What changed between the plenary report and the adopted text

M. whereas TNR has a severe and sustained impact on human rights defenders, journalists, lawyers and political activists, as well as on their family members;

N. whereas TNR is often mischaracterised as a series of isolated incidents rather than as a sustained strategy targeting entire communities; whereas the absence of physical violence or overt harassment should not be equated with safety or freedom, as silencing, fear, trauma and fragmentation are often the intended outcome of TNR; whereas these cumulative effects of TNR necessitate not only immediate protection but also access to effective remedies and compensation; whereas, even when victims prevail, compensation is often symbolic, delayed or unenforced;

O. whereas TNR affects individuals differently depending on their gender, sexual orientation, racial, ethnic or religious background, and socio-economic position; whereas intersecting forms of discrimination and structural inequalities in both countries of origin and host states may increase the negative effects of TNR; whereas women face particular forms of TNR that can manifest in sexualised and sexist digital attacks targeting their identity, aiming to intimidate, discredit and deter them from activism, reflecting a broader pattern of gender-based online abuse and harassment, and whereas LGBTIQ+ individuals are also disproportionately targeted;

Trends, forms and methods of transnational repression

P. whereas TNR, albeit not new as such, is an evolving phenomenon and is taking place in a challenging context marked by the deterioration of human rights, restrictions on fundamental freedoms and civic space, and the increasingly assertive behaviour of certain authoritarian regimes;

Q. whereas physical forms of TNR include targeted killings, abductions, violence, enforced returns, enforced disappearances, deportations, and attacks on property; whereas 1 375 direct physical incidents were recorded by Freedom House in 107 target countries between 2014 and 2025;

R. whereas certain regimes are known to use threats or pay collaborators to record participants in public protest or spy on dissidents within the EU, thereby directly affecting the exercise of fundamental rights;

S. whereas authoritarian regimes, in the digital era, are developing increasingly sophisticated capabilities to conduct digital TNR; whereas digital TNR includes online harassment, direct threats, doxxing, hacking, cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, smear operations, and incitement of hatred against dissidents in their countries of residence, including through the use of artificial intelligence (AI), and the deployment of spyware and other surveillance technologies, to monitor, profile, intimidate or silence individuals abroad, intertwining with traditional methods of TNR; whereas such practices are often difficult to attribute and frequently remain below traditional criminal thresholds; whereas these practices are especially harmful as internet platforms and digital media can be crucially important, both personally and professionally, for individuals who have been forced to leave their countries as a result of political persecution; whereas the rise of AI has exponentially increased TNR’s reach and impact, including by enabling authorities to perform facial recognition, behaviour analysis and real-time data processing; whereas digital threats against civil society are considered human rights violations; whereas social media companies and online platforms play a significant role in shaping the online environment for human rights defenders and activists; whereas the absence of effective rapid-response mechanisms to address doxxing and targeted online harassment leaves defenders exposed to heightened risks of intimidation, surveillance and further TNR; whereas the Digital Services Act provides tools that can address aspects of TNR, particularly regarding coordinated harassment and disinformation;

T. whereas digital service providers, social media and other online platforms, private spyware companies and other technology companies have, at times, become enablers of TNR; whereas mainstream platforms such as WeChat, Telegram, Facebook, X and others are used for tracking dissidents participating in protests or expressing their opinions in other ways; whereas companies placing surveillance technologies on the market have a responsibility to prevent their illegitimate use for political purposes;

U. whereas malicious foreign actors abuse open vulnerabilities in devices in order to infiltrate personal or professional communications; whereas multiple cases in recent years have shown that the EU is not equipped to tackle infiltration of devices by spyware; whereas spyware has been used by foreign actors to monitor dissidents and public officials alike; whereas the growing surveillance of human rights defenders should be considered a form of TNR or surveillance-enabled coercion; whereas the use of spyware for TNR poses a serious threat to fundamental rights, democratic processes and electoral integrity;

