What changed between the plenary report and the adopted text

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2024, Section II – European Council and Council,

– having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0051/2026),

A. whereas the democratic legitimacy of the Union institutions derives first and foremost from strict respect for the Treaties, which lay down the institutional balance and the clear distribution of competences; whereas transparency, accountability and sound financial management are essential obligations of all Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies when spending taxpayers’ money; whereas in the context of the discharge procedure, the discharge authority wishes to stress the particular importance of further strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the Union institutions by improving transparency and accountability, and by implementing the concept of performance-based budgeting and good governance of human resources;

B. whereas, under Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Parliament has the sole responsibility of granting discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the Union, and whereas the budget of the European Council and of the Council (the ‘Council’) is a section of the Union budget and is therefore legally bound by the Treaties and the Financial Regulation to ensure transparency, accountability and sound financial management, irrespective of its intergovernmental nature;

C. whereas, pursuant to Article 15(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the European Council is not to exercise legislative functions;

D. whereas, under Article 317 TFEU, the Commission is to implement the Union budget on its own responsibility, having regard to the principles of sound financial management, and whereas, under the framework in place, the Commission is to confer on the other Union institutions the requisite powers for the implementation of the sections of the budget relating to them;

E. whereas, under Articles 235(4) and 240(2) TFEU, the ‘Council’ is assisted by the General Secretariat of the Council (the ‘Secretariat’), and whereas the Secretary-General of the Council is wholly responsible for the sound management of the appropriations entered in Section II of the Union budget;

F. whereas, over the course of more than twenty years, Parliament has been implementing the well-established and respected practice of granting discharge to all Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, and whereas the Commission supports that the practice of giving discharge to each Union institution, body, office and agency for its administrative expenditure should continue to be pursued;

G. whereas, according to Article 59(1) of the Financial Regulation, the Commission shall confer on the other Union Institutions the requisite powers for the implementation of the sections of the budget relating to them;

H. whereas, since the 2009 budget discharge, the Council’s lack of cooperation in the discharge procedure has prevented Parliament from exercising its democratic scrutiny role and has repeatedly compelled Parliament to refuse to grant discharge to the Secretary-General of the Council;

I. whereas the European Council and the Council, as Union institutions and as recipients of the general budget of the Union, should be transparent and democratically accountable to the citizens of the Union and subject to democratic scrutiny of the spending of public funds;

J. whereas Article 15(3) TFEU requires the Union institutions to ensure in their Rules of Procedure that their proceedings are transparent, while in several of its inquiries and decisions the European Ombudsman (the ‘Ombudsman’) has criticised the Council for its lack of transparency suggesting that the Council has failed fully to grasp the critical link between democracy and the transparency of decision-making;

K. whereas the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) confirms the right of taxpayers and of the public to be kept informed about the use of public revenue and that the General Court in in its judgment of 25 January 2023 in Case T-163/21, De Capitani v Council, stated on transparency within the Union legislative process that documents produced by the Council in its working groups are not of technical nature but legislative and are therefore subject to access to documents requests;

1. Notes that the budget of the Council falls under MFF heading 7, ‘European public administration’, which amounted to EUR 13,3 billion in 2023 (representing 6,9 % of the total Union budget); notes that the Council’s budget of approximately EUR 0,7 billion represents 5,26 % of the total administrative expenditure of the Union;

2. Notes that the Court of Auditors (the ‘Court’), in its Annual Report for the financial year 2024 (the ‘Court’s report’) examined a sample of 70 transactions under the heading ‘Administration’, the same number as in 2023, whereas the Court further states that administrative expenditure comprises expenditure on human resources, including expenditure on pensions, which in 2024 accounted for approximately 69 % of the total administrative expenditure, and expenditure on buildings, equipment, energy, communications and information technology (IT), and that its work over many years indicates that, overall, this spending is low risk;

3. Notes that 16 (23 %) of the 70 transactions contained errors but that the Court, based on the three errors which were quantified, estimates the level of error to be below the materiality threshold; notes that the Court’s report did not identify any specific issues concerning the Council;

State of play of the discharge procedure

4. Deeply regrets that since 2009 and again for the financial year 2023 Parliament has had to refuse discharge to the Council because the Council continues to refuse to cooperate with Parliament on the discharge procedure despite Parliament’s repeated efforts to establish constructive cooperation, thereby preventing Parliament from taking an informed decision based on a serious and thorough scrutiny of the implementation of the Council’s budget;

