What changed between the plenary report and the adopted text

14 unchanged paragraphs

AJ. whereas the Arctic holds diverse energy resources crucial for the EU’s green and digital transitions, including green hydrogen, hydropower, wind and geothermal energy, which can help diversify and decarbonise the EU’s energy mix; whereas strategic investments are necessary to secure critical raw materials essential for the EU’s industrial competitiveness and defence capabilities;

AK. whereas initiatives such as Polar Connect and the ‘Vision 2030’ concept envisage resilient trans-Arctic submarine cable routes linking Greenland and Iceland with continental Europe; whereas such projects are vulnerable to hybrid threats by malign actors such as Russia and China;

AL. whereas the development of Arctic subsea fibre-optic cables linking Europe with Japan and South Korea represents a strategic opportunity to enhance secure, high-speed digital connectivity, strengthen the EU’s digital sovereignty and deepen EU-Asia cooperation; whereas protecting submarine cables, pipelines, communication systems and transport corridors in the Arctic is vital for the digital, energy and economic security of the EU and the EEA;

AM. whereas Greenland, Iceland and Norway manage the Arctic’s largest sustainable fisheries, and the region is developing expertise in biotechnology and innovation, which are vital for the EU’s food security, blue economy and scientific leadership; whereas the UNCLOS contains provisions on the rights, duties and responsibilities of states to safeguard environmental considerations;

AN. whereas the Arctic’s economic potential extends beyond natural resources to sectors such as sustainable tourism, space technology, and data centre infrastructure, offering the EU opportunities to develop strategic partnerships that leverage the region’s unique geography, renewable energy resources and proximity to key allies;

AO. whereas the principle of ‘do no significant harm’ means not supporting or carrying out economic activities that cause serious damage to environmental objectives within the meaning of Article 17 of Regulation (EU) 2020/852;

AP. whereas energy connections with the Arctic – including oil and gas imports from Norway’s Barents Sea, liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipments via Arctic shipping routes during the transition period towards the EU’s energy autonomy, renewable energy exports and green hydrogen potential from Iceland and Greenland, EU-backed infrastructure projects such as submarine cables and pipelines, and cooperation in research and innovation for sustainable development – are crucial for the EU’s energy security and future economic development and to ensure investments in local Arctic economies and infrastructure; whereas reliable energy partners and supplies are key to achieve overall security, as shown by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the subsequent energy crisis;

AQ. whereas the Arctic suffers from a shortage of infrastructure, placing local populations and others at a disadvantage; whereas the development of multipurpose infrastructure projects could help address both these shortcomings and broader security challenges;

AR. whereas newly constructed and planned LNG terminals – in particular floating storage and regasification units to which EU Member States have committed in recent years – provide an essential gateway for Norwegian LNG, further strengthening the diversification and security of supply; whereas the further development and production of icebreakers is key for the exploration and safety of the Arctic, and Finland has particular expertise in this regard;

AS. whereas EU-funded research, Horizon Europe partnerships and Copernicus satellite services provide essential data for security, climate resilience, navigation safety and environmental stewardship in the High North;

AT. whereas secure, resilient and autonomous satellite connectivity constitutes a strategic asset for safeguarding communications, enhancing situational awareness, protecting critical infrastructure and reinforcing the EU’s capacity to prevent, deter and respond to hybrid and conventional threats in the Arctic;

AU. whereas space technologies, including positioning, navigation, Earth observation and satellite communication, are essential for Arctic situational awareness, environmental monitoring and connectivity; whereas Norway’s geographic location and facilities, such as the Andøya Spaceport and the Arctic satellite broadband mission, provide critical infrastructure supporting EU interests and enable independent European access to space; whereas enhanced cooperation with Norway on space capabilities is vital for advancing the EU’s Arctic strategy and security;

AV. whereas the European External Action Service (EEAS) plays a central role in shaping and coordinating the EU’s Arctic policy;

1. Recommends that the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy:

Change 1

Changed:a)(a) condemn the growing militarisation of the Arctic, particularly due to Russia’s extensive military restructuring, including the establishment of the Maritime Collegium, which, in combination with China’s clear interest in the region, has further escalated regional tensions and undermined regional stability;

Change 2

Changed:b)(b) closely monitor China’s growing strategic interest and activities in the Arctic region under the framework of the ‘Polar Silk Road’; acknowledge that China’s declared ambition to become a ‘polar great power’ by 2030 and the expansion of its presence through research missions, strategic infrastructure investments and dual-use partnerships may challenge established governance principles;

