institutions are subject to and the sustainability reporting requirements laid down in other pieces of Union legislation will provide more granular data in a few years. However, to properly assess the ESG risks that institutions might face, it is essential that markets and supervisors obtain adequate data from all entities exposed to those risks, irrespective of their size. In order to ensure that competent authorities have at their disposal data that are granular, comprehensive and comparable for an effective supervision, information on exposures to ESG risks should be included in the supervisory reporting of institutions. The scope and granularity of that information should be consistent with the principle of proportionality, and should have regard to the size and complexity of the institutions.

Removed:(41) As the transition of the Union economy towards a sustainable economic model is gaining momentum, sustainability risks become more prominent and will potentially require further consideration. According to the International Energy Agency, to reach the carbon neutrality objective by 2050, no new fossil fuel exploration and expansion can take place. This means that fossil fuel exposures represent a higher risk both at micro level, as the value of such assets is set to decrease over time, and at macro level as financing fossil fuel activities jeopardises the objective of maintaining the global rise of temperature below 1,5°C and therefore threatens the financial stability. It is therefore necessary to bring forward by 2 years EBA’s mandate to assess and report on whether a dedicated prudential treatment of exposures related to assets or activities substantially associated with environmental or social objectives would be justified from a risk-based perspective. However, only after the completion of this accelerated report and the ongoing climate stress tests would it be justified to potentially propose a dedicated prudential treatment for these exposures.

Removed:(41a) To ensure that any adjustments for exposures for infrastructure do not undermine the climate ambitions of the Union, departure from the risk-based approach of the banking framework should only take place when such exposures have shown a positive impact on the climate ambitions as set out in Regulation (EU) 2020/852.

Removed:(42) It is essential for supervisors to have the necessary empowerments to assess and measure in a comprehensive manner the risks to which a banking group is exposed at a consolidated level and to have the flexibility to adapt their supervisory approach to new sources of risks. It is important to avoid loopholes between prudential and accounting consolidation which may give rise to transactions aimed at moving assets out of the scope of prudential consolidation, even though risks remain in the banking group. The lack of coherence in the definition of “parent undertaking”, “subsidiary” and “control” concepts, and the lack of clarity in the definition of “ancillary services undertaking”, “financial holding company” and “financial institution” make it more difficult for supervisors to apply the applicable rules consistently in the Union and to detect and appropriately address risks at a consolidated level. Those definitions should therefore be amended and further clarified. In addition, it is deemed appropriate for EBA to investigate further whether these empowerments of the supervisors might be unintendedly constrained by any remaining discrepancies or loopholes in the regulatory provisions or in their interaction with the applicable accounting framework.

Removed:(42a) The rapid increase in the financial markets’ activity on crypto-assets and the potentially increasing involvement of institutions in crypto-assets related activities should be thoroughly reflected in the Union prudential framework, in order to adequately mitigate the risks of these instruments for the institutions’ financial stability. This is even more urgent in light of the recent adverse developments in the crypto-assets markets. The existing prudential rules are not designed to adequately capture the risks inherent to crypto-assets. The recently published BCBS standards on the prudential treatment of crypto-asset exposures, to be implemented by 1 January 2025, provide a dedicated prudential treatment that should be implemented in Union law in a timely manner. The Commission should follow up on these developments and, if appropriate, adopt a legislative proposal by 31 December 2024, to transpose the different elements of the BCBS standards into Union law. Until the legislative proposal is adopted, institutions’ exposure to crypto-assets should apply prudent own funds requirements.

Removed:(43) The lack of clarity of certain aspects of the minimum haircut floors framework for securities financing transactions (SFTs), developed by the BCBS in 2017 as part of the final Basel III reforms, as well as reservations about the economic justification of applying it to certain types of SFTs have raised the question of whether the prudential objectives of this framework could be attained without creating undesirable consequences. The Commission should therefore reassess the implementation of the minimum haircut floors framework for SFTs in Union law by [OP please insert date = 24 months after entry into force of this Regulation]. In order to provide the Commission with sufficient evidence, EBA, in close cooperation with ESMA, should report to the Commission on the impact of that framework, and on the most appropriate approach for its implementation in Union law.