5. Notes that, on 22 September 2025, the relevant Parliament services, on behalf of the rapporteur for the discharge procedure, forwarded a questionnaire to the Secretariat containing 103 important questions for Parliament in order to enable a thorough scrutiny of the implementation of the Council budget and of the management of the Council; further notes that similar questionnaires were sent to all other institutions, all of which have provided Parliament with detailed answers to all the questions;

6. Regrets that, on 3 October 2025, the Secretariat informed Parliament once again that it would not be answering Parliament’s questionnaire and that the Council would not be participating in the hearing organised on 6 November 2025 as part of the discharge procedure and in which all other invited institutions participated;

7. Reiterates Parliament’s prerogative to grant discharge pursuant to Article 319 TFEU as well as the applicable provisions of the Financial Regulation and Parliament’s Rules of Procedure in line with current interpretation and practice, namely the power to grant discharge in order to maintain transparency and to ensure democratic accountability to Union taxpayers;

8. Underlines that Article 59(1) of the Financial Regulation states that the Commission shall confer on the other Union institutions the requisite powers for the implementation of the sections of the budget relating to them and, therefore, finds it incomprehensible that the Council believes it appropriate that discharge should be granted to the Commission for the implementation of the Council budget;

9. Stresses the well-established and respected practice followed by Parliament over the course of more than 20 years of granting discharge to all Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, including the Council; recalls that the Commission has declared its inability to oversee the implementation of the budgets of the other Union institutions; stresses the reiterated view of the Commission that the practice of granting discharge to each Union institution for their administrative expenditure and implementation of the Union budget should continue to be pursued directly by Parliament to preserve the compliance of the principle of sound financial management; recalls that all other institutions, bodies, offices and agencies cooperate fully with Parliament in the discharge procedure, and considers the Council’s refusal to do so unjustified and incompatible with the principle of institutional loyalty under the Treaties;

10. Stresses that the current situation implies that Parliament can only check the reports of the Court and of the Ombudsman as well as the publicly available information on the Council’s website, which makes it impossible for Parliament to make an informed decision on granting discharge; underlines that the lack of cooperation of the Council undermines Parliament’s prerogative to effectively fulfil its oversight role;

11. Deplores the lack of political willingness from the Council, for more than a decade, to collaborate with Parliament in the context of the annual discharge procedure, thereby creating a structural blind spot in the Union’s system of checks and balances, and that this has had a lasting negative effect on both institutions and has discredited the management and democratic scrutiny of the Union budget and on the trust of citizens in the Union as a transparent entity; stresses that such persistent institutional obstruction undermines the principle of sincere cooperation laid down in the Treaties; considers that continued non-cooperation risks further eroding the legitimacy of the Union’s budgetary governance framework; underlines that the Council must adhere to the same standards of accountability and transparency as the other Union institutions;

12. Reiterates that the Council’s continued refusal to engage in the discharge procedure is an unacceptable breach of democratic accountability; calls on the introduction of concrete and effective measures to ensure that any Union institution failing to comply with transparency obligations is held fully accountable, by exploring practical measures in line with Article 59(1) of the Financial Regulation, and the principle of sound financial management, that incentivise cooperation, including enhanced conditionality in administrative arrangements and reporting requirements;

13. Recalls that the case-law of the CJEU supports the right of taxpayers and the public to be kept informed about the use of public revenues; demands, therefore, full respect for Parliament’s prerogative and role as guarantor of the democratic accountability principle; calls on the Council to duly follow up on the recommendations adopted by Parliament in the context of the discharge procedure and insists on the full application of Article 14(1) TEU;

14. Notes that on 6 May 2025, during his intervention in Parliament’s plenary, the Representative of the Presidency of the Council expressed the latter’s willingness ‘to engage in a meaningful and pragmatic cooperation between our institutions’ when it comes to discharge in relation to the Council section of the Union budget, and calls for this intention to be translated into concrete and immediate actions; calls therefore on the Council to resume negotiations with Parliament at the highest level as soon as possible, involving the Secretary-Generals and the Presidents of both institutions, in order to break the deadlock and find a solution that upholds the institutional competences of Parliament and the Council in the discharge procedure and ensures transparency and robust democratic control of the budget implementation; reiterates its request that the Commission and the Council legal services provide an opinion on potential Treaty-based solutions to enforce Council’s accountability in the discharge procedure;

15. Stresses that, while the current situation has to be improved through better inter-institutional cooperation within the framework of the Treaties, a revision of the Treaties could make the discharge procedure clearer and more transparent by giving Parliament the explicit competence to grant discharge to all Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies individually; stresses, however, that pending such a review, the current situation must be improved through enhanced inter-institutional cooperation; urges in this sense the Council to actively engage with Parliament;