Change 3

Changed:c)(c) take into account all potential threat scenarios related to the situation in Ukraine, including the possible strengthening of Russia’s presence in the Arctic as a consequence of a potential frozen conflict in Ukraine; therefore fully implement EU sanctions on dual-use technologies destined for Russia’s Arctic military expansion, while supporting Ukraine’s engagement with Arctic governance structures, including the prospect of observer status in relevant forums; strengthen sanctions against shadow fleet vessels using flags of convenience to evade sanctions in the Arctic; upgrade the monitoring and enforcement thereof, including through international cooperation to ensure that ports and insurance companies blacklist such vessels; hold flag states fully accountable for ensuring compliance with environmental and safety standards;

Change 4

Changed:d)(d) appreciate to its full extent the importance of the GIUK gap as a maritime transit corridor indissociable from EU interests, and the risks associated with its emergence as a theatre for grey-zone operations; accordingly, seek to build the institutional resilience of these countries and territories in cooperation with constructive partners;

Change 5

Changed:e)(e) work together with the Member States and NATO allies to strengthen deterrent capabilities in response, including through enhanced EU-NATO strategic dialogues on Arctic domain awareness, intelligence sharing and defensive joint exercises in the High North, following the examples of the Arctic Challenge 2023 hosted by Sweden, Finland and Norway and the Danish-led military exercise Arctic Light 2025; enhance cooperation with NATO structures and the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats to build resilience and develop common standards for infrastructure protection in the Arctic; deepen practical EU-NATO cooperation in the Arctic in areas of shared concern – including maritime domain awareness, protection of critical infrastructure, logistics and search and rescue interoperability; enhance vigilance in the EU’s engagement with external partners and establish EU-level security screening mechanisms for foreign Arctic research and infrastructure projects;

Change 6

Changed:f)(f) in parallel, continue working to prevent a spillover of geopolitical conflicts into the region, while assuming a more prominent role in the Arctic and pursuing a comprehensive re-articulation of Arctic policy that moves beyond the outdated notion of Arctic exceptionalism, and instead employing it as a method for assessing evolving challenges in the current geopolitical context;

Change 7

Changed:g)(g) with all that in mind, ensure that EU actions in the High North are complementary to NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept and benefit from the Alliance’s reinforced maritime posture; promote NATO-EU deconfliction and shared situational awareness and call for strengthened interoperability between the EU Member States and other NATO allies in Arctic security, maritime surveillance, search and rescue operations and the protection of critical infrastructure;

Change 8

Changed:h)(h) take note that the European Arctic region is part of a continuum that includes the Baltic Sea region within the Arctic, sharing common challenges and interests; acknowledge that the EU’s activities in the Arctic need to be aligned with, and support, the EU’s development activities implemented within the EU’s eastern border areas in the north to maximise their impact;

Change 9

Changed:i)(i) against this backdrop and in the light of recent incidents in the Baltic Sea attributed to Russia’s shadow fleet and Chinese vessels, substantially strengthen the protection of essential underwater infrastructure in the Arctic, particularly submarine cables and pipelines, including those in the proximity of Greenland, and tighten the regulatory framework for sanctions and countermeasures; uphold and enforce obligations under Articles 112 to 115 of the UNCLOS, which are essential to safeguard Europe’s digital and energy interconnectivity from geopolitical disruption; develop an EU and EEA strategy to monitor and counter Sino-Russian cooperation in the High North, which potentially undermines freedom of navigation and international law;

Change 10

Changed:j)(j) support the establishment of common cybersecurity and resilience standards for submarine cables, landing points and critical digital infrastructure in the Arctic, including through joint risk assessments, incident reporting requirements and periodic stress-testing exercises, recognising their strategic role in the EU’s open strategic autonomy;

Change 11

Changed:k)(k) address hybrid threats such as cyberattacks, GPS jamming and spoofing and undersea cable sabotage, which require enhanced monitoring and response mechanisms through a joint EU-NATO monitoring and response framework and increased investment in upgraded, secure and autonomous satellite communications, including launch capacity, as well as investments, underwater drones and sea-floor mapping; in that regard, support research, testing and phased deployment of EU-funded hybrid surveillance technologies, including unmanned systems, in coordination with Nordic partners, to monitor and respond to hybrid threats;

Change 12

Changed:l)(l) considering the growing strategic importance and reliance on Arctic space-based capabilities for European security, strengthen collective situational awareness, resilience and regional stability in the Arctic; in addition, promote EU-led investments and partnerships with trusted allies to secure critical Arctic infrastructure and reduce dependency on authoritarian powers, including the production of icebreakers, if possible, in cooperation with the EU’s strategic partners;

