What changed between the plenary report and the adopted text

75. Asks the EIB to collaborate with other bilateral and multilateral institutions to develop and apply common methodologies for development impact analysis, with a view to ensuring added value and long-term, positive impacts;

EIB accountability architecture

76. Recalls that internal oversight at the EIB is headed by the Inspectorate General (IG), which comprises three accountability-related divisions – operations evaluation, the complaints mechanism and fraud investigation – that hold complementary roles, contributing to the consistent handling of allegations and complaints;

77. Observes that the EIB Complaints Mechanism (EIB-CM) handled a total of 104 cases in 2023 (97 in 2022); notes that 60 new complaints were received in 2023 (54 in 2022), of which 44 were considered admissible and 29 were related to EIB-financed projects, of which 27 were located outside Europe;

78. Notes that the EIB Procurement Complaints Committee is the independent EIB committee handling complaints about project procurement procedures relating to EIB-financed projects outside the EU;

79. Welcomes the efforts of the Investigative Division (IG/IN) to cooperate and coordinate efforts with the other components of the EU’s anti-fraud architecture, in particular the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), which received 37 % of the referrals made for investigations in 2023 (27 cases out of 74); encourages the IG/IN to strengthen its cooperation with all components of the EU’s anti-fraud architecture;

80. Notes that the IG/IN carries out proactive fraud detection activities using the Fraud and Integrity Risk Scoring Tool and the Corruption Risk In Procurement robot and that, in 2023, 24 reviews identified targets for three full and in-depth proactive integrity reviews; invites the Bank to assess how these digital tools could be further enhanced to support transparency and financial accountability;

81. Regrets the fact that, despite repeated calls by Parliament, the IG/IN annual report does not provide adequate information about the financial magnitude of the cases it handles, the funds or mandates affected, the kinds of projects concerned, the mitigating measures adopted, the role of the EIB services and of the intermediaries or partners in the cases, or even the Member States concerned; invites the representatives of the IG/IN to increase the level of engagement, interactions and transparency with Parliament, especially regarding the control of the financial activities; reiterates its call to the IG/IN to go beyond providing a mere narrative description of a few case studies, and to periodically report valuable insights into the extent to which financial interests are safeguarded; suggests that the IG/IN adopt a reporting model similar to those used by other investigative bodies, such as EPPO and OLAF, where a proper balance between transparency and duty of confidentiality or of professional secrecy is pursued;

82. Is aware that the EIB Exclusion Policy provides for an autonomous exclusion process that is not fully equivalent to the Commission’s Early Detection and Exclusion System in terms of decision-making standards, results and remedies; reiterates its call on the EIB Group and the Commission to cooperate in identifying the potential gaps and proposing remedies, including an expedited procedure to enforce EIB exclusion decisions via the Early Detection and Exclusion System; observes that in 2023, exclusion proceedings based on IG/IN findings excluded five companies from participating in any EIB-financed activity for a period of five years;

83. Welcomes the approval, in 2023, of the EIB Group’s Internal Control Framework Policy; acknowledges the results of the group alignment process between the EIB and the EIF insofar as they reflect the different business models and governance structures of the two entities; refers, in particular, to the Audit Committee’s remarks that both internal audit and the internal control framework should evolve to become group functions;

84. Notes that the EIB’s independent external auditor is the third line of defence; points out that the regular rotation of auditors and assignments allows fresh perspectives, and therefore observes that the EIB external auditor should be rotated periodically, yet its mandate was extended until 2027 and it has been the auditor of the EIB Group since 2009;

85. Appreciates that the EIB Group Risk Management Framework and EIB Group’s semi-annual Risk Management Disclosure Reports are effective and are aligned with the requirements and technical standards of the European Banking Authority;

86. Stresses that, in 2023, despite difficult market conditions, the EIB’s portfolio continued to exhibit very low levels of non-performing exposures (NPEs); takes the view that even if a significant portion of the Bank’s loan portfolio benefits from credit enhancements or from EU Member State guarantees, the high quality of the EIB’s portfolio results from the diligent implementation of very effective EIB lending policies;