V. whereas coercion-by-proxy constitutes a widespread and particularly harmful form of TNR, involving threats, harassment, detention or punishment of family members or associates who remain in the country of origin, as well as the use of diaspora events or organisations to enable surveillance and intimidation of community members, thereby inflicting severe psychological harm and creating incentives for self-censorship; whereas coercion-by-proxy can also involve members of diaspora communities being compelled to carry out repressive activities on behalf of the state, rendering them simultaneously victims and instruments of TNR; whereas some members of diasporas can also be used as a tool to exert TNR without being compelled; whereas it is important to strengthen the identification of individuals among the diaspora that might be involved in carrying out acts of TNR;

W. whereas, in order to make their requests appear more credible, state services responsible for TNR often falsify allegations, presenting victims of TNR as perpetrators of crimes; whereas perpetrators of TNR increasingly use trials in absentia, mass criminal proceedings, property confiscation, and intimidation of relatives as tools of repression against dissidents abroad, thereby preventing international travel and safe return, restricting property rights, and exerting indirect pressure through family members remaining in the country; whereas jurisdictional limitations and the extraterritorial nature of such practices make coercion-by-proxy especially difficult for host countries to prevent, document and prosecute, contributing significantly to victims’ reluctance to report incidents;

X. whereas states engaging in TNR frequently misuse international and legal cooperation mechanisms, including extradition and information requests, data-sharing mechanisms, mutual legal assistance, the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) anti-money laundering / countering of the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) and cybersecurity frameworks, as well as Interpol notices or diffusions used in connection with their implementation, to locate, detain or forcibly return individuals on political grounds, thereby giving repressive regimes legitimacy, despite explicit prohibitions on political misuse under international law; whereas, in particular, Interpol Purple and Silver Notices are conceived as operational tools without individual remedy or review avenues for those affected, which facilitates their abuse in the context of TNR; whereas the sharing of Interpol data, including for red notices and diffusions, can expose the persons targeted by autocratic actors to danger; whereas the number of Interpol red notices and diffusions has increased dramatically over the last decade and is the key tool used by perpetrators of TNR;

Y. whereas perpetrator states employ administrative and mobility-based forms of TNR through surveillance and coercion by diplomatic or consular missions, including by cancelling or refusing to renew passports, denying consular services, or revoking nationality, thereby coercing individuals to engage with consular authorities or preventing travel; whereas the denial of consular services affects not only human rights defenders and political activists but also their families;

Z. whereas financial TNR involves the misuse of FATF AML/CFT standards to disseminate false allegations and trigger compliance-based account freezes and de-banking; whereas these practices deprive affected individuals and organisations of funding and financial services, and undermine their livelihoods, civic and political activities; whereas the Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AMLA) constitutes a key EU safeguard point that must develop rapid-response mechanisms against abusive freezes and closures and establish strict limits on data-sharing with perpetrator states;

AA. whereas administrative procedures may be exploited by perpetrator states and their enablers, particularly where access to documents issued by the country of origin is required or where interpreters are used as proxies to intimidate or coerce victims;

Perpetrators, cooperation and proxy structures

AB. whereas Parliament-commissioned research and independent datasets demonstrate that TNR is a global phenomenon, with more than 25 % of governments worldwide engaged in TNR, an estimated 3.5 million people at risk, and documented cases in more than 100 countries, according to Freedom House research; whereas TNR is committed mostly by authoritarian regimes; whereas prominent perpetrators of TNR in Europe and globally include Russia, China, Iran and Belarus;

AC. whereas Parliament-commissioned research demonstrates that a majority of documented TNR incidents involve cooperation between origin and host states or the exploitation of weak rule-of-law environments, including through misuse of extradition frameworks, law enforcement cooperation and international organisations;

AD. whereas TNR is often regionally clustered, indicating informal or formal cooperation frameworks and shared practices among perpetrator states and their enablers, including reciprocal enforcement of repression against exiled communities, European citizens and entities;

