What changed between the plenary report and the adopted text

67. Calls for the EU to learn from the role played by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States in ensuring a coherent and coordinated approach to investment screening and the protection of critical technologies across different agencies and institutions;

68. Underlines that investments affecting critical infrastructure require heightened vigilance, as changes in ownership, governance or operational control can directly affect the security and continuity of supply, including, in particular, major transport and logistics hubs that are critical for external trade and military mobility, as well as energy generation, transmission, distribution and storage infrastructure; is deeply concerned by the deepening dependency on high-risk vendors in EU critical infrastructure; concludes that the EU has replicated its dependency on fossil fuels in its imports of clean technologies from high-risk third countries, especially in wind, solar and batteries, noting that these are often equipped with remote monitoring and update capabilities, creating significantly greater risks of data exfiltration, system disruption or remote interference in energy grids, transport systems and other critical infrastructure; considers that such structural dependencies expose the EU to economic coercion and security vulnerabilities at a time of heightened geopolitical competition and urges the EU to become more autonomous in those sectors; welcomes the revision of the Cybersecurity Act as an opportunity to ensure that all critical infrastructure operators are restricted from using systems with remote monitoring capabilities that are manufactured by or made with technology licensed from high-risk vendors;

69. Considers it essential that the Commission exercise a stronger role in ensuring the EU’s economic security, commensurate with the EU’s exclusive competence for the common commercial policy under Article 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; points, in this regard, to the Foreign Subsidies Regulation as a powerful and effective EU-level instrument to protect the internal market from distortions and underlines its significant deterrent value; deems it crucial that the Commission be ultimately responsible for authorising or blocking foreign direct investments in the EU where they give rise to EU-wide economic security risks; warns that leaving such decisions to Member States creates the risk of a race to the bottom whereby competition for inbound investment leads individual Member States to approve transactions that are detrimental to the EU’s collective interests; calls on the Commission to make full and determined use of its powers under the Foreign Subsidies Regulation, including through ex officio investigations, to address emerging circumvention practices such as duty offshoring, whereby exporters acquire or establish production facilities in third countries or within the EU to obtain a new origin for goods, thereby bypassing existing EU anti-dumping or anti-subsidy duties, or to acquire a monopoly position in the EU market;

70. Stresses that economic security risks also arise where outbound investment, strategic partnerships or corporate restructuring enable the transfer, development or scaling-up of sensitive technologies, production capabilities or technical know-how outside the EU, including through greenfield investments, joint ventures, licensing arrangements, contract manufacturing or the relocation of key research and development and manufacturing activities; stresses that such transfers may weaken the EU’s long-term industrial base or technological leadership;

71. Takes note of the Commission’s recommendations on outbound investment and stresses the need to develop a common understanding at EU level of the potential risks arising from investments, partnerships or corporate restructuring; underlines the importance of a targeted, risk- and evidence-based and proportionate approach, limited to clearly identified and well-defined risks, in order to avoid unintended spillover effects on legitimate economic activities and to ensure that the EU’s competitiveness, innovation capacity and legitimate global economic engagement are not undermined; calls on the Commission to propose an outbound investment screening framework aimed at addressing the risks of critical technology leakage as soon as possible;

72. Emphasises that, to safeguard its economic security, the EU must maintain its effective control, decision-making capacity and operational autonomy or strategic indispensability with regard to critical technologies, including, in particular, advanced semiconductors and microelectronics, cloud and data infrastructure, AI and high-performance computing, quantum technologies, advanced robotics, space-based and satellite systems, cybersecurity and encryption technologies, and key energy-related technologies, as these are essential pillars of Europe’s technological and economic sovereignty; calls on the Commission to ensure that investment-related risks in these areas are assessed and addressed in a targeted and confidential manner;

73. Stresses that the EU should participate fully in emerging semiconductor coordination frameworks; underlines that the EU is currently under-represented in such arrangements, despite the strategic role of some EU companies in the global semiconductor supply chains;

74. Stresses that, in strategically sensitive sectors, intellectual property and industrial know-how constitute core strategic assets, the control and location of which are essential to the EU’s economic security; underlines that public support, procurement decisions and foreign investment authorisations should include safeguards ensuring that critical intellectual property generated or developed within the EU remains effectively anchored in the EU and is not transferred outside it in ways that undermine the EU’s technological leadership and industrial capacity;