87. Highlights that the EIB does not fall within the scope of application of the EU’s legislation applicable to credit institutions, in particular the Capital Requirements Regulation and Directive (CRR, CRD), thus the Bank is entitled to determine its capital and liquidity requirements in a manner that is adequate and appropriate to its activities, its mission and the market conditions; points out that the EIB Group is committed to conform to the best banking and market practices and can determine their applicability in line with the proportionality principle; stresses that the implementation of these norms should not create unwarranted burden; welcomes the fact that the EIB Group voluntarily performed the Review and Evaluation Process; points out that this should be in line with the EIB’s governance structure and mission;

88. Understands that, in line with the EU’s evolving needs, the EU institutions approved, in 2024, the change in statute proposed by the EIB Board of Governors by amending the statutory limit on its gearing ratio and raising it from 250 % to 290 %, to enable the EIB to invest more without increasing its equity base;

89. Notes that the amended gearing ratio paves the way for increased risk-taking; acknowledges that investments in renewable energy, sustainable infrastructure and innovative technologies are crucial for the EU’s competitiveness, but often carry greater risk because of the uncertainty of returns; points out that increased risk-taking may increase the volatility of the EIB’s returns, but observes that the EIB maintains capital buffers that would support expanded risk activities;

91. Stresses that the expansion of the gigafactory site was expected to increase the annual output capacity for battery production and was of strategic importance for global competitiveness and was consistent with the EU’s strategies in the sector;

92. Calls on the Commission and the EIB Board of Directors to launch an in-depth internal review without undue delay to verify the financial damage, the reasons for and the background to the failure of this flagship project and to learn from this experience in order to prevent the recurrence of a similar situation or enable the early detection thereof;

93. Maintains that the greatest added value of EU support lies in fostering higher-risk investments in innovative projects, scaling up EU strategic goals and enabling long-term transition projects that cannot get funding from the private sector; believes that to effectively pursue its targets in innovation and competitiveness, the InvestEU programme should focus on financing higher-risk and more scale-up investment and that the EIB Group should take on more and larger high-risk projects, which should involve primarily and preferentially European investors, combining a more risk-absorption-oriented deployment of InvestEU resources with an equivalent orientation in the use of the EIB Group’s own financial resources; urges the EIB to introduce stricter conditions to prevent EU public financing from being used to subsidise companies relocating production outside Europe, ensuring that all EIB-funded projects contribute to long-term European industrial resilience;

94. Is aware that members of the EIB’s Management Committee are often civil servants in their countries of origin before beginning their terms at the EIB, which typically last for two to six years, and that they are therefore entitled to pursue professional development opportunities subject to certain conditions during the cooling-off period (which has been extended to a period of 24 months after the end of their term at the EIB); notes that Management Committee members are asked to inform the Ethics and Compliance Committee and seek approval as soon as possible for any negotiations regarding prospective employment;

95. Strongly echoes Parliament’s repeated calls to strengthen the mechanism to prevent conflicts of interest within the EIB and to improve the handling of such cases, and to better define the terms under which EIB vice-presidents can participate in decisions about operations in their countries of origin, and insists that these matters be addressed in a future revision of the Management Committee code of conduct;

96. Highlights that on 31 October 2023, the European Ombudsman ruled in Case 611/2022/KR that a former vice-president had participated in approving financing agreements between the EIB and a national promotional bank in his country of origin just weeks before becoming the Chief Executive Officer of that national promotional bank, despite the EIB’s Chief Compliance Officer advising against such actions during the appointment process; understands that this case predates the entry into force of the current Management Committee code of conduct, which now includes specific provisions regarding the prospective employment of its members; notes that, in the future review of the rules applicable to its Ethics and Compliance Committee, the EIB has committed to consider the European Ombudsman recommendation to make public the Committee’s decisions;

97. Observes that mitigating measures, such as ring-fencing and cooling-off periods, are the most common precautionary clauses to be used when handling a revolving-doors case and understands that such measures are implemented and are complied with by the members of the Management Committee, including those recently reported on in the media;

98. Shares the view of the European Ombudsman that the role of the EIB Ethics and Compliance Committee should be strengthened when it comes to overseeing the intended new jobs of Management Committee members and that it should be able to impose and enforce risk-mitigating measures; understands that the role of the Ethics and Compliance Committee has become more prominent in recent years and that internal discussions are ongoing on how to enhance its efficiency;

