What changed between the plenary report and the adopted text

Removed:Die PARTEI, a German political party that had entered the European Parliament benefiting from the lack of a threshold, and Member Martin Sonneborn brought a constitutional complaint against the introduction of the minimum 2 % threshold. On 6 February 2024, the German Constitutional Court dismissed the procedures challenging the approval of the Council Decision with the motivation that Council Decision 2018/994 is not an ultra vires act overstepping the EU’s competences and it does not affect the fundamental principles of the German constitution. Moreover, the Court also acknowledged that the threshold is essential for maintaining the stability and proper functioning of the European Parliament.

Removed:While Germany has ratified Council Decision 2018/994, the German electoral law for the European Parliament election has not been amended because the Council Decision is not in force yet. As long as the 2 % threshold is not mandatory under European law, it cannot be introduced in German law.

Removed:In Spain, the crucial pending modification to the current Electoral Law also concerns the establishment of a minimum threshold for the allocation of seats. Since Spain has a single constituency, this requires Article 3 of Council Decision 2018/994 to be implemented to enforce a minimum threshold ranging from 2 to 5 % of the votes, thus, implying the modification of the Ley Orgánica del Régimen Electoral General (LOREG).

Removed:From a legal point of view, no major obstacles are foreseen concerning the ratification of Council Decision 2018/994 in Spain. However, the process is more delicate from a political perspective. Establishing an electoral threshold implies the possibility that a few smaller political parties (especially regional political parties) may be prevented from having MEPs elected. Therefore, adopting a formal electoral threshold may be particularly problematic for a political system as fragmented as Spain’s. Although the electoral threshold will benefit the major political parties, which could facilitate its parliamentary approval, it can be argued that the absence of a clear majority in the Spanish Cortes Generales, the potential impacts of the threshold for the junior coalition partners, as well as the relative political instability could present obstacles to an expeditious process.

Removed:The situation is complicated by the fact that the PSOE and EAJ-PNV, the largest Basque nationalist party, signed an agreement to form a government on 10 November 2023, explicitly mentioning that one of the conditions for EAJ-PNV to vote in favour of the investiture of Pedro Sánchez as president of the government is that the PSOE does not promote any modification to the Electoral Law (LOREG), and if necessary in extraordinary circumstances, it will only do so with prior agreement with the EAJ-PNV. In view of the European elections of June 2024, it is clear the extent to which democratic representation is distorted: the CEUS coalition, of which the EAJ-PNV was a member, won one seat with only 1.63 % of the votes cast in Spain. This result, which represents less than 0.078 % of the European electoral roll, would not have met the minimum threshold required by the 2018 reform. Therefore, it would not be entitled to that seat.

Removed:It should be noted that, while the modification of the LOREG can be carried out at the initiative of the Spanish Government or either Chamber of the Cortes Generales (Congress of Deputies or Senate), Council Decision 2018/994 can only be approved on the initiative of the Government (the proposal for the Spanish Parliament to approve the Council Decision must be enacted from the Consejo de Ministros).

Removed:5. European Parliament proposal for a new Electoral Act

Removed:Although Council Decision 2018/994 has not yet entered into force, the European Parliament has put forward a new legislative initiative that seeks to repeal the current European Electoral Act and adopt a new regulation governing European elections.

Removed:The Constitutional Affairs Committee (AFCO) appointed Domènec Ruiz Devesa (S&D, Spain) as rapporteur. The report was adopted on 28 March 2022 in AFCO and it was adopted by Plenary on 3 May 2022. During the current legislative term, Juan Fernando López Aguilar (S&D, Spain) has been appointed as the new rapporteur for this legislative file.

Removed:The proposal introduces several key changes, including the following:

Removed: A minimum common age of 18 years to stand as a candidate in European elections and a minimum common voting age of 16 years, except in Member States where the constitutional order establishes a minimum voting age of 17 or 18 years.

Removed: An obligation for Member States to ensure the right to vote in European elections to EU citizens living in a country outside the EU, those without a permanent residence, those living in closed residential settings, those experiencing homelessness or those serving a prison sentence.

Removed: An obligation for Member States to ensure the accessibility of the relevant materials, voting facilities and polling stations, including for persons with disabilities.

Removed: An obligation for Member States to provide for postal voting, including for EU citizens living abroad, and the possibility to allow advance physical voting, proxy voting, electronic and internet systems for voting.

Removed: A fixed day for holding European elections across the whole of the EU (9 May, every five years).

Removed: A common electoral campaign period starting eight weeks before the day of the elections and a common electoral reserve period commencing 48 hours before election day.

Removed: The obligation for all political parties and other entities participating in European elections to observe ‘democratic procedures and transparency’ when electing their candidates and to ensure gender equality in their candidatures, either by using a zipper system or quotas.

Removed: The creation of a Union-wide constituency, comprising the territory of all Member States, in which 28 Members of the European Parliament would be elected through transnational electoral lists.

Removed: The creation of a European Electoral authority.

Removed:Parliament’s legislative initiative as conferred on it by Article 223 TFEU is blocked for various reasons and still needs to be approved unanimously by the Council, obtain Parliament’s consent (by a majority of its component members) and receive the approval of all the Member States by their respective constitutional requirements to enter into force.

Removed:6. Conclusions

Removed:In the light of the above considerations, the rapporteurs consider that this implementation report should emphasise, in particular, the following conclusions:

Removed: Council Decision 2018/994 introduced few mandatory measures, of which only the establishment of the minimum threshold of 2 % was problematic for two Member States.

Removed: While Germany has ratified Council Decision 2018/994, the 2 % threshold cannot be applied at the next European elections if the Council Decision is not in force.

Removed: Council Decision 2018/994 can be considered as ‘minimal’ agreement, where many common criteria, aimed at reducing the fragmentation of voting procedures across the EU, are only optional.

Removed: Most countries already had the mandatory measures in force, and they did not change their national legislation to introduce the optional measures. Therefore, Council Decision 2018/994 had a somewhat limited impact.

Removed: Council Decision 2018/994, while not a perfect fit, would have contributed to greater uniformity in the 2024 EU elections.

Removed: Council Decision 2018/994 is not in force yet as the ratification process is still ongoing in Spain, due to the political obstacles to introducing a minimum threshold.