AE. whereas Russia is among the most aggressive perpetrators of TNR globally and is responsible for the highest number of documented incidents within the EU of any origin country, treating political emigration as a strategic threat, and using practices including assassination, attempted assassination, digital surveillance, harassment, kidnapping plots, cyberattacks, hostile intelligence operations, blackmail, smear campaigns, intimidation of diaspora communities, stigmatisation, in-absentia legal proceedings, coercion-by-proxy and threats against family members, the systematic weaponisation of international legal, financial, cybersecurity and lawenforcement cooperation mechanisms, as well as threats against EU lawmakers; whereas Russia accounts for a disproportionate share of public Interpol Red Notices globally, far exceeding comparable usage by other states; whereas Russia relies on bilateral prosecutorial cooperation agreements with third countries to facilitate extradition requests targeting its nationals abroad; whereas Russia’s intelligence services have conducted online recruitment campaigns, often through Telegram, for murder-for-hire and terrorist activities often directed against Russian diaspora and political opponents; whereas Russia uses proxies, including the Wagner Group, Chechen death squads, cultural institutions, and, in some cases, structures affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church to carry out TNR;

AF. whereas Belarus conducts TNR at an alarming scale, including on EU territory, notably through physical violence, the abuse of Interpol mechanisms, denial of travel documents, the use of spyware, coercive consular practices, forced returns, asset seizures and intimidation; whereas Belarus uses Interpol’s Red Notice system to target political opponents in exile, and targets the diaspora and dissidents, including those residing in the EU, through criminal cases, special in-absentia trials and coercion-by-proxy;

AG. whereas China operates the most comprehensive and systematic TNR campaign in the world, supported by extensive extraterritorial infrastructure, comprising state-aligned entities, overseas police service stations, diaspora, academic and student organisations, media outlets and digital networks, used to identify, monitor, intimidate and coerce individuals within diaspora communities and their associates, through surveillance, harassment, legal and financial pressure, abuse of Interpol mechanisms, forced returns and family intimidation; whereas China uses coercive measures against European individuals and entities; whereas reports by human rights defenders indicate that China operates covert police stations and proxy actors on European soil without legal basis, enabling surveillance and coercive returns, including through threats against relatives and, in some cases, abductions; whereas Chinese authorities exert pressure on academics to halt research deemed sensitive, including on supply chains and forced labour practices, or on Tibet and Taiwan, and target artists by seeking the cancellation of events relating to Taiwan; whereas China is a leading exporter of surveillance systems, spyware and data-driven policing tools, which are used by other authoritarian regimes to monitor and intimidate their own diaspora communities abroad; whereas Hong Kong’s 2020 National Security Law and the 2024 Safeguarding National Security Ordinance assert extraterritorial jurisdiction and have been used to carry out TNR, including by targeting European politicians with threats of prosecution and extradition, and issuing arrest warrants and bounties against activists and academics residing in the EU; whereas the EU’s extradition arrangements with China and Hong Kong raise serious concern;

AH. whereas Iran has a long-standing record of pursuing perceived opponents abroad and conducting TNR within the EU, with operations directed at the highest levels of state authority and executed by the Ministry of Intelligence and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including its Quds Force, using tactics such as assassinations, abductions, enforced disappearances, credible threats of violence, digital TNR and the outsourcing of repression to organised crime groups and other proxies, including by intimidation of journalists and dissidents, cyber surveillance, coercion of relatives in Iran and documented assassination and kidnapping plots against opposition figures on European soil; whereas these actions threaten public security and violate fundamental rights;

AI. whereas the EU global human rights sanctions regime (EU Magnitsky Act) provides an important instrument to target individuals and entities responsible for serious human rights violations and abuses worldwide, including those involved in acts of TNR; whereas its effective and consistent use can contribute to deterrence, accountability and the protection of fundamental rights;

AJ. whereas the EU currently lacks a common definition, comprehensive data collection mechanisms and a coordinated, whole-of-EU institutional approach to countering TNR; whereas these are also lacking outside the EU, which creates challenges for prevention, identification and effective policy responses;

AK. whereas many forms of TNR are rarely captured in official statistics due to their covert nature; whereas TNR is significantly under-reported, including within the EU, as persons targeted by TNR often fear retaliation against family members or distrust authorities due to prior experiences in authoritarian contexts; whereas additional barriers to reporting include a lack of awareness and training among law enforcement and administrative authorities, the absence of accessible and trauma-informed reporting mechanisms, language barriers and the cumulative psychological toll of sustained intimidation, surveillance and harassment; whereas many TNR victims also refrain from reporting instances of abuse due to the inefficiency of local law enforcement or fear of making the situation worse; whereas this structural under-reporting results in a persistent protection gap for victims and communities targeted by TNR, undermines evidence-based policymaking and accountability, and thus contributes to the continued use of TNR by perpetrator states with limited risk of exposure or consequences;

