What changed between the plenary report and the adopted text

W. whereas failures to implement or partial implementation of and persistent delays in executing judgments of the CJEU and of the ECtHR are not isolated cases but reflect persistent problems in several Member States and recurring issues in others;

X. whereas the European Implementation Network and Democracy Reporting International highlight the fact that, across both the CJEU and the ECtHR, the implementation gaps relate largely to the same areas, namely judicial independence and access to justice, asylum and migration, detention conditions, equality and data/surveillance; whereas at the same time, there have been positive cross-cutting developments in certain Member States, demonstrating that compliance and improvement are possible where there is a clear political will and a genuine commitment to abide by the rulings of the international courts to uphold the rule of law;

Y. whereas disinformation, algorithmic manipulation and insufficient transparency of online platforms undermine democratic debate, and enforcement under the Digital Services Act seeks to address these risks;

Z. whereas the limited attention given to recommendations under ‘Other institutional issues related to checks and balances’ raises further concerns, as this thematic area is very broad and covers a wide range of issues;

AA. whereas although the methodology of the Commission’s annual rule of law report has improved over time, it still does not always use clear and operational benchmarks for assessing Member States under each pillar, which makes it harder to compare conditions across Member States and to ensure uniform standards, and can lead to weakening the reliability of the rule of law report as an early-warning and preventive mechanism;

AB. whereas according to the 2025 rule of law analysis by Liberties EU, since 2022, about one third of all Member States have shown little or no progress in implementing the Commission’s recommendations; whereas nine countries consistently have five to eight recommendations that remain unimplemented; whereas 61 % of the recommendations assessed in 2025 have shown little or no progress since 2022; whereas 93 % of all the Commission’s 2025 recommendations are repetitions from previous years (with 71 % dating back to 2022) and only nine new recommendations were introduced in 2025; whereas in 2025, only 6 % of recommendations could be considered fully implemented;

AC. whereas the DRFMG within Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs has the mandate to monitor breaches of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights, and the fight against corruption within the EU; whereas for more than seven years, the DRFMG has assessed the state of the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights across the EU through dedicated sessions on Member States and horizontal topics, and ad hoc delegations; whereas monitoring is a technical exercise that strengthens integrity systems and enhances institutional resilience and should remain independent from political influence; whereas although embedded within the parliamentary framework, the DRFMG has a long-standing commitment to refrain from party-political considerations and to base its assessments on established standards and evidence-based judgment, and has produced valuable input into the EU’s work on the rule of law;

AD. whereas the Commission’s 2026 work programme notes the need for an integrated annual rule-of-law cycle with a common pace, clear milestones and the active contribution of all the EU institutions; whereas respect for the rule of law remains imperative to safeguard all EU funds;

AE. whereas Parliament has repeatedly called for a stronger link between respect for the rule of law and access to EU funds, including by strengthening the connection between the recommendations contained in its annual rule of law resolution and financial support from the EU budget; whereas the Commission has, on several occasions, committed itself to reinforcing such links, including in the State of the Union address delivered by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on 10 September 2025;

AF. whereas the use of rule-of-law instruments must remain impartial and based exclusively on verifiable fact-finding and legal reasoning, free from instrumentalisation or political bargaining;

AG. whereas in her opinion of 5 June 2025 in Case C-769/22, Advocate General Ćapeta concluded that Article 2 TEU can serve as a separate legal basis for infringement proceedings in cases where the negation of a value is the root cause of other breaches of EU law, and she proposed that the CJEU declare that, by adopting Law LXXIX of 2021, Hungary has infringed the Electronic Commerce Directive, the Services Directive, the Audiovisual Media Services Directive, the General Data Protection Regulation, Article 56 TFEU, Articles 1, 7, 8(2), 11 and 21 of the Charter and Article 2 TEU;

AH. whereas the Commission’s annual rule of law report should continue to assess Member States and candidate countries; whereas compliance of EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies with the rule of law should continue to be ensured through the EU judicial system and the oversight of the European Ombudsman; whereas the Commission’s rule of law report should also transparently assess the compliance of EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies with rule-of-law standards, thereby allowing shortcomings within the EU institutions to be addressed more effectively and enhancing the EU’s credibility by subjecting its own institutions to scrutiny;