16. Notes that, despite the Council’s longstanding unwillingness to cooperate in the discharge procedure, Parliament, nevertheless, highlights some political priorities and sets out some observations concerning the budgetary and financial management of the Council and other observations relevant for the discharge procedure in this report, in a manner that respects national sovereignty, the Treaties and the principle of sound financial management;

17. Notes that, given the Council’s lack of cooperation with Parliament, observations in the following sections primarily rely on aggregated information published on the Council’s website, which provides limited detail;

Political priorities

18. Recalls that in 2024 the Union agreed to provide predictable financial support to Ukraine through the Ukraine Facility for 2024–2027; stresses that, in this context, the Council and the Secretariat have a heightened responsibility to ensure transparency, integrity and sound financial management in all Council-related administrative spending connected to Ukraine-related decision-making, meetings and logistical arrangements, including clear reporting of related costs and contract management;

19. Regrets that the Council exerts its prerogative in the nomination and appointment procedures for many Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, without taking into account the views of interested parties or the recommendations of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF);

20. Notes with concern the Council’s practice regarding appointments made by individual Member States for most positions which may limit the extent to which the professional qualifications of candidates are checked; insists, therefore, on the need for a review of the Council’s prerogative with a view to guaranteeing and strengthening the participation of the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies concerned and increasing the legitimacy of those appointed; suggests that one possibility that could be put in place to ensure that candidates have the necessary qualifications would be to apply the same screening by an external panel used for the nominations of the judges and advocates-general of the CJEU;

21. Recalls that, pursuant to Article 286(2) TFEU, the Council appoints the members of the Court after consultation with Parliament; recalls that, on the basis of this prerequisite, Parliament delivers an opinion on the candidates; regrets that the Council has repeatedly disregarded Parliament’s recommendations in its consultative role regarding the appointment of the members of the Court; recalls that although Parliament’s opinion is non-binding on the Council, candidates who received an unfavourable opinion withdrew their candidatures by accepting Parliament’s decision, thereby recognising the role of Parliament as the democratic supervisory authority linked to the safeguarding of the Union budget; calls on the Council to recognise Parliament’s role by cooperating in the discharge procedure;

22. Stresses that the persistent gender imbalance among the Members of the Court undermines the Union’s equality objectives; reiterates its call on the Council to address this issue by revising the nomination procedure and taking concrete measures, such as requiring Member States to submit at least two candidates of different genders, thus ensuring a more balanced and representative composition of the Court while respecting the principles of merit, excellence and equal opportunities;

23. Reaffirms its call for the creation of a Council of Defence Ministers as an institutional forum for political and strategic coordination; considers that a permanent and dedicated Council configuration on defence would reflect the need for the Union to assume greater responsibility for its own security and defence, complementing the establishment of a Security and Defence Committee in Parliament and a Commissioner for Defence and Space in the Commission;

24. Regrets that the Council has so far ignored Parliament’s resolution of 17 December 2020 on the need for a dedicated Council configuration on gender equality and insists that a dedicated institutional forum would ensure stronger integration of gender equality in Union policies and strategies as well as essential coordination and progress in the main files related to gender equality;

25. Recalls that the judges and advocates-general of the Court of Justice are appointed by common accord of the governments of the Member States after consulting a panel responsible for giving an opinion on prospective candidates' suitability to perform the required duties;

26. Notes that, in her decision of 9 September 2024 on the strategic initiative on sponsorship of the presidency of the Council, the Ombudsman encouraged the Council to take stock of how the non-binding rules adopted by the Council for the use of sponsorship by its presidency (‘the Guidance’) have been implemented and to explore other possible measures that could help mitigate the risks associated with the use of sponsorship, which include the risk of conflicts of interest, as well as reputational risks; notes with concern from the annual report of the Ombudsman for 2024 that the Council has still not fully addressed public concerns around the use of corporate sponsorship, as there is a recurrent “lack of transparency around the identity of sponsors, the nature of their support, and what they gain in return” and sponsors were still able to use the presidency logo for commercial purposes; calls on the Council to render the Guidance binding; reiterates its call on the Council to provide a budget for the Council Presidencies to ensure adequate and uniform standards of efficiency and effectiveness in the work in the Council in general;

27. Calls on the rotating Council Presidencies to stop using corporate sponsorship to contribute to covering their expenses as this entails a risk of creating conflicts of interest, in line with the conclusions of the workshop held by Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control on 27 June 2023;

28. Takes note of the European Council’s growing involvement in legislative files, and such role requires oversight and enhanced cooperation with the budgetary authority in the frame of the discharge procedure; calls on the Council to ensure that its actions are carried out with transparency and accountability, in line with the standards applicable to other Union institutions, to maintain citizens’ trust;