75. Stresses that economic security risks may also arise after an investment has taken place and underlines the need for effective monitoring and risk assessment of post-investment developments, including governance, strategic decision-making and the potential transfer of critical technologies or know-how in order to ensure that the objectives of the EU’s investment screening framework are fully met;

Economic security across sectoral policies

76. Considers maritime transport routes, ports and logistics services to be critical economic security assets and stresses that safeguarding freedom of navigation should be a key diplomatic and military objective for the EU; calls for stronger EU-level contingency planning and coordinated preparedness mechanisms to address prolonged disruptions affecting major maritime chokepoints, such as the Strait of Hormuz;

77. Calls for an EU air freight resilience mechanism for essential goods (such as medical supplies and critical components), including rapid capacity mobilisation and simplified authorisation procedures during crisis periods;

78. Calls for a strategic approach to rail freight corridors, prioritising the strengthening and integration of the EU’s internal freight network to address existing inefficiencies and bottlenecks, while also supporting diversified and resilient connections with third countries, including along Europe-Asia routes; emphasises the need for risk assessment of corridor infrastructure, operators and digital systems supporting rail freight;

79. Notes that maritime insurance premiums and risk classifications can become de facto trade barriers in times of crisis; calls for EU-level engagement with insurers, classification actors and shipping companies to ensure continuity of critical shipments and to prevent manipulation through coercion;

80. Calls for the enhanced use of shipping and container data to detect coercion, circumvention and illicit diversion, including improved EU capability to identify the use of anomalous routing patterns and transhipment hubs for sanctions evasion;

81. Welcomes the introduction of the EU crisis-mode customs and border ‘fast lane’ for critical inputs and essential goods as part of the redesign of the EU customs code, and notes that it is to be activated during major disruption events, with harmonised criteria to avoid fragmentation across Member States;

82. Calls for strengthened EU resilience against large-scale global navigation satellite system (GNSS) disruption, including jamming and spoofing affecting aviation, through the deployment of backup navigation protocols and secure positioning alternatives and robust detection and mitigation systems, including, where relevant, AI-supported capabilities for critical operations;

83. Warns that repeated drone incursions over major European airports have exposed serious vulnerabilities in European airspace and have led to significant disruption of air traffic and cargo routes; stresses that the protection of critical infrastructure, such as aviation hubs, must be treated as an economic security priority, requiring coordinated EU-level measures to prevent operational disruption of critical transport infrastructure;

84. Stresses that critical energy infrastructure, such as liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals, interconnectors, storage facilities or electricity grids, must be treated as economic security assets, with heightened scrutiny of ownership, control and key service providers, as provided for in the revised FDI Screening Regulation;

85. Calls for a targeted EU plan to reduce high-risk dependencies in the nuclear fuel cycle, including coordinated protocols on diversification and emergency procurement;

86. Notes that the recent large-scale blackout in the EU exposed vulnerabilities in both grid stability and the digital control systems underpinning critical energy infrastructure and generated immediate cascading economic effects, with risks of heightened dependency on third countries;

87. Underlines that the EU’s data centre capacity remains insufficient to meet rapidly growing demand for high-performance and advanced computing, with Europe accounting for only around 15 % of global hyperscale data centre capacity, while European demand is expanding at double-digit annual rates;

88. Underlines the importance of enhanced screening of ownership, operations and maintenance contracts with regard to undersea cables, landing stations and key internet hubs, which are strategic assets;

89. Calls for targeted protection against hostile acquisitions of strategic digital start-ups, including the screening of minority stakes, convertible instruments and intellectual property transfer arrangements, while ensuring adequate high-level channels for EU investment;

90. Notes with concern that, according to the second report on Member States’ progress in implementing the EU toolbox on 5G cybersecurity, 14 Member States have yet to implement restrictions on high-risk suppliers, creating significant security vulnerabilities; welcomes the risk-based approach and the stricter enforcement outlined in the proposal for a revision of the Cybersecurity Act for high-risk cases;

91. Stresses that strengthening the EU’s economic security requires EU companies in leading-edge technologies to be safeguarded from coercion and supported through the promotion of a level playing field;

92. Underlines that the EU’s digital regulatory framework is a fundamental pillar of its sovereignty; emphasises that the enforcement of this framework must remain unaffected by external pressure or threats of retaliatory measures arising from trade disputes;

93. Welcomes the upcoming proposals for an EU quantum act, a cloud and AI development act and a revision of the Chips Act; underlines that the effectiveness of these will depend on a strong trade and investment dimension, including measures to support scale-up and market deployment and facilitate access to global value chains, as well as partnerships with like-minded countries;