AI. whereas Member States must ensure that their national human rights institutions (NHRIs) are established and accredited and that they operate in full compliance with the UN Paris Principles; whereas the independence, pluralism, financial security, appropriate resourcing, effective mandate and statutory authority of the NHRIs are indispensable for their mission to effectively promote and protect fundamental rights and monitor rule-of-law standards and the functioning of democratic checks and balances; whereas Member States should be called on to safeguard NHRIs from political interference;

Justice systems

1. Reaffirms that the rule of law is founded on the binding nature of law on all public authorities and on the effective right of every individual to have access to an independent and impartial tribunal, and that these two dimensions are inseparable and mutually reinforcing;

2. Underlines that fair and accessible justice is a basic rule of law principle that requires an independent judiciary; reiterates that equal access to justice for all citizens is essential;

3. Stresses the importance of independent judicial systems and access to free legal aid in ensuring equal access to justice; reiterates that adequate resources, including infrastructure and personnel, are crucial to improving justice systems;

4. Calls on the Member States, candidate and potential candidate countries to take the necessary measures to ensure structurally independent, efficient and impartial judicial systems, as well as access to free legal aid, in accordance with their obligations under EU law and national law, thereby guaranteeing equal access to justice for all, which is essential for citizens to exercise their rights, challenge discrimination, and hold decision-makers accountable; reiterates the need for concrete actions to improve access, particularly for marginalised and vulnerable groups

5. Stresses that ensuring judicial independence and effective access to justice requires – as a minimum – automated and random case allocation systems, with narrowly defined and reviewable grounds for derogation; transparent, law-based and depoliticised appointment and promotion procedures, ensuring that judicial councils or equivalent bodies have a substantial majority of judicial members elected by their peers, in line with Venice Commission standards, and that the executive cannot exercise discretionary control over appointments, including to court presidencies and supreme courts; stable and objective rules on and adequate judicial remuneration; sufficient resources, including funding, infrastructure, and qualified staff;

6. Recalls that robust national legal systems are indispensable in Member States, candidate and potential candidate countries, given that the Commission relies on national judicial authorities to enforce EU law, and that they are fundamental to judicial cooperation across the EU and to fostering mutual trust;

7. Notes that the Commission has found that there are structural challenges with regard to improving the efficiency, accessibility and quality of the judiciary of some Member States and of candidate and potential candidate countries; stresses the need to improve the monitoring of these challenges, particularly in countries at an advanced stage of the accession process; strongly believes that training is a key factor in guaranteeing the independence of judges, as well as the quality and efficiency of the judicial system; calls on the Member States to invest in judicial training, digitalisation, legal aid, and access to justice for marginalised and vulnerable groups; encourages the Member States to ensure training opportunities for judges; strongly believes that training should be multidisciplinary; reiterates that adequate resources, including funding, infrastructure and qualified personnel, are crucial for the efficiency and accessibility of the justice system; stresses the utmost importance of the EU’s strong support in this field;

8. Invites the Member States to seize the opportunities offered by digitalisation to enable simplification, improved efficiency and accessibility, time savings and reduced data storage costs;

9. Underlines serious concerns regarding excessive political influence over judicial appointments, disciplinary panels, promotions and case allocation, including through newly created judicial structures that bypass existing safeguards and facilitate executive interference, especially in Hungary;

10. Recalls that the 2025 Rule of Law Report demonstrates that many of the deep-rooted deficiencies identified in previous years persist in Hungary, namely judicial independence continues to be questioned, the prosecution service still lacks robust safeguards against political influence, legislative processes remain opaque with limited public consultation, and efforts to defend media freedom, pluralism and civic space have not produced meaningful results;

11. Stresses the need for the impartiality of judges; recalls that the appointment and promotion of judges must be determined solely by their qualifications, as the judges are essential for safeguarding judicial independence; recalls that the criteria for nominations and appointments to high-level judicial positions must be fully transparent and without undue political or external interference; recalls that transparent and impartial procedures must also apply for the dismissal of judges; calls on the Commission to monitor and ensure that the principle of non-regression, as clarified by case-law of the CJEU, is fully respected by Member States, in particular with regard to the appointment of judges, so as to prevent any backsliding in the area of judicial independence;

12. Recalls the need to guarantee the autonomy of the prosecution service, thereby preventing any political interference in its work; calls on the Member States to further strengthen safeguards to ensure the impartiality of prosecutors, in light of the varying structures of national prosecution services; urges them to advance reforms in line with the recommendations of the 2025 Rule of Law Report, including enhanced protections for judicial independence and the autonomy of prosecutors in the context of parliamentary inquiries, as well as measures such as decoupling the term of office of the Prosecutor General from that of the Government; calls on the Commission to review the reforms implemented in this regard and to monitor their effectiveness; calls for disciplinary procedures for judges and prosecutors to be reformed to preclude their use by political authorities to exert control over the judiciary, and to ensure that they are handled by independent bodies;

