Changes between two versions
What changed between the plenary report and the adopted text
AI:What changed, in short
The digital euro provisions are substantially changed: Parliament now demands a political decision by EU co-legislators before introduction, and the ECB must demonstrate benefits first.89 The call on market neutrality is softened by noting it is an operational tool, not a legal requirement.10 Other changes are formal: updated inflation figures and months, and a decimal separator correction.1234
3 changes of substance · 6 formal · 1 of wording only
Written by AI from the two texts only · read the changes before relying on it · 4 Sept 2026 · Report a problem
+7 added · −9 removed · 12 changed paragraphs, packaging included.
Part 2 of 3: Paragraphs 61–114
6 unchanged paragraphs
10. Stresses that keeping interest rates too high could harm economic growth; calls on the ECB not to lower interest rates too quickly, given the risk that inflation levels could start increasing again while inflation is already above 2 %; highlights the key role that inflation expectations play and that excessive volatility in inflation rates might distort inflation expectations; invites the ECB to assess the impact of interest rate changes on different economic sectors, among them capital-intensive sectors;
11. Acknowledges that the monetary policy decisions taken by the Governing Council of the ECB since the inflation crisis stemming from the rise in energy prices have put inflation on a path which is compatible with the achievement of the objective of price stability, while avoiding a serious deterioration in economic activity or employment;
12. Recalls that the Eurosystem was built on the principle of monetary dominance and that the economic and monetary union therefore requires solid fiscal policies in the Member States in order to be able to respond to external shocks; recalls the need for adequate implementation of the new fiscal framework to ensure the credibility of fiscal policies at the level of the economic and monetary union; notes that sufficient fiscal space also allows Member States to respond to external shocks; notes the flexibility provided by the new fiscal rules in this regard; points out that Member States can enhance their resilience to external shocks through fiscal measures as well as with growth-enhancing reforms;
13. Recalls that prudent fiscal policies by the Member States can complement the ECB’s efforts to keep inflation low and thereby protect incomes; highlights that addressing excessive public deficit and debt levels is crucial to maintaining a stable economy, sustainable growth and to having the policy space available for governments to respond to adverse shocks; notes in this respect the recent findings of the Financial Stability Review concerning high levels of national debt;
14. Notes that the ECB’s monetary policies aimed at delivering its primary mandate are subject to a proportionality assessment; notes that the proportionality assessment takes into account the impact of monetary policy measures on the broader economy and economic policies;
Monetary policy
Change 5
Changed:15. Strongly welcomes the fact that headline inflation has come down from its peak of 10.610,6 % in October 2022 to 2.22,4 % in NovemberDecember 2024;
Change 6
Changed:16. Welcomes the decrease in core inflation from its peak of 7.67,6 % in March 2023 to 2.72,7 % in NovemberDecember 2024, but expresses its unease at its historically and persistently high level; notes with concern that high core inflation could translate into higher headline inflation numbers;
5 unchanged paragraphs
17. Notes that it has taken the ECB more than three years to achieve a level of inflation that is commensurate with its target level of 2 %; recalls in this regard the ECB’s incorrect assessment that inflation was expected to be only transitory;
18. Stresses that supply shocks, primarily originating from external sources, were among the key drivers of the inflation surges; recognises that monetary policy has a more direct effect on inflation levels when it stems primarily from demand factors rather than supply factors;
19. Welcomes the ECB’s efforts to regularly update its models; invites the ECB to continue reviewing and improving its models and their role in its policymaking in light of the subpar performance of the models in recent years, in order to learn from previous crises, particularly to better distinguish between demand-driven and supply-side sources of inflation; stresses that economic supply shocks can arise from many sources, among others geopolitical events, climate-related or natural disasters and cyberattacks;
20. Stresses that the inclusion of owner-occupied housing (OOH) in the HICP is desirable for reasons of both representativeness and comparability across countries in the euro area; calls for an acceleration of the roadmap in order to ensure the rapid inclusion of OOH data in the HICP; welcomes the Governing Council of the ECB’s commitment to consider both in its monetary policy assessments and decisions also the available inflation measures regarding the quarterly stand-alone OOH index;
21. Supports the ECB’s decision to scale back its asset purchase programmes, so as to balance market liquidity conditions and inflation levels, in view of the excess liquidity in the market and decreased levels of inflation; welcomes the fact that the asset portfolio under the ECB’s purchasing programmes has been on a downward trend since 2023;
Change 7
Changed:22. Underlines that interest on commercial banks’ holdings of bank reserves resulted in the Eurosystem paying more than EUR 120 billion interest to credit institutions in 2023, amounting to at least 0.80,8 % of euro area GDP; considers this is a significant subsidy to the banking sector; asks the ECB to mitigate this issue;