29. Deeply regrets the Hungarian government’s misuse of its role in the 2024 rotating Presidency of the Council by engaging in high-level international meetings that undermined the Union’s core values and agreed common positions; calls on the Council to firmly condemn any conduct by a Member State holding the Presidency that is not in conformity with Union values, and to take all necessary measures to ensure that future Presidencies discharge their functions in full compliance with Union principles, thereby safeguarding the integrity and credibility of the Union;

30. Stresses that while unanimity voting remains a core principle of the Treaties, its application can, in certain circumstances and in critical policy areas, affect the timelines and effectiveness of the Union, including by paralysing the Union’s decision-making process and therefore making it prone to blackmail by Member States, especially those who fail to respect the rule of law; reiterates in this sense its regret regarding the Hungarian government’s obstructive stance within the European Council; notes that ongoing political deadlocks continue to undermine trust and the European Council’s effectiveness; calls for targeted treaty reforms or, alternatively, practical improvements, within the existing Treaty framework, to strengthen transparency, democratic decision making, accountability and the efficiency of the European Council’s work; reiterates in this context its call for the Council of Ministers to move from unanimity to qualified majority voting for decisions in areas of strategic interest to the Union; notes further that the unanimity requirement has been a significant impediment to effectively responding to Russia’s action, in particular on the imposition of sanctions which are subject to renewal every three months, thereby risking the weakening of the Union’s capacity to act decisively and transparently and undermining citizens’ trust and the Union’s credibility as a geopolitical actor; calls on the Council to shift to qualified majority voting in critical areas, notably sanction regimes, in order for the Union to be able to act effectively in the face of global challenges;

Budgetary and financial management

31. Recalls that, pursuant to Article 15 of the Treaty on European Union, the European Council plays a central strategic role in providing the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and in defining its general political directions and priorities, while not exercising legislative functions; emphasises the unique added value of the European Council as a forum for high-level political coordination among Member States;

32. Regrets once again that the budget of the European Council and the Council has not been divided into two clearly separated budgets as recommended by Parliament in previous discharge resolutions in order to improve transparency and accountability, not least concerning the European Council, given that it is currently impossible to get reliable information about its costs; calls that this separation include distinct budget lines for meeting-related expenditure, travel, communication and representation costs, so that the discharge authority can distinguish between European Council and Council activities and assess trends over time;

33. Notes that the budget for the Council was EUR 676 881 123 in 2024, representing an increase of 4,47 % compared to 2023; notes that this increase is mainly related to the revision of salary update parameters due to inflation;

34. Notes that the Council’s implementation rate of current year commitment appropriations was 96,40 % in 2024 (compared to 97,01 % in 2023) and the implementation rate of the current year payments appropriations was 87,95 % in 2024 (compared to 86,39 % in 2023); notes that approximately EUR 24 million in appropriations were cancelled at the end of 2024 out of which approximately 62 % originated from budget lines linked to staff-related expenditure; notes that the implementation rate of the total amount carried over from 2023 to 2024, i.e. EUR 85 520 696, was 91 %;

35. Notes that appropriations carried over from 2024 to 2025 totalled EUR 78,6 million (down from approximately EUR 85,5 million the previous year) covering mainly computer systems, cost of interpretation provided in 2024 for which invoices have not been yet agreed with the Commission services at the time of the closure, buildings, information and public events, technical equipment, for safety and security, meetings and conferences mostly relating to invoices not yet received for organising European Council, Council meetings and summits in 2024, furniture and other staff expenditure;

36. Notes that the Council carried out 42 budgetary transfers in 2024 in accordance with Article 29 of the Financial Regulation, in order to reinforce various budget lines including “Fitting-out and installation work”, “Work to make premises secure”, “Acquisition of equipment and software” and “Purchase and replacement of technical equipment and installation”; notes that three of those transfers, which required informing the budgetary authority in accordance with Article 29(2) of the Financial Regulation, totalled approximately EUR 12,8 million;

37. Notes that the average time for payments of invoices increased from 13 to 15 days from 2023 to 2025, well below the maximum time limit of 30 days, thus avoiding interest on late payments;

38. Notes that mission expenses, comprising both mission expenses from the Secretariat and mission expenses of members of staff related to the European Council, decreased by 18,50 % from approximately 5,2 million in 2023 to approximately EUR 4,3 million in 2024, while travel expenses of delegations incurred by Presidencies and national delegations decreased by 2,61 % from approximately 15,3 million in 2023 to approximately EUR 14,9 million in 2024;