14. Stresses the important role of the national councils of the judiciary in safeguarding judicial independence, as they serve as a buffer between the judiciary and other branches of power, including in matters such as appointments, career development, and justice system management;

15. Underlines that, where Councils for the Judiciary exist, their composition and functioning should be in line with the standards established by the Venice Commission and the Council of Europe, including that the Council is to be composed either of judges exclusively or, when mixed with non-judges, a substantial majority of members are to be judges elected by their peers, while non-judicial members may be appointed through transparent democratic procedures to ensure pluralism and legitimacy, and that the executive cannot exercise discretionary control over appointments, in order to ensure independence and prevent undue influence, which has been endorsed by the CJEU;

16. Welcomes the Commission’s assessment in its report of the reforms undertaken, and notes that some Member States have made progress and are taking legislative initiatives to strengthen the independence and effectiveness of Councils for the Judiciary where they exist;

17. Stresses that an effective and properly functioning justice system in the Member States requires independent bars and lawyers who can carry out their duties freely and without undue pressure or interference, given their crucial role in safeguarding the rule of law and defending fundamental rights and freedoms; further emphasises that full respect for the core principles of the legal profession, including lawyer-client confidentiality, is essential;

18. Deplores the fact that there are still concerns about the remuneration levels of judges and judicial staff in several Member States, making posts unattractive and therefore difficult to fill;

19. Expresses serious concern at the growing trend to structurally question the role and legitimacy of an independent judiciary thereby challenging the proper functioning of the justice system as such and underlines that judicial independence constitutes a prerequisite for the legitimacy of judicial authority, the enforceability of court decisions and public trust in justice; recalls that the principle of the balance of powers implies that no public authority may escape judicial review, and deplores narratives that seek to delegitimise it; recalls that criticism of judges is unacceptable when it seeks to obstruct or discredit the exercise of that constitutional function; distinguishes clearly between legitimate criticism of judicial decisions and attacks targeting the legitimacy of national and international courts as institutions; condemns any attempt, whether direct or indirect, to influence, intimidate or hinder judges in the exercise of their duties, including through disciplinary pressure or public attacks undermining their authority; reaffirms that international courts derive their legitimacy from the sovereign will of the states that established them and from the democratic procedures governing the election of their judges, and that their role is essential for the effective protection of fundamental rights;

20. Calls on the Commission to address political attacks on judges and judicial intimidation, to ensure independent judicial systems, including protection from political interference; stresses that the significant number of threats and attacks suffered by justice professionals and in particular lawyers poses a direct threat to democracy and the rule of law; calls on the Member States to sign and ratify the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of the Profession of Lawyers and to use all appropriate means to ensure the defence and freedom of expression of lawyers; calls on the Commission to put forward, without delay, a draft Council Decision enabling the EU to sign and conclude the Convention, and highlights the need for swift agreement on this decision;

21. Recalls that professional associations of judges and prosecutors, together with civil society actors, play an important role in fostering the rule of law on the ground, in defending judicial independence and in contributing to public debate;

22. Calls on the Member States to refrain from making excessive use of accelerated procedures or emergency decrees, as these negatively impact the stability and quality of lawmaking and democracy; calls on the Member States to set up transparent lawmaking processes following systematic consultation with various stakeholders;

23. Welcomes the national reforms undertaken in some Member States to strengthen judicial independence, and calls on Member States, candidate and potential candidate countries to continue taking the necessary measures to ensure independent judicial systems and access to free legal aid, thereby guaranteeing equal access to justice for all;

24. Welcomes the role of the European Network of Ombudsmen and underlines that cooperation should go beyond mere information exchange, notably through the systematic use of query procedures, allowing national ombudsman’s offices to seek authoritative answers at EU level when facing obstacles in the application of EU law, thereby strengthening their leverage vis-à-vis national authorities; regrets that ombudsman’s offices are not always consulted in a systematic manner in the preparation of the rule of law report, despite their key role in detecting shortcomings in the implementation of EU law; therefore calls for more structured and consistent involvement of national ombudsmen in EU-level processes, in order to better identify systemic issues affecting several Member States and to support the Commission in addressing shortcomings in the effective application of EU law;