4 unchanged paragraphs
23. Stresses that the ECB’s purchase programmes are unconventional policies applicable only during crisis periods that, if not carefully implemented, risk contravening the prohibition on monetary financing under Article 123(1) TFEU; invites the ECB to continue monitoring the gradual reduction of its balance sheet, to limit prolonged potential destabilising effects in the euro area, while monitoring the growth and competitiveness of the EU’s economy; invites the ECB to share insights on the impact of the purchasing programmes on the functioning of financial markets, including the impact on pension funds and pension insurance cooperation;
24. Stresses that an even transmission of monetary policy is vital to the achievement of the ECB’s price stability mandate; underlines that excessive divergence in sovereign yields makes credit conditions inconsistent with the uniform transmission of monetary policy and makes reducing public debt exceedingly difficult; takes note of the establishment of the transmission protection instrument (TPI) in July 2022 as a tool to support the effective transmission of monetary policy;
25. Stresses that diverging interest rates in the euro area are – in the absence of any serious financial disturbances – generally the result of different risk premiums on government bonds reflecting, among other factors, different approaches to fiscal policy; notes that TPI interventions may conceal underlying fiscal challenges; stresses that TPI should be used under the conditions set by the ECB only to address financial market stress unrelated to economic fundamentals; calls on Member States to conduct responsible fiscal policies and ensure sustainable debt levels, thereby ensuring their resilience against current and future shocks;
Digital euro
Change 8
Changed:26. WelcomesNotes the ECB’s progress on the digital euro project and welcomes its ongoing dialogue with Parliament; underscores that theany digital euro should deliver clear added value to European citizens, including enhanced strategic autonomy in payments, a higher level of competition in the retail payment market, potential to foster innovation in payments and finance, improved financial inclusion and a reliable offline backup payment system; calls on the ECB to clearly communicatedemonstrate these benefits in order tobefore fosterthe publicEU trustco-legislators anddecide awareness;whether notesor thatnot theto EUintroduce co-legislatorsa willdigital needeuro tothat strikestrikes the right balance, among others, on holding limits, privacy concerns, competition with private payment solutions and usability in a business context;
Change 9
Removed:27. Considers that the digital euro will only become a success story if it provides tangible added value for European citizens that they can understand; notes that currently many European citizens either have not heard about the digital euro project or remain sceptical; invites the ECB, together with relevant stakeholders, to launch a broad information campaign on the digital euro in order to allay citizens’ concerns;
Added:27. Demands that any decision to issue the digital euro should not be taken exclusively by the Governing Council of the ECB; considers, instead, that the decision on whether or not to introduce a digital euro is ultimately a political decision that has to be taken by the EU co-legislators, given the profound potential impact of such a decision on a wide range of EU domains, including privacy, consumer protection, financial stability, financial policy and other areas that go beyond the strict remit of monetary policy;
Removed:28. Reiterates that the digital euro will serve as complement to physical cash, that it should not replace cash and that cash will remain widely available and accessible at all times in order to ensure a plurality of means of payment; welcomes, in that context, the proposal for a regulation on the use of euro cash as legal tender;
Added:28. Considers that the digital euro will only become a success story if it provides tangible added value for European citizens that they can understand; notes that currently many European citizens either have not heard about the digital euro project or remain sceptical;
Added:29. Reiterates that cash should remain widely available and accessible at all times in order to ensure a plurality of means of payment; welcomes, in that context, the proposal for a regulation on the use of euro cash as legal tender;
8 unchanged paragraphs
30. Stresses the need for a cost-based compensation model for the banking sector, which is tasked with the practical implementation of the digital euro project; recalls that the compensation model must guarantee a euro that is free of charge for its users;
31. Calls on the ECB to take due account of financial stability concerns and potential changes in the structure of the financial sector resulting from the introduction of the digital euro; recalls the importance of holding limits, in order not to create additional risks for banks’ balance sheets, especially during crises;
32. Calls on the ECB to prioritise robust privacy safeguards, establishing them as a gold standard for privacy for central bank digital currency (CBDC), to secure public confidence and address citizens’ concerns regarding data protection and autonomy;
Secondary objectives
33. Stresses that the EU’s secondary objectives are indeterminate as currently specified by the Treaties; notes that the supportive nature of the ECB’s secondary objectives complements the primary mandate; according to the Treaties, the EU’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples, create balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment;