AL. whereas many EU host countries fail to address and capture TNR below the criminal threshold;

AM. whereas the current proposal for the European Democracy Shield includes no mention of TNR;

Establishing a common EU understanding of transnational repression

1. Considers TNR to constitute a serious and growing threat to democracy, a human rights violation, and a form of foreign interference, undermining democratic governance, the rule of law, fundamental rights and the sovereignty and security of host states and their ability to ensure the protection of persons residing on their territory; underlines that these trends are likely to intensify due to the erosion of international norms and rapid technological change, which is also reducing the cost of carrying out such actions;

2. Condemns acts of TNR and foreign interference, including those carried out in EU Member States, in the strongest possible terms; calls on the Commission and the Member States to acknowledge that TNR constitutes an unacceptable and unlawful practice, primarily exercised by authoritarian regimes, and to commit to a zero-tolerance approach, which requires decisive, coordinated and comprehensive action towards any form of TNR occurring on EU territory;

3. Considers that the lack of a clear definition of TNR contributes to under-reporting, limits effective policy responses and hinders the use of accountability tools, including sanctions mechanisms; therefore calls on the Commission, the Council and the Member States to adopt a common EU definition of TNR based on the definition set out in this report and previous Parliament reports and integrate this definition systematically in all EU policies and instruments, including in external action, justice and home affairs, digital policy, financial regulation and sanctions frameworks, in order to prevent the EU’s legal and administrative frameworks from being misused for repressive purposes; urges Member States to codify TNR in their national legislation;

4. Defines TNR as deliberate acts or threats carried out by states, including repressive or authoritarian regimes, state-affiliated entities or entities subject to the influence of, or pressure from, a state, or its proxies, to defend and advance their interests by reaching across borders to intimidate, threaten, silence, coerce, control or harm in any other way individuals or groups living abroad, or their support networks and family members;

5. Notes with concern that targets of TNR include a broad range of individuals and groups, comprising, inter alia, dissidents, journalists, activists, academics and diaspora members and their families; acknowledges that TNR extends beyond diasporas and also targets organisations and persons defending or assisting victims, including those with no national connection to the perpetrator state; expresses serious concern about the shrinking of civic space and the silencing of exiled communities, whose voices are instrumental in documenting human rights situations and abuses;

6. Underlines that TNR encompasses a wide range of constantly expanding coercive practices, including but not limited to:

(a) physical TNR, such as targeted killings, abductions, violence, forced returns, enforced disappearances, deportations, and attacks on property;

(b) legal and administrative abuse – including the misuse of consular services, extradition and mutual legal assistance procedures – in absentia prosecutions, abuse of international notice systems, asset freezing and restriction of access to banking and financial services, baseless criminal charges, selective prosecution, denial of permits, licenses, or approvals without valid reason, or arbitrary fines or penalties;

(c) non-physical coercive methods, such as digital surveillance, threats, intimidation, digital harassment, misuse of spyware technologies, hacking, blackmail, accusations of terrorism or undermining state security, harassment of relatives and coercion-by-proxy – including through diplomatic or consular missions, organised crime networks, private actors, or state-aligned and state-affiliated entities operating abroad;

7. Stresses that the Member States are currently affected by TNR to differing degrees and display varying levels of awareness, institutional preparedness and protection mechanisms; stresses, however, that as perpetrators operate across borders and exploit divergences between national systems, TNR cannot be addressed effectively through isolated national responses, and therefore requires the engagement and preparedness of all Member States, within a coordinated EU framework;

Strengthening EU coordination, data collection and institutional response

8. Stresses that TNR is significantly under-reported, even though collecting reliable data is essential to understand its scale; notes that people targeted by TNR may be reluctant to report incidents because they fear retaliation against family members, distrust authorities due to experiences in authoritarian countries or face language barriers;

9. Calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS), in cooperation with relevant EU bodies including Europol, to establish an EU data collection, monitoring and reporting mechanism on TNR, covering incidents within the EU and globally, allowing public authorities and stakeholders to provide input, and which the Commission and Member States can use to develop, refine and evaluate their policies to counter TNR; stresses the need for shared methodologies and ensuring cooperation in this area with like-minded partners; stresses that reporting channels should be multilingual and trauma-informed, while ensuring robust data protection and confidentiality;

10. Calls on the Member States to ensure that criminal and non-criminal acts that have a component of TNR are consistently recorded as such across the EU, and that the relevant authorities are equipped to identify the TNR dimension;

11. Highlights the need for strong encryption and strict safeguards to ensure that information shared through these channels cannot be intercepted, misused or accessed by unauthorised actors, and that victims are not exposed to further harm;

12. Stresses that reports received through these channels should be assessed quickly and, where appropriate, followed by concrete action by the competent authorities, including investigations and efforts to identify possible links to foreign intelligence actors;

13. Recognises the essential role of civil society organisations in documenting the most hidden forms of TNR – including digital surveillance, financial repression, administrative harassment, and coercion-by-proxy; highlights that current data collection on TNR is still primarily based on non-governmental sources, many of which face severe funding constraints, increasing the urgency for Member State and EU-level monitoring mechanisms; reiterates the need to support civil society, journalists, whistleblowers and others who uncover mechanisms and cases of TNR, often exposing them to high personal risks;

14. Calls on the Member States to maintain close contact with the diasporas most susceptible to TNR; calls on the Commission to provide guidance and recommendations to the Member States on how to protect at-risk groups in exile;

15. Calls on the Member States to provide specialised training for law enforcement, the judicial, financial, cybersecurity, immigration and asylum authorities on identifying and responding to TNR; calls on the Member States to include affected communities in the design and implementation of this training;

16. Urges the establishment of a comprehensive framework to address the fragmentation of national responses and ensure coordination and information-sharing across EU institutions and agencies, Member States, national human rights institutions, and relevant stakeholders; stresses the need for strengthened inter-service cooperation and structured policy dialogue in order to ensure a consistent and effective EU response;

17. Invites Member States to designate national contact points on TNR tasked with coordinating between relevant authorities at all levels;

18. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to facilitate regular exchange between Member States through a network of those national contact points on TNR, enabling them to share experiences, trends, good practices and lessons learned; calls for the national contact points to be regularly invited to meetings of the European Centre for Democratic Resilience; calls on the Member States to ensure systematic reporting on national-level developments to the Commission and strengthen coordination of national measures with a view to more effectively addressing the cross-border dimension of TNR;

19. Calls on the Commission and the EEAS to publish an annual public report on TNR affecting the EU, assessing trends, patterns and emerging risks, including under-reported forms such as digital surveillance, financial repression, administrative harassment, and coercion-by-proxy;

20. Calls on the Commission to make a proposal to update the mandates of Europol and Eurojust to counter TNR more effectively; calls on Europol and Eurojust to prioritise close cooperation and information exchange among EU Member States to address TNR and ensure better information sharing, including via dedicated training, as well as targeted TNR threat assessments;

21. Calls on the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the EEAS to strengthen coordination within existing EU foreign policy instruments in order to counter TNR more effectively, including by reinforcing EU presence in non-EU countries and by strengthening focal points in EU Delegations to raise cases of TNR in non-EU countries;

22. Calls on the Council to appoint a coordinator for countering TNR, who could serve as a central contact point and contribute to the development of an overarching EU strategy on TNR; considers that this coordinator should be involved in and complement the work of the European Centre for Democratic Resilience;

23. Emphasises that all data collection, victim support, protection measures and all other mechanisms aimed at tackling TNR should consider the specific risks faced by racial, ethnic and religious minorities, and LGBTIQ+ persons, and should be culturally competent and systematically consider gendered impacts and intersecting vulnerabilities;

Strengthening protection and support for persons targeted by transnational repression

24. Calls for a comprehensive, victim-centred and intersectional approach to protection and support for persons targeted by TNR, combining immediate and long-term protection measures, and tailored support for persons at heightened risk; calls, in this context, on the Commission and the Member States to adopt gender-sensitive protection measures for women and LGBTIQ+ communities affected by TNR;