25. Calls on the Member States to strengthen the independence of national oversight bodies;

26. Calls for the EU and its Member States to continue to strengthen their support for European and international justice institutions, starting with the reinforcement of internal judicial cooperation mechanisms based on mutual trust between the judicial systems of the various Member States and of candidate and potential candidate countries;

27. Welcomes the revision of the Victims’ Rights Directive to close legal gaps, ensuring that victims can access justice and receive support, including avenues to review decisions in criminal proceedings concerning victims, provisions on support and protection of victims, access to compensation, as well as effective data collection, better allocation of resources for upholding the rights of the victims of crimes, and respect for the victims’ privacy and the protection of their personal data when reporting a crime, regardless of residence status, and that personal data is not shared with the offender;

28. Stresses that non-implementation of domestic and international judgments remains a systemic concern in some Member States, as highlighted by recent FRA findings and stakeholder submissions; notes with serious concern the growing backlog and slowing progress in the implementation of leading judgments of the ECtHR across the EU, as evidenced by the fact that, as of 1 January 2025, 650 leading ECtHR judgments remained pending full implementation in EU Member States, compared to 624 in January 2024 and 616 in the year before; notes further that 45.7 % of leading judgments delivered in respect of EU Member States over the past 10 years are still pending implementation, compared to 44 % at the end of 2023 and 40 % at the end of 2022; further notes that, by the end of 2024, the average implementation time for leading ECtHR judgments concerning EU Member States had reached 5 years and 4 months, compared to 5 years and 2 months in 2023 and 5 years and 1 month in 2022, thereby highlighting a structural and worsening compliance deficit; believes that the Commission should treat serious non-implementation as a priority topic in political dialogue with national governments and parliaments;

29. Highlights the pivotal role of the CJEU in upholding the rule of law across the EU; endorses further initiatives to enhance the resources and the capabilities of the CJEU to effectively address further challenges to the rule of law;

30. Calls on the Member States to implement pending judgments of the CJEU and the ECtHR promptly; suggests that the EU institutions establish a monitoring unit, building on and, where necessary, reinforcing relevant existing structures and resources of the Union institutions and agencies, to monitor the implementation of CJEU and ECtHR judgments relating to democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights in EU and candidate countries, and calls on the Commission to develop a public scoreboard or an equivalent tool to track such implementation, to fully integrate the relevant findings into the annual rule of law report, and to systematically issue tailored, country-specific recommendations, with a particular focus on Member States that persistently fail to implement CJEU and ECtHR judgements; calls on the Commission to analyse data on non-compliance with country-specific views of UN treaty bodies, drawing on data collected by EU agencies, in particular the Fundamental Rights Agency; reiterates that effective implementation of judgments is essential to ensuring protection of the fundamental rights enshrined in the TEU, TFEU, the Charter and the ECHR;

31. Urges the Commission to use enforcement tools more decisively in cases of persistent non-implementation, assessing whether they warrant proceedings under Article 258 TFEU, Article 260 TFEU, and, where relevant, budgetary conditionality;

32. Calls on the Member States to adopt measures to support implementation with clear timelines, responsibilities and parliamentary oversight, and to safeguard judicial independence and ensure that national courts are not hindered from consistently applying ECtHR and CJEU case law;

33. Recalls that the rule of law is undermined when democratically adopted laws face institutional obstruction or resistance from certain judicial or administrative sectors going beyond legitimate review or scrutiny, preventing their proper implementation; underlines that democratic states must ensure mechanisms for political and social reconciliation, prevent the excessive judicialisation of political conflicts, and reinforce democratic dialogue;

34. Underlines the clear link between rule-of-law backsliding and serious violations of fundamental rights, including the lack of due process for detainees, misuse of pre-trial detention, incitement to hatred in political or institutional discourse, and restrictive measures targeting civil society organisations; firmly believes that the Commission should assess how Member States address these violations of rule-of-law principles and fundamental rights, and increase its efforts to ensure an accessible, effective and impartial justice system; notes with alarm the use of extraordinary legal procedures and executive decrees to reshape the judicial landscape beyond the scope of normal parliamentary scrutiny, mirroring patterns previously identified as incompatible with the separation of powers;