Change 13

Changed:m)(m) recognise the increasing geopolitical competition along Arctic maritime routes, particularly the NSR; support, therefore, diplomatic dialogues aimed at establishing clear international agreements regarding freedom of navigation and peaceful maritime cooperation, resisting unilateral claims and promoting the application of international maritime law in accordance with the UNCLOS; accordingly, publicly condemn Russia’s restrictions on free navigation in the NSR and its reinforcement of military infrastructure along the NSR; support the application of international law to counter attempts to legitimise contested shipping corridors or to project geopolitical influence under the pretexts of scientific or economic cooperation; engage in regional dialogues on the implementation of the Agreement under the UNCLOS on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction in the Arctic;

Change 14

Changed:n)(n) given the disproportionate impact of climate change on the Arctic, and in cooperation with international partners and Arctic Indigenous peoples, urgently enhance adaptation strategies that also have a security policy dimension, support extensive monitoring initiatives and significantly increase investments in research programmes that prioritise the need to balance economic growth while protecting critical ecosystems in the Arctic, in line with the ‘do no significant harm’ principle enshrined in Article 17 of Regulation (EU) 2020/852; recognise that, while climate change threatens Arctic ecosystems, rising temperatures also have major societal impacts in the Arctic regions, emphasising the need to place the people living in the Arctic at the centre of research and to ensure that the benefits of research activities help local communities adapt and become more resilient;

Change 15

Changed:o)(o) given the significance of Arctic natural resources, including hydrocarbons, rare earth elements and fisheries, and together with the Member States, strengthen consensual partnerships with Greenland and other Arctic stakeholders, including Indigenous communities, on sustainable resource extraction and processing while strictly adhering to the highest environmental standards to avoid disastrous consequences, such as the ones caused by the 2020 Norilsk (Russia) oil spill; ensure that such cooperation, on the one hand, contributes to population growth and the revitalisation of local communities in the Arctic and, on the other hand, reduces the EU’s dependence on China and other unreliable providers; take into account the EU’s strategic interests in securing access to critical raw materials from reliable, like-minded partners, as well as the EU’s economic growth;

Change 16

Changed:p)(p) in parallel, work towards the establishment of a binding international environmental liability regime to ensure that polluters bear full responsibility for accidents and ecological damage in Arctic waters, in the light of the potential opening of new trans-Arctic shipping lanes;

Change 17

Changed:q)(q) given the need to respect and promote the rights of Indigenous peoples across the Arctic, work towards the incorporation of Indigenous knowledge in environmental and policymaking processes, ensuring that Indigenous interests and expertise are well integrated in all levels of EU policymaking alongside all other relevant sources of knowledge, and that their languages and culture are protected;

Change 18

Changed:r)(r) prioritise mental health, literacy, language and youth programmes in EU Arctic cooperation, responding to recommendations from Arctic Indigenous and youth forums;

Change 19

Changed:s)(s) respect Article 19 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples which states their rights; similarly, ensure that the EU’s and Member States’ activities in the Arctic contribute to, and do not harm, the well-being and rights of Indigenous communities, in accordance with the 1996 Ottawa Declaration; consider and counteract Indigenous peoples’ heightened exposure to foreign interference and disinformation campaigns that seek to weaponise complex and unique contexts;

Change 20

Changed:t)(t) fully integrate the recommendations of the 2013 Kiruna Declaration into the EU’s Arctic policy, including by supporting increased funding for renewable energy and sustainable waste management in Arctic communities, strengthening mechanisms for the meaningful participation of Indigenous peoples in Arctic governance and decision-making, enhancing civil security and emergency response capacities in Arctic regions – including search and rescue and disaster preparedness infrastructure – and promoting interdisciplinary research and education partnerships, including support for Arctic youth and local and Indigenous institutions;

Change 21

Changed:u)(u) promote the full implementation of the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement, requiring the signatories to establish a joint programme of scientific research and monitoring and to integrate Indigenous knowledge before allowing any future commercial fishing activities in the region;

Change 22

Changed:v)(v) acknowledging that a populated Arctic, cross-border infrastructure and resilient societies are of strategic importance for European security, strengthen cooperation within and with the European Arctic; support, in particular, the development of north-to-north and east-to-west infrastructure projects in the Swedish and Finnish Arctic, with particular emphasis on facilitating increased capacity on the existing railway from Finland to the Arctic Ocean and exploring new multimodal transport links, to strengthen EU-Nordic connectivity and military mobility;