94. Recognises critical medicine shortages as an economic security vulnerability; calls for targeted trade and procurement tools to secure continuity of supply of essential medicines, their active substances and key inputs during emergencies;

95. Calls for priority mitigation of dependencies in active pharmaceutical ingredients, starting materials and key precursors where production is concentrated and export restrictions are plausible, including diversified supply chains;

96. Calls for EU mapping and mitigation of single-source dependencies in the manufacturing of medical devices, in vitro medical devices and their key components, and stresses the need for targeted diversification of manufacturing and the scaling-up of domestic production;

97. Calls for the risk-based protection of health data infrastructure and cloud services supporting healthcare systems, including continuity requirements and safeguards against hostile access or disruption;

98. Stresses that the flow of counterfeit medical products from third countries undermines security and public trust; calls for stronger cooperation on customs enforcement to reinforce the traceability requirements laid down in the Falsified Medicines Directive;

99. Stresses that strengthening and completing the capital market union and mobilising European private savings towards strategic industries could reduce reliance on external financing and prevent the loss of control over critical assets and technologies;

100. Underlines that financial messaging systems, including SWIFT, constitute critical infrastructure for the functioning of the global financial system and the EU’s external trade; notes that past instances of geopolitical tensions and sanctions regimes have demonstrated the implications of access to such systems; stresses the importance of ensuring the resilience, autonomy and legal certainty of the EU’s financial infrastructure, including through safeguards against undue external interference or disruptions that could affect the continuity of economic activity;

101. Reaffirms the EU’s commitment to a rules-based multilateral trading system, with the WTO as the most developed framework for managing global economic interdependency and addressing economic security risks in a predictable and non-discriminatory manner;

102. Regrets, however, the fact that the WTO, in its current form, fails to address asymmetries among its members in terms of market openness and commitment to fair competition, and has a dysfunctional dispute settlement system; stresses that meaningful WTO reform, including the restoration of a fully functioning dispute settlement system, is essential to address systemic risks, curb unfair practices and prevent the escalation of trade disputes; acknowledges that, pending such reform, the EU must strengthen its own capacity to act autonomously and respond effectively to economic security risks, rising tariffs and a lack of reciprocity in market openness; believes that the EU should take the lead in establishing a coalition of like-minded middle powers with a clear framework for collective response and mutual assistance in cases of economic coercion;

103. Notes with interest the position set out by the Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security, Maroš Šefčovič, on the need to reassess the ‘most favoured nation’ principle in light of the fact that certain WTO members have dramatically expanded their share of global trade while keeping their own markets relatively closed; calls for an assessment of how the ‘most favoured nation’ principle might better reflect the realities of the current trading environment;

104. Encourages closer and more structured cooperation with trusted partners and like-minded economies to build networked resilience against disruptions to trade and supply, including through trusted supplier networks for critical technologies and infrastructure, which should go beyond technical compliance by incorporating non-technical governance-based criteria that address systemic risks posed by suppliers under foreign state influence, and through coordinated preparedness, mutual support arrangements, and complementary approaches to stockpiling, responding to crises and protecting critical supply chains; calls on the Commission to ensure that the experiences of partners that have been subject to economic security risks are systematically reflected in the EU’s economic security assessments, preparedness planning and external coordination;

105. Welcomes the economic security initiatives developed within the G7; calls on the Commission to ensure that the EU plays a proactive and visible role in implementing and following up on these initiatives, while ensuring coherence between G7 commitments and the EU’s own economic security toolbox;

106. Insists on the crucial role of Parliament, and in particular its Committee on International Trade, in the democratic scrutiny of economic security-related measures with trade and investment implications, including at all stages of their design, implementation and review in order to ensure transparency, accountability and informed parliamentary oversight; asks the Commission to give the Committee on International Trade access to all the relevant documents relating to the implementation of the Economic Security Strategy, in line with interinstitutional best practice on access to documents; calls for the Committee on International Trade to be included in the economic security network proposed in the joint communication of 3 December 2025; highlights the need to maintain regular structured dialogue with Parliament on economic security priorities, risks and mitigation strategies;

107. Calls on the Commission to propose an institutional and governance framework that allows a comprehensive economic security strategy to be developed and implemented with Parliament and the Council and all other relevant public and private stakeholders;

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108. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.