35. Calls on the Commission to address prison conditions as a rule-of-law concern, in the light of widespread overcrowding, inadequate living conditions and rising suicide rates, which undermine detainees’ fundamental rights across Member States’ penitentiary systems; calls on the Member States to take measures to ensure that detention conditions in prisons, including juvenile facilities, are in line with fundamental rights standards, by addressing overcrowding, ensuring access to healthcare and psychological support, and strengthening suicide prevention measures; welcomes the initiatives undertaken by some Member States to address overcrowding, and stresses the need for further structural measures, including coherent strategies to reduce prison populations and prioritise non-custodial measures and other alternatives to imprisonment;

Anti-corruption framework

36. Reiterates that corruption is a serious threat to democracy, the rule of law and the fair treatment of all citizens, that it hampers economic development, erodes public trust in institutions, and creates vulnerabilities which may be exploited by external actors at both national and EU levels;

37. Regrets that public confidence in the fight against corruption remains low, as two-thirds of Europeans believe that high-level corruption cases are not pursued sufficiently, more than half consider government action ineffective and nearly half doubt the impartial application of anti-corruption measures; highlights significant gaps in reporting mechanisms and public awareness; considers this a clear call for the EU to intensify its work to prevent and combat corruption;

38. Is deeply concerned by corruption cases that have emerged within European institutions and stresses that the rule of law requires that persons holding public office cannot act arbitrarily or abuse their power for personal gain; calls on EU institutions to fully apply the principles of good governance, including transparency, accountability, and integrity;

39. Stresses that the EU’s full membership in GRECO, beyond its current observer status, is necessary to address the existing asymmetry whereby all EU Member States are evaluated by GRECO while EU institutions themselves are not, thereby limiting coherence across the EU’s integrity framework; emphasises that the Commission cannot reasonably be expected to self-assess in matters of integrity and anti-corruption, and that recourse to a recognised, independent external monitoring is essential to ensure credibility, transparency and public trust; stresses the importance of sending a clear political signal that EU institutions are themselves subject to the same level of scrutiny and standards as national authorities; recalls that EU membership of GRECO would strengthen the alignment of rules, ensure methodological consistency, improve transparency, accountability and efficiency in the management of EU funds, the legislative process and the work of the EU institutions, while enhancing cooperation with Member States, candidate countries and neighbouring countries in the fight against corruption;

40. Calls on the Commission to swiftly conclude the negotiations on the EU’s full membership of GRECO; notes that EU accession may follow two legal routes, either by a direct request to accede to the GRECO Agreement or, more straightforwardly, through accession to one or both Council of Europe anti-corruption conventions (ETS No 173 and/or 174), which would automatically entail GRECO membership; therefore calls on the Commission to pursue without delay the most efficient legal pathway to full GRECO membership and to ensure that the annual rule of law report also covers EU institutions;

41. Urges the Member States to fully implement all Council of Europe GRECO recommendations;

42. Calls on the Member States to publish, adopt, update, monitor, implement and revise their national strategy on preventing and combating corruption, establishing objectives, priorities, and corresponding measures and the means to meet these objectives, in order to ensure that action against corruption is mainstreamed in all relevant policy sectors;

43. Acknowledges the key role of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in safeguarding the rule of law and in combating corruption in the EU, as well as in effectively protecting the Union’s financial interests from criminal activity; encourages the Commission to closely monitor participating Member States’ level of cooperation with the EPPO in subsequent reports, and to make full use of its tools where cooperation is deficient; supports the reinforcement of the EPPO’s monitoring, coordination and operational powers with a view to strengthening its capacity to investigate and prosecute corruption in the Member States; calls on the Commission to accelerate the revision of the EPPO Regulation in order to enhance operational cooperation and data-analysis support between the EPPO and Europol; urges all Member States that have not yet done so to join the EPPO in order to enhance the effectiveness of the fight against corruption, particularly in relation to the protection of EU funds;

44. Calls on the Member States, candidate countries and potential candidate countries, as well as EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, to establish or strengthen preventive measures against corruption, such as specialised and independent anti-corruption institutions, transparent management of EU funds, strengthened or proper enforcement of transparency requirements in decision-making, such as registers of lobbyists and reporting obligations on political funding, ensuring a high level of transparency in the relevant EU policy areas, codes of conduct for public officials, mandatory asset declarations and verification thereof, early warning systems, and clear rules on conflict-of-interest and revolving-door practices;

45. Calls on all the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies to strengthen their anti-corruption measures with regard to the disclosure and management of conflicts of interest, open access to information, and rules regulating the interaction of EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies with the private sector;