34. Recalls that without prejudice to the ECB’s primary mandate, the Treaties require it to support the general economic policies of the Union; calls on the ECB to adhere to its mandate when interpreting or acting upon its secondary objectives; stresses that overstepping this mandate touches on the independence of the ECB; considers that maintaining price stability and stable macroeconomic conditions is conducive to creating the right conditions for the implementation of the EU’s general economic policy objectives;
35. Stresses that the ECB’s secondary objectives are best achieved when operating in a stable macroeconomic environment based on predictable price levels that encourages investment; calls on the ECB to include a specific chapter in its annual report explaining how it has interpreted and implemented its secondary objectives;
36. Stresses that the ECB should prevent distortions in the signalling function of prices that ensures an efficient allocation of resources; invites the ECB to further assess to what extent climate change affects its ability to maintain price stability;
Change 10
Changed:36.37. InsistsCalls thaton the ECB to respect the market neutrality approach in its monetary operations;operations, while noting that the ECB acknowledges that market neutrality is an operational tool, rather than a legal requirement;
21 unchanged paragraphs
38. Notes that the ECB’s actions to decarbonise its corporate bond holdings have not strictly followed a market neutral approach;
39. Invites the ECB to review its policies to ensure that these measures promote EU competitiveness whereas such actions should in no way jeopardise the primary objective of the ECB;
40. Calls on the ECB to use all its available tools to ensure that banks take all financial and external risks, including climate and geopolitical risks, seriously; welcomes the ECB’s activities to further enhance the Eurosystem’s risk assessment tools and capabilities in order to better include climate- and environment-related risks, particularly because climate change and extreme weather phenomena could lead to greater price volatility, especially in the agri-food sector; invites the ECB to continue its work on climate risk stress tests developed to assess the resilience of banks and corporations in the face of climate transition risk;
41. Notes the Climate and nature plan 2024-2025; invites the ECB to draft a Geopolitics plan 2025-2030 in order to better understand the implications of war and conflict on price stability and treat all potential sources of external shocks equally;
Other aspects
42. Underlines that a strengthened international role of the euro would lead to lower interest rates in the euro area, increased status for the EU on the international stage and enhanced macroeconomic stability; recalls that strengthening the international role of the euro would contribute to enhancing the EU’s strategic autonomy;
43. Calls on the ECB to look into strengthening the international role of the euro with a view to enhancing its attractiveness as a reserve currency and support market-driven shifts in this direction; notes that the completion of the economic and monetary union could foster the international role of the euro;
44. Notes the ECB’s support for the establishment of a fully fledged European deposit insurance scheme; acknowledges that risk-sharing and risk-reduction are interlinked;
45. Welcomes the attention that the ECB pays to the risks of cyberattacks; calls on the ECB to ensure the safety and security of the monetary system for its users, especially in the light of ongoing geopolitical developments;
46. Considers that financial stability is a prerequisite for effective monetary policy and a resilient financial system; welcomes the finalisation of the Basel III framework and its implementation from 1 January 2025, as it has the potential to strengthen the resilience of the banking sector in this regard; notes, however, the delays in implementation and lack of clarity with regard to implementation by a certain number of other jurisdictions, resulting in an uneven level playing field at the global level;
47. Acknowledges the ECB’s concern regarding the rise of the shadow banking sector and the risk it may pose to financial stability;
48. Encourages collaboration with the Member States and national central banks on financial literacy programmes to empower individuals and businesses to make informed financial decisions;
49. Regrets that only two members of the ECB’s Executive Board and Governing Council are women; reiterates that the nominations to the Executive Board should be gender-balanced, with shortlists submitted to Parliament; urges the euro area Member States to improve the principles of gender equality in their appointment procedures, so that both genders have equal opportunities to serve as governors of their respective national central banks;
50. Reiterates that ECB appointments should be based on objective merit and competence assessment processes;
51. Supports the aim of the ECB to increase female representation by encouraging women to advance in this field; therefore welcomes initiatives such as the ECB Women in Economics Scholarship;
52. Highlights that the latest Financial Stability Review released by the ECB in November 2024 raises concerns over the possibility of an AI-related asset price bubble given the concentration among a few large AI beneficiary firms;
53. Calls for the further enhancement of the ECB’s internal whistleblowing framework to bring it into line with the EU Whistleblower Directive;
54. Invites the ESCB to continue and strengthen its dialogues with national parliaments, which it believes would strengthen the legitimacy and policies of the ESCB;
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55. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the European Central Bank.