Change 23

Changed:w)(w) recognising the importance of resilient connectivity for Arctic communities and EU security, devise EU instruments that actively promote increased economic integration in the Arctic region, as investments in cross-border infrastructure increase mobility, stimulate innovation and business development and strengthen the security of supply and preparedness through cooperation between public and private actors;

Change 24

Changed:x)(x) acknowledge that the EU’s support of Arctic development and collaboration is vital for fostering relations, trust and development capacity in sparsely populated and vulnerable northern areas;

Change 25

Changed:y)(y) recognise that competitiveness and crisis management in a complex security policy environment depend on strong, innovative societies and local businesses with their own capabilities, and on cross-border cooperation between policymakers, researchers, businesses and communities; recognise that the EU should continue to, in close dialogue with relevant states and regional bodies, support the capacity building of more resilient and sustainable Arctic communities;

Change 26

Changed:z)(z) highlighting the critical role played by international scientific cooperation in Arctic governance and climate understanding, support continued EU funding for and active participation in Arctic research projects and scientific dialogues; promote open data sharing and the integration of scientific findings into policymaking processes, while ensuring that such scientific exchange is conducted with full awareness of the current defence and security risks arising from the geopolitical situation;

Change 27

Changed:aa)(aa) recognise the unique role of universities in Arctic rural areas as drivers of regional development and economic growth through innovation in research and businesses, attracting newcomers, enhancing local and regional competence and skills, promoting regional cohesion, and distributing knowledge and information that contributes to resilience and preparedness; support Arctic universities, including through financial contributions via a mix of EU programmes; reinforce educational and research mobility between EU universities and Arctic higher education institutions, including in Greenland, Iceland and northern Norway, to foster a new generation of Arctic experts and deepen people-to-people cooperation; increase funding of interdisciplinary research on the Arctic and support the establishment of a European Centre of Excellence for Arctic Research, making use of Copernicus services, open data infrastructures, in situ measurements and traditional knowledge, in order to provide operational scientific products to support EU-level decision-making and cooperation with legitimate international partners;

Change 28

Changed:ab)(ab) in the light of the growing support for EU accession in Iceland, welcome the intention expressed by local authorities to hold a referendum by 2027 on the resumption of EU accession negotiations and pledge to respect the outcome thereof, as democratically expressed by the Icelandic people; meanwhile, engage proactively with the Icelandic Government to promote the benefits of potential EU membership and enhance preparedness for a renewed accession process should Iceland formally reactivate its application, while immediately enhancing cooperation on common interests and offering EU assistance in the fight against hybrid threats and foreign interference;

Change 29

Changed:ac)(ac) welcome the Icelandic Government’s decision to launch talks on a security and defence partnership with the EU; express that the resulting agreement will be fundamental for future EU-Iceland relations;

Change 30

Changed:ad)(ad) recognise Norway as a key EU and NATO ally and underline the ongoing need to strengthen security and defence cooperation with full alignment to NATO commitments; with that in mind, considering that Norway’s EU membership would strengthen both its national interests and the EU’s geopolitical resilience by closing critical gaps in the latter’s collective defence – notably in the GIUK gap – explore deeper cooperation with Norway, including the possible extension to Norway of Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union and Norway’s potential EU accession; highlight that comprehensive defence cooperation with Norway is already possible, as demonstrated by robust Nordic defence cooperation, which should serve as a model for closer EU-Norway ties;

Change 31

Changed:ae)(ae) given Norway’s crucial role in EU energy security, accounting for more than 30 % of EU gas imports in 2024, enhance cooperation on energy resilience and supply diversification as a key tool – alongside other strategic infrastructure projects such as the Baltic Sea Gas Corridor – to achieve EU strategic autonomy, enhanced resilience and reduced dependence on Russian energy supplies;

Change 32

Changed:af)(af) welcome Norway’s ongoing support for Ukraine, including its decision to allocate almost EUR 600 million towards Ukrainian air defence systems;

Change 33

Changed:ag)(ag) in the light of Parliament’s deep concern about Greenland’s growing geopolitical significance – exacerbated by external actors’ statements questioning Denmark’s constitutional arrangements and sovereignty, and reports of foreign interference in its domestic affairs, including certain statements by the US administration – reaffirm respect for Greenland’s right to self-determination, emphasising that decisions regarding Greenland’s constitutional future and international relations must be made exclusively by the people of Greenland, free from external pressure;