99. Invites the Bank to boost the participation of European companies in procurement processes launched for projects financed by the EIB; encourages the Bank to advise borrowers to prioritise eligibility for European companies in order to strengthen European competitiveness;

100. Reiterates its call on the EIB to ensure proper geographical representation, including at middle and senior management levels, and calls on it to publish an annual breakdown of the gender and nationality for middle and senior management positions;

Scrutiny, transparency and oversight

101. Strongly regrets the fact that the European Court of Auditors (ECA) still lacks full access to all data relating to EIB operations; acknowledges that not all the activities of the EIB are directly financed by the EU and, therefore, not all activities are automatically accessible to the ECA; insists that the ECA should have access to the necessary information to comprehensively and exhaustively assess all EIB operations involving EU funds, including those conducted through financial intermediaries, designed to implement EU policies; calls on the ECA to fully scrutinise, to the best of its abilities, all operations involving the EU budget to any degree;

102. Observes that the main relevant audit tasks are entrusted to the EIB Audit Committee, which is a fully independent body; believes that the participation of qualified external representatives in specific Audit Committee tasks could enhance the objectivity of the Audit Committee’s analyses;

103. Notes that the EIB’s Transparency Policy strikes a compromise between the principle of openness and the need to safeguard sensitive information; observes that the policy indicates what information should be published proactively and when – stipulating, for instance, that project summaries should be published at least three weeks before the project’s financing is considered for approval by the EIB Board of Directors – and sets out the relevant derogations; calls for these summaries to provide meaningful information to stakeholders;

104. Notes that in 2023, 449 projects were approved by the EIB Board of Directors and that almost all (94 %) of the project summaries were published, in the majority (57 %) of cases before approval; observes that all EIB operations conducted through financial intermediaries are published on the EIB’s website and that the EIB provides details on request;

105. Recalls that all EIB documents are accessible to the public in line with the presumption in favour of disclosure; emphasises that all applicants should be informed in advance about public access to documents, and any refusals should be based solely on specified exceptions; stresses that the EIB should consider publishing, in a timely manner, information regarding the rationale and context for projects and the explanation of their alignment with and contribution to EU policy goals; calls on the EIB to systematically publish audit results of its largest financial operations, ensuring independent scrutiny of its risk management and impact assessments; expects the EIB to limit non-disclosure to the applicable exceptions listed in Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 and Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006; calls for the full implementation of the Ombudsman’s recommendations issued following its inquiries into EIB disclosure policy and related requests for access to documents;

106. Recalls that all recipients of EU funding have a general obligation to acknowledge its origin and ensure the visibility of any EU funding received; calls on the EIB Group to ensure that final recipients comply with the visibility criteria of the EU’s financial support;

107. Highlights that the Bank is working to reduce the time needed to bring a product from conception to market availability (time to market) by fully digitising its project cycles; calls for the Bank to intensify its efforts in the digitalisation of its operations;

109. Reiterates that more structured dialogue between Parliament and the EIB would be enhanced by the adoption of a memorandum of cooperation; praises, in this connection, the EIB’s unprecedented cooperation with Parliament for the preparation of this resolution, noting that it is a tangible expression of openness and transparency;

Follow-up on Parliament’s recommendations

110. Urges the EIB to continue reporting on the status of previous recommendations issued by Parliament, particularly regarding the outcomes achieved and the impact of the actions taken to implement its priorities and the EU’s policies, especially as regards:

(a) impact (economic, environmental and social) of its investment strategy and results achieved in contributing to the balanced and steady development of the internal market in the interests of the Union;

(b) actions adopted to enhance the prevention and countering of conflicts of interest, fraud, corruption and other potential forms of misconduct;

(c) new measures to strengthen transparency;

(d) measures to strengthen support for SMEs and eligible economic operators during the implementation of EU policies;

(e) follow-up on the calls and requests adopted via the present resolution;

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111. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission, and asks that the Council and the EIB Board of Directors hold a debate on Parliament’s positions presented herein.