Removed:(44) The Commission should transpose into Union law the revised standards for the capital requirements for CVA risks, published by the BCBS in July 2020, as these standards overall improve the calculation of own funds requirement for CVA risk by addressing several previously observed issues, in particular that the existing CVA capital requirements framework fails to appropriately capture CVA risk.

Removed:(45) When implementing the initial Basel III reforms in Union law through the CRR, certain transactions were exempted from the calculation of capital requirements for CVA risk. These exemptions were agreed to prevent a potential excessive increase in the cost of some derivative transactions triggered by the introduction of the capital requirement for CVA risk, particularly when banks could not mitigate the CVA risk of certain clients that were not able to exchange collateral. According to estimated impacts calculated by EBA, the capital requirements for CVA risk under the revised Basel standards would remain unduly high for the exempted transactions with these clients. To ensure that banks’ clients continue hedging their financial risks via derivative transactions, the exemptions should be maintained when implementing the revised Basel standards.

Removed:(46) However, the actual CVA risk of the exempted transactions may be a source of significant risk for banks applying those exemptions; if those risks materialise, the banks concerned could suffer significant losses. As EBA highlighted in their report on CVA from February 2015, the CVA risks of the exempted transactions raise prudential concerns that are not being addressed under CRR. To help supervisors monitor the CVA risk arising from the exempted transactions, institutions should report the calculation of capital requirements for CVA risks of the exempted transactions that would be required if those transactions were not exempted. In addition, EBA should develop guidelines to help supervisors identify excessive CVA risk and to improve the harmonisation of supervisory actions in this area across the EU.

Removed:(47) Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 should therefore be amended accordingly,

Removed:HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Removed:Amendments to Regulation (EU) No 575/2013

Removed:Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 is amended as follows:

Removed:(1) in Article 4, paragraph 1 is amended as follows:

Removed:(-a) point (12) is deleted

Removed:(a) points (15) and (16) are replaced by the following:

Removed:‘(15) ‘parent undertaking’ means an undertaking that controls, in the meaning of point (37), one or more undertakings;

Removed:(16) ‘subsidiary’ means an undertaking that is controlled, in the meaning of point (37), by another undertaking;’;

Removed:(b) point (18) is replaced by the following:

Removed:‘(18) ‘ancillary services undertaking’ means an undertaking the principal activity of which, whether provided to undertakings inside the group or to clients outside the group, the competent authority is any of the following:

Removed:(a) a direct extension of banking;

Removed:(b) operational leasing, factoring, the management of unit trusts, the ownership or management of property, the provision of data processing services or any other activity that is ancillary to banking;

Removed:(c) any other activity considered similar by EBA to those mentioned in points (a) and (b);’;

Removed:(c) point (20) is replaced by the following:

Removed:‘(20) ‘financial holding company’ means an undertaking fulfilling all of the following conditions:

Removed:(a) the undertaking is a financial institution;

Removed:(b) the undertaking is not a mixed financial holding company;

Removed:(c) at least one subsidiary of that undertaking is an institution;

Removed:(d) more than 50 % of any of the following indicators are associated, on a steady basis, with subsidiaries that are institutions or financial institutions, and with activities performed by the undertaking itself that are not related to the acquisition or owning of holdings in subsidiaries when those activities are of the same nature as the ones performed by institutions or financial institutions:

Removed:(i) the undertaking’s equity based on its consolidated situation;

Removed:(ii) the undertaking’s assets based on its consolidated situation;

Removed:(iii) the undertaking’s revenues based on its consolidated situation;

Removed:(iv) the undertaking’s personnel based on its consolidated situation;