Change 34

Changed:ah)(ah) in view of the increasing relevance of Greenland in Arctic and European security frameworks, alongside increasing support for EU accession among Greenlanders, evidenced by polling suggesting that around 60 % of Greenlanders now favour rejoining the EU, welcome any potential initiative by the Government of Greenland to strengthen its political, institutional and economic links with the EU; encourage the EU to engage in deeper strategic and economic partnerships, including in the context of potential accession, if and when desired by the Greenlandic people; in this regard, underline that EU membership, which gives access to initiatives such as Iris2 and Galileo, would give Greenland a stronger voice in Arctic governance, provide the means to protect its crucial ecosystems and enable the sustainable development of critical infrastructure as new northern trade routes emerge, while also bolstering its security;

Change 35

Changed:ai)(ai) take note of Greenland’s first security strategy entitled ‘Greenland in the World: Nothing about Us Without Us – Greenland’s Foreign, Security and Defense Policy 2024-2033’, which reflects the principle of meaningful inclusion of Arctic peoples in shaping policies that affect their region; take note of the recommendation in the strategy to establish a peace centre in Nuuk that would promote dialogue and facilitate research and mediation;

Change 36

Changed:aj)(aj) acknowledge that Greenland aligned itself with EU sanctions against Russia following the invasion of Ukraine; underline that the opening of the Commission’s office in Nuuk marks a new stage in cooperation with Greenland, which, although not a Member State, has long maintained a close association with the EU and benefited from its financial support, including in the education sector;

Change 37

Changed:ak)(ak) strengthen collaboration with Canada; underline the strategic relevance of the EU-Canada partnership in the light of shared democratic values and global responsibilities, and promote security and defence cooperation in the Arctic as part of an ambitious and forward-looking EU-Canada agenda;

Change 38

Changed:al)(al) highlight, in particular, the need for increased cooperation to combat malign activities by Russia and China in the Arctic, while fostering economic development and recalling that military cooperation can also strengthen local communities; develop a structured dialogue within the framework of the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, focusing on ecosystem and biodiversity protection, the implementation of international environmental standards, resilient infrastructure, maritime route security and the integration of Indigenous knowledge into decision-making processes; recall the high potential for EU-Canada cooperation on Canadian natural resources; encourage closer cooperation in scientific and cultural fields to empower Indigenous populations and strengthen Arctic resilience; emphasise that collaboration on infrastructure development and management and Indigenous partnership models is central to EU-Canada cooperation; prioritise rapid steps to deepen political, economic and security cooperation with Canada, given its role as a founding member of the Arctic Council and a strategic EU partner;

Change 39

Changed:am)(am) advance EU-US dialogue on the Arctic; highlight the many common EU-US challenges in the region, ranging from climate to security cooperation; underline that EU-US cooperation in the Arctic is fundamental to containing Russia and China and ensuring shared security between the EU and the US;

Change 40

Changed:an)(an) underline that a stronger regional dialogue with like-minded partners in the Arctic is necessary, and call upon EU leaders to bring together the leaders of such partners in order to establish a common, substantial and viable long-term Arctic strategy;

Change 41

Changed:ao)(ao) reinforce multilateral governance and cooperation through the Arctic Council, particularly under the current Chairship of the Kingdom of Denmark, spearheaded by Greenland for the 2025-2027 period; in this respect, urge all members to uphold peaceful, law-based governance frameworks and to restore effective multilateral cooperation, with a particular emphasis on environmental protection, sustainable development and the rights of Indigenous peoples;

Change 42

Changed:ap)(ap) strengthen cooperation with Arctic Council observer states, such as Japan and South Korea, focusing on sustainable technology, icebreaking capabilities and maritime safety, while safeguarding EU strategic interests;

Change 43

Changed:aq)(aq) renew its efforts to support the EU’s application to become a full observer within the Arctic Council and enhance EU participation in the working groups of the Arctic Council;

Change 44

Changed:ar)(ar) increase funding and support for cooperation with key Arctic institutions, such as the Arctic Economic Council, the Arctic Mayors’ Forum and the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, including through capacity-building, joint projects and research initiatives, recognising their essential role in promoting sustainable development and local engagement across the Arctic region;

Change 45

Changed:as)(as) recognise that an upgraded and enhanced EU Arctic strategy also requires additional financial resources; therefore, ensure that the next multiannual financial framework stimulates strategic investments in Arctic shipping capabilities, modern communication systems, logistics hubs and supporting infrastructure, including icebreaking vessels; stress that such investments must guarantee strict compliance with environmental standards and ensure the meaningful participation of Indigenous peoples in policy planning and implementation;

Change 46

Changed:at)(at) strengthen the mandate of the Special Envoy for Arctic Matters by ensuring clearer authority, adequate resources and responsibilities to monitor security and environmental developments, represent the EU in Arctic forums, coordinate Arctic policy, engage with Indigenous communities, and report to the